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Notes Introduction 
Mind  in  its  purest  play  is  like  some  bat 
That  beats  about  in  caverns  all  alone, 
Contriving  by  a  kind  of  senseless  wit 
Not  to  conclude  against  a  wall  of  stone. 
It  has  no  need  to  falter  or  explore; 
Darkly  it  knows  what  obstacles  are  there, 
And  so  may  weave  and  flitter,  dip  and  soar 
In  perfect  courses  through  the  blackest  air. 
And  has  this  simile  a  like  perfection? 
The  mind  is  like  a  bat.  Precisely.  Save 
That  in  the  very  happiest  intellection 
A  graceful  error  may  correct  the  cave. 
-Richard  Wilbur,  'Mind'  (ig56) 
RICHARD  WILBUR  evokes  the  image  of  the  mind  as  a  self- 
contained,  fluttering  thing,  animated  by  an  innate,  uncanny 
insight  into  the  environs  that  confine  its  coursings.  By  some 
power  alien  to  the  insensible  caverns  it  inhabits,  the  mind  is 
aware  of  the  contours  of  its  surroundings,  so  that  unerringly  it 
weaves  a  right  path  through  a  maze  of  possibilities.  But  beyond 
this  point,  the  metaphor  fails,  for  unlike  as  for  a  bat,  an  endless 
cavern  is  no  prison  for  the  mind.  Unlike  its  winged  simile,  the  mind  is  able  to  exert  its 
own  influence  upon  the  walls  that  surround  it  and  dictate  its  paths,  and  so  carve  for  itself 
new  ones.  Where  a  passae  may  not  lead  to  a  destination  it  desires,  the  mind  takes 
matters  unto  itself  and  willfully  constructs  a  new  way.  The  mind  corrects  the  cave. 
That  the  mind  makes  a  difference  in  the  physical  world  is  beyond 
commonsensical  questioning,  but  the  problem  of  how  it  does  so  has  been  with  us  for 
centuries,  even  before  Descartes,  so  captivated  by  the  mechanical  workings  he  perceived 
to  be  operative  in  the  material  world  and  the  rational  workings  he  understood  to  govern 
the  right-thinking  mind,  declared  the  mental  and  the  material  to  be  of  disparate  essence. 
Descartes  was  never  able  to  answer,  to  his  own  satisfaction  or  to  anyone  else's,  precisely 
how  an  immaterial  substance  such  as  he  held  the  mind  to  be  could  possibly  exert  a  causal 
weaves  a  right  path  through  a  maze  of  possibilities.  But  beyond 
this  point,  the  metaphor  fails,  for  unlike  as  for  a  bat,  an  endless 
cavern  is  no  prison  for  the  mind.  Unlike  its  winged  simile,  the  mind  is  able  to  exert  its 
own  influence  upon  the  walls  that  surround  it  and  dictate  its  paths,  and  so  carve  for  itself 
I influence  upon  the  material  substance,  or  how  such  influence  would  not  violate  the 
closed  mechanical  laws  subsuming  the  material  world.  The  insurmountable  difficulty 
involved  with  explaining  the  interaction  of  an  immaterial  mind  and  the  material  world  has 
led  most  modern  philosophers  of  mind  to  abandon  substance  dualism  in  favour  of 
monism,  and  overwhelmingly,  materialist  or  physicalist  monism.  We  now  tend  to  believe 
that  our  minds  are  not  substances  apart  from  our  bodies,  but  that  minds  are  somehow 
realised  in  the  complex  workings  of  our  brains  and  bodies  The  interaction  problem  is 
this  dissolved,  but  the  mind/body  problem  is  far  from  solved  by  such  a  move.  For  us,  the 
problem  has  ceased  to  be  how  a  mental  substance,  given  that  it  shares  nothing  in 
common  with  a  physical  substance,  can  exert  its  influence  in  the  physical  world,  and  has 
become  the  problem  of  how  mental  states,  given  that  they  are  realised  in  physical  states 
of  the  brain  and  body,  can  be  causally  significant  in  their  own  terms.  Insofar  as  we  hold 
on  to  the  idea  that  it  is  our  beliefs  and  our  desires  that  motivate  our  actions,  and  that  our 
actions  are  best  explained  in  terms  of  our  reasons  for  acting,  there  remains  a  tension 
between  explanations  for  events  involving  mental  causes  and  effects  in  terms  of  reasons, 
and  explanations  for  the  same  events  in  terms  of  the  physics  of  whatever  it  is  in  which 
the  mental  states  involved  are  realised. 
One  move  which  has  enjoyed  some  popularity  in  the  debate  on  the  mind/body 
problem  is  to  question  the  validity  of  the  physicalist  position  itself.  If  it  can  be  shown  that 
physicalism  cannot  be  formulated  so  as  to  set  up  a  distinction  between  the  psychological 
and  the  physical  sciences,  then  the  tension  between  psychological  and  physical 
explanations  may  dissolve.  Alternatively,  if  it  is  in  principle  impossible  to  differentiate 
between  physical  properties  and  nonphysical  properties,  then  it  is  difficult  to  say  what 
reasons  we  could  have  for  excluding  mental  properties  from  being  legitimately  involved  in 
explanations  of  events  in  their  own  terms  qua  mental.  If  we  cannot  differentiate  between 
physical  and  nonphysical  properties,  and  if  there  is  no  real  distinction  between  the 
substance  and  methodologies  of  the  special  sciences  and  the  physical  sciences,  then  any 
privilege,  ontological  or  explanatory,  that  we  place  in  the  physical  sciences  can  be  seen  to 
be  ill-founded. 
It  is  my  belief  that  the  wholesale  rejection  of  physicalism  at  this  point  in  the 
debate  is  premature.  The  doctrine  of  physicalism  has  much  to  recommend  it,  foremost 
of  its  merits  being  that  it  is  an  expression  of  the  rational  requirement  that  explanations 
should  make  sense  -  that  meaningful,  comprehensible  rules  circumscribe  all  the  world's 
relata;  that  the  regularity  we  think  we  find  in  terms  of  the  relations  of  cause  to  effect,  of 
parts  to  wholes,  or  of  the  general  to  the  specific,  are  not  brute  and  miraculous  features  of 
a  world  of  discrete  particulars,  but  that  some  metaphysical  glue,  whatever  that  miht 
actually  be  and  whether  or  not  we  could  possibly  fully  comprehend  its  nature,  actually 
does  hold  the  world  together  and  ground  the  order  we  perceive.  So  central  are  these 
notions  to  the  way  we  conduct  our  enquiries  into  the  workings  of  the  world,  whether  in 
terms  of  the  special  sciences  or  in  terms  of  basic  physics,  that  the  extent  to  which 
physicalism  is  motivated  by  them  or  motivates  them  deserves  attention  outside  of  the 
mind/body  debate.  Any  insight  into  the  question  of  physicalism,  however,  will  have  an 
impact  upon  the  mind/body  problem. 
ii In  this  thesis,  I  shall  examine  the  question  of  physicalism  through  two  papers 
criticising  the  formulation  of  the  doctrine.  In  the  first  chapter,  I  discuss  Tim  Crane's  and 
D.  H.  Mellor's  influential  (19  9  6)  There  Is  No  !  Zyestion  ofPbysicalismz  in  which  they  argue 
that  there  are  no  real  criteria  by  which  the  science  of  psychology  can  be  separated  from 
the  paradigmatically  physical  sciences,  and  so  no  principled  reason  to  suppose  that  the 
predicates  of  psychology  do  not  describe  real  elements  of  the  world's  ontology  whereas 
those  of  physics  do.  I  shall  explain  why  I  find  their  arguments  unconvincing,  and  to  show 
how  some  of  the  reasons  they  consider  not  to  support  the  noncontinuity  of  psychology 
with  physics  actually  can  support  the  distinction. 
Crane  and  Mellor  take  physicalism  to  be  an  epistemological  doctrine,  according 
to  which  the  empirical  world  "contains  just  what  a  true  and  complete  physical  science 
would  say  it  contains".  2  Physicalism  can,  however,  be  taken  as  a  metaphysical  doctrine, 
and  indeed  I  think  that  many  modem  physicalists  do  take  it  this  way.  In  his  (1998)  What 
Are  AysicalProperties?,  J  Chris  Daly  argues  that  no  principled  distinction  can  be  drawn 
between  physical  and  nonphysical  properties,  and  that  therefore  any  metaphysical 
programme  which  assumes  such  a  distinction  is  misguided.  I  shall  agree  with  much  of  his 
reasoning,  but  not  with  his  'downbeat'conclusion:  4while  I  agree  that  there  are  serious 
difficulties  involved  in  setting  constraints  on  the  bounds  of  the  physical,  I  think  that 
enough  can  positively  be  said  to  make  physicalism  a  meaningful  position.  Between  the 
two  papers,  a  fairly  broad  survey  of  some  recent  accounts  of  physicalism  is  made  and 
these  two  distinct  avenues  explored:  physicalism  construed  as  a  doctrine  about  science, 
and  physicalism  as  a  doctrine  attempting  to  limit  the  contents  of  the  world  apriori 
through  a  definition  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  physical  properties.  All  in  all,  I  think  that  there  is 
much  to  learn  from  these  two  papers,  but  not  all  of  it  is  as  negative,  conclusive,  or 
'downbeat'as  their  authors  might  have  intended.  Rather,  I  think  that  some  new 
directions  are  indicated  by  the  failure  of  some  of  the  avenues  they  explore. 
In  the  third  chapter,  I  shall  consider  some  of  the  difficulties  for  physicalism  and 
reductionist  physicalism  in  particular  as  were  indicated  in  the  preceding  discussions. 
Based  largely  upon  the  functional  model  of  reductionism  recently  forwarded  byJaegWon 
Kim  in  his  (x998)  Mind  in  a  PhAical  World.,  I  present  a  formulation  of  physicalism 
which  I  believe  to  be  consonant  with  the  primary  aims  and  concerns  of  Physicalists,  and 
which  is  not  faced  with  some  of  the  difficulties  presented  for  traditional  reductionist 
physicalism.  I  shall  argue  that  a  minimal  expression  the  doctrine  of  physicalism  is  best 
understood  as  encapsulated  in  two  principles:  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the 
physical  domain  and  that  of  the  supervenience  of  all  phenomena  upon  physical 
phenomena,  where  that  supervenience  is  taken  to  be  grounded  in  a  metaphysical  and 
explanatory  relation  between  higher  and  lower  level  properties.  I  agree  with  Daly  that  it  is 
not  possible  to  set  aprio?  i  constraints  upon  what  properties  are  to  count  as  physical 
properties,  but  I  shall  argue  that  this  is  neither  necessary  nor  desirable:  the  constraints 
imposed  upon  what  can  and  cannot  be  allowed  into  the  physical  ontology  in  the 
conjunction  of  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain  and  the 
metaphysically  and  explanatorily  grounded  supervenience  of  all  phenomena  upon 
Physical  phenomena  is  sufficient  to  set  physicalism  up  as  a  positive  doctrine. 
id The  arguments  of  the  third  chapter  define  minimalist  physicalism,  and  indicate 
that  functional  reductionism  is  consonant  with  physicalism.  In  chapter  4,  I  further  argue, 
again  following  Kim,  that  any  version  of  nonreductive  physicalism  that  construes  mental 
properties  and  generalisations  realistically  is incoherent.  Kim  has  argued'  that 
nonreductive  physicalism  is  in  essence  a  version  of  emergentism,  a  doctrine  which 
flourished  in  the  earlier  quarter  of  the  20th  century,  according  to  which  some  properties 
of  composed  wholes  have  simply  to  be  accepted  as  brute,  inexplicable  in  terms  of  the 
properties  of  the  elements  that  constitute  them.  Because  of  some  very  fundamental 
differences  I  find  between  emergentist  doctrine  and  nonreductive  physicalism,  I  do  not 
agree  that  modern  nonreductive  physicalism  is  a  restatement  of  the  earlier  doctrine. 
However,  I  do  believe  that,  as  for  emergentism,  nonreductive  physicalists  cannot 
consistently  retain  both  a  commitment  to  the  real  nature  of  mental  properties  and 
generalisations  and  to  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain. 
Therefore,  as  a  physicalist  doctrine,  nonreductive  physicalism  is  at  odds  with  itself. 
The  conclusions  of  the  fourth  chapter  are  largely  negative,  and  the  discussion  of 
the  third  chapter  does  not  indicate  anyway  in  which  the  mental,  qua  mental,  can  be 
construed  as  causally  effective  in  the  physical  world.  In  the  fifth  and  final  chapter,  I  shall 
attempt  to  address  this  deficiency.  The  notion  of  dynamicism  has  received  quite  a  bit  of 
recent  attention  in  the  fields  of  artificial  intelligence  and  artificial  life,  and  in  the  study  of 
the  eusocial  hymenoptera.  In  dynamic  systems,  complicated,  ordered,  `intelligent' 
behaviour  can  be  bought  very  cheaply  through  the  exploitation  of  interactions  between 
dynamic  components  that  follow  very  simple  rules,  and  thus  enable  whole  systems  that 
can  instantiate  them  to  act  in  and  interact  with  their  environments  in  ways  unanticipated 
by  the  properties  of  the  least  whole  parts  (such  as  a  single  ant,  or  a  single  brain  cell) 
realising  them.  Further,  higher-level  dynamically  emergent  properties  have  the  very 
interesting  feature  of  self-perpetuation:  once  they  are  instantiated  in  a  system,  the 
components  of  the  system  tend  to  be  constrained  by  the  presence  of  the  property  so  as 
to  continue  to  realise  the  property.  These  features  indicate  that  dynamically  emergent 
properties  are  particularly  robust  properties  of  complex  systems,  and  there  are  good 
reasons  to  believe  that  they  are  best  understood  in  their  own  terms,  at  their  own  level,  as 
features  of  the  systems  instantiating  them.  Dynamically  emergent  properties  are, 
however,  demonstrably  unproblematic  from  a  physicalist  perspective:  they  are  fully 
realised  in  and  explicable  (if  not  necessarily  predictable  in  practical  terms)  in  terms  of 
their  microstructures.  Following  Andy  Clark  and  Brian  Goodwin,  I  illuminate  the  notion 
of  what  I  term  `dynamically  emergent  properties'.  As  John  McCrone  has  indicated  in  his 
Going  Inside  a  dynamic  understanding  of  how  the  brain  works  is  taking  hold  in  current 
neuroscience.  Primarily  following  his  descriptions,  I  show  how  it  could  be  possible  that 
one  of  the  brain's  abilities,  the  recognition  of  complex  objects,  is  an  ability  that  emerges 
dynamically  in  the  actions  and  interactions  of  many  highly  specialised  cells  in  different 
areas  of  the  brain.  If  indeed  the  brain  is  a  realiser  of  dynamically  emergent  properties, 
then  we  can  begin  to  see  how  mental  properties  and  the  laws  of  psychology,  taken 
realistically,  might  be  unproblematically  grounded  in  the  physical  and  the  laws  of  physics 
without  being  reducible  to  them. 
iv There  is  much  that  I  do  not  address.  Most  outstandingly,  the  problem  of 
consciousness  -  of  why  any  processes  in  the  brain,  no  matter  how  complex  ox  dynamic  - 
should  be  accompanied  by  phenomenal  experience  is  untouched  by  any  of  the 
discussions  I  have  been  able  to  forward.  Indeed  it  is  my  belief  that  what  David  Chalmers 
has  termed  `the  Hard  Problem'  of  consciousness  is  really  the  hardest  problem  facing 
modem  philosophy  of  mind.  It  is  my  hope,  however,  that  with  a  better  understanding  of 
the  requirements  of  a  physicalist  system  and  with  greater  knowledge  of  the  possibilities 
there  are  for  the  realisation  of  robust  higher  level  properties  in  complex  physical  systems 
-  an  understanding  of  how  the  mind,  by  happy  intellection  or  graceful  error,  may  be  able 
to  correct  its  cave  -  we  may  better  envision  how  to  proceed. 
V 1 
Questions  of  Physicalism 
1.  Physicalism  as  an  Epistemological  Doctrine 
THE  DOCTRINE  THAT  EVERYTHING  THAT  EXISTS  either  is 
physical  or  is  fully  realised  in  physical  things  would  of  course 
be  an  empty  one  if  it  were  not  possible  to  draw  a  principled 
distinction  between  physical  things  and  things  that  are  not 
physical.  This  truism  is  the  point  of  departure  for  Tim 
Crane's  and  D.  H.  Mellor's  now  classic  (i99o)  There  IsNo 
2  estion  ofPhysicalism.  The  physical  or  nonphysical  status  of 
the  sciences  appropriate  to  the  study  of  various  phenomena 
can  be,  and  generally  are,  taken  to  be  definitive  of  the 
physical  or  nonphysical  status  of  the  phenomena  they  pick  out.  Against  the  doctrine  of 
physicalism,  Crane  and  Mellor  argue  that  there  are  no  real  criteria  by  which  the  science 
of  psychology  -  the  paradigm  nonphysical  science  -  can  be  separated  from  the 
paradigmatically  physical  sciences,  and  so  there  is  no  real  reason  to  suppose  that 
psychology,  or  by  extension  any  other  special  science,  is  not  contiguous  with  the  physical 
sciences.  If  that  is  so,  then  the  claim  that  everything  is  in  one  way  or  another  susceptible 
to  description  and  explanation  in  terms  of  the  physical  sciences,  by  virtue  of  being 
straightforwardly  physical  or  being  fully  realised  in  physical  phenomena,  is  empty. 
Crane  and  Mellor  take  modem  physicalism  to  be  a  doctrine  about  the  empirical 
world  to  the  effect  that  it  contains  "just  what  a  true  and  complete  physical  science  would 
say  it  contains".  "  Significantly,  though  they  take  it  that  it  is  descended  from  seventeenth- 
century  materialism,  which  is  a  metaphysical  doctrine,  they  take  it  that  modem 
physicalism  is  not  a  metaphysical  doctrine.  The  materialists  of  the  classical  tradition,  they 
tell  us,  were  concerned  to  limit  the  contents  of  the  world  a  priori  by  describing  what 
material  things  had  to  be  like:  specifically,  that  they  had  to  be  extended  in  space, 
impenetrable,  conserved,  and  subject  to  deterministic  mechanical  law.  Of  course,  as 
modern  physics  describes  basic  physical  elements,  they  in  no  way  resemble  the 
seventeenth  century  materialist  conception  of  fundamental  material  entities  Accordingly, 
I modem  physicalists  "...  have  -  understandably  -  lost  their  metaphysical  nerve.  No 
longer  trying  to  limit  physics  a  priori,  they  now  take  a  more  subservient  attitude:  the 
empirical  world,  they  claim,  contains  just  what  a  true  and  complete  physical  science 
would  say  it  contains.  "2 
According  to  Crane  and  Mellor,  physicalism  cannot  coherently  be  formulated  to 
do  the  work  that  it  is  supposed  to  do:  to  claim  priority  to  physical  facts  as  against 
nonphysical  facts,  and  to  claim  for  the  physical  sciences  alone  that  their  terms  represent 
genuinely  real  entities.  Their  attack  is  not  directed  towards  the  falsification  of 
physicalism  in  favour  of  dualism;  rather,  they  hold  that  "there  is  no  divide  between  the 
mental  and  the  non-mental  even  to  set  physicalism  up  as  a  serious  question.  "3  They,  it 
must  be  said,  are  not  exempt  from  a  general  trend  they  open  their  paper  in  criticising: 
they  do  not  give  the  doctrine  of  physicalism  a  very  clear  definition,  except  to  qualify  that 
the  see  it  as  a  doctrine  essentially  about  the  mental,  to  the  effect  that  all  things  mental 
are  "really  physical,  "4and  that  they  are  interested  in  physicalism  as  about  the  empirical 
world,  rather  than  as  a  doctrine  that  there  are  no  universals.  This  lack  of  detail  might  be 
forgiven,  considering  that  the  task  they  have  assigned  for  themselves  is  to  examine 
possible  justifications  for  the  central  claims  of  physicalism  as  have  been  offered  in  the 
past,  to  see  where  and  how  they  fail.  Yet  what  they  perceive  these  justifications  as  failing 
to  do  answers  to  a  predefined  notion  of  the  aims  of  physicalism  that  they  do  not 
expressly  state,  which  is  that  physicalism  is  essentially  a  reductive  program  aimed  at 
eliminating  nonphysical  entities,  properties,  and  generalisations  form  its  recognised 
ontology. 
Thus  the  form  of  physicalism  that  Crane  and  Mellor  are  explicitly  concerned  to 
reject  is  eliminative  physicalism,  the  thesis  that,  as  they  say,  "all  entities,  properties, 
relations,  and  facts  are  those  which  are  studied  by  physics  or  other  physical  sciences",  ' 
and  that  entities,  properties,  relations  and  facts  studied  by  the  special  sciences,  most 
notably  psychology,  are  not  reat"  So  much  can  be  gathered  from  such  phrasing  as  "Why 
should  we  suppose  the  existence  of  sub-atomic  particles  to  require  the  non-existence  of 
atoms,  molecules,  tables,  trees  or  tennis  rackets,  figs  or  fast  food  restaurants  -  or  animals 
or  people  with  mind  S?  ".  6  The  physical  sciences  then  have  a  privileged  epistemic  position. 
They  alone  have  "a  unique  ontological  authority.  the  authority  to  tell  us  what  there  is"  7 
Crane  and  Mellor  undertake  to  question  the  source  of  this  authority,  by  which 
physicalists  might  dismiss  the  special  sciences  as  "non-physical,  and  thus  ontologically 
inconsequential".  '  But  not  all  physicalist  systems  are  essentially  reductive  or  eliminative.  I 
am  sure  that  Crane  and  Mellor  would  agree,  but  it  is  not  immediately  evident  from  the 
discussion  that  they  do  not  see  physicalism  as  essentially  eliminative.  However,  all 
versions  of  physicalism  do  claim  for  the  physical  domain  a  certain  ontological  priority. 
This  naturally  will  preclude  special  sciences  from  adding  straightforwardly  and  in  their 
own  terms  to  the  inventory  of  'what  there  is',  for  the  physicalist  will  claim  for  all  facts 
featured  in  the  special  sciences  that  they  are  under  some  description  physical  facts.  9  The 
two  claims  are  very  different:  it  is  one  thing  say  of  some  paradigmatically  non-physical 
thing  -  an  economy,  for  example  -  that  it  must  be  realised  in  a  physical  system,  quite 
another  to  say  that  only  the  physical  system  is  real,  the  economy  is  not.  Crane's  and 
2 Mellor's  arguments  might  be  extended  to  cover  the  weaker,  noneliminativist  claim  as 
well,  however,  so  I  will  proceed  with  the  weaker  claim  primarily  in  mind. 
Crane  and  Mellor  rightly  point  out  that  to  physicalists,  the  physical  sciences  have 
a  certain  epistemic  superiority,  or  epistemic  prioricity,  as  regards  the  special  sciences, 
and  quite  rightly,  they  question  the  source  from  which  this  superiority  arises,  and  what  it 
is  about  special  sciences,  and  their  paradigm  special  science,  psychology,  that  makes 
them'epistemically  suspect'.  They  are  right  to  conclude  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
quantity  or  quality  of  physical  laws  and  the  predictions  and  explanations  based  upon  them 
that  oughtprimafacie  to  render  special  science  predictions  and  laws  specious.  Indeed, 
on  a  practical  level,  the  predictions  physics  could  make  for  phenomena  normally  dealt 
with  by  a  proprietary  special  science  would  be  useless,  if  not  impossible:  neuroscien- 
tifically  based  explanations  of  behaviour  are  a  dream  for  some,  but  for  the  rest  of  us,  and 
for  all  of  us  right  now,  good  old  belief-desire  folk  psychology  carries  the  day  for 
explanations  of  the  actions  of  intentional  agents.  No,  as  Crane  and  Mellor  point  out,  the 
appeal  of  physicalism  cannot  rest  on  the  notion  that  the  physical  sciences  are  just  better 
(at  providing  explanations)  than  the  special  sciences;  if  anyone  thinks  that,  they  must 
have  reasons  other  than  the  obvious  evidence  for  thinking  it.  "The  bounds  of  the 
physical  are  set  from  the  outside",  ",  Crane  and  Mellor  say.  But,  they  believe,  the  bounds 
of  the  physical  cannot  be  set  so  as  to  differentiate  the  physical  from  the  non-physical  so 
as  to  make  physicalism  a  nonvacuous  doctrine.  They  argue  that  there  can  be  no 
principled  reason  why  psychology  (and  presumably  other  special  sciences  by  extension) 
are  not  actually  continuous  with  the  paradigmatically  physical  sciences,  because,  as  they 
attempt  to  show,  the  same  difficulties  involved  in  the  reconciliation  of  psychology  with 
basic  physics  are  present  between  paradigmatically  physical  sciences  as  well. 
Physicalism,  then,  gives  to  physics  and  to  physics  alone  the  ontological  authority 
to  inform  us  as  to  what  the  world  contains:  the  world  "contains  just  what  a  true  and 
complete  physical  science  would  say  that  it  contains".  1m  The  task  at  hand  is  to  assess  this 
authority,  and  the  aptness  of  the  sciences  to  which  it  is  given  to  bear  it.  What  does 
physical  science  encompass,  and  whence  comes  its  authority  to  dismiss  special  science 
concepts  as  empty?  There  are  some  sciences  that  are  generally  considered  to  be  physical 
sciences,  while  clearly  not  being  the  sciences  of  the  most  basic  entities  as  we  currently 
understand  such  basic  physical  sciences:  Crane  and  Mellor  name  suchparadigmatically 
physical  sciences'as  mechanics,  electromagnetism,  thermodynamics,  gravity,  and  particle 
physics,  as  well  as  sciences  like  chemistry  and  molecular  biology.  VVhat  principle  allows 
us  to  consider  these  sciences  as  physical,  and  entitled  to  the  ontological  authority 
accorded  to  physics,  while  this  authority  is  denied  to  psychology  and  other  special 
sciences? 
U  .  I.  Reducibility  to  Physics 
The  standard  response  to  which  Crane  and  Mellor  first  direct  their  attention  is 
that  the  paradigmatically  physical  sciences  are  directly  reducible  to  physics,  while  other 
3 special  sciences,  notably  psychology,  are  not  so  reducible.  The  reduction  in  question  is 
derivational:  a  science  is  reducible  to  physics  if  all  of  the  generalisations  in  the  science  to 
be  reduced  can  be  derived  from  physics  supplemented  with  suitable  'bridge  principles' 
connecting  the  terms  of  the  science  to  be  reduced  with  the  terms  of  physics.  Of  course, 
the  reduction  of  any  particular  science  to  physics  does  not  actually  have  to  have  been 
done  for  the  science  to  be  considered  reducible;  it  is  sufficient  if  the  sciences  in 
question  are  'reducible  in  principle'  to  physics.  If  all  the  terms  in  any  particular  science 
are  amenable  to  bridge  principles  linking  them  with  terms  in  physics,  such  that  all  of  the 
generalisations  of  that  science  could  in  theory  be  derivable  from  the  laws  of  physics,  then 
in  principle,  an  explanation  of  any  particular  event  in  that  science  could  be  replaced  by 
an  explanation  in  physics  with  no  loss  of  content.  Qualifiedly  reducible  sciences  thereby 
gather  their  authority  to  tell  us  what  the  world  contains  directly  from  physics.  As  long  as 
we  know  the  bridge  principles,  or  at  least  as  long  as  we  know  that  there  could  be  such 
principles,  we  can  rest  assured  that  these  sciences  are  not  adding  any  elements  to  our 
ontology  that  physics  cannot  accommodate.  The  principle  according  to  which 
'paradigmatically  physical'  sciences,  and  any  others  that  may  qualify,  can  be  identified  as 
physical  sciences  is  dubbed,  somewhat  unfortunately,  the  RIP  (Reducible  In  Principle) 
principle. 
Crane  and  Mellor  criticise  this  approach  from  three  directions.  First  and  most 
obviously,  they  ask:  to  whatphysics  shall  we  say  that  reducible  sciences  are  Reducible  In 
Principle?  Physics  as  a  science  is  an  ongoing  project,  subject  to  change  or  to 
supplementation  as  the  science  develops.  This,  obviously,  will  have  an  effect  upon  what 
sciences  we  find  are  reducible  in  principle  to  physics:  current  physics  may  not  be  able  to 
accommodate  some  certain  special  science,  and  so  by  the  RIP  principle  we  would  be 
obliged  to  judge  that  science  not  to  be  a  physical  science;  if  we  are  materialists  of  an 
eliminative  demeanour,  we  will  affirm  that  its  terms  do  not  refer  to  anything  real.  Yet 
some  future  development  in  physics  may  make  that  same  science  amenable  to  reduction. 
Would  that  salvage  both  the  science  and  its  terms?  If  so,  how  can  we  possibly  know 
which  of  the  special  sciences  we  might  now  employ  may,  at  some  future  point  in  the 
history  of  physics,  be  amenable  to  reduction?  -2 
Crane  and  Mellor  also  point  out  that  if  the  science  to  which  eligible  sciences  are 
Reducible  In  Principle  is  current  physics,  then  it  is  highly  probable  that  any  future 
developments  inphysics  would  render  physics  itself  not  a  physical  science,  for  it  is  highly 
improbable  that  any  future  physics  will  be  reducible  to  current  physics.  It  is  more  likely 
to  be  the  other  way  around:  current  physics  will  be  reducible  to  further,  more 
encompassing,  developments  in  physics.  But  neither  can  we  appeal  to  some  Unspecified 
Future  Physics  to  tell  us  what  sciences  are  to  count  as  physical,  because  we  do  not,  and 
cannot,  know  what  sciences  this  Unspecified  Future  Physics  might  cover.  Nor  does  the 
principle  under  discussion  serve  to  illuminate  us  at  all  in  that  respect.  If  we  apply  the 
Reducible  In  Principle  principle  to  the  Unspecified  Future  Physics  in  an  effort  to  divine 
what  sciences  the  Unspecified  Future  Physics  might  cover,  then  we've  made  a  mistake, 
for  as  we  have  seen,  we  cannot  know  what  sciences  might  be  Reducible  In  Principle  to  a 
physics  upon  which  we  cannot  set  constraints  as  to  what  properties  it  will  or  will  not  be 
4 able  to  accommodate.  Are  we  to  take  it  that  the  Unspecified  Future  Physics  will  be  able 
to  encompass  all  the  special  sciences?  If  so,  then  physicalism  comes  out  vacuous,  and  if 
not,  we  are  left  with  precisely  the  problem  with  which  we  began.  We  do  not  know  what 
sciences  will  be  Reducible  In  Principle  to  an  Unspecified  Future  Physics. 
I  agree  that  to  define  physicalism  this  way  is  highly  problematic.  However,  I  do 
not  agree  that  this  is  what  we  are  necessarily  doing  when  we  say  that  any  science  that 
counts  as  a  physical  science  is  in  principle  reducible  to  physics,  and  I  would  argue  that, 
while  the  principle  is  interesting,  it  is  not  a  reasonable  way  to  define  physicalism  at  all.  It 
would  seem  that  if  we  do  define  physicalism  in  terms  of  a  true  and  complete  physics 
then  physicalism  becomes  either  trivial,  or  very  probably  false:  if  the  history  of  science 
has  taught  us  anything at  all,  we  can  expect  that  physics  will  undergo  serious  revision  in 
the  future,  and  additions  or  alterations  to  its  ontology  may  be  made.  Unless  we  allow 
physics  room  for  growth,  physicalism  defined  in  terms  of  physics  will  be  falsified  as  soon 
as  physics  changes.  But  ifwe  do  allow  physics  room  for  growth,  it  is  unclear  what  sorts  of 
facts  it  may  cover,  or  what  sorts  of  entities  and  properties  it  may  admit.  Unless  there  are 
independent  principled  reasons  to  exclude  certain  kinds  of  phenomena  from 
subsumption  under  physics  or  independent  constraints  applied  to  Unspecified  Future 
Physics,  then  conceivably,  an  Unspecified  Future  Physics  might  cover  anything  we  like, 
and  so  physicalism  becomes  trivial. 
Many  have  held,  and  held  reasonably,  that  all  physical  sciences  must  be  reducible, 
at  least  in  principle,  to  physics,  13  and  the  question  of  to  what  physics  they  are  to  be 
reduced  is  well  placed.  Crane  and  Mellor  have  already  given  the  answer  when  they  tell  us 
what  physicalists  say  the  world  contains:  exactly  what  a  true  and  compkte  physics  would  say 
that  it  does.  If  it  is  a  true  and  complete  physical  science  that  is  supposed  to  tell  us  which 
entities  and  properties  we  might  name  are  real,  then  it  is  unreasonable  to  postulate  any 
current  physics  or  any  unspecified  future,  but  presumably  incomplete  and  possibly  less 
than  true,  physics  as  the  science  to  which  all  eligible  sciences  should  in  principle  be 
reducible,  for  that  would  give  these  physics  the  authority  to  tell  us  what  there  is,  which,  if 
they  are  not  true  and  complete,  they  are  in  no  position  to  do. 
I  think  that  many  physicalists  would  agree  that  if  we  had  a  true  and  complete 
physical  science,  the  entities  proprietary  to  that  science  would  be  the  basic,  fundamental 
entities  at  the  bottom  of  the  ontology,  and  that  current  physics  and  any  unspecified 
future  physics,  as  well  as  all  of  the  paradigmatically  physical  sciences,  would  be  reducible 
to  it.  That  is  not  to  say  that  it  is  the  physics  that  sets  the  criteria  as  to  what  the  basic 
physical  elements  are.  Indeed,  if  we  take  on  board  the  view  that  the  object  of  physics  is 
to  discover  things  about  the  world,  it  ought  to  be  the  world  which  sets  the  constraints  on 
what  the  true  and  complete  physics  will  say  the  world  contains.  The  idea  that  all  sciences 
that  are  to  count  as  physical  sciences  would  have  to  be  reducible  to  this  hypothetical 
science  is  not  terribly  informative,  and  quite  leaves  open  the  question  of  whether  or  not 
there  may  be  sciences  that  describe  physical  or  physically  instantiated  systems  that  are 
not  physical  sciences.  14  'Whether  or  not  we  can  or  ever  will  have  a  true  and  complete 
physics  is  an  open  question,  and  one  that  could  certainly  be  argued;  such  argument  is 
beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis.  What  is  important  is  only  that  reducibility  to  a 
5 hypothetically  true  and  complete  physical  science  cannot  be  a  criterion  for  defining 
physicalism,  or  for  identifying  those  sciences  that  can  tell  us  what  there  is  in  the  world,  as 
we  are  not  in  a  position  to  say  what  sciences  might  be  so  reducible.  That  physics  as  it 
stands  is  not  complete,  and  that  we  do  not  know  what  physics  will  cover  in  the  future,  is 
no  objection  to  the  common  physicalist  idea  that  special  sciences  must  in  some  sense  be 
reducible  to  physical  sciences.  But  it  does  mean  that  we  cannot  use  the  principle  to 
evaluate  which  of  any  possible  sciences  would  count  as  physical  sciences,  for  we  cannot 
say  which  among  them  could  be  reduced  to  the  hypothetical  true  and  complete  physical 
science.  To  dismiss  psychology  and  other  special  sciences  as  'ontologically 
inconsequential'  on  the  ground  that  they  are  irreducible  to  physics  would,  thus,  be  a 
mistake.  But  since  we  do  not  know  even  ifpbysics  is  reducible  to  hypotetically  true  and 
complete  future  physics  or  whether  or  not  psychology  might  be  reducible  to  such  a 
science,  we  have  no  basis  upon  which  to  claim  ontological  consequentiality  for  any 
science  on  the  grounds  of  its  in  principle  reducibility.  Crane  and  Mellor  are  quite  right  to 
deny  that  Reducibility  In  Principle  provides  the  physical  sciences  the  ontological 
authority  to  tell  us  what  the  world  contains. 
Part  of  the  appeal  of  the  RIP,  Crane  and  Mellor  say,  is  that  it  is  compatible  with  a 
view  of  the  unity  of  science,  or  the  goal  of  being  able  to  derive  all  sciences  from  one  great 
comprehensive  science.  That  is  certainly  a  dream  alive  and  well  in  some  quarters,  but  one 
that  cannot  be  pursued,  in  Crane's  and  Mellor's  opinion.  Obviously,  different  kinds  of 
sciences  are  needed  to  study  different  kinds  of  phenomena,  and  these  methods  do  not 
represent  anything  unified: 
The  world  contains  a  vast  number  of  very  different  kinds  of  entities,  properties,  and  facts.  That  is 
why  so  many  different  sciences  are  needed  to  study  them.  No  one  could  think  astrophysics  and 
genetics  unified  even  in  their  methods,  except  under  the  most  abstract  descriptions  of  scientific 
methodology.  And  in  their  contents,  they  display  no  more  unity  than  that  of  a  conjunction. 
Nothing  wrong  with  that:  but  why  then  cannot  psychology  supply  another  conjunct?  " 
Further,  even  physics,  they  note,  is  not  unified;  quantum  mechanics  and  gravity  have  not 
been  reconciled  to  anyone's  satisfaction  (yet,  to  my  knowledge),  "  a  possibility  that  Crane 
and  Mellor  do  not  seem  willing  to  admit.  17  I  do  not  think  that  this  is  quite  the  right  way  to 
view  the  dream  of  the  unity  of  science.  Even  if  a  comprehensive  physical  science  were 
developed,  it  would  not  mean  that  scientists  would  stop  using  the  sciences  and 
methodologies  they  now  employ,  or  at  least  not  as  long  as  those  methods  remain  useful. 
This  is  for  practical  reasons:  many  scientists,  as  well  as  other  people,  will  unhesitatingly 
tell  you  that  all  the  world  is  made  out  of  quarks,  the  constituents  of  subatomic  particles. 
Nobody  believes  that  the  physics  of  quarks  is  the  appropriate  science  for  the  study  of 
everything,  for  the  practical  consideration  that  the  endeavour  is  neither  humanly 
possible,  nor  would  it  give  answers  interpretable  to  human  scientists  interested  in 
anything  but  quarks. 
Further,  even  if  the  methodologies  of  various  different  sciences  are  not  unified,  it 
seems  reasonable  to  think  that  the  dream  of  the  unity  of  science  is  motivated  by  a 
genuine  unity  exhibited  by  most,  if  not  at  some  level  all,  of  the  empirical  sciences.  They 
6 are  all  about  real,  tangible  things  in  the  world:  things  that  can  be  seen,  poked,  prodded, 
taken  apart,  viewed  under  an  electron  microscope,  whose  smoke  trails  can  be  observed 
in  accelerators,  &c.  The  properties  of  atoms  and  molecules  -  as  examples  of  such  real 
tangible  things  in  the  world  -  are  very  important  to  such  diverse  sciences  as,  say, 
astrophysics  and  genetics.  The  two  sciences  may  not  focus  on  the  same  properties  of 
atoms  and  molecules,  but  I  hazard  to  guess  that  an  astrophysicist  will  recognise  a 
geneticist's  description  of  carbon  as  awfijlly  familiar,  as  easily  as  the  geneticist  will  agree 
that  the  atoms  in  amino  acids  have  their  ultimate  beginnings  in  stellar  dynamics.  The 
biologist  is  conscious  of  a  continuity  between  her  science  and  chemistry,  microbiology, 
physics;  so  too  even  the  psychologist,  who  does,  after  all,  deal  with  physical  human 
beings,  and  who  must  recognise  that  chemical  facts  are  factors  in  the  concerns  of  his 
subjects.  All  of  the  empirical  sciences  are,  in  that  sense,  unified  in  their  subject  matter. 
None  of  the  sciences  so  considered  supply  an  ontological  conjunct  to  the  inventory  of  the 
world  (even  if  they  do  supply  an  epistemological  one).  It  is  hardly  surprising  if  psychology 
also  does  not. 
Well  and  good,  but  what,  one  might  ask,  are  the  characterising  features  of  'real, 
tangible  things  in  the  world'  supposed  to  be?  Is  it  that  these  things  are  physical?  If  so, 
then  to  define  all  sciences  as  physical  because  they  are  all  about  physical  things  is 
circular;  moreover,  it's  false:  many  of  the  sciences  are  unconcerned  with  thephysical 
particulars  of  their  subject  matter  (psychology  and  economics  being  the  paradigm 
examples).  That,  however,  would  be  to  stand  the  argument  on  its  head.  I  only  mean  to 
express  that  the  idea  of  the  unifiability  of  science  is  not  inconsistent  if  different  sciences 
are  not  unified  in  their  methodologies  or  in  the  particulars  of  their  foci.  Is  the 
characterising  feature  of  'real,  tangible  things  in  the  world'that  they  are  empirically 
accessible?  If  so,  then  Crane  and  Mellor  could  surely  argue  that  psychological  facts  are 
eminently  accessible,  as  much  so  as  anything  else.  I  do  not  deny  it,  but  I  trust  that  Crane 
and  Mellor  would  agree  that  psychological  facts  are  accessible  in  a  slightly  different  way 
from,  say,  rocks  or  electrons,  and  that  physicalists  win  have  to  provide  an  account  of  how 
so.  I  do  not  think  that  they  are  prevented  from  doing  so  by  the  fact  that  different 
sciences  employ  different  methodologies. 
Crane  and  Mellor  would  probably  not  admit  that  the  unity  of  subject  matter  I  put 
forward  represents  any  kind  of  genuine  unity,  for  it  assumes,  essentially,  that  any  science 
that  studies  real  tangible  things  in  the  world  is  in  a  sense  contributing,  or  contributed  to 
by,  other  sciences  which  also  study  such  things,  and  this  is  largely  because  the  stuff  of 
some  sciences  -  molecular  biology,  for  example  -  is  composed  of  or  comprised  by  the 
stuff  of  other  sciences  -  chemistry,  perhaps,  or  more  basic  sciences.  This  is  the  third 
source  of  the  appeal  for  the  RIP  principle  that  they  criticise. 
Crane  and  Mellor  identify  microreduction  as  the  idea  that  "there  is  really  nothing 
more  to  things  than  the  smallest  particles  they  are  made  up  of.  ""  Since  "the  study  of  the 
smallest  entities  is  indeed  traditionally  called  'physics':  departments  of  physics  have  by 
long  tradition  cornered  that  particular  market",  19  there  is  really  nothing  more  to  the  world 
than  physical  things.  That  would  of  course  entail  that  everything  that  is  extended  in 
space  is  physical.  Of  course,  physics  is  not  only  the  science  of  very  little  things,  as  Crane 
7 and  Mellor  point  out;  it  also  is  directed  at  very  large  things  indeed.  Thus  physics  must 
give  an  account  of  how  and  why  things  such  as  galaxies  and  quasars  fall  within  its  province 
while  other  kinds  of  large  things  do  not,  and  the  account  that  is  given,  according  to 
Crane  and  Mellor,  is  that  facts  about  such  large  things  reduce  to  facts  about  the  very 
small  things  that  constitute  them.  If  this  notion  is  supposed  to  support  the  RIP 
principle,  its  appeal  to  reduction  is  fatal. 
This  is  not  an  acceptable  way  to  interpret  the  thesis  of  microreduction,  20  and  the 
language  employed  is  obfuscatory.  It  seems  that  Crane  and  Mellor  are  suggesting  that  the 
thesis  of  microreduction  is,  in  essence,  that  everything  is  made  out  of  small  parts  and 
descriptions  of  everything  and  of  interactions  between  all  things  can  be  reduced  to 
descriptions  of  small  parts  and  their  interactions.  But  the  essence  of  the  thesis  of 
microreduction.  is  not  simply  that  everything  is  made  out  of  small  parts,  as  Crane  and 
Mellor  are  aware.  Nor  is  physics,  not  by  long  tradition,  mere  convention,  or  even  by 
popular  understanding  the  study  of  small  things.  Microreduction  says  of  big  things  not 
just  that  they  are  made  of  and  so  can  be  reduced  to  small  things,  which  might  be 
gathered  from  the  fact  that  the  reduction  of  wholes  to  parts  can  be,  and  perhaps  is 
normally,  implied  along  with  the  notion  that  wholes  are  bigger  than  parts.  But  that  is  not 
the  whole  story,  and  arguably  not  the  most  important  or  interesting  part  of  the  story. 
More  interesting,  and  more  faithful  to  long  scientific  tradition,  is  the  reduction  of 
specific  things  and  behaviours  to  general  things  and  behaviours,  or  of  complex  tlýiings  to 
basic  things.  The  significance  of  this  factor  might  be  gathered  from  Terence  Horgan's 
phraseoloW.  "Paradigm  examples  of  scientific  reduction  have  a  part/whole  aspect:  laws 
and  phenomena  involving  complex  wholes  are  explained  in  terms  of  laws  and 
phenomena  involving  the  parts  of  which  those  wholes  are  composed  (this  is  called  micro- 
reduction).  "'-  The  reason  why  this  is  interesting  is  that  the  laws  and  phenomena  involved 
with  parts  ought  to  cover  wholes  as  well,  if  parts  are  taken  as  wholly  constitutive  of 
wholes:  the  laws  and  phenomena  involved  with  the  simpler  components  of  complex 
things  are  more  general  than  the  laws  and  phenomena  involving  the  wholes  constituted, 
those  typically  not  picking  out  phenomena  on  the  level  of  the  parts.  The  reduction  could 
be  construed,  therefore,  as  the  reduction  of  the  specific  or  complex  to  the  more  general 
or  basic  than  to  the  smallperse.  Though  it  is  obviously  not  a  coincidence  that  basic  things 
are  often  very  small,  it  is  by  no  means  a  necessary  condition  of  basic  things  that  they 
should  be  so.  Indeed,  they  may  be  huge,  --  or  of  no  particular  size;  they  may  be  forces, 
fields,  or  even  principles.  Physics  is  not  the  study  of  the  smallest  tbings  as  a  matter  of 
definition,  but  is  more  properly  to  be  considered  the  study  of  the  most  general  and 
fundamental  of  things.  That  many  small  fiindamental  things  are  the  parts  of  larger,  non- 
fundamental  things  should  not  strike  us  as  odd,  nor  should  it  strike  us  as  definitional. 
I  suspect  that  Crane  and  Mellor  would  not  concede  this  point,  for  the  notion  that 
facts  about  specific,  non-basic  things  actually  do  reduce  to  general,  basic  facts,  or  that 
the  entities  individuated  by  the  special  sciences  are  composed  by  the  entities 
individuated  in  physics,  is  required  by  microreduction.  But  microreduction,  as  they  say, 
U 
...  cannot  have  it.  For  unless  the  sciences  of  the  very  large,  including  psychology,  reduce 
to  microphysics,  we  shall  still  need  to  quantify  over  entities  described  in  those  science's 
8 terms.  But  in  fact...  even  the  physics  of  the  relatively  large  does  not  reduce  to 
microphysics.  m3 
Admitting  that  facts  about  parts  often  explain  facts  about  wholes,  they  go  on  to 
say  that: 
If  for  example  we  take  the  quantum  mechanical  description  of  a  quantum  ensemble  to  be  complete 
(as  orthodox  interpretations  do),  the  superposition  principle  entails  that  its  properties  will  not  be  a 
function  only  of  those  of  its  isolated  constituents  plus  relations  between  them.  Orthodox  quantum 
physics  is  not  microreductive.  And  some  physics  is  positively  macroreductive:  Mach's  principle,  for 
example,  which  makes  the  inertial  mass  even  of  microparticles  depend  on  how  matter  is 
distributed  throughout  the  universe.  We  realise  of  course  that  Mach's  principle  and  orthodox 
quantum  theory  are  controversial,  and  that  a  future  physics  might  well  abandon  them.  But  they 
cannot  be  abandoned  because  they  conflict  with  an  MR  [microreduction)  entailed  by  modern 
microphysics:  since,  as  they  show,  it  entails  no  such  thing.  ' 
Well  enough,  but  I  am  not  sure  that  either  the  superposition  principle  or  Mach!  s 
principle  provides  the  counterexample  to  microreduction  that  Crane  and  Mellor  seem  to 
think  that  they  do.  I  am  far  from  an  expert  on  quantum  mechanics,  or  even  well  versed  in 
the  popular  understandings  of  this  extremely  conceptually  difficult  science.  But 
according  to  my  understanding  ofjohn  Gribbin;  ls  who  is,  the  superposition  principle 
says  that  for  any  quantum  particle  with  a  certain  probability  of  being  in  one  of  two  (or 
more)  states,  the  quantum  is  really  in  none  of  them  as  such,  but  is  in  a  superposition  of 
those  states  in  which  it  could  be  until  it  is  measured.  While  this  is  a  property  that 
certainly  seems  to  be  a  little  bizarre,  I  see  no  reason  why  it  couldret  be  a  well  behaved 
one,  and  I  fail  to  see  how  it  provides  a  counterexample  to  microreduction  or  entails  that 
the  properties  of  an  ensemble  are  not  a  function  only  of  the  members  of  the  ensemble 
and  the  relations  between  them.  I  suppose  that  it  might  be  entailed  if  it  were  taken  that 
any  of  the  quanta  in  the  ensemble  were  entangled  with  quanta  outside  the  ensemble. 
Quantum  entanglement  is,  according  to  my  understanding,  relatively  uncontroversial  in 
quantum  physics  these  days,  and  the  notion  behind  it  is  something  like  this:  some 
particles  e,  )dst  in  pairs,  and  the  pairs  are  bound  together  such  that,  if  one  member  of  the 
pair  has  one  of  two  properties  when  measured  (for  until  at  least  one  is  measured,  they  are 
both  in  a  superposition  of  states)  -  say,  the  first  particle  has  spin  up  -  then  the  other 
one  has  spin  down,  and  this  is  true  irrespective  of  where  in  the  universe  either  member 
of  the  pair  might  find  itself.  Further,  there  is  no  principle  restricting  where  the  members 
of  the  pair  might  be  -  they  may  be  in  extreme  and  opposite  ends  of  the  universe.  I 
suppose  that  if  one  member  of  an  entangled  pair  were  a  member  of  a  quantum  ensemble 
taken  as  complete  and  the  other  were  not,  then  the  measurement  of  the  second  particle 
would  cause  the  collapse  of  the  first  into  one  of  two  states,  and  this  effect  would  have 
its  origin  outside  the  ensemble.  In  that  case,  all  of  the  properties  of  the  ensemble  would 
not  entirely  be  explained  by  the  properties  of  the  members  of  the  ensemble  and  their 
relations,  and  since  the  other  member  of  the  entangled  pair  could  be  anywhere  in  the 
universe,  it  would  be  quite  impossible  to  set  spatial  boundaries  that  would  enclose  only 
the  ensemble. 
What  this  says  to  me,  however,  is  that  the  superposition  principle  entails  that 
isolated  quantum  mechanical  ensembles  cannot  be  closed.  Facts  about  elements  outside 
9 the  ensemble  as  isolated,  which  elements  might  be  unlocated  or  in  principle  unlocatable, 
may  potentially  have  an  effect  on  elements  within  the  ensemble.  If,  however,  the  isolated 
system  is  taken  as  being  the  entire  universe,  I  doubt  whether  orthodox  interpretations  of 
quantum  mechanics  would  make  the  same  prediction.  What  this  indicates  is  that  the 
superposition  principle  entails  not  that  microreduction  is  false  for  isolated  quantum 
ensembles,  but  that  quantum  ensembles  cannot  be  isolated  within  a  universe  containing 
27  other  such  ensembles  such  that  they  are  closed. 
Mach's  principle  makes  similar  claims  about  the  inertial  mass  of  objects,  as  it  says 
that  the  inertia  of  any  object  is  relative  to  the  positions  and  inertias  of  every  other  object 
in  the  universe.  Again  according  to  Gribbin,  28  the  idea  comes  to  us  from  Mach  almost 
unchanged  from  its  formulation  in  Berkeley's  arguments  against  the  absoluteness  of 
space.  Berkeley  and  Mach  both  held  that  space  could  not  be  taken  as  a  reference  against 
which  to  measure  the  motion  of  objects,  and  that  motion  could  only  be  measured  against 
other  objects  in  the  universe.  The  relation  is  transitive,  so,  theoretically,  the  inertia  of 
anything  -  even  microparticles  -  depends  upon  the  relative  inertia  of  everything  else  in 
the  entire  universe.  But  this  does  not  entail  that  facts  about  inertia  do  not  microreduce,  if 
the  frame  of  reference  in  which  they  are  taken  to  be  microreducible  is  the  entire 
universe. 
The  fact  that  the  physics  of  a  particular  'closed'  system  do  not  microreduce  to 
facts  only  within  the  system  as  isolated  ought  not  to  be  surprising,  for  this  kind  of  thing  is 
taken  as  understood  in  physics  all  the  time.  Physicists  routinely  stipulate  systems  to  be 
closed  for  practical  reasons,  all  the  while  tacitly  knowing  that  they  are  really  not  closed, 
but  are  affected  in  minute  ways  from  without;  often,  the  forces  from  without  are  so 
minute  that  they  cannot  practically  figure.  Gravity,  for  example,  is  currently  understood  to 
be  a  force  with  infinite  range.  The  fact  that  predictions  of  the  orbits  of  the  moons  of 
Jupiter  do  not  include  the  gravitational  influence  of  distant  quasars  does  not  make  the 
theory  that  predicts  either  the  orbits  of  the  moons  ofjupiter  or  the  theory  of  gravity  false, 
nor  does  it  indicate  that  facts  about  the  orbits  of  the  moons  ofJupiter  do  not 
microreduce. 
What  should  boundaries  of  a  closed  system  be  taken  to  be?  The  idea  that  the 
PhYsical  universe  constitutes  such  a  system  is  common  to  physicalists,  but  the  notion  that 
the  physics  of  systems  taken  in  isolation  within  a  particular  boundary  must  microreduce 
to  the  physics  of  the  elements  within  the  same  boundary  is  not  plausible  according  to 
modem  science  (though  the  notion  that  most  of  them  do  is).  Microreduction  involves  the 
idea  that  phenomena  can  be  individuated  on  higher  or  lower  levels  of  description. 
Though  the  physics  of  the  very  large  may  often  reduce  to  the  physics  of  the  smaller,  the 
boundaries  of  the  system  as  picked  out  on  the  lower  level  may  vastly  outreach  the 
boundaries  of  the  system  as  it  is  isolated  on  a  higher  level,  perhaps  in  principle  even 
involving  the  entire  physical  universe.  There  is  noprimafacie  reason  why  this  is 
incompatible  with  microreduction,  and  no  reason  why  we  should  take  it  that  general 
principles  and  facts  do  not  underlie  more  specific  principles  and  facts. 
I  suppose  that  there  are  some  who  might  take  this  as  somewhat  unsettling.  If 
phenomena  such  as  quantum  state  superposition  and  quantum  entanglement  can  have 
I0 such  an  effect  upon  what  we  might  have  wanted  to  think  were  'closed'systems,  where 
does  this  leave  us  as  regards  the  intrinsic  properties  of  purely  physical  systems?  Much  of 
the  literature  having  to  do  with  psychophysical  supervenience,  for  example,  takes  it  as 
standard  that  if  two  individuals,  x  and  y,  are  physically  identical  and  embedded  in 
identical  environments,  they  must  instantiate  the  same  mental  states.  It  is  also  a 
commonly  accepted  criteria  upon  causation  that  the  causal  powers  of  a  system  are 
intrinsic  to  that  system.  But  what  if  there  is  no  way  to  set  the  boundaries  for  the  intrinsic 
properties  of  any  system  isolated  within  the  universe? 
This  might  appear  to  be  a  genuine  problem,  but  I  hazard  that  it  isn't.  The 
gravitational  effects  of  distant  quasars  upon  the  moons  ofjupiter  are  so  small  as  to  be 
insignificant,  and  so  likewise  are  the  effects  of  a  single  quantum,  or  even  quite  a  sizeable 
number  of  quanta,  changing  states  in  systems  as  complicated  as  rocks,  let  alone  human 
beings  with  mental  states.  In  general,  whenever  a  story  is  told  about  a  macrophysical 
phenomenon  in  microphysical  terms,  one  discovers  that  there  is  a  quite  a  lot  going  on 
that  isn't  expressed  in  the  macrophysical  terms:  a  meandering  river  erodes  its  outside 
banks,  but  at  the  same  time,  water  molecules  are  absorbed  into  the  matter  forming  the 
outside  banks;  some  chemical  breakdowns  happen;  some  evaporation  into  the  air  occurs; 
some  subatomic  particles  decay-,  all  kinds  of  things  take  place.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that 
there  aren't  expressions  for  things  like  this  going  on  on  the  level  that  describes  'rivers' 
and'banks'.  That  doesn't  mean  that  there  are  no  rivers  or  banks,  or  that  it  isn't 
meaningful  to  say  that  a  meandering  river  erodes  its  outside  bank.  It  might  be  meaningful 
to  say  that,  if  no  quantum  boundaries  can  be  set  on  an  individual  upon  whose  intrinsic 
properties  some  mental  state  is  supposed  to  supervene,  then  the  only  way  mental  states 
can  supervene  is  globally,  which  is  arguably  not  enough  for  a  robust  physicalism.  But 
neither  is  it,  in  my  opinion,  reasonable  to  set  the  constraints  of  the  realisation  of  a  mental 
state  at  a  level  so  basic  as  a  single  quantum  state  or  even  several  such  states.  Neural 
systems,  relative  to  quanta,  are  really  very  large  and  complicated  indeed.  I  dare  say  that 
the  impact  of  changing  quantum  states  in  neural  systems  is  probably  about  as  significant 
to  the  functioning  of  those  systems  as  the  gravitational  effects  of  distant  quasars  are  on 
the  orbits  of  the  moons  ofjupiter. 
Crane  and  Mellor  do  not  deny  that  some  sciences  can  be  reduced,  either  actually 
or  in  principle,  to  physical  science,  or  that  physics  in  its  current  incarnation  might  be 
reducible  to  some  undefined  future  physics.  They  deny  that  this  gives  the  physical 
sciences  any  ontological  authority  whatsoever  or  any  right  to  provide  conjuncts  to  the 
inventory  of  what  there  is;  that  "if  the  phenomena  of  psychology  are  less  ontologically 
acceptable  than  those  of  physics  and  chemistry,  it  cannot  be  because  psychology  is 
irreducible  to  present  or  future  physics.  "n  I  have  argued  that  none  of  the  non-basic 
physical  sciences  have  that  authority,  and  that  the  only  physical  science  that  would  have 
that  authority,  the  one  to  which  all  non-basic  physical  sciences  are  necessarily  reducible, 
is  not  one  which  we  are  in  a  position  to  define.  I  agree  with  Crane  and  Mellor,  therefore, 
that  there  are  serious  difficulties,  probably  insurmountable  ones,  involved  with  defining 
physicalism  in  terms  of  the  possibility  of  reducing  all  empirical  sciences,  where  that  is 
taken  as  meaning  all  sciences  that  study  things  observable  in  the  world,  as  reducible  to 
'IT physics,  but  I  do  not  agree  that  this  implies  that  there  is  no  reason  why  psychology 
cannot  add  to  the  world,  in  its  own  terms,  its  proprietary  entities  and  generalisations.  The 
examples  offered  to  show  how  even  physics  does  not  microreduce  are  not  conclusive 
without  a  further  requirement  that  the  boundaries  of  microsystems  must  match  the 
boundaries  of  macrosystems  for  ensembles  isolated  within  the  physical  universe,  for 
which  requirement  I  can  foresee  no  convincing  argument.  Further,  there  is  a  question 
about  the  notion  of  reduction  itself  that  Crane  and  Mellor  employ.  Their  model  for 
reduction  is  Hempel's,  --  according  to  which  a  science  is  reducible  to  physics  if  all  of  the 
laws  of  the  target  science  can  be  derived  from  the  laws  of  physics  supplemented  with 
appropriate  'bridge  principles'  linking  the  terms  of  the  target  science  to  the  terms  of 
physics.  -vThis  is  very  similar,  almost  identical  in  fact,  to  the  Nagelian  model  of  reduction 
by  derivation  via  bridge  laws,  which  has  been  standard  in  the  literature  for  some  time.  Yet 
there  is  a  question  as  to  whether  derivational  reduction  of  this  type  is  appropriate  when 
some  of  the  terms  of  higher-level  sciences  are  interpreted  functionally.  Indeed,  very 
convincing  arguments  against  reductionist  physicalism  taking  intertheoretic  reduction  as 
definitive  of  reduction  have  been  forwarded  on  the  basis  that  sciences  featuring  multiply 
instantiable  functional  kinds  as  their  subject  matter  cannot  be  reduced  to  physics.  This 
may  not  prove  to  be  a  difficulty  according  to  a  model  of  reduction  sensitive  to  functional 
higher  level  properties,  -u  and  such  models  are  possible.  For  example,  Jaegwon  Kim  has 
recently  forwarded  a  model  of  reductionism  focusing  on  the  reduction  of  properties 
rather  than  on  the  reduction  of  sciences.  According  to  Kim's  model,  the  key  notion  in 
whether  or  not  a  property  described  by  a  special  science  is  reducible  to  physical 
properties  is  whether  or  not  that  property  can  be  construed  extrinsically  and  defined  as  a 
second-order  functional  property.  This  model  will  be  a  topic  of  more  detailed  discussion 
later,  -v  so  I  propose  to  leave  it  here. 
I 
j  41.2.  Mental  Causation  and  Intentionality 
The  mark  of  the  mental,  as  Brentano  wrote,  "  is  its  intentionality.  mental  states  are 
essentially  representational  states,  individuated  by  their  content  properties,  whereas 
physical  states  are  typically  (with  caveats,  of  course)  individuated  by  their  intrinsic 
properties.  The  problem  this  creates  for  mental  causation  is  that  we  generally  expect  the 
behaviour  of  a  system  to  be  determined  by  the  intrinsic  properties  of  that  system  in 
response  to  inputs  to  it,  and  not  by  relational,  extrinsic  properties  of  the  system. 
Crane  and  Mellor  accept  that  extrinsic  properties  cannot  feature  in  explanations 
of  a  system's  behaviour,  but  they  deny  that  this  means  that  content  properties  cannot 
cause  events.  "All  it  means  is  that  they  must  do  so  indirectly,  via  a  mental  representation, 
i.  e.  via  some  intrinsic  non-relational  property  of  the  mental  state.  "s  Such  an  intrinsic 
property,  correlated  with  its  object  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  it  "its  right  causes  and 
effects",  they  term  a  `causal  surrogate'  for  the  object  of  the  mental  state,  wherever  that 
may  happen  to  be  and  whatever  its  ontological  status. 
I  must  admit  that  I  find  this  talk  of  causal  surrogates  a  little  strange.  If  a  'local 
12 causal  surrogate'  is  required  to  do  the  causal  work  of  the  extrinsic  content  properties  of  a 
mental  state,  then  surely  it  is  not  the  content  properties  of  the  mental  state  at  all  that  are 
doing  the  causal  work,  but  the  intrinsic  properties  that  are  standing  in  as  causal 
surrogates  for  the  content  properties  only.  Crane  and  Mellor  might  object  that  since  the 
local  causal  surrogate  is  appropriately  related  to  the  object  of  the  mental  state,  the  object 
does  in  fact  play  a  role  in  the  determination  of  behaviour.  Two  obvious  objections  can  be 
made  to  this  approach,  one  from  consideration  of  the  `causal  exclusion  problem'  raised  by 
Jaegwon  Kim,  and  one  from  the  moral  of  the  well  known  `Twin  Earth'  story  as  forwarded 
by  Hilary  Putnam.  ' 
Kim  formulates  the  causal  exclusion  problem  as  follows: 
Suppose  then  that  mental  event  m,  occurring  at  time  t,  causes  physical  event  pAnd  let  us  suppose 
that  this  causal  relation  holds  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  m  is  an  event  of  mental  kind  M  and  p  an 
event  of  physical  kind  P.  Does  p  also  have  a  physical  cause  at  t,  an  event  of  some  physical  kind  N? 
...  to  acknowledge  that  p  has  also  a  physical  cause,  p*,  at  t  is  to  invite  the  question:  given  that  p  has 
a  physical  cause  p*,  what  causal  work  is  left  for  m  to  contribute?  " 
The  application  of  this  problem  to  the  notion  of  a  causal  surrogate  is  transparent:  given 
that  an  intrinsic  causal  surrogate  is  required  to  produce  the  behaviour  of  an  intentional 
agent,  surely  it  is  all  that  needs  to  be  cited  in  a  complete  explanation  of  that  behaviour? 
Surely  it  is  sufficient  to  give  an  explanation  invoking  only  the  causal  surrogate  properties) 
and  not  to  refer  to  the  content  properties  of  the  mental  state,  which  would  be  cited  in  an 
explanation  couched  in  psychological  terms,  at  all?  It  might  be  objected  that  since  the 
intrinsic  property  in  question  is  somehow  correlated  with  the  extrinsic  content  property 
in  question,  that  extrinsic  property  is  a  feature  in  a  complete  explanation  of  an  intentional 
agent's  behaviour.  But  if  Hilary  Putnam's  Twin  Earth  scenario  has  taught  us  anything,  it  is 
that  this  sort  of  correlation  is  highly  problematic  indeed:  however  correlated,  content'just 
ain't  in  the  head'.  39 
Crane  and  Mellor  would  not  accept  that  these  arguments  create  any  difficulty  for 
the  causal  efficacy  of  the  mentalper  se,  for  they  see  no  reason  why  intrinsic,  nonrclational 
properties  of  individuals  might  not  themselves  be  mental.  Such  intrinsic  properties 
could,  on  their  account,  "be  sensations,  or  visual  or  mental  images  or  modelS".  4"  This 
should  immediately  strike  us  as  odd,  for  since  Descartes,  a  major  problem  in  the 
philosophy  of  mind  has  been  how  to  make  sense  of  causal  interaction  between  physical 
things  and  things  that  have  none  of  the  properties  that  arc  apparently  necessary  to 
produce  effects  in  physical  things,  and  vice  versa.  But  Crane  and  Mellor  appear  almost  to 
see  this  difficulty  as  merely  stipulative: 
Perhaps  the  physical  just  is  the  causal,  and  what  physicalism  really  means  is  that  the  empirical 
world  comprises  all  and  only  those  entities,  properties,  relations,  and  facts  which  have  causes  or 
effects.  This  definition  clearly  underlies  one  familiar  formulation  of  the  mind-body  problem:  how 
can  mental  states  have  effects  in  a  physical  world?  This  question  would  not  pose  such  a  problem  if 
it  were  not  assumed  that  causation  is  essentially  non-mental. 
...  But  why  should  we  assume  this?  It  is  surely  obvious  that  there  is  plenty  of  mental  causation.  "' 
This  is,  to  my  mind,  to  miss  the  point  of  the  physicalist's  position.  Physicalists  do 
not  typically  deny  that  there  is  mental  causation.  It  is,  however,  a  desideratum  of 
X3 physicalism  that  descriptions  of  chains  of  events  involving  physical  properties  be 
explanatorily  sufficient:  that  they  should,  to  put  it  crudely,  make  sense.  Thus,  physicalists 
are  concerned  to  spell  out  precisely  how  the  mental,  qua  mental,  can  be  causally  effective 
with  regard  to  the  physical.  It  is  fairly  well  received  that  causal  interaction  between 
physical  things  and  nonphysical  things  cannot  meet  with  this  desideratum.  Thus,  the 
physicalist  asserts  that  if  indeed  mental  properties  are  causally  effective  with  regard  to 
physical  things,  they  must  under  some  description  themselves  be  physical  things.  This,  I 
take  it,  is  the  source  of  the  claim  that  "the  physical  just  is  the  causal,  and  what 
physicalism  really  means  is  that  that  the  empirical  world  comprises  all  and  only  those 
entities,  properties,  relations,  and  facts  which  have  causes  or  effects",  to  which  Crane 
and  Mellor  take  exception.  But  to  counter  this  with  the  observation  that  "there  is  plenty 
of  mental  causation"  is  simply  to  deny  the  physicalist  desideratum  of  explanatory 
sufficiency.  Recall  that  the  object  of  Crane's  and  Mellor's  argument  here  is  to  show  that 
the  notion  of  causal  efficiency  is  not  one  that  can  set  psychological  properties,  and  so  the 
sciences  that  describe  them,  apart  from  physical  properties  in  such  a  way  as  to  deny  the 
psychological  sciences  the  authority  to  add  to  the  world's  ontology,  in  their  oum  terms,  their 
proprietary  elements.  Their  claim  is  that,  while  it  is  assumed  that  causation  is  essentially 
non-mental,  there  is  really  no  reason  for  the  assumption,  and  it  is  obvious  that  mental 
properties  such  as  sensations  or  mental  representations  often  cause  physical  events.  To 
the  physicalist's  objection  that  this  kind  of  interaction  is  fundamentally  mysterious, 
Crane  and  Mellor  answer:  "It  is  indeed  an  old  thought  that  mental  causation  is  hard  to 
make  sense  of,  and  especially  causation  linking  the  mental  to  the  non-mental,  because 
they  seem  to  be  so  different.  But  why  should  that  impress  anyone  who  has  learned  from 
Hume  that  causation  never'makes  sense':  that  it  is  always  a  matter  of  fact,  not  of 
reason?  "o 
There  is,  of  course,  not  much  to  be  said  to  a  Humean  sceptic  on  the  subject  of 
causation,  but  while  the  question  of  the  ultimate  status  of  the  causal  relation  and  the 
question  of  the  desirability  of  explanations  that  make  explanatory  sense  are  related,  they 
are  hardly  identical.  One  can,  I  think,  subscribe  to  physicalism  without  having  any 
commitment  one  way  or  the  other  about  the  status  of  the  causal  relation,  but  physicalism 
is  motivated  in  large  part  by  the  desideratuni  that  properties  or  events  construed  as 
related  be  related  in  a  way  that  makes  explanatory  sense.  To  reject  this  and  to  assert  that 
relations  of  a  non-explanatory  nature  just  simply  obtain  is  ultimately  to  reject  the 
possibility  of  explanation,  even  in  the  basic  physical  sciences:  if  nonphysical  events  can 
in  their  own  terms  interrupt  purely  physical  chains  of  events,  then  explanations  in 
physics  can  not  be  understood  to  be  sufficient  to  describe  all  kinds  of  physical  events.  If 
Crane  and  Mellor  are  prepared  to  allow  that  causal  interactions  between  the  type 
described  straightforwardly  take  place,  then  they  cannot  countenance  the  possibility  of 
fiffly  explanatory  theories  of  anything,  or  of  generalisations  that  would  not  be  subject  to 
falsification  by  miracles.  Rather  than  demonstrating  the  continuity  of  psychology  with  the 
Physical  sciences,  I  think  that  this  approach  ultimately  robs  all  the  sciences  of  their 
explanatory  power.  This  is  not,  I  believe,  a  conclusion  that  many  will  find  acceptable. 
Another  feature  of  intentional  mental  states  that  is  thought  to  set  them  apart  from 
14 physical  states  is  that  they  involve  non-extensional  contexts,  or  in  other  words,  that 
coreferential  substitutions  for  terms  used  in  the  ascription  of  a  mental  state  are  not 
necessarily  truth-preserving.  For  example,  Ed  may  believe  that  Gustav  is  a  very  nice  man. 
But  Ed  may  not  believe  that  the  King  of  Sweden  is  a  very  nice  man,  if  he  does  not  know 
that  Gustav  is  the  King  of  Sweden.  So  while  we  can  truthfiffly  substitute'Gustav,  for'the 
King  of  Sweden'  for  statements  in  nonmental  contexts  -  "Gustav  is  a  very  nice  man"  is 
just  as  true  (or false)  as  "The  King  of  Sweden  is  a  very  nice  man"  -  we  cannot  make  this 
substitution  for  mental  contexts.  If  Ed  does  not  believe  that  Gustav  is  the  King  of 
Sweden,  then  the  truth  values  of  "Ed  thinks  that  Gustav  is  a  very  nice  man"  and  "Ed 
thinks  that  the  King  of  Sweden  is  a  very  nice  man"  are  completely  independent.  He  may 
believe  one,  the  other,  both,  or  neither,  even  if  Gustav  is  indeed  the  King  of  Sweden  and 
is  also  a  nice  man. 
Crane  and  Mellor  deny  that  this  is  a  unique  feature  of  the  mental,  "since  non- 
extensionality  occurs  in  physics  too.  This  is  because  laws  entail  non-extensional 
conditionals.  "43They  go  on  to  give  the  following  example: 
Suppose  for  example  that  H  and  K  are  the  genes  that  give  us  hearts  and  kidneys.  The  fact  that  we 
all  have  both  does  not  make  `anyone  who  had  gene  H  would  have  a  heart'  entail  either  `anyone  who 
had  gene  K  would  have  a  heart'  or  `anyone  who  had  gene  H  would  have  a  kidney'.  44 
I  fail  to  see  how  this  means  that  laws  entail  nonextensional  conditionals.  If  it  is  as  they 
say  just  afact  that  we  all  have  both  hearts  and  kidneys,  and  so  the  genes  that  are 
responsible  for  our  having  them,  and  if  it  is  as  they  seem  to  imply  just  afact  that  we  all 
have  the  genes  responsible  for  our  having  hearts  and  at  the  same  time  those  responsible 
for  our  having  kidneys,  then  there  is  no  law  connecting  our  having  hearts  to  our  having 
kidneys,  and  so  no  law  connecting  our  having  gene  H  with  our  having  gene  K.  Hence 
there  is  no  law  to  create  a  nonextensional  context. 
The  correlation  between  the  our  having  hearts  and  our  having  kidneys  might 
generate  a  nonextensional  context  if  indeed  it  were  a  law,  but  that  any  science  would 
countenance  a  law  correlating  the  presence  of  fally  formed  hearts  and  kidneys  in  adult 
human  beings  is  extremely  unlikely.  I  suspect,  however,  that  it  is  not  just  afact  that  all 
human  beings  have  both  hearts  and  kidneys.  Rather,  it  seems  likely  that  there  are  some 
biological  features  that  necessitate  the  presence  of  both  hearts  and  kidneys  in  creatures 
such  as  ourselves.  4y  We  may,  then,  loosely  grant  that  there  is  a  law  correlating  the  having 
of  both  hearts  and  kidneys  in  us.  If  there  is  such  a  law,  however,  it  must  be  a  law  about 
the  biological  constitution  of  certain  kinds  of  animals  to  the  effect  that  they  are  so 
constituted  that  they  have  both  hearts  and  kidneys,  among  other  things.  This  law  would 
be  resolved  on  the  level  of  species  and  individuals  to  species-specific  laws  about  the 
constitution  of  individual  creatures,  and  as  such,  it  would  correlate  the  mechanisms 
responsible  for  the  having  of  both  hearts  and  kidneys  in  healthy  representatives  of  the 
species  (or  in  an  individual  typical  of  the  species).  In  such  a  case,  'anyone  who  had  gene 
H  would  have  a  heart'does  entail  that  anyone  who  had  gene  H  would  have  a  kidney,  via 
the  suppressed  'anyone  who  had  gene  Hwould  have  gene  K,  and'anyone  who  had  gene 
K  would  have  a  kidney.  Thus  in  extension,  the  substitution  is  truth-preserving,  but  is  not 
Is in  intension,  for  if  anyone  did  not  know  the  generalisation,  one  could  believe  that  all 
mammals  had  hearts,  but  not  necessarily  that  they  had  kidneys,  even  though  there  is  a 
law  (if  there  is)  to  the  effect  that  they  all  do  46 
Crane  and  Mellor  argue  further  that  probabilistic  laws  such  as  are  employed  in 
quantum  mechanics  create  nonextensional  contexts.  They  say. 
The  probabilistic  laws  of  modern  microphysics  cannot  be  extensional  for  another  reason,  too, 
because  `p(...  )=n'  is  not  extensional:  for  if  it  were,  `a  is  the  Fand  the  necessary  truth  `p  (a  is  a)=i' 
would  entail  p  (a  is  the  F)=i,  which  it  clearly  does  not,  on  any  view  of  probability  (take  for  example 
7=  `next  Prime  Minister')!  ' 
This  is  a  very  curious  claim,  and  Crane  and  Mellor  do  not  explicate  any  further  than  the 
quotation  indicates.  If  I  read  them  correctly,  what  is  meant  is  something  like  this:  we 
cannot  make  truth-preserving  substitutions  between  propositions  and  conjunctions 
involving  those  propositions  where  either  involves  a  statement  of  probability.  Take  the 
two  propositionsTony  Blair  is  Tony  BlaiiandTony  Blair  is  the  next  Prime  Minister'. 
That  Tony  Blair  is  himself  is  a  necessary  truth,  but  that  he  is  the  next  Prime  Minister  is  a 
lesser  certainty.  So,  p(Tony  Blair  is  Tony  Blair)=i,  but  p(Tony  Blair  is  the  next  Prime 
Minister)=x-n. 
Now,  suppose  that  Tony  Blair  is  the  next  Prime  Minister.  Since,  however,  he  is  so 
with  probability  i-n,  there  is  a  possible  world  in  which  he  is  not  the  next  Prime  Minister. 
So,  although  "Tony  Blair"  and  "The  next  Prime  Minister"  refer  to  the  same  thing  in  this 
world,  but  not  to  the  same  thing  in  some  alternate  possible  world  where  something  other 
than  Tony  Blair  is  the  next  Prime  Minister  or  in  which  there  are  no  Prime  Ministers,  the 
conjunction  is  not  truth-preserving  across  worlds.  That  is,  neither 
p((Tony  Blair  is  Tony  Blair)&(Tony  Blair  is  the  next  Prime  Minister))=i 
nor 
p((Tony  Blair  is  Tony  Blair)&(Tony  Blair  is  the  next  Prime  Minister))=z-n 
is  true. 
If  this  is  correct,  then  the  argument  might  be  very  persuasive  towards  the 
conclusion  that  the  creation  of  nonextensional  contexts  is  not  a  feature  of  the  mental 
that  sets  psychology  apart  from  physics.  But  I  think  that  to  read  the  example  as 
applicable  to  the  probabilistic  laws  of  quantum  mechanics  would  be  to  misinterpret  the 
role  of  probability  in  quantum  mechanics.  Given  that  Tony  Blair  is  the  next  Prime 
Minister  in  some  possible  world  Wi,  but  that  he  is  not  the  next  Prime  Minister  in  some 
other  possible  world  W2,  surely  it  is  the  case  that  in  Wi,  p(Tony  Blair  is  the  next  Prime 
Minister)=i,  and  that  in  W2,  p(Tony  Blair  is  the  next  Prime  Minister)=o,  or  that,  within 
possible  worlds,  the  substitution  of  `Tony  Blair'  for  The  Next  Prime  Minister'  is  truth 
preserving  in  nonmental  contexts,  for  probability  statements  involving  whether  or  not 
i6 Tony  Blair  is  the  next  Prime  Minister  do  not  hold  cross-worlds.  However,  this  is  not  the 
case  for  quantum  events  with  probabilistic  outcomes.  Suppose  that  it  is  a  law  of  quantum 
mechanics  that  particles  of  type  a  decay  within  a  certain  time  t  with  probability  i-n. 
Then  if  x  is  a  particle  of  type  a,  p(x  will  decay  within  t)=i-n  is  true  across  all  possible 
worlds,  because  it  is  an  intrinsic  feature  of  such  particles  that  the  laws  concerning  when 
they  decay  are  probabilistic.  It  seems  deeply  unlikely  that  there  is  any  such  intrinsic 
feature  of  Tony  Blair  or  of  any  candidate  for  Prime  Minister,  but  that  rather  whether  or 
not  someone  is  the  next  Prime  Minister  and  the  probability  with  which  they  are  one  or 
the  other  are  relational  properties  individuals  possess  by  virtue  of  their  embedment 
within  a  society  with  certain  electoral  procedures  and  having  members  with  certain 
political  leanings.  But  if  there  were  some  intrinsic  feature  of  candidates  for  Prime 
Minister  having  to  do  with  the  likelihood  of  their  actual  election,  as  there  are  intrinsic 
features  of  particles  having  to  do  with  their  actual  decay,  then  p(Tony  Blair  is  the  next 
Prime  Minister)=i-n  would  be  true  across  possible  worlds. 
This  would  mean  that  when  the  property  of  having  a  certain  probability  to  be  F  is 
an  intrinsic  property  of  a  thing  such  that  laws  about  events  involving  such  things  are 
stochastic,  the  conjunctions  p[(a  is  a)&(a  is  the.  F)I=i  or  that  p[(a  is  a)&(a  is  the  F)1=1-n 
are  misformed.  The  conjunction  properly  ought  to  be  [(a  is  a)&(p(a  is  the  F)=I-n)], 
which,  it  should  be  clear,  does  not  generate  nonextensional  contexts  in  nonmental  cases. 
But  since  a  subject  could  fail  to  be  aware  that  (a  is  the.  F)  with  any  degree  of  probability, 
the  substitution  of  'aforthe  F  cannot  be  made  for  intensional  states,  as  far  as  I  can  see, 
uniquely. 
c 
,  1.3  .  Psychological  and  Psychophysical  Laws 
Crane  and  Mellor  next  turn  to  the  possibility  that  psychology  can  be  denied 
ontological  authority  if  there  are  no  strict  psychological  or  psychophysical  laws.  They  say. 
"The  ontological  authority  of  a  science  arguably  rests  on  the  laws  it  discovers,  which  tell 
us  what  kinds  of  things  there  are,  and  what  properties  and  relations  distinguish  them. 
But  many  agree  with  Davidson  that  the  mental  is  'anomalous':  that  strictly  speaking  there 
are  no  psychological  or  psychophysical.  laws.  If  that  were  so,  psychology  would  add 
nothing  to  our  ontology  of  non-mental  kinds,  with  their  distinctive  properties  and 
relations.  "48  They  consider  four  possible  avenues  from  which  such  a  denial  might  come: 
0  the  idea  that  laws  are  necessarily  true  while  generalisations  about  the  mental  are  not, 
and  that  there  are  no  necessarily  true  generalisations  linking  mental  terms  to  mental  or  to 
physical  terms;  2)  that  physical  laws  are  subject  to  excogitation  whereas  psychological 
generalisations  are  not-,  3)  that  the  mental  is  multiply  instantiable;  and  4)  the  arguments 
presented  by  Donald  Davidson  for  anomalous  monism.  I  agree  with  Crane  and  Mellor 
that  i)  and2)  are  unconvincing,  if  not  entirely  for  the  same  reasons,  and  in  the  interests 
of  brevity  propose  to  let  those  stand.  A  defence  of  anomalous  monism  against  Crane's 
and  Mellor's  highly  general  critique  would  be  substantial  diversion  and  is  quite  outwith 
17 the  scope  of  this  thesis,  though  I  believe  that  such  a  defence  could  be  sustained.  In  any 
case,  I  am  convinced  by  the  arguments  forwarded  by  Kim  and  others  to  the  effect  that 
anomalous  monism  is  ultimately  a  form  of  epiphenomenalism,  leaving  no  genuine  causal 
work  for  the  mental  to  perform  in  the  world.  Since  the  multiple  instantiability  of  the 
mental  is  a  topic  to  which  we  will  return  in  detail,  I  would  like  to  attend  briefly  to  3),  the 
notion  that  the  multiple  instantiability  of  the  mental  could  ground  the  assertion  that 
there  are  no  psychological  or  psychophysical  laws. 
Crane  and  Mellor  write: 
Another  bad  reason  for  denying  the  existence  of  psychophysical  laws  is  the  so-called  `variable 
realisation'  of  mental  states:  the  fact  that  `the  range  of  physical  states  fit  to  realise  a  given  mental 
state  can  be  indefinitely  various'.  That  cannot  stop  psychophysical  generalisations  being  laws.  For  if 
it  did,  there  would  be  hardly  any  laws  in.  hysics  either.  States  like  masses,  volumes,  and 
temperatures  are  even  more  variously  realised  than  mental  states:  one  can  have  a  dram  or  a  litre  of 
almost  anything,  at  any  one  of  an  indenumerable  infinity  of  temperatures.  So  if  variable  realisations 
does  not  rule  out  laws  in  mechanics  and  thermodynamics,  it  can  hardly  rule  them  out  in 
psychology.  4' 
This  may  immediately  appear  plausible,  but  in  fact  the  multiple  instantiability  of  the 
mental  is  quite  a  different  form  of  multiple  instantiability  than  that  of  such  states  as 
masses,  temperatures,  and  volumes.  The  problem  generated  for  physicalism  by  the 
multiple  instantiability  of  mental  states  is  that,  if  mental  states  are  instantiable  in  wildly 
heterogeneous  physical  bases  -  if  a  particular  mental  state,  such  as  a  sensation  of  being 
in  pain,  can  be  realised  in  me,  in  my  dog,  in  an  octopus,  or  in  a  silicon-based  Martian  life 
form  -  then  physical  explanations  of  actions  involving  individuals  in  pain  will  take 
different  forms.  For  me,  explanations  in  terms  of  human  neuroanatomy  will  be  relevant; 
for  my  dog  and  for  the  octopus,  dog  and  octopus  neuroanatomy.,  for  the  Martian, 
explanations  in  terms  of  whatever  physical  mechanisms  detect  damage  to  the  Martian 
body  and  initiate  damage-avoidance  behaviour  routines  will  be  relevant.  There  is  no  one 
physical  theory  that  can  explainpain  behaviour.  Thus  pain,  qua  pain,  is  not  reducible  to 
any  physical  type,  wherefore  laws  involving  pain  qua  pain  cannot  be  reduced  to  physics. 
It  should  be  clear  that  the  heterogeneity  of  the  realisation  bases  of  such  states  as 
having  a  mass  ofr  gram,  even  though  all  kinds  of  things  can  possess  this  property,  does 
not  indicate  that  sciences  in  which  having  amass  ofone  gram  can  feature  are  irreducible  to 
physical  sciences.  Firstly,  we  do  not  generally  think  of  things  massing  one  gram  as  being 
kinds  of  things,  or  of  the  property  massing  one  gram  as  a  special  property  defined  by  its 
causal  role,  whereas  we  do  tend  to  think  of  mental  states  as  being  kinds  of  things  so 
defined.  Secondly,  explanations  of  causal  transactions  involving  only  such  multiply 
realised  properties  as  masses,  volumes,  and  temperatures  will  take  generally  similar  forms, 
no  matter  what  it  is  that  has  some  mass  or  some  volume  or  some  temperature:  they  will  all 
most  appropriately  be  explained  in  sciences  of  macroscopic  mechanics.  Further,  though 
there  may  well  be  different  explanations  for  these  kinds  of  causal  transactions,  and 
indeed  there  may  be  different,  mutually  incompatible  sciences  of  macroscopic 
mechanics,  an  explanation  for  any  causal  transaction  involving  masses,  volumes, 
temperatures  and  the  like  could  be  given  in  any  science  of  macroscopic  mechanics.  This 
could  not  be  the  case  for  explanations  involving  mental  properties  qua  mental,  if  mental 
i8 properties  are  multiply  instantiable.  Though  human  neuroanatomy  may  be  appropriate  to 
explain  some  of  my  actions,  it  is  useless  for  explaining  any  of  a  Martian's.  ira  being  in  pain, 
our  physical  descriptions  are  far  too  diverse. 
Unlike  the  multiple  instantiability  of  mass,  volume,  temperature,  and  other  such 
properties,  the  multiple  instantiability  of  mental  properties  like  beinginpain  in  entities 
with  very  different  physical  descriptions  prevents  being  inpain  from  being  treated  in 
general  physical  terms.  This  is  enough  to  qualify  sciences  that  deal  with  such  multiply 
instantiable  properties  as  noncontinuous  with  the  physical  sciences,  if  continuity  is 
judged  by  the  generality  of  laws  about  causal  transactions. 
f` 
,  1.4.  Supervenience 
The  notion  of  mind/body  supervenience  is  essential  to  most  versions  of 
nonreductive  physicalism.  Nonreductive  physicalists  claim  that  mental  states  are 
dependent  upon  and  realised  by  physical  states,  but  that  they  are  in  principle  irreducible 
to  physical  states  and  relations.  If  they  are  right,  then  this  irreducibility  would  ground  a 
claim  of  the  noncontinuity  of  psychology  with  the  physical  sciences. 
A  standard  definition  of  the  supervenience  relation  is  as  follows:  A  family  of 
properties  A  is  supervenient  upon  a  family  of  properties  B  just  in  case  for  any  property  F 
in  A,  if  some  x  has  F,  then  there  is  some  property  G  in  B  such  that  x  has  G;  further,  if 
any  y  has  G  then  y  has  F.  It  follows  that  if  any  two  things  are  A-identical,  they  are  B- 
identical.  For  the  psychophysical  case,  this  means  that  there  can  be  no  change  in  the 
mental  state  of  an  individual  without  there  being  some  change  in  the  physical  state  of 
that  individual.  This  is  a  rather  intuitive  notion  that  should  appeal  to  any  physicalistically 
inclined  person. 
Crane  and  Mellor  argue  that  there  is  no  empirical  support  for  the  notion  of 
supervenience:  "The  evidence  for  it  cannot  be  empirical,  since  the  prospect  of  ever 
finding  two  things,  complex  enough  to  have  psychological  properties,  type  identical  in 
every  reasonable  non-mental  respect  is  very  slight,  to  say  the  least.  "v  They  find  the  only 
sensible  argument  that  could  be  made  for  supervenience  the  notion  that  there  can  be  no 
unmediated  action  at  a  distance,  but  even  this  is  not  enough,  for,  as  they  had  claimed 
earlier,  the  local  causal  surrogates  for  extrinsic  properties  could  themselves  be  brute 
mental  states,  not  supervenient  upon  physical  states.  If  the  only  argument  for 
psychophysical  supervenience  is  the  idea  that  there  can  be  no  unmediated  action  at  a 
distance,  but  mental  states  can  be  local  causes  of  behaviour  in  a  system,  then  clearly 
there  is  no  further  reason  to  postulate  a  relation  of  supervenience  between  mental  and 
physical  properties.  Further,  they  argue,  mental  states  will  still  fail  to  supervene  upon 
physical  states,  for  the  reasons  given  in  Putnam's  Twin  Earth  argument  to  the  effect  that 
the  content  of  a  mental  state  will  not  supervene  directly  upon  the  intrinsic  properties  of 
an  individual,  but  upon  the  intrinsic  properties  of  an  individual  and  that  individuars 
relation  to  their  environment. 
They  do  note  that  proponents  of  supervenience  might  attempt  to  formulate  the 
19 thesis  so  as  to  account  for  this,  and  indeed,  such  formulations  are  in  the  offing.  Terence 
Horgan,  for  example,  has  constructed  a  tri-level  version  of  supervenience  as  follows: 
Any  two  physically  possible  worlds  which  are  exactly  alike  physically  are  also  exactly  alike  in  all 
other  respects. 
For  any  two  individuals  i  and  ',  either  in  distinct  physically  possible  worlds  or  in  a  single  such 
world,  if  i  and  j  are  exactly  alike  in  all  intrinsic  physical  respects  then  they  are  exactly  alike  in  all 
other  intrinsic  respects. 
For  any  two  individuals  i  and  j,  either  in  distinct  physically  possible  worlds  or  a  sin&le  such  world, 
if  (i)  i  and  j  are  exactly  alike  in  all  intrinsic  physical  respects,  (ü)  i  has  a  non-intrinsic  property  F, 
and  (iii)  i  and  j  are  exactly  alike  with  respect  to  all  non-physical  features  which  are  pertinent  to  i's 
possession  of  F,  then  j  also  possesses  F.  s 
Crane  and  Mellor  object  that  consideration  of  the  ways  in  which  thinkers  err  will 
show  the  falsity  of  such  formulations:  "Suppose  for  example  that  you  and  your  physically 
identical  twin  now  look  at  the  same  elm,  but  that  although  this  makes  you  think  that  it  is 
an  elm,  it  makes  your  twin  think  that  it  is  an  oak.  Same  intrinsic  properties,  same 
relations,  same  properties  of  the  thing  thought  about:  but  different  thoughts.  " 
Such  a  scenario  is  precluded  by  Horgan's  formulation,  and  would  falsify  the 
formulation  if  it  could  be  shown  to  be  possible.  However,  I  do  not  think  that  it  is 
possible;  indeed,  I  find  the  scenario  as  Crane  and  Mellor  describe  it  wildly 
counterintuitive.  Ifeveryproperty  of  the  two  individuals  is  supposed  to  be  the  same, 
including  all  of  their  histories  and  educations  regarding  the  identification  of  trees,  and  if 
they  are  related  in  identical  ways  to  identical  trees,  howpossibly  could  one  individual  think 
"That's  an  elm"  and  the  other  "That's  an  oak"?  Perhaps  the  counterintuitive  nature  is 
better  exposed  if  we  take  the  scenario  slightly  differently:  suppose  that  I  am  now 
standing  in  front  of  an  elm  on  a  clear,  bright  day,  and,  being  in  a  frame  of  mind  to  name 
trees,  I  think  'That's  an  elm.  "  Presumably,  the  series  of  events  producing  this  thought 
take  a  little  bit  of  time:  at  ti,  I  focus  my  attention  in  an  elmward  direction;  light  bounces 
off  of  the  elm  into  my  retinas;  some  rational  thought  process  takes  place  wherein  I 
compare  the  characteristics  of  the  tree  to  various  tree-concepts  I  possess;  &c  until  I 
come  out  withThat's  an  elm'at  t2.  Now  suppose  that  time  goes  backwards  to  ti  again, 
and  the  same  process  occurs  (in  the  original  scenario,  my  twin  is  just  as  identical  to  me  at 
ti  as  this).  Howposs;  bly  can  I  now  come  out  with  'Iliat's  an  oak?  Even  if  it  is  an  oak  and  I 
am  making  a  mistake,  I  should  make  the  same  mistake  upon  repetition  of  the  scenario: 
same  tree  in  the  same  relation  to  me;  same  light;  same  rational  thought  process;  same 
tree-concepts:  same  outcome.  I  believe  that  the  burden  is  upon  anyone  who  would  assert 
that  anything  other  that  this  could  happen  to  show  bow  it  could  happen. 
This  consideration  does  not  falsify  supervenience.  However,  Crane  and  Mellor 
claim  that  modem  physics  itself,  with  its  probabilistic  laws,  does  falsify  supervenience. 
Their  example  is  as  follows: 
Suppose  an  intrinsic  non-mental  property  P  causes  a  mental  property  M  indeterministically.  (Say  for 
example  that  one's  being  in  Mat  tz  is  o.  9  if  one  has  just  been  P  (at  ti)  and  o.  t  if  one  has  not).  Now 
suppose  that  at  ti  many  people  share  all  their  intrinsic  non-mental  roperties,  including  P.  At  ta, 
therefore,  most  but  not  all  of  them  will  be  M:  that  is,  some  pairs  of  people,  atom-for-atom  alike  at 
20 ti,  will  differ  at  t2  in  this  mental  respect... 
In  other  words,  modern  indeterministic  physics  must  predict  that  some  pairs  of  people,  atom-for- 
atom  alike  in  all  non-mental  respects,  will  differ  in  some  simultaneous  mental  respects:  and  will  do 
so  precisely  because  the  properties  involved  are  causally  related.  "" 
This  does  not  work.  First,  there  is  an  equivocation:  in  the  first  part  of  the  example,  the 
relation  involved  is  causal:  an  instance  of  some  physical  state  P  causing  some  mental  state 
M  with  a  certain  probability.  In  the  second  part,  two  atom-for-atom  identical  individuals 
are  supposed  to  diverge  in  mental  states  because  of  the  supposed  indeterminism  of  the 
supervenience  of  a  mental  state  by  a  physical  state.  But  causation  and  supervenience  are 
hardly  the  same  relation.  Supervenience  is  almost  universally  taken  to  be  a  synchronic 
relation,  whereas  the  probabilistically  interruptible  relation  required  by  Crane's  and 
Mellor's  argument  would  certainly  have  to  be  diachronic. 
Crane  and  Mellor  might  change  the  example,  and  argue  that  the  supervenience  of 
rationality,  or  any  other  mentalprocess,  fails  to  supervene  upon  the  physical  because  of  the 
probabilistic  causal  relations  between  certain  kinds  of  physical  events.  Suppose  that  two 
individuals  x  and  y  are  in  a  particular  physical  state  P  at  tz.  When  presented  with  some 
stimulus  Oet's  call  it  q),  physical  state  Pr  has  a  o.  901o  probability  of  going  to  state  P2,  and  a 
o.  iO/o  probability  of  going  to  state  P3.  Then  it  is  quite  clearly  possible  for  two  physically 
identical  individuals  with  identical  causal  histories  to  be  presented  with  the  exactly 
similar  stimulus  q  and  yet  respond  differently:  9  out  of  io  individuals  in  Pr  at  U,  when 
presented  with  q,  will  move  to  P2,  while  one  will  move  to  P3.  This  physical  difference 
could  ground  a  mental  difference:  some  mental  state  M2  might  be  supervenient  upon  P2, 
while  a  different  mental  state  or  no  mental  state  at  all  might  supervene  upon  P3. 
This  objection  will  not  work  either,  for  it  isn't  at  all  clear  that  supervenience 
cannot  accommodate  probabilistic  physics.  Consider  the  following: 
Necessarily,  for  any  object  x  and  any  property  F  in  A,  if  x  has  F,  then  there  exists 
some  property  G  in  B  such  that  x  hýs  G,  and  necessarily,  if  any  y  has  G,  then  there 
is  a  probability  n  that  y  has  F. 
I  do  not  see  that  there  is  anything  intrinsically  wrong  with  this  formulation.  Some  might 
be  uncomfortable  accepting  it  for  the  psychophysical  case,  for  it  would  make  the 
determination  of  mental  states  by  physical  states  only  probabilistic:  there  would  be 
nothing  to  guarantee  that  rational  thought  might  not  be  interrupted  by  a  random  quantum 
occurrence,  and  nothing  to  ensure  that  sightings  of  brown  cows  would  produce  brown- 
cow-thoughts,  if  some  random  quantum  event  could  get  in  the  way  and  replace  the  brown 
cow  thought  with,  say,  a  John  Major  thought.  But  provided  the  probability  of  y's  having  F 
when  y  has  G  was  high  enough  (say,  99.999999901o),  this  would  make  the  worry  all  but 
ridiculous,  and  were  the  probability  lower,  it  might  explain  quite  a  bit  of  human 
irrationality. 
Further,  it  must  again  be  pointed  out  that  practically  speaking,  quanta  and 
quantum  events  and  their  effects  are  incredibly  tiny  in  comparison  to  anything  that  might 
reasonably  be  postulated  to  realise  complex  mental  states.  Thus,  a  particular  random 
quantum  event  would  have  such  a  small  impact  upon  rational  thought  or  the  realisation  of 
21 anything  so  grandly  complex  as  a  sensation  or  a  mental  representation  as  to  be  negligible, 
as  the  gravitational  effects  of  distant  quasars  are  theoretically  a  factor,  albeit  a  negligible 
one,  in  tides  on  Eartl-L  It  is,  of  course,  possible  that  enough  co-ordinated  quantum 
randomness  could  produce  a  quite  unanticipated  mental  anomaly.  I  cannot  myself 
perform  the  calculations,  but  I  dare  say  that  the  probability  of  such  an  event  occurring 
within  the  lifetime  of  the  universe  is  vanishingly  small.  -" 
In  conclusion,  I  find  that  Crane  and  Mellor  have  failed  to  provide  convincing 
arguments  against  the  noncontinuity  of  psychology  with  the  physical  sciences.  They  have 
failed  satisfactorily  to  show  that  the  idea  of  reducibility  to  physics  is  so  in  defined  as  to 
suggest  that  the  reducibility  or  irreducibility  of  a  science  to  physics  is  insufficient  ground 
to  say  that  irreducible  sciences  are  noncontinuous  with  physics.  According  to 
physicalism  about  the  mind,  the  content  properties  of  mental  states  must,  indeed,  in  some 
sense  be  physical  intrinsic  Properties  of  mindful  systems,  and  that  the  postulation  of 
causally  effective  brute  sensations  is,  if  not  simply  philosophically  unsatisfying, 
explanatorily  disastrous.  Therefore  the  intentionality  of  mental  states  and  the  essential 
reference  psychology  makes  to  the  contents  of  mental  states  could  very  well  ground  the 
autonomy  of  psychology  vis-ii-vis  physics.  Crane's  and  Mellor's  arguments  against  the 
thesis  of  supervenience  have  proven  to  be  inadequate.  So  if  indeed  the  relation  of 
supervenience  can  make  sensible  the  thesis  that  mental  properties  can  be  realised  in  the 
physical,  but  be  irreducible  to  physical  phenomena  subsumed  by  physical  laws  (though 
there  is  some  question as  to  whether  indeed  it  can  do  this),  then  the  nonreductive 
physicalists  have  a  case  for  the  autonomy  of  psychology.  In  short:  there  is  still  very  much  a 
question  of  the  epistemological  doctrine  of  physicalism. 
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The  Physical 
2.  Physicalism  as  a  Metaphysical  Doctrine 
CRANE  AND  MELLOR  HAD  TAKEN  PHYSICALISM  to  be  an 
epistemological  rather  than  a  metaphysical  doctrine,  focusing 
their  arguments  on  the  possibility  of  the  contiguity  or 
noncontiguity  of  the  special  sciences,  particularly  psychology, 
with  physics.  However,  physicalism  can  also  be  taken  as  a 
metaphysical  doctrine  limiting  the  contents  of  the  world  to 
one  prime  ontological  category  in  which  all  phenomena 
consist  or  are  realised.  In  a  recent  paper,,  Chris  Daly  argues 
that  no  principled  and  well  defined  distinction  between 
physical  and  nonphysical  properties  can  be  drawn,  and  that  therefore,  an  metaphysical 
projects  that  assume  such  a  distinction  should  be  abandoned.  Correctly,  Daly  asserts  that 
physicalism  must  provide  such  a  distinction  in  order  to  avoid  vacuousness.,,  His 
arguments  for  the  rejection  of  physicalism  as  a  viable  doctrine  are  thus  quite  different  in 
character  from  those  presented  by  Crane  and  Mellor. 
'Three  claims  characterise  the  thesis  of  physicalism  for  Daly.  Given  that 
physicalism  must  provide  a  distinction  between  two  classes  of  properties,  W  physical 
properties  and  (2)  properties  which  are  not  physical,  he  identifies  the  central  claims  of 
physicalism  as  follows: 
W  (at  least)  all  actual  individuals  are  physical  individuals,  and  all  actual  properties  are 
physical  properties; 
(ii)  there  is  a  relation  (or  a  family  of  relations)  R  such  that  if  any  property  F  of  type  (2) 
exists  at  a  world  w,  there  are  properties  Gi,...,  Gn  of  type  (i)  at  world  w,  and  R  holds 
between  F  and  Gi....  Gn  at  w,  then  F  is  a  physical  property  at  v-,  and 
23 (iii)  For  every  property  F  of  type  (2)  which  exists  at  the  actual  world,  there  are 
properties  Gi,... 
' 
Gn  of  type  (i)  which  exist  at  the  actual  world,  such  that  R  holds 
between  F  and  Gi,... 
' 
Gn  at  the  actual  world.  3 
In  order  to  be  nonvacuous,  physicalism  must  be  able  to  distinguish  between  properties  of 
type(i),  physical  properties,  and  properties  of  type  (2),  properties  that  are  not  physical. 
(ii)  claims  that  any  property  F  of  type  (2)  -  that  is,  any  nonphysical  property  -  if  injact  a 
property  oftype  (z)  -  aphysicalproperty  -  if  it  exists  at  a  world  such  that  Gi  Gn  also 
exist  at  that  world  and  some  relation  (Daly  is  ambivalent  as  to  what,  specifically,  this 
relation  is  specified  to  be)  obtains  between  Gi,...  '  Gn  and  F.  (iii)  claims  that  in  the  actual 
world,  all  nonphysical  properties  are  so  related  to  physical  properties  in  such  a  way  and  so 
are  in  fact  physical  properties. 
This  formulation  is  a  bit  too  strong  for  the  minimal  requirements  of  physicalism. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  say  that  all  apparently  nonphysical  properties  are  really  physical 
properties.  It  is  consistent  with  minimal  physicalism  to  assert  that  there  are  really 
properties  that  are  nonphysical,  requiring  only  that  any  such  properties  be  wholly  realised 
or  constituted  by  physical  properties.  Physically  realised  properties  must  have  a  complete 
physical  description,  but  in  themselves,  may  have  no  interesting  features  identifiable  on 
the  physical  level,  and  so  in  themselves  may  be  considered  nonphysical  properties.  For 
example,  the  property  being  a  token  ofa  monetary  unit  is  not  a  straightforwardly  physical 
property,  because  any  number  of  physical  things  might  serve  to  realise  that  property:  bits 
of  paper,  pieces  of  metal,  even  wholly  electronic  processes,  can  suffice  for  being  a  token 
of  a  monetary  unit,  as  potentially  could  be  all  manner  of  physical  thing.  It  follows  that 
there  is  no  way  of  identifying  a  monetary  unit  merely  by  its  physical  features,  and  so  that 
being  a  monetary  unit  is  not  straightforwardly  a  physical  property.  However,  there  are  never 
tokens  of  monetary  units  that  do  not  have  something  physical  about  them,  so  each 
instantiation  of  the  property  being  a  monetary  unit  is  ontologically  grounded  in  some 
physical  property  or  other.  It  seems  that  meaningful  things  can  be  said  about  monetary 
units  and  their  interactions  in  economic  systems  without  necessary  reference  to  the 
physical  phenomena  with  which  they  correlate,  and  the  idea  that  the  property  being  a 
monetary  unit  -  or  any  similarly  multiply  realisable  property,  such  as  being  a  belieftbat  Ri*b 
Nadershould  win  the  election  -  is  really  a  physical  property  is  far  too  strong.  I  would  prefer 
to  weaken  Daly's  formulation  to  reflect  this  notion: 
Oa)  (at  least)  all  actual  objects,  properties  and  states  either  are  physical  objects, 
properties  or  states  or  are  nonphysical  ones  wholly  realised  by  physical  objects, 
properties  and  states;  4 
Oia)  there  is  a  relation  (or  a  family  of  relations)  R  such  that  if  any  nonphysical 
property  exists  at  a  world  w,  there  are  properties  Gi,...,  Gn  of  type  (i)  at  world  w, 
and  R  holds  between  F  and  Gi...,  Gn  at  w,  then  F  is  wholly  realised  by  physical 
properties;  and 
24 (iiia)  For  every  nonphysical  property  F  which  exists  at  the  actual  world,  there  are 
physical  properties  Gi,... 
' 
Gn  which  mist  at  the  actual  world  such  that  R  holds 
between  F  and  Gi,... 
' 
Gn  at  the  actual  world. 
I  believe  that  this  weaker  formulation  will  answer  to  most  physicalists'  requirements 
without  burdening  them  with  implications  that  they  would  rather  not  countenance,  and  is 
therefore  truer  to  physicalism.  It  should  be  noted  that  this  weakening  of  the  formulation 
of  physicalism  does  not  affect  Daly's  arguments,  so  anyone  objecting  to  his  formulation  of 
the  physicalist  thesis  could  read  his  arguments  as  applying  to  this  perhaps  more 
agreeable  version. 
Daly  considers  several  methods  of  defining  what  it  is  for  a  property  to  be  a 
physical  property.  He  immediately  rejects  the  notion  that  paradigm  physical  properties 
might  simply  be  picked  out  by  ostention,  for  the  simple  reason  that  physical  properties 
are  "a  large  and  varied  bunch7,  Y  not  all  ofwhich  are  observable,  and  many  of  which 
currently  recognised  physical  properties  are  not  the  sorts  of  properties  we  might 
intuitively  classify  as  physical.  Neither  can  physical  properties  be  picked  out  by  reference 
to  the  kinds  of  laws  in  which  they  feature,  as  for  any  kind  of  constraint  we  put  upon  such 
laws,  we  could  certainly  find  examples  of  nonphysical  properties  that  feature  in  similar 
calculations  of  lawfike  interactions  between  such  properties. 
He  is  quite  right  to  reject  both  of  these  approaches.  As  he  says,  we  could  not 
possibly  pick  out  all  the  physical  properties  by  ostention,  and  further,  without  adding  a 
constructive  element  to  the  description  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  physical  property  by  which 
we  could  project  nonoccurrent  but  possible  physical  properties,  this  method  would  be  in 
danger  of  failing  to  recognise  merely  possible  physical  properties.  I  take  it  that  such  a 
property  as  'being  a  sphere  ofuraniumfive  miles  in  diameterwould  be  a  perfectly  well  behaved 
physical  property,  even  if  it  is  not  one  that  is  instantiated  in  the  actual  world.  It  would  not 
do  for  a  formulation  of  physicalism  to  exclude  such  properties  from  its  ontology.  Daly  is 
likewise  right  to  reject  the  idea  that  physical  properties  miht  be  picked  out  as  uniquely 
featuring  in  functional  laws.  He  considers  that  one  might  take  it  that  physical  properties 
are  characterised  by  featuring  in  functional  laws,  and  so  by  being  represented  by 
differential  equations.  But  surely  anything  to  which  a  quantity  could  be  assigned  could  be 
6  treated  in  just  the  same  way  as  physical  quantities  for  the  purposes  of  study.  Clearly,  we 
can  assign  quantities  to  all  manner  of  nonphysical  things:  values  to  monetary  units, 
numerical  probabilities  to  degrees  of  belief,  and  so  on,  and  so  render  these 
paradigmaticafly  nonphysical  properties  subject  to  treatment  in  terms  of  functional  laws 
expressed  in  differential  equations. 
These  simpler  accounts  rejected,  Daly  goes  on  to  consider  some  more  complex 
and  promising  means  of  distinguishing  physical  properties:  an  account  from  family 
resemblances,  credited  to  FrankJackson  and  David  Papineau;  7  an  identification  of  the 
physical  as  an  extremely  basic  natural  kind  constructed  by  Paul  Snowdon;  an 
identification  of  the  physical  from  a  pre-theoreticafly  given  class  of  paradigm  physical 
effects  forwarded  in  Papineau!  s  PhilosoDhical  Naturalism;  '  and  the  idea  of  physical 
properties  as  those  properties  studied  by  the  physical  sciences,  citing  formulations  by 
25 Geoffrey  Heffman9  andjeffrey  Poland.  -  Finding  these  accounts  also  wanting,  Daly 
concludes  that  we  have  no  satisfactory  definition  ofwhat  it  is  to  be  a  physical  property 
that  will  serve  the  purposes  of  analytical  metaphysics,  and  that  therefore  all  theses  that 
assume  such  a  distinction  are  not  well  defined.  In  light  of  this,  he  urges  that 
philosophical  effort  be  concentrated  on  those  problems  that  would  arise  independently 
of  an  assumed  distinction  between  the  physical  and  the  nonphysical.  I  intend  to 
examine  these  accounts  and  Daly's  criticisms  in  some  detail,  and  ask  whether  Daly's 
'downbeae  conclusions  are  indeed  motivated  by  his  aruguments. 
4 
4,;  -  2.1.  The  Family  ResemblanceAccount 
According  to  the'Family  Resemblance'  account  ofjackson  and  Papineau, 
ifA,  B  and  C  are  paradigm  physical  properties  at  the  actual  word,  then  a  propertyj  is 
also  a  physical  property  if  there  is  a  series  of  properties  D,  A  F,  G,  AI  which  carry  a 
chain  of  suitable  family  resemblances  from  any  ofA,  B,  or  C  through  to,  7.  "' 
This  account  has  a  few  features  in  its  favour:  for  one,  it  does  not  require  that  physical 
properties  all  share  any  particular  characteristic,  but  only  that  they  are  all  related  by  some 
chain  of  resemblances  to  any  of  the  paradigm  physical  properties  (A,  B,  Q.  It  might 
express  how  we  actually  apply  the  concept  of  the  physical:  Daly  notes  that  the  account 
could  be  supported  by  Kuhn's  argument  to  the  effect  that  scientists  do  not  acquire 
abstract  theoretical  concepts  by  studying  strict  definitions  and  principles,  but  rather 
become  familiar  with  the  categories  in  their  purview  through  experience  and  exposure  in 
their  work.  n  However,  Daly  raises  problems  for  the  account  which  cast  serious  doubt  over 
its  fitness  for  physicalist  purposes. 
First  of  all,  it  is  all  very  well  and  good  to  say  that  physical  properties  are  related 
through  chains  of  resemblances,  but  then  we  need  to  know  in  what  at  least  some  of 
these  resemblance  relations  consist,  and  we  need  a  convincing  reason  to  believe  that  this 
relation  will  do  the  work  that  it  must  do  to  make  physicalism  a  nonvacuous  metaphysical 
doctrine  -  to  provide  a  principled  distinction  between  physical  properties  and 
nonphysical  properties.  But  as  Daly  says,  "As  matters  stand,  we  have  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  any  two  physical  properties  are  linked  by  suitable  family  resemblanceso  and 
that  these  same  resemblances  do  not  also  hold  between  the  members  of  of  some  pair  of 
properties,  at  least  one  of  which  undoubtedly  is  not  a  physical  property.  "13 
AE  tua  Suppose  that  there  are  physical  properties  (,  B,  Q  D, 
, 
F,  G,  H,  Ij  in  the  ac 
world,  and  that  A  E,  F,  G,  A  Ij  are  all  linked  by  suitable  family  resemblance  relations  to 
A,  B,  and  C,  which  will  serve  as  our  paradigm  physical  properties.  For  clarity,  Daly  asks  us 
to  suppose  thatj  is  the  property  being  an  electromagnetic  wave,  as  that  is  a  property  that  we 
would  unhesitatingly  classify  as  a  physical  property,  but  which  is  not  among  the 
historically  paradigmatically  physical  properties  (as,  presumably,  such  properties  as  being 
26 extended  in  space  and  having  location  are).  Now  imagine  an  alternative  possible  world  WX 
which  contains  fewer  properties:  this  world  has  onlyA,  B,  C,  andj.  In  W,  there  are  not 
enough  properties  to  carry  the  family  resemblance  relation  through  to,  7,  so  on  the  family 
resemblance  accountJ  is  not  a  physical  property  in  WI,  but  we  have  specified  that  it  is. 
Now  consider  a  paradigmatically  nonphysical  property  Z,  for  which  in  the  actual  world 
there  are  not  properties  carrying  the  resemblance  relation  from  (A,  B,  Q  through  to  Z.  But 
there  is  another  possible  world  W2  which  has  so  many  properties,  AAC,  A  E,  F,  G,  H,  1, 
J...  and  so  on,  which  carry  teh  resemblance  relation  to  Z.  Thus  the  family  resemblance 
account  mistakenly  identifies  Z  as  a  physical  property  in  W2. 
An  advocate  of  the  family  resemblance  account  might  answer  Daly  along  two 
lines.  They  might  a)  restrict  'any  possible  world'to  the  actual  world,  or  b)  allow  that  if  in 
some  possible  world  a  suitable  family  resemblance  chain  relating  A  B,  C,  AAF,  G,  A  I, 
J,  Y,..  Z  obtains,  then  Z  is  a  physical  property,  but  constrain  the  resemblance  relation 
such  that  there  is  a  principled  reason  why  certain  kinds  of  properties,  which  will  be 
nonphysical  in  all  possible  worlds,  cannot  stand  in  such  a  relation  to  the  paradigmatically 
physical  properties,  no  matter  how  far  removed.  Such  constraints  might  be  constructed 
from  various  avenues:  the  failure  of  qualitative  information  to'fall  out'of  physical 
descriptions  as  illustrated  by  Levine;  4or  the  intractable  conceptual  difference  between 
the  subjective  and  the  objective  as  outlined  by  Thomas  Nagel,  15  for  example. 
Of  these  two  possible  avenues,  a)  will  not  work.  To  draw  upon  the  actual  world  for 
criteria  by  which  to  identify  physical  properties  across  possible  worlds  trivialises 
physicalism  for  the  actual  world:  if  the  properties  that  are  physical  in  the  actual  world  are 
the  properties  that  are  physical  in  all  possible  worlds  regardless  of  whether  or  not  there 
exists  a  chain  of  properties  linking  them  via  resemblance  relations  to  the  paradigmatically 
physical  properties,  and  those  properties  which  are  not  physical  in  the  actual  world  are 
not  physical  in  possible  worlds  in  which  such  a  chain  of  resemblance  relations  does 
obtain,  then  it  seems  that  the  family  resemblance  account  only  works  at  the  actual  world, 
and  only  because  those  properties  that  are  physical  at  the  actual  world  are  physical  at  the 
actual  world.  Daly  considers  this  approach  as  well,  and  points  out  that  rigidification  with 
respect  to  the  actual  world  would  fail  to  identify  merely  possible  physical  properties:  any 
property  P  is  a  physical  property  if  it  is  linked  by  a  chain  of  family  resemblances  to  a 
paradigmatically  physical  property.  This  requires  that  P  exists  at  the  actual  world,  so  any 
merely  possible  property  in  an  alternative  possible  world  -  such  as  being  a  sphere  of 
uraniumfive  miles  in  diameter-  is  not  a  physical  property,  which  seems  wrong. 
Line  b)  might  appear  to  be  more  promising,  but  there  are  serious  difficulties  with 
this  line  of  reasoning  as  well.  First,  a  description  of  the  characteristics  of  properties  that 
would  be  precluded  from  standing  in  the  resemblance  relation  must  be  given,  and  we 
would  need  to  see  reasons  why  such  characteristics  would  do  what  the  family 
resemblance  theorist  would  want  them  to  do.  Immediately,  it  seems  that  it  would  be 
difficult  to  provide  this  description  without  it  being  too  adhoc  on  the  one  hand,  merely 
stipulating  that  properties  which  have  a  suspiciously  mental  tone  be  excluded,  letting 
anything  else  be  a  physical  property,  or  else  in  danger  of  disallowing  genuine  physical 
27 properties  identified  by  a  more  advanced  physics  than  that  which  we  now  have.  At  a 
previous  state  in  physics,  being  an  etectrvnzagnetic  wave  would  not  have  counted  as  a 
physical  property  under  the  suggested  constraints  given  above,  as  a  property  that  would 
not'fall  out'of  explanations  made  in  terms  of  classical  mechanical  physics.  Along  those 
lines,  we  would  not  wish  to  exclude  properties  that  might  be  countenanced  by  a  later 
physics:  physicists  currently  are  willing  to  entertain  some  very  strange  properties.  We 
have  every  reason  to  believe  that  in  the  future  they  may  very  wen  countenance  properties 
that  are  stranger  still. 
The  family  resemblance  account  could  be  developed  fin-ther,  but  in  light  of  the 
difficulties  Daly  has  raised  for  the  account  and  the  filrther  ones  I  have  presented,  I  think 
it  unlikely  that  the  account  could  be  developed  to  a  satisfactory  degree.  It  may  work  as  a 
'rough  and  readyguide  to  picking  out  physical  properties,  but  it  cannot  provide  a 
complete  definition  of  'physical'  that  will  suit  metaphysical  analysis. 
x!  2.2.  The  Physical  as  a  Basic  Natural  Kind 
Paul  Snowdon  gives  an  account  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  physical  property  according  to 
which'physical'refers  to  an  extremely  basic  natural  kind  with  which  we  are  familiar 
through  encounter.  He  writes: 
We  apply  the  term'physical'  to  a  range  of  objects,  for  example,  tables,  chairs,  and  stones  which  we 
think  we  encounter  in  perception.  The  term  is  intended  to  mark  out  their  most  basic  and  shared 
essential  features.  That  is,  'physicar  is  an  extremely  ýasic  natural  kind  term,  a  term  for  the  most 
all-embracing  (natural)  kind  with  which  we  are  acquainted.  The  discovery  (if  such  is  possible)  of 
the  essence  of  the  kind  is  a  posteriori.  So,  on  this  suggestion,  the  term's  restrictions  flow  in  the 
same  way  that  those  of  a  natural  kind  do  in  other  cases.  " 
Thus  the  predication  'physical'  of  objects.  For  a  property  to  count  as  physical,  Snowdon 
gives  the  following  condition: 
A  property  is  a  physical  property  if  it  can  be  instantiated  in  a  domain  consisting  only  of  physical 
objects.  " 
Daly  criticises  Snowdon's  account  from  several  directions.  Waiving  the  objection 
that  the  account  draw's  essentially  on  the  Putnam-Kripke  theory  of  natural  kind  terms 
such  that  substantive  arguments  against  that  theory  would  have  implications  for 
Snowdoes  account  of  the  physical,  Daly  objects  that  it  is  not  at  all  easy  to  see  what  could 
be  the  'basic  and  shared  essential  features'  that  all  and  only  physical  things  have  in 
common.  The  two  features  offered  by  Snowdon  -  that  physical  objects  should  be  able 
to  exist  independently  of  perception  and  occupy  space  -  are  intuitive,  but  are 
problematic.  First  of  all  Daly  notes  that  some  paradigmatically  nonphysical  objects 
putatively  are  supposed  to  be  able  to  exist  unperceived:  Cartesian  souls,  Platonic  forms, 
and  the  like.  Secondly,  Daly  objects  to  the  use  of  the  idea  of  occupation  of  space  as  a 
criterion  for  the  definition  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  physical  object,  for  what  is  meant  by 
28 'space'is  surely'physical  space'.  If  so,  then  to  avoid  circularity  some  account  needs  to  be 
given  ofphysical  space'that  does  not  draw  on  physical  concepts.  " 
A  further  difficulty  could  be  raised  with  the  first  part  of  the  account  given  above: 
that  'we  apply  the  term  physical  to  objects  which  we  believe  we  encounter  in  perception 
and  use  the  term  to  mark  out  the  most  basic,  shared  essential  features  of  those  things'. 
This  is  an  extremely  forgiving  account  of  the  attribution  of  physicality  to  objects,  and 
without  a  number  of  psychological  caveats,  could  possibly  admit  quite  a  bit  too  much  into 
the  physical  ontology.  For  example,  many  people  believe  that  they  have  encountered  in 
perception  such  things  as  ghosts  and  apparitions.  Are  the  most  basic  and  shared 
essential  features  of  all  things  to  include  features  shared  by  these  things  as  well?  If  so, 
then  it  seems  that,  unless  we  can  apply  some  limitations  on  what  we  can  and  cannot 
genuinely  encounter  in  perception,  all  manner  of  reports  might  contribute  to  the  physical 
ontology.  We  might  add  a  constraint  to  the  effect  that  such  observations  of  entities  be 
repeatable,  but  consider  an  argument  from  a  cryptozoologist  against  a  quantum  physicist 
that  might  run  as  follows:  "You  ask  me  to  believe  in  quarks,  but  you  refuse  to  believe  in 
ghosts.  Show  me  a  quark,  and  then  I  will  believe".  I  agree  that  the  physicist  probably  has 
a  more  coherent  case  than  the  cryptozoologist  for  the  existence  of  quarks,  but  it  is  not 
one  that  he  could  present  without  turning  the  cryptozoologist  into  a  quantum  physicist: 
how  else  would  the  cryptozoologist  be  convinced  that  smoke  trails  in  particle  accelerators 
and  mathematical  predictions  demonstrate  the  existence  of  quarks?  And  if  the  quantum 
physicist  were  to  submit  to  an  equal  amount  of  instruction  by  the  cryptozoologist,  perhaps 
she  would  find  herself,  at  the  end  of  a  three  year  postdoctorate  project,  convinced  of  the 
existence  of  ghosts.  Stranger  things  have  happened.  Thus  it  appears  that,  without  some 
limitations,  'things  that  we  believe  we  encounter  in  perception'  is  rather  too  broad  to 
work  as  a  ground  for  the  formulation  as  given.  19 
To  be  fair  to  Snowdon,  he  is  aware  that  there  are  difficulties  in  setting  aptioli 
constraints  upon  the  physical,  and  particularly  of  the  ones  he  had  given:  "...  it  is  hard  to  be 
confident  of  even  the  most  general  notions,  such  as  occupation  of  space,  such  that,  as 
understood,  they  must  apply  to  all  physical  objects-21-0  The  criteria  criticised  by  Daly  are 
offered  by  Snowdon  in  response  to  a  possible  idealist  argument  that  the  most  basic  and 
shared  essential  features  of  objects,  such  as  tables,  chairs,  and  stones,  that  we  think  we 
encounter  in  perception  might  not  be  a  physical  essence,  but  a  nonphysical  one. 
Nonetheless,  it  does  seem  that,  given  that  there  are  obvious  difficulties  in  constraining 
the  physical  aptioH,  it  will  not  help  the  physicalist  case  against  idealism  to  posit  aptiori 
constraints  that  the  idealist  denies. 
Daly  criticises  the  account  offered  by  Snowdon  that'a  property  is  a  physical 
property  if  it  can  be  instantiated  in  a  domain  consisting  only  of  physical  objects'because 
it  would  seem  to  identify  all  kinds  of  properties,  such  as  biological  properties,  economical 
properties,  and  even  mental  properties,  as  physical.  Consider  tables  and  chairs,  some  of 
Snowdon's  paradigmatically  physical  objects.  Plainly  (unless  you  are  an  idealis0they  have 
physical  properties,  but  they  probably  also  have  biological  properties  as  well,  such  as  being 
made  ofcellulose,  as  well  as  chemical  properties,  such  as  being  viscous  (these  are  Daly's 
examples:  this  author  shrinks  from  the  thought  of  a  viscous  chair).  If  these  properties  can 
29 be  instantiated  in  a  domain  consisting  only  of  physical  objects,  then  it  would  follow  that 
they  are  physical  properties.  So,  too,  would  be  mental  properties:  human  beings  are 
physical  objects,  and  presumably  can  be  instantiated  in  a  domain  consisting  only  of 
physical  objects.  Thus  on  Snowdon's  account,  mental  properties  would  turn  out  to  be 
physical  properties. 
It  does  indeed  seem  that  Snowdon  is  committed  to  this  view.  -  But  that  is  a  very 
strong  claim,  particularly  for  a  minimalist  physicalism,  the  central  claims  ofwhich  it  had 
been  Snowdon's  initial  aim  to  abstract.  Further,  it  would  seem  to  make  all  properties 
physical  trivially,  as  long  as  they  are  properties  that  some  physical  object  can  have. 
Further,  as  Daly  notes,  "even  if  it  is  true  that  these  properties  are  physical  properties,  it 
should  not  be  a  matter  of  definition  that  they  are.  "2z  Merely  defining  properties  as 
physical  as  we  feel  inclined  will  not  save  physicalism  from  vacuousness. 
It  will  be  interesting  to  look  at  how  Snowdon  constructs  his  minimalist 
physicalism  so  as  to  understand  the  context  in  which  the  formulations  given  above  arise. 
The  object  of  Snowdon's  paper  is  to  provide  a  minimal  formulation  of  both  materialism 
and  dualism,  in  order  to  investigate  whether  or  not  there  might  be  viable  positions  in 
between.  From  the  outset  he  is  not  concerned  to  construct  an  exhaustive  account:  he 
states  that  his  is  but  one  possible  account,  whose  primary  virtue  is  that  it  is  one  which  is 
"intuitively  plausible  both  in  the  notions  it  employs  and  in  its  conception  of  materialism, 
but  one  which  faces  problems  of  clarification  and  elucidation.  "23  For  Snowdon 
physicalism  involves  a  notion  of  'weak  reductionism!,  weak  because  he  does  not  wish  to 
imply  by  the  use  of  the  term  anything  to  which  a  minimalist  physicalist  would  not  agree. 
With  that  caveat  he  writes  that  "Physicalism  is  the  thesis  that  we  can  reduce  mental  facts 
(states  of  affairs)  to  physical  facts  (states  of  affairs);  dualism  is  the  denial  of  this  thesis.  '4 
Weak  reductionism  involves  the  notion  of  the  'exhaustive  constitution'  of  one  state  of 
affairs  by  an  arrangement  of  other  states  of  affairs.  Thus  mental  states  will  be  weakly 
reducible  to  physical  states  if  they  are  exhaustively  constituted  by  physical  states. 
With  this  understood,  it  is  easy  to  see  why  Snowdon  has  no  difficulty  with  the 
formulation  of  a  physical  property  being  one  that  can  be  instantiated  in  a  dom  in 
consisting  only  of  physical  objects:  a  domain  consisting  only  of  physical  objects  may  be 
arranged  such  that  all  manner  of  things  might  be  'exhaustively  constituted'  by  that 
arrangement,  but  in  every  case,  whatever  is  so  constituted  will  be  reducible  to  physical 
states  of  affairs.  He  is  aware,  of  course,  that  the  constitution  thesis  is  empty  if  there  is  not 
some  definition  of  what  is  to  count  as  a  physical  property  and  what  non-physical, 
specifically,  mental.  He  offers  the  following  idea  for  elucidatingphysical': 
One  possible  response  is  to  explain  what  the  import  of  'physicar  is  in  a  way  which  is  like  that 
standardly  employed  for  the  terni'mental'.  That  way  is  to  cite  samples  or  paradigm  cases  while 
saying  that  mental  states  are  states  of  this  kind.  It  is  allowed  that  this  is  enough  to  exg)lain  (or 
convey)  a  notion,  which  is  then  used  with  a  fair  degree  of  intersubjective  agreement.  so,  we  can  try 
to  explain  by  a'physical  fact'we  mean  facts  which  are  like  these  -  and  then  we  would  list  a 
characteristic  group...  it  provides  no  discursive  account  of  what  'physical'  means,  and  it  provides  no  identification  of  the  essence  of  the  physical.  But  if  it  succeeds  in  generating  a  recognitional 
capacity,  then  it  makes  physicalism  contentful  and  non-vacuous.  31 
30 Snowdon  thinks  it  unlikely  that  we  should  be  able  to  give  an  aptioii  account  of 
what  counts  as  a  physical  property:  "the  reason  is  that  it  is  hard  to  be  confident  of  even 
the  most  general  notions,  such  as  occupation  of  space,  that,  as  understood,  they  must 
apply  to  all  physical  objects,  given  the  surprising  entities  physicists  are  prepared  to 
endorse",  2'  and  ffirther,  that  even  if  we  could  provide  some  criteria,  it  is  doubtfid  that  they 
would  provide  sufficient  conditions  for  a  property's  counting  as  a  physical  property.  What 
is  needed,  he  says,  is  "an  elucidation  of  'physicar  which  allows  its  elucidation  to  be 
sensitive  to  the  empirical  exploration  of  the  physical  world".  -7  He  rejects  the  idea  that 
either  current  physical  science  or  some  unspecified  future  physics  should  be  the 
measure  ofwhat  is  physical,  because  it  is  impossible  to  say  what  properties  an 
unspecified  future  physics  might  admit,  as  will  be  familiar  from  above.  It  is  in  this  context 
that  he  offers  the  formulation  criticised  by  Daly. 
I  understand  Snowdon!  s  formulation  in  the  following  war.  when  he  says  'We  apply 
the  term  'physical'  to  a  range  of  objects  ...  which  we  think  we  encounter  in  perceptioný, 
Snowdon  means  to  capture  the  basic,  intuitive  sense  in  which  we  know  how  to  identify  a 
physical  thing,  and  apply  the  term  to  those  things  that  we  can  see,  touch,  smell,  poke 
&c.,  and  not  to  things  that  we  cannot  encounter  in  perception,  such  as  other  people's 
mental  states,  which  must  be  derived  from  things  that  we  can  encounter  in  perception, 
such  as  their  speaking,  acting,  and  so  forth.  Whatever  our  best  science  tells  us  about  the 
basic  nature  of  these  things,  no  matter  how  surprising  it  may  be,  it  is  these  things  which 
we  will  consider  to  be  physical,  and  should  we  ever  be  able  to  specify  the  essence  of  such 
things  -  which,  presumably,  a  true  and  complete  physics  would  be  able  to  do  -  then 
we  will  have  a  fiffl  definition  of  what  the  essence  of  the  physical  is.  Snowdon's  definition 
is  intended  to  perform  three  functions:  to  set  up  a  principled  distinction  between  the 
mental  and  the  physical;  to  specify  something  that  generates  a  recognitional  capacity  for 
what  is  to  count  as  'physical';  and  to  leave  whatever  is  the  essence  of  the  physical 
sensitive  to  and  (possibly)  discoverable  through  aposteHoii,  empirical  investigation  of  the 
world. 
With  the  context  of  Snowdon's  formulation  understood,  and  especially  with  the 
understanding  that  he  is  not  offering  a  defence  of  any  particular  version  of  physicalism, 
but  only  attempting  to  lay  out  and  clarify  its  central  claims,  I  think  it  is  easier  to  see  the 
places  in  which  the  phrases  extracted  by  Daly  for  criticism  fit,  and  why  Snowdon  makes 
the  somewhat  surprising  claims  he  does  about  any  property  that  can  be  instantiated  in  a 
physical  domain  reaffy  being  a  physical  property,  about  which  Daly  had  said  "  Snowdon 
provides  no  independent  support  for  this  apparently  mistaken  consequence  of  his 
view".  2'  On  Snowdoes  account,  if  any  property  is  instantiated  in  a  domain  consisting  only 
of  physical  objects,  then  it  is  exhaustively  constituted  by  the  obtaining  of  purely  physical 
states  of  affairs.  This  notion  of  exhaustive  constitution  can  easily  give  way  to  identity,  so 
long  as  it  is  individual  instantiations  of  exhaustively  constituted  properties  that  are 
identified  with  the  physical  things  that  constitute  them,  rather  than  types  of  exhaustively 
constituted  properties,  to  be  sensitive  to  the  multiple  realisability  of  some  types  of 
properties.  Thus  Snowdon  might  say,  as  he  does,  "The  obtaining  of  our  mental  states 
(our  being  the  way  we  are  mentally  speaking)  is  exhaustively  constituted  by  the  obtaining 
31 of  purely  physical  states  of  affairs  (by,  that  is,  our  being  the  way  we  are  mentally 
speaking),  "2-9  and  interpret  that  to  mean  that  our  being  the  way  we  are  mentally  is  our 
being  the  way  we  are  physically,  and  that  mental  properties  are  physical  properties  in  this 
restricted  sense.  So  it  appears  that  Daly's  criticisms  are  slightly  unfair.  Snowdon  does  not 
mean  to  define  physical  properties,  for  once  and  an,  in  the  way  that  Daly  suggests  that  he 
does,  and  neither  is  the  problematic  consequence  that  mental  states  are  physical  states 
entirely  unsupported.  However,  while  the  notion  of  exhaustive  constitution  certainly  can 
be  construed  this  way,  it  does  not  seem  that  it  must  be  so  construed.  It  is  not  clear  that 
the  notion  of  exhaustive  constitution  cannot  accommodate  a  notion  of  realisation  as 
above  outlined  according  to  which  some  realised  properties  are  genuinely  nonphysical. 
Thus,  without  further  development  of  the  notion  of  exhaustive  constitution,  the  account 
is  susceptible  to  the  objections  raised  by  Daly.  311  There  is  also  the  matter  of  the  actual 
identification  of  those  properties  to  which  we  apply  the  term'physical'-  Snowdon's 
account,  it  has  been  shown,  is  in  danger  of  admitting  far  too  much,  and  identifying  higl-Ay 
suspect  properties  as  physical.  Snowdon's  account  thus  also  fails  to  pass  the  test  for 
providing  a  metaphysically  satisfactory  definition  of  the  physical. 
2.3.  Pbysieal  Properties  andParadigm  Pbysieal  Effeets 
t4l, 
Daly's  next  target  is  an  account  of  the  physical  given  by  David  Papineau  in  the 
first  chapter  of  his  Philosophical  Naturalism,  -v  in  which  he  describes  his  interpretation  of 
the  physicalist  thesis  and  attempts  a  defence  of  physicalism  generally.  I  would  like  to 
take  a  slightly  different  approach  to  the  analysis  of  Daly's  criticism  of  this  account.  It  will 
be  instructive  first  to  see  exactly  how  Papineau's  physicalism  is  constructed. 
Physicalism  for  Papineau  consists  in  the  conjunction  of  two  theses:  supervenience 
and  token  congruence.  The  supervenience  relation  Papineau  favours  is  local,  strong 
supervenience,  according  to  which  two  systems  cannot  differ  in  any  intrinsic  higher  level 
respect  without  differing  in  some  physical  respects,  and  if  two  systems  are  physically 
identical,  they  will  also  be  identical  in  all  of  their  intrinsic  higher  level  respects.  3'  The 
token  congruence  of  mental  states  with  physical  states  is  a  statement  of  the  identity  of  each 
dated  mental  occurrence  with  some  dated  physical  occurrence.  Papineau  is  not 
committed  to  the  strict  identity  of  higher-level  properties  and  events  with  complexes  of 
physical  properties.  Respecting  the  multiple  instantiability  of  mental  states,  token 
congruence  does  not  require  that  types  of  mental  occurrences  correlate  with  types  of 
physical  occurrences,  though  they  certainly  could.  Papineau  thus  prefers  to  cash  out  the 
notion  of  token  congruence  in  terms  of  the  realisation  of  higher  level  properties  by 
physical  properties.  -v  In  those  cases  where  type  identity  between  higher  and  lower  level 
properties  fails,  because  the  higher  level  properties  are  multiply  realised,  "special 
categories  cannot  even  in  principle  be  specified  in  physical  terms.  Nevertheless, 
physicalists  will  say,  such  special  terminology  is  still  just  a  way  of  describing  complexes  Of 
physical  stuff,  and  does  not  require  us  to  recognise  any  non-physical  substances.  "-14The 
conjunction  of  these  two  theses  is  sufficient  for  physicalism,  constraining  all  properties 
32 and  relations  to  physical  properties  and  relations  (thus  excluding  epiphenomcna)  and 
providing  an  account  of  the  relation  between  physical  and  nonphysical  properties  which, 
while  respecting  the  idea  that  special  terms  have  real  referents,  does  not  have  difficulties 
with  the  issue  of  overdetermination.  35 
Both  the  theses  of  supervenience  and  token  congruence  are  independently 
motivated  by  what  Papineau  calls'an  important  feature  of  physical  science',  the  principle 
of  the  causalclosure  ofphysics.  He  writes: 
I  take  it  that  physics,  unlike  other  special  sciences,  is  complete,  in  the  sense  that  all  physical  events 
are  determined,  or  have  their  chances  determined,  by  prior  physýýl  events  accordin  tophysical 
laws.  In  other  words,  we  never  need  to  look  beyond  the  realm  of  the  physical  in  orYer  to  identify  a 
set  of  antecedents  which  fixes  the  chances  of  any  subsequent  physical  occurrence.,  ' 
Thus  the  causal  closure  of  physics  amounts  to  the  proposition  that  physics  is  complete,  or 
able  to  give  complete  explanations  for  physical  phenomena.  This  principle,  in 
conjunction  with  an  intuitively  plausible  principle  Papineau  terms  the  manifestability  ofthe 
mental,  supports  both  the  principles  of  psychophysical  supervenience  and  token 
congruence. 
The  principle  of  the  manifestability  of  the  mental  states  that  for  each  mental 
particular,  there  are  possible  contexts  in  which  the  possession  of  that  mental  particular 
by  an  agent  would  make  a  causal  difference,  and  thus  would  be  manifest:  "...  if  two 
systems  are  mentally  different,  then  there  must  be  some  physical  contexts  in  which  this 
difference  would  display  itself  in  differential  physical  consequences,  or  chances 
thereof".  37  He  does  not  argue  for  this  principle,  apparently  taking  its  truth  as  obvious,  but 
some  explanation  of  the  principle  is  appropriate.  As  I  understand  it,  the  key  idea  is  not 
that  each  mental  state  is  infact  causally  effective,  but  that  each  mental  state  baspotential 
causalpowers  such  that,  were  it  instantiated  in  an  agent  embedded  in  the  right 
circumstances,  it  wouldbe  causally  effective.  No  mental  state  (say,  the  belief  that  the  kind 
of  aliens  who  tend  to  abduct  people  from  Earth  speak  Quebecois)  can  have  zero  causal 
potential,  even  if  infact,  in  the  entire  history  of  all  sentient  life  anywhere  in  the  actual 
world,  it  never  features  in  any  causal  chain  (no  aliens  ever  abduct  anyone  from  Earth,  and 
no  one  considers  the  possibility  that  they  might):  had  things  been  otherwise,  the  mental 
state  would  have  featured  in  some  causal  chain  with  a  behavioural  outcome  (some  aliens 
abduct  me,  and  believing  that  they  speak  Quebecois,  I  greet  them  in  French,  which  they 
will  understand).  In  other  words:  For  each  possible  mental  state,  there  is  at  least  one 
possible  world  in  which  it  features  in  some  causal  interaction. 
This  principle  is  similar  to  a  principle  expressive  of  realism,  specifically,  anti- 
epiphenomenalism  about  the  mental  which  Kim  has  termed'Alexander's  Dictum.  It  is 
the  principle  that  "to  be  real  is  to  bave  causalpowers,  "O  or,  if  something  has  no  causal  powers, 
it  may  as  well  not  exist  at  all.  Kim  quotes  Alexander: 
[Epiphenomenalism)  supposes  something  to  exist  in  nature  which  has  nothing  to  do,  no  purpose  to 
serve,  a  species  of  noblesse  which  depends  on  the  work  of  its  inferiors,  but  is  kept  for  show  and 
might  as  well,  and  undoubtedly  would  in  time  be  abolished.  " 
33 Alexander's  dictum  is  stronger  than  the  principle  of  the  manifestability  of  the  mental,  for 
differential  epiphenomenal  mental  states  could  show  themselves  -  or  more 
appropriately  perhaps,  be  shown  -  in  differential  physical  consequences,  in  virtue  of 
being  epiphenomena  of  differential  physical  states,  whereas  according  to  Alexander's 
dictum,  if  that  is  the  only  way  they  are  shown,  they  may  as  well  be  assumed  not  to  exist. 
However  the  principle  of  the  manifestability  of  the  mental  is  forwarded  by  Papineau  in 
the  context  of  the  conjunction  of  the  principles  of  supervenience  and  token 
congruence,  the  latter  of  which  is  designed  to  rule  out  the  possibility  of 
epiphenomenalism.  So,  in  essence,  the  principle  of  the  manifestability  of  the  mental  as  it 
functions  in  Papineau's  account  and  Alexander's  Dictum  amount  to  the  same  thing:  each 
real  mental  state  has  real  causal  powers,  even  if  those  powers  are  only  potential. 
Perhaps  this  principle  would  be  easier  to  swallow  if  it  were  translated  to  the 
physical  case,  as  is  easily  done,  for  it  generalises  over  physical  things  as  well.  The  notion 
of  a  physical  thing  which  cannot  interact  with  any  other  physical  thing,  ever,  in  any  way, 
in  any  possible  world  under  any  circumstances,  makes  very  little  sense:  what  reason  could 
there  be  to  postulate  such  a  thing?  What  purpose  could  it  serve  in  any  physical  theory,  or 
in  any  epistemological  system?  What  reason  could  we  give  even  for  calling  such  a  thing 
pbysical,  as  opposed  to  anything  else?  If  it  has  no  causal  powers,  then  it  can  never  be 
detected,  never  have  any  effect  upon  the  world  at  all,  never  make  a  whit  of  difference.  By 
contrast,  consider  a  possible  world  in  which  the  laws  governing  electromagnetism  are 
exactly  as  they  are  in  the  actual  world,  but  wherein  there  exists  nothing  but  a  single, 
solitary  electron.  In  the  entire  history  of  this  universe,  no  causal  transactions  take  place,  40 
for  there  is  nothing  with  which  the  electron  could  interact.  But  if  there  had  been  a 
proton  in  suitable  proximity  to  the  electron,  the  two  particles  would  have  interacted, 
because  it  is  in  the  nature  of  electrons  and  protons  to  do  so.  Their  potential  for  causal 
interaction  is  a  fact  about  their  nature,  even  if  in  fact  they  never  interact  with  anything. 
Papineau7s  arguments  for  supervenience  and  for  token  congruence  run  as  follows: 
*According  to  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  physics,  the  effects  of  any 
physical  event  are  determined  by  prior  physical  events:  once  the  physical 
antecedents  are  given  in  any  casual  interaction,  the  outcome  (or  chances  thereoO  is 
fixed. 
*According  to  the  principle  of  the  manifestability  of  the  mental,  any  mental 
differences  must  be  able  to  show  themselves  in  differential  physical  effects. 
So: 
*It  follows  that  mental  differences  without  Physical  differences  are  impossible. 
The  argument  in  support  of  token  congruence  is  similar: 
O"D-- 
Every  mental  event  is  a  potential  cause  of  some  physical  event  (the  manifestability 
of  the  mental). 
34 -All  physical  events  have  complete  physical  causes  (the  causal  closure  of  physics). 
So: 
-It  follows  that  all  mental  events  are  physical  events. 
Both  of  these  arguments  rest  on  the  principles  that  mental  states  are  or  potentially 
are  causes  of  physical  effects,  and  that  physical  effects,  or  their  chances,  are  fixed  once 
all  physical  antecedents  of  those  effects  are  fixed.  In  order  to  be  causally  effective, 
mental  states  must  indeed  be  physical  states:  they  must  be  token  congruent  with  physical 
states.  4-  This  is  not  to  say  that  they  are  strictly  to  be  identified  with  mental  states,  for,  as 
Papineau  is  aware,  if  any  mental  states  are  multiply  instantiable,  then  they  cannot  strictly 
be  identified  with  the  types  of  physical  states  with  which  they  are  token  congruent. 
Again,  Papineau  prefers  to  cash  out  the  relations  of  supervenience  and  token 
congruence  in  terms  of  the  realisation  of  one  set  of  states  (properties)  by  another  set  of 
states  (properties),  preserving  a  genuine  difference  between  mental  properties  and  the 
physical  properties  realising  them  whilst  providing  an  explanation  of  how  the  physical 
effects  of  mental  causes  are  not  overdetermined:  4-  "even  though  the  two  properties  arc 
not  the  same  property,  the  instantiation  of  one  is  realised  by  the  instantiation  of  the 
other.  "43 
The  next  step  in  Papineau's  argument  is  to  provide  a  defence  of  the  principle  of 
the  causal  closure  of  physics,  upon  which  his  arguments  for  supervenience  and  token 
congruence  depend.  Papineau  identifies  the  most  obvious  difficulty  facing  a  defender  of 
the  principle  to  be  to  say  what  is  meant  by'physics'.  Current  physics  cannot  be  the 
physics  involved,  for  current  physics  is  surely  incomplete  and  not  suited  to  the 
identification  of  all  the  antecedents  of  some  physical  events.  Neither  can  some  future  or 
ideal  physics  be  meant,  for  we  cannot  know  at  this  juncture  in  the  history  of  physics  what 
kinds  of  things  physics  will  in  the  future  countenance.  However,  Papineau  makes  use  of 
the  notion  of  an  ideal  physics,  possibly  very  different  from  current  physics,  but  stipulated 
to  be  complete  and  correct:  "Suppose  we  simply  deflne  'physics'  as  the  science  of 
whatever  categories  are  needed  to  give  full  explanations  for  all  physical  effects".  44Nowwe 
need  to  know  what  these  'physical  effects'  for  which  the  ideal  physics  is  supposed  to 
provide  explanations  are.  It  is  here  that  the  passage  to  which  Daly  objects  occurs. 
Papineauwrites: 
I?  ropose  that  we  simply  postulate  some  pre-theoreticaUX  given  class  of  of  paradigmatic  physical 
e  fects,  such  as  stones  fang,  the  matter  in  our  arms  movi%,  and  so  on.  If  we  take  this  class  to  be 
independently  given,  then  we  can  effectively  chaj  te  rest  of  physics  as  all  the  categories 
that  need  to  be  brought  in  to  explain  those  paradigmatic  physical  effects.  ý' 
Those  properties  identified  by  physics  will  be  physical  properties.  Thus,  any  category 
that  needs  to  be  brought  in  to  explain  the  stipulated  class  of  paradigmaticafly  physical 
effects  will  be  a  physical  property.  46 
35 Daly  finds  three  major  difficulties  with  the  notion  of  deriving  the  import  of 
'physical'  from  a  pre-theoretically  given  class  of  paradigm  physical  effects.  First,  the 
account  may  fail  to  identify  merely  possible  physical  properties,  as  these  win  not  be 
needed  to  provide  explanations  of  any  paradigmatically  physical  effects.  Daly  considers 
two  methods  by  which  Papineau  might  overcome  this  difficulty:  he  might  suggest  that  a 
possible  nonphysical  property  P  is  physical  just  in  case  there  is  some  possible  world  at 
which  P  is  needed  to  explain  some  paradigmatically  physical  effects.  This  will  not  work, 
however,  for  there  are  possible  worlds  at  which  dualism  is  true,  and  in  these  worlds, 
nonphysical  properties  would  need  to  be  cited  to  explain  some  paradigmatically  physical 
effects.  To  identify  merely  possible  physical  properties  with  reference  to  possible  worlds 
in  which  they  would  be  needed  to  explain  paradigmatically  physical  effects  would  thus 
mistakenly  identify  nonphysical  properties  as  physical  in  such  worlds.  47 
Daly  considers  that  Papineau  could  present  an  account  of  what  counts  as  a 
determinable  physical  property,  from  which  all  truly  physical  properties  would  emanate  as 
determinates.  However,  providing  such  an  account  would  be  extremely  problematic. 
Indeed,  it  seems  to  me  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  form  a  notion  of  a  physical 
determinable  without  a  prior  grasp  of  the  determinates  that  were  to  emanate  from  it. 
What  sorts  of  properties  could  count  as  physical  determinables?  Perhaps  properties  such 
as  be;  ngaforce,  from  which  bein  gravitational,  electromagnetic,  strong,  weak  forces,  &c., 
would  emanate;  perhaps  be;  ngapartirk,  from  which  being  electrons,  muons,  photons, 
tachyons,  &c.  would;  and  so  forth.  But  what  else  might  be  specified  by  future  physics?  It 
is  certainly  possible  that  a  future  physics  might  postulate  properties  that  do  not  fit  into 
any  determinable  category  now  employed,  thus  implying  a  new  determinable  property, 
and  so  we  cannot  postulate  a  determinable  that  will  cover  them  all.  4'  In  advance  of 
knowledge  as  to  what  properties  future  physics  will  accommodate,  we  cannot  constrain 
the  determinables  from  which  such  properties  will  emanate.  Such  an  account  as  Daly 
postulates  might  be  able  to  accommodate  possible  physical  properties  such  as  could 
reasonably  be  projected  from  properties  that  are  currently  recognised  as  physical  -  being 
a  spbere  ofuraniumfive  miles  in  diameter,  for  example,  would  be  included,  but  the  account 
might  exclude  actual  physical  properties  not  recognised  by  current  physics,  but  which 
physics  could  recognise  at  a  later  stage  in  its  development,  as  well  as  possible  physical 
properties  that  might  not  be  projectable  from  any  of  the  actual  physical  properties  in  this 
world.  49 
Daly's  second  objection  is  that  Papinea&s  account  is  too  narrow  with  respect  to 
physical  properties  at  the  actual  world,  for  some  physical  properties  can  be  brought  in  to 
explain  paradigmatic  physical  effects,  but  are  not  necessary  to  explain  those  effects.  Daly 
notes  that  since  density  can  explain  certain  kinds  of  paradigmatic  physical  effects  which 
could  just  as  easily  be  explained  by  reference  to  mass  and  volume,  it  follows  that  density  is 
not  a  physical  property.  But  surely  Papineau  could  reply  that  since  density  just  is  the 
Product  of  mass  and  volume,  and  explanations  of  a  paradigm  physical  effect  made  in  terms 
of  one  or  the  other  are  effectively  the  same  explanations  couched  in  different  terms. 
From  such  an  account  a  form  of  reductionism  might  be  seen  to  follow.  a  property  is  a 
Physical  property  just  in  case  it  is  part  of  the  set  of  categories  that  need  to  be  brought  in 
36 to  explain  paradigmatically  physical  effects  or  is  identical  with  or  reducible  to  a  member 
of  that  set. 
This  does  indeed  seem  to  be  the  spirit  in  which  Papineau!  s  account  is  offered, 
insofar  as  he  intends  it  to  provide  an  account  of  what  is  to  count  as  a  physical  property.  A 
class  of  pre-theoretically  given  paradigm  physical  effects  is  given,  the  explanations  for 
which  will  be  provided  by  a  stipulatively  complete  ideal  physics.  This  physics  is  "the 
science  of  whatever  categories  are  needed  to  give  full  explanations  for  all  physical 
effects.  "511  Presumably,  whatever  this  physics  has  to  say  about  the  microstructure  of  the 
paradigmatically  physical  effects  and  their  causes  will  tell  us  what  are  the  basic  physical 
categories,  and  so  in  what  'being  physical'  consists. 
This  brings  us  to  the  third  difficulty  Daly  identifies  for  Papineau's  account.  Daly 
writes:  "...  we  know  which  effects  to  include  in  the  selection  of  the  requisite  physical 
effects  only  to  the  extent  that  we  know  which  properties  are  physical,  and  so  what 
properties  need  to  be  brought  in  to  explain  those  effects.  But  without  a  definition  of 
what  a  physical  property  is,  it  is  unclear  which  effects  should  be  included  in  the 
selection.  "O  Daly-  is  quite  right  to  call  attention  to  this  weakness.  The  notion  of  a 
paradigmatically  physical  effect  must  draw  upon  the  notion  of  physical  properties,  for,  as 
Daly  says,  "a  paradigmatic  physical  effect  is  -  paradigmatically  -a  change  with  respect 
to  a  paradigmatic  physical  property".  $&  Thus  we  must  draw  upon  a  pre-theoretic  notion  of 
physical  properties  in  order  to  be  able  to  say  what  properties  physics  is  to  cover.  Any 
attempt  to  define  which  properties  are  to  count  as  physical  properties  by  this  method 
would  be  circular. 
I  believe  Papineau  would  reject  the  charge  of  circularity  on  the  grounds  that  the 
set  of  paradigmatic  physical  effects  is  taken  as  independently  given  such  that  what  is  to 
count  as  'physics'  is  derived  from  this  set.  Whether  or  not  this  is  a  viable  strategy  remains 
to  be  seen.  I  am  not  certain,  however,  that  in  this  section  of  his  book  Papineau  is 
concerned  with  the  definition  of  what  is  to  count  as  a  physical  property.  His  intention  is 
rather  to  provide  a  defence  of  physicalist  intuitions  and  physicalism  generally,  according 
to  which  all  properties  either  are  physical  properties,  or  else  they  are  multiply 
instantiable,  functional  properties  not  strictly  to  be  identified  with  any  particular  types  of 
physical  states,  yet  identical  to  instantiations  of  physical  states  with  which  they  are  token 
congruent.  If  he  is  right,  we  will  not  require  a  definition  of  what  is  to  count  as  a  physical 
property.  Physics,  stipulated  to  be  complete,  will  in  principle  be  adequate  to  the  task  of 
explaining  all  physical  effects  in  physical  terms,  and  any  category  physics  employs  will  be 
a  physical  category.  Thus  he  focuses  his  attention  on  the  defence  of  the  more 
problematic  of  the  two  main  assumptions  upon  which  his  arguments  depend:  the 
principle  that  physics  is  closed  or  complete. 
There  are  serious  difficulties  with  this  defence,  however.  We  have  seen  that 
Papineau  solves  the  difficulty  involved  with  clarifying  what  is  to  count  as  a  'physical  effect' 
for  the  purpose  of  identifýring  those  effects  for  which  stipulatively  complete  physics  is 
supposed  to  account  by  postulating  an  independently  given  set  of  paradigmatically 
physical  effects.  But  this  threatens  to  trivialise  physicalism.  Recall  that  Papineau  gives 
very  loose  criteria  for  the  identification  of  the  independently  given  class  of  physical 
37 effect:  "stones  falling,  the  matter  in  our  arms  moving,  and  so  on.  "o  What  are  we  to  make 
of  this  'and  so  on?  I  take  it  that  Papineau  means  to  include  at  least  all  objectively 
observable  macroscopic  changes  of  states  of  affairs  in  the  set.  This  involves  mental 
causes  as  well:  'the  matter  in  our  arms  movingis  presumably  sometimes  caused  by  our 
desires  to  move  our  arms.  By  definition,  physics  will  be  the  science  that  provides 
explanations  for  all  paradigmatically  physical  effects,  including  those  for  which  mental 
causes  can  be  cited.  Thus  mental  causes,  even  if  they  are  shown  to  be  irreducible  to 
purely  physical  states  of  affairs  (as  some  people  certainly  believe  that  they  are)  will  simply 
be  included  in  the  domain  of  physics.  This  simply  makes  it  a  matter  of  definition  that 
physics  is  complete,  and  that  physicalism  is  true  in  this  world.  It  will  also  mistakenly 
identify  nonphysical  properties  as  physical  properties  in  possible  worlds  at  which  dualism 
is  true,  as  Daly  had  argued,  noted  above. 
Papineau  is  aware  that  this  definitional  strategy  is  in  danger  of  making  the 
principle  of  the  completeness  of  physics  an  'empty  analyticity,  and  of  trivialising  the 
physicalism/dualism  debate  by  allowing  that  mental  states  are  simply  included  in  the 
physical.  54  His  answer  to  this  difficulty  is  somewhat  surprising.  He  writes: 
I  still  need  to  explain  how  substantial  conclusions  about  supervenience  or  token  congruence  could 
possibý  follow  from  such  a  definition. 
y  answer  is  that  no  substantial  conclusions  follow  from  the  completeness  of  physicsperst. 
But  they  do  follow  from  the  joint  assumption  that  a)  physics  is  complete  and  b)  that  it  does  not 
make  use  of  psychological  categories.  " 
This  is  just  not  satisfying.  An  adequate  defence  of  the  principle  that  physics  is  complete 
and  closed  cannot  be  based  on  an  argument  that  assumes  it  along  with  the  added 
premise  that  physics  makes  no  use  of  psychological  terms  to  the  conclusion  that 
substantial  conclusions  about  nontrivial  psychophysical  supervenience  and  token 
congruence  follow.  Also,  this  strategy  fails  to  characterise  'physics'  in  any  meaningful 
sense.  The  mental  may  be  a  category  whose  realisation  in  the  physical  is  difficult  to 
explain,  but  it  is  by  no  means  the  only  category  of  realised  properties:  consider  such 
properties  as  being  a  unit  ofmomy,  being  a  tiver,  being  an  atmospbere,  being  a  bive,  or  any 
number  of  similar  properties.  Each  of  these  is  multiply  instantiable:  a  unit  of  money  can 
be  realised  by  printed  bits  of  paper,  specially  shaped  pieces  of  metal,  an  electronic 
process,  even  a  promise.  A  river  presumably  could  be  realised  by  any  liquid  flowing 
through  some  terrain.  An  atmosphere  is  a  collection  of  gases  held  to  the  surface  of  a 
celestial  body  by  gravitational  force:  any  gases  win  do,  and  any  kind  of  celestial  body, 
provided  it  is  such  that  gases  can  cling  to  it.  A  hive  is  a  collection  of  individuals  living  and 
working  together  in  a  particular  way.  This  arrangement  is  typically  realiscd  by  insects,  but 
could  just  as  easily  be  realised  by  spiders,  birds,  the  Borg,  or  what  have  you.  All  of  these 
kinds  of  properties  will  be  picked  out  by  a  different  special  science:  economics,  geology, 
meteorology,  xenosociobiology,  and  so  forth. 
Merely  stipulating  psychological  categories  as  unemployed  by  physics  leaves  it 
open  that  categories  employed  by  economics,  geology,  meteorology,  xenosociobiology, 
and  any  other  special  science  can  be  included  in  physics.  Thus  'physics'becomes 
38 'whatever  isn't  psychology,  which  cannot  be  right.  Papineau%  only  defence  of  this  adboc 
exclusion  of  psychological  categories  from  physics  is  that,  looking  back  on  the  history  of 
science  and  considering  the  aims  of  physics,  it  is  extremely  unlikely  that  psychological 
categories  will  need  to  be  brought  in  to  explain  anything.  That  may  be  true,  but  the 
notion  grounding  this  unlikeliness  is  the  idea  that  the  psychological,  like  other  special 
science  categories,  is  realised  in  the  physical,  and  thus  that  purely  physical  explanations 
will  suffice  for  explanations  of  such  phenomena.  However,  this  is  not  an  assumption  of 
Papineau's  argument,  but  rather  a  conclusion  for  which  he  intends  to  argue.  This  is  not 
only  circular,  but  it  is  simply  to  ignore  arguments  to  the  effect  that  the  physical  ontology 
is  incomplete,  some  ofwhich  are  rather  compelling,  and  which  are  certainly  deserving  of 
far  more  serious  attention. 
Infine,  Papineau  presents  a  highly  flawed  formulation  of  physicalism,  and  his 
general  defence  of  physicalism  proves  inadequate.  Daly  is  generous  to  take  it  that  this 
formulation  provides  any  criteria  by  which  physical  properties  could  be  distinguished 
from  nonphysical  properties,  for  it  does  no  such  thing.  It  fails  even  to  provide  a 
principled  distinction  between  physics  and  special  sciences.  Much  of  the  difficulty 
could,  I  believe,  have  been  avoided  had  Papineau  formulated  the  principle  that  physics  is 
complete  or  closed  as  the  metaphysical  principle  perhaps  more  standardly  employed,  the 
principle  of  the  causal  closure  oftbepbysical  domain,  for  which  principle  there  are  good 
independent  arguments:  the  difficulty  involved  in  explaining  how  a  nonphysical  event 
could  cause  a  physical  event,  with  us  since  Descartes,  paramount  among  them.  The  only 
reason  I  can  consider  that  Papineau  formulates  his  version  of  the  principle  as  he  does  is 
that  he  wishes  to  keep  physicalism  an  epistemological  rather  than  a  metaphysical 
doctrine,  and  thus  to  define  physicalism  in  terms  of  the  science  of  physics  rather  than  in 
terms  of  the  ontological  priority  of  physical  properties  as  related  to  nonphysical 
properties.  I  can  think  of  no  reason  why  such  a  formulation  would  not  be  possible,  and 
many  of  the  difficulties  involved  with  Papineau!  s  account  could  be  addressed  from  within 
such  a  formulation.  But  any  such  formulation  will  have  to  provide  a  more  principled 
distinction  between  the  physical  and  the  nonphysical  or  not  strictly  physical  than  'all  the 
categories  needed  to  explain  paradigmatically  physical  effects,  where  the  set  of 
I paradigmatically  physical  effects'  is  left  so  vague. 
4,  *ýPbysical 
Properties  as  Properties  Studied  by  the  Pbysical  Sciences 
The  final  approach  criticised  by  Daly  is  the  identification  of  physical  properties  as 
those  properties  that  feature  in  the  physical  sciences.  Accompanying  this  approach  are 
the  notions  that  "what  makes  a  science  a  physical  science  is  just  that  it  (more  or  less) 
shares  its  methods  and  principles  with  paradigm  physical  sciences"s'  and  that  "a  physical 
science,  such  as  mechanics,  is  a  paradigm  physical  science  simply  because  of  its 
pioneering  role:  it  is  among  those  relatively  few  long-standing  sciences  which  were 
originally  called  physical  sciences".  rDaly  focuses  upon  the  work  of  Geoffrey  Heilman 
andjeffrey  Poland  as  advocates  of  this  approach. 
39 The  attempt  to  identify  physical  properties  as  those  that  feature  in  the  physical 
sciences  faces  difficulties  similar  to  those  already  encountered  in  the  Family 
Resemblance  account:  no  criteria  are  immediately  presented  according  to  which  we 
could  say  which  sciences  are  appropriately  related  to  whatever  sciences  we  identify  as  the 
paradigmatically  physical  sciences  such  that  they  themselves  count  as  physical  sciences. 
Further,  sciences  could  presumably  be  related  to  paradigmatically  physical  sciences  via 
chains  of  sciences  -  say,  for  example,  chemistry  is  taken  to  be  appropriately  related  to 
basic  physics  via  subatomic  theory.  Chemical  properties  would  then  count  as  physical. 
But  in  an  alternate  possible  world  without  subatomic  theory,  nothing  would  carry  the 
relation  to  more  basic  physics,  and  chemical  properties  would  not  count  as  physical 
properties.  58  Likewise,  physicalists  in  an  alternate  possible  world  in  which  a  putatively 
false  science  could  stand  in  such  a  relation  to  a  paradigmatic  physical  science  (or  a 
science  unproblematically  linked  to  basic  physics)  and  to  some  paradigmatically 
nonphysical  science,  such  as  psychology  or  economics,  such  that  its  properties  were 
mistakenly  classified  as  physical.  Thus  in  the  absence  of  criteria  constraining  the 
relations  of  nonbasic  sciences  to  paradigmatically  physical  sciences,  defining  physical 
properties  as  properties  studied  by  a  physical  science  could  mistakenly  identify 
nonphysical  properties  as  physical,  or  fail  to  admit  genuinely  physical  properties  into  the 
recognised  physical  ontology.  Also,  it  appears  that  according  to  this  system  which 
properties  would  count  as  physical  properties  would  in  part  be  a  matter  of  historical 
accident,  dependent  upon  which  sciences  actually  had  been  developed  to  carry  relations 
through  to  basic  physics. 
The  second  obvious  difficulty  with  this  approach  is  the  familiar  problem  of 
isolating  what  is  to  count  as  'physics'  for  purposes  of  identifying  what  is  to  count  as  a 
physical  property.  Current  physics  is  beyond  reasonable  doubt  incomplete  in  some 
respects  and  incorrect  in  others,  so  is  not  suitable  to  provide  an  exhaustive  definition  of 
physical  properties.  But  we  cannot  appeal  to  an  unspecified  but  putatively  complete  and 
correct  future  physics,  because  we  do  not  know  what  properties  such  a  science  will 
admit. 
Geoffrey  Hellman  and  Frank  Thompson,  in  their  paper  Physicalism:  Ontology, 
Determination,  andReduction,  -v  developed  an  account  of  physicalism  drawing  upon  current 
physics  for  its  elucidation,  while  admitting  that  current  physics  is  almost  assuredly 
incomplete  and  that  it  very  probably  makes  claims  about  the  world  that  are  false  outright. 
This  account  is  defended  by  Hellman  in  the  paper  criticised  by  Daly,  Determination  and 
LqgicalTruth.  "o  Acknowleding  that  physics  may  be  incomplete  and  incorrect  in  some  of 
its  claims,  Hellman  says: 
Physicalist  princi  les  (say,  ontol9gical  exhaustion  and  the  determination  principle)  still  serve  two  functions:  first,  twey  may  be  useful  in  articulating  conditions  of  adequacy  that  science  aims  to  meet 
-  that  is,  satis  -  ng  principles  of  the  same  l9gicil  form  may  serve  as  a  useful  criteria  of 
completeness. 
Zlond, 
literally  false  principles  may  be  highly  instructive,  and  they  may  even  be 
very  nearly  true  (or  even  exactly  true)  in  a  restricted  form,  that  is,  when  applied  to  a  specific 
subdomain  of  interest,  such  as  living  or  sentient  beings  on  this  planet  (+satellites).  Thus  for 
"ample  mental  phenomena,  if  they  are  physically  determined,  are  almost  certainly  determined  by 
physical  events  at  the  level  of  neurons  and  synapses,  and,  on  dimensional  grounds,  we  expect 
cUssical  (i.  e.  nonquantum)  mechanics  to  be  able  to  describe  this  level  accurately  enough  to  fix  the 
40 mental  (i.  e.,  'pin  it  down!,  not'curc  it).  Thus,  a  workiýg  assumption  would  be  that,  even  if  there  arc, 
e.  g.,  yet  to  be  discovered  elementary  particles  swimming  around  in  our  brains,  they  hold  no  secrets 
for  psychologyý' 
This  claim  is  engineered  to  convey  content  upon  the  thesis  of  physicalism  without 
having  to  be  concerned  with  the  incompleteness  and  incorrectness  of  current  physics: 
though  physics  may  be  in  a  state  of  development,  and  may  in  the  future  course  of  its 
development  make  further  claims  about  the  intrinsic  nature  of  such  things  as  neurons 
and  synapses  that  falsify  claims  about  the  nature  of  these  and  other  things  as  made  by 
current  physics,  that  will  change  little  about  how  we  actually  deal  with  neurons  and 
synapses  in  neurophysiology.  Insofar  as  neurons  and  synapses  qualify  as  physical,  and 
insofar  as  we  describe  connections  between  our  neurophysiology  and  relations  to  our 
external  environment  and  our  mental  fives,  then  we  will  have  a  meaningful  physicalist 
thesis  about  the  mind.  Meanwhile,  physics  is  free  to  develop  as  it  will.  Heilman 
effectively  separates  'physics'  from  'physicalism-physicalism  is  for  him  the  thesis  that  all 
macroscopic  phenomena,  such  as  mental  phenomena,  are  comprised  and  determined  by 
and  explicable  in  terms  of  phenomena  that  can  be  picked  out  by  current  physics:  that  is, 
there  are  no  (macrophysical)  phenomena  that  do  not  have  their  bases  in  something 
describable  in  terms  of  current  physics.  Physics  as  it  proceeds  may  identify  lower-level 
phenomena  that  constitute  and  explain  the  phenomena  picked  out  by  current  physics, 
and  future  physics  may  prove  that  some  or  all  of  the  claims  made  by  current  physics  are  in 
fact  false.  Whatphysics  does  will  not  falsify  Hellman's  restricted  version  dphysicalism  as 
long  as  it  remains  true  that  macroscopic  physics  is  sufficient  to  provide  explanations  for 
all  macroscopic  phenomena  and  descriptions  of  all  macroscopic  entities. 
Daly  finds  this  version  of  physicalism  inadequate.  First,  in  the  absence  of  a 
definition  of  what  is  to  count  as  a  physical  property,  it  is  difficult  to  make  sense  of  the 
claims  that  all  natural  phenomena  depend  on  physical  phenomena  and  all  entities  are 
exhausted  by  physical  entities.  Secondly,  Daly  finds  that  Hellman!  s  formulation  of 
physicalism  falls  short  of  providing  a  general,  unrestricted  version  of  physicalism,  as  it 
explicitly  restricts  the  claims  of  physicalism  to  the  macroscopic.  This  is  correct.  But  it 
seems  that  we  only  need  such  a  general,  unrestricted  version  of  physicalism  if  we  require  a 
principled  account  of  what  is  to  count  as  a  physical  property.  But  Hellman  explicitly 
rejects  this  requirement:  "HeRman-Thompson  physicalism  appealed  to  existing  physics 
in  formulating  ontological  exhaustion  Cbasic,  positive,  physical  predicate"),  and  it  made 
no  sense  of  "physical  property"  apart  from  "what  is  expressed  [in  models  of  relevant  laws] 
by  a  predicate  of  physical  theory.  `2  Hellman  accepts  the  fact  that  the  current  physics 
upon  which  Hellman-Thompson  physicalism  draws  is  incomplete,  but  they  do  not 
require  a  complete  physics  for  their  elucidation  of  the  physicalist  thesis.  Thus,  if 
Hellman's  and  Thompson's  physicalism  fails  to  provide  a  satisfactory  account  ofwhat  is  to 
Count  as  a  physical  property,  that  is  hardly  surprising:  they  do  not  intend  for  it  to  do  so. 
'What  will  count  as  a  physical  property,  as  far  as  restricted,  macroscopic  physicalism  is 
concerned,  will  be  those  properties  that  are  picked  out  by  macroscopic  physics.  They 
will  also  be  those  properties  picked  out  by  quantum  mechanics,  by  superstring  theory,  by 
whatever  theories  are  developed  in  physics.  The  explanation  of  macroscopic  physical 
41 phenomena  given  by  these  branches  of  knowledge  will  be  interesting  to  physicists,  but 
irrelevant  to  restricted  physicalism. 
There  remains  the  question  of  whether  such  a  restricted  version  of  physicalism 
can  truly  be  satisfying.  Many  physicalists  would  prefer  a  stronger  connection  between 
physicalism  and  physics  as  it  develops  than  is  expressly  involved  in  Hellman-Thompson 
physicalism.  Further,  Daly  points  out  that  Hellman-Thompson  restricted  physicalism  is 
entailed  by  weakphysicalism  as  formulated  by  David  Armstrong,  and  that  weak 
physicalism  is  compatible  with  certain  notions  that  physicalists  characteristically  arc 
concerned  to  reject:  the  idea  that  there  exists  a  transcendent  God  is  his  example-'3  If 
indeed  a  stronger  version  of  physicalism  is  motivated,  it  appears  that  Hellman-Thompson 
restricted  physicalism  will  not  address  all  physicalist  concerns. 
Jeffrey  Poland  describes  a  more  general  version  of  physicalism  according  to  which 
the  physicalist  ontology  is  to  be  derived  from  the  ideology  of  physics.  He  describes 
physicalism  as  "a  general  programme  of  non-eliminative,  structural  unification  that 
accords  a  certain  sort  of  privilege  to  physics.  "64  The'structural  unification'involved  is 
unification  of  branches  of  knowledge:  according  to  physicalism  as  Poland  describes  it,  all 
sciences  have  a  place  within  a  structure  with  physics  at  the  foundation.  He  is  careful  to 
distinguish  between  the  notions  of  unitary  science  and  unified  science:  6s  according  to  the 
former  notion,  one  science  will  be  sufficient  for  the  description  and  explanation  of  all 
real  phenomena.  This  is  an  eliminative  reductive  notion,  entailing  that  all  nonbasic 
sciences,  while  they  may  be  humanly  interesting,  are  explanatorily  superfluous.  The 
notion  of  unified  science,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  entail  eliminativism,  but  is 
compatible  with  the  idea  that  there  can  be  real  divisions  between  different  branches  of 
knowledge  and  the  kinds  of  phenomena  with  which  they  deal,  such  that  physics  is 
entirely  inappropriate  for  the  explanation  of  some  genuine  phenomena  that  are  within 
the  domains  of  other  sciences.  However,  all  sciences  are  in  some  way  related  to  physics, 
such  that  physics  is  privileged  over  all  other  sciences.  This  privilege  is  characterised  by 
claims  in  three  areas:  ontology,  objectivity,  and  explanation. 
The  ontological  privilege  of  physics  consists  in  the  notion  that  "everything  has  a 
place  in  an  ontological  structure  grounded  in  the  ontology  of  physics:  the  physical 
ontology  is  the  most  basic  and  comprehensive  relative  to  all  that  there  is  in  the  sense  that 
all  objects  and  attributes  are  dependent  upon,  supervenient  upon,  and  realised  by 
physical  objects  and  attributes"ý"  Thus  there  are  no  objects,  attributes  or  relations 
independent  of  physical  objects,  attributes  and  relations.  This  does  not  entail  the  strong 
claim  that  there  mists  nothing  apart  from  the  purely  physical,  but  involves  only  the 
notion  that  if  there  are  genuinely  nonphysical  things,  they  are  ontologically  grounded  in 
and  dependent  upon  physical  things. 
The  objective  privilege  of  physics  is  similar  to  the  notion  that'the  physical  facts 
determine  all  the  facts':  "The  idea  is  that  for  there  to  be  objective  matters  of  fact  and 
truth  in  some  domain  and  for  there  to  be  objective  sameness  and  difference  in  some 
respect  between  individuals,  there  must  be  certain  appropriately  relatedphysical  facts, 
truths,  similarities  and  differences.  "67There  is  also  the  related  epistemological  notion 
that  the  physical  facts  are  as  they  are  independently  of  how  any  human  endeavour  (or  any 
42 other  intellectual  endeavour)  describes  them:  after  all,  if  physicalism  is  indeed  true,  all 
human  endeavor  is  realised  in  the  physical.  Physical  facts  and  truths  are  thus  prior  to  all 
other  facts  and  truths:  "they  are  the  putative  objects  of  our  knowledge,  but  they  are  in  no 
way  dependent  upon  that  knowledge.  "" 
The  explanatory  privilege  of  physics,  perhaps  the  most  interesting  feature  of 
Poland's  physicalism,  involves  the  idea  of  a  layered  hierarchy  of  sciences  with  physics  as 
the  most  fundamental  branch  of  knowledge.  Descriptions  of  phenomena  picked  out  by 
any  particular  science,  such  as  biology  or  chemistry,  can  be  explained  and/or  described  in 
terms  of  phenomena  picked  out  by  sciences  at  a  (characteristically)  lower  level,  for 
example,  molecular  physics  or  chemistry,  ultimately  by  physics.  'The  key  idea  is  that  of  a 
unified  explanatory  system  in  which  different  branches  of  knowledge  are  organised 
hierarchically  with  physics  at  the  foundation,  and  in  which  the  generalisations  and 
phenomena  studied  at  each  level  of  the  hierarchy  are  explainable  in  terms  of 
generalisations  and  phenomena  at  lower  levels.  "69  Poland's  term  for  this  relation  isvertical 
explanation'.  70  The  idea  does  not  entail  that  for  all  phenomena  at  all  levels,  there  exists  an 
explanation  inphysics,  but  only  that  the  explanation  that  does  obtain  for  any  given 
phenomenon  on  any  particular  level  is  related,  either  directly  or  by  any  number  of 
intermediate  explanatory  links,  to  physics.  7,  Physical  explanations  ultimately  serve  to 
demystify  higher  level  phenomena  by  providing  a  set  of  basic  processes  and  mechanisms 
that  ground  all  processes  on  higher  levels. 
Poland's  notion  of  whatphysicalism  is,  as  well  as  what  thephysical  is,  draws  upon  the 
notion  ofwhatphysics  is,  such  that  the  physical  ontology  and  the  doctrine  of  physicalism 
are  to  be  derived  from  the  ideology  of  physics.  In  order  to  give  content  to  his  formulation, 
he  must  give  a  definition  of  physics.  It  is  to  this  strategy  that  Daly  objects.  Daly  says 
'Jeffrey  Poland  attempts  to  say  which  properties  are  physical  by  (i)  saying  what  physics 
is,  and  then  (2)  saying  what  properties  are  physical  properties  in  terms  of  saying  what 
properties  are  described  by  physics.  "  But  this  is  not  quite  right.  Poland  writes: 
The  central  idea  for  an  aposteiioH  approach  [to  formulating  physicalism)  is  to  pin  downpbyýiq  as  a 
distinct  branch  of  knowledge  and  to  develop  the  physical  bases  in  terms  of  it...  the  approach  I 
favour  begins  with  a  characterisation  of  pliysics  that  can  briefly  be  summarised  as  f6liows:  physics 
is  the  branch  of  science  concerned  with  identifying  a  basic  class  of  objects  and  attributes  and  a 
class  of  principles  that  are  sufficient  for  an  account  of  space-time  and  of  the  composition,  dynamics, 
and  interactions  of  space-time.  7 
Let  us  see  how  DaVs  criticisms  do  not  address  Poland's  actual  position.  Daly  offers 
several  criticisms  of  Poland's  account.  Firstly  he  asks:  in  what  sense  of  'basic'  does 
physics  describe  'basic'  classes  of  entities,  and  what  kinds  of  dynamics  and  interactions 
does  it  describe?  He  mentions  Poland's  assertion  that  psychologically  based  systems, 
unlike  physics,  do  not  introduce  properties  and  principles  to  explain  the  dynamics  of  the 
occupants  of  space-time,  and  comments  that  as  human  beings  are  unquestionably 
occupants  of  space-time  and  since  psychology  introduces  properties  and  principles  to 
explain  the  dynamics  of  human  interactions,  Poland's  claim  seems  wrong,  and  physics 
cannot  uniquely  be  characterised  in  this  way.  Second  he  asks  us  to  consider  a  merchant 
bank,  composed  of  a  chair,  shareholders,  a  board  of  deputies  &c.  It  interacts  with  other 
43 financial  institutions,  and  engages  in  the  dynamics  of  buying  and  selling  stocks.  Yet 
physics,  presumably,  is  not  concerned  with  the  dynamics  and  interactions  of  this 
particular  type  of  space-time  occupant.  The  question  presents  itself.  with  what  class  of 
dynamics  and  interactions  is  physics  concerned,  then? 
I  think  that  these  questions  are  answered  in  the  passage  directly  following  the  one 
quoted  above.  Poland  writes: 
The  crucial  feature  of  these  classes  is  that  they  are  minimal  with  respect  to  the  descriptive  and 
explanatory  purposes  they  serve,  that  the  magnitudes  are  defined  for  all  regions  of  space-time,  and 
that  each  occupant  of  space-time  satisfies  the  principles  governing  these  magnitudes.  It  is  both 
the  types  of  phenomena  they  are  introduced  to  explain  (i.  e.  com 
. 
position,  dynamics,  interactions) 
and  their  complete  generality  that  distinguishes  these  magnitudes  and  principles  from  others,  and 
hence  that  distinguishes  physics  from  all  other  branches  of  inquiry.  " 
Thus,  though  human  beings  are  occupants  of  space-time  and  though  psychology  does 
introduce  properties  and  principles  to  explain  their  dynamics  and  interactions, 
psychology  does  not  introduce  minimal  properties  and  principles,  nor  does  it  introduce 
general  ones,  such  as  would  apply  to  those  regions  of  space-time  not  containing  human 
beings.  We  never  find  objects  or  processes  and  dynamics  such  as  would  appropriately  be 
explained  by  psychology  in  the  absence  of  human  beings.  74  However,  wherever  we  find 
human  beings,  we  also  find  masses,  electrical  charges,  gravitational  forces,  &c  - 
magnitudes  shared  by  other  regions  of  space-time  containing  no  intentional  agents,  and 
which  are  appropriately  described  and  explained  by  the  properties  and  principles 
introduced  by  physics.  The  properties  and  principles  introduced  by  psychology 
presumably  will  be  vertically  describable  and  explainable  in  terms  of  the  science  of  that 
which  is  shared  by  all  regions  of  space-time,  and  that  science  will  be  physics.  The  same 
is  true  for  the  example  of  the  merchant  bank:  we  never  find  a  merchant  bank  or  its 
various  constituents  and  dynamics  in  the  absence  of  objects  and  dynamics  appropriately 
described  by  physics.  ' 
Thus  physics,  being  concerned  to  identify  the  most  basic  class  of  objects  and 
principles  sufficient  for  the  explanation  of  the  dynamics  and  interactions  of  all  occupants 
of  space-time  in  all  regions  of  space-time,  is  to  be  considered  a  universal  science"  -  not, 
as  noted  above,  that  all  phenomena  in  space-time  have  descriptions  and  explanations  in 
pbysics,  but  that  for  any  occupant  of  any  region  of  space-time  and  for  all  interactions  and 
dynamics  involved  with  that  occupant,  there  are  space-time  occupants  comprising  or 
constitutive  of  that  occupant  such  that  explanations  in  terms  of  physics  are  appropriate  to 
the  constitutive  objects,  and  such  explanations  are  vertically  related  to  the  explanations 
appropriate  to  the  explanation  of  the  interactions  and  dynamics  of  the  original  space- 
time  occupant.  76  The  descriptions  and  explanations  given  for  those  phenomena  Will  be,  if 
not  enlightening  insofar  as  they  are  applied  to  the  higher-level  space-time  occupant, 
sufficient  for  the  explanation  of  all  the  dynamics  and  interactions  in  the  system. 
For  Poland,  the  universality  of  physics  is  not  to  be  construed  in  terms  of  its 
universal  explanatory  power,  for  it  does  not  have  the  power  to  explain  all  kinds  of 
phenomena  that  there  are  or  could  be.  Its  universality  consists  in  the  kinds  of  questions 
it  is  characteristically  directed  towards  answering.  Poland  gives  a  partial  list  of  such 
44 questions,  very  broadly  construed: 
What  are  the  fundamental  constituents  of  all  occupants  of  space-time? 
Wliat  are  the  fundamental  processes  that  underlie  all  causation  and  interaction 
between  such  occupants? 
What  parameters  are  relevant  to  the  dynamic  unfolding  of  all  systems  in  space- 
time  and  hence  to  all  change? 
What  is  the  nature  of  space-time  itself,  its  origin  (if  it  has  one),  and  its 
destinyý77 
The  answers  to  these  highly  general  questions  will  of  necessity  themselves  be  highly 
general,  and  it  is  this  feature  that  Poland  finds  characteristic  of  physics:  "it  is  these 
features  which  establish  the  ontological  and  epistemological  rekvance  of  physics  to  the 
physicalist  programme".  78 
In  objection,  Daly  points  out  that  there  are  branches  of  physics  that  are  not 
concerned  with  questions  such  as  those  Poland  lists  as  characteristic  of  physics,  citing 
astronomy  and  thermodynamics.  He  is  certainly  right:  such  sciences  as  these  are  typically 
not  concerned  with  the  ultimate  structure  and  origin  of  all  things.  However,  I  think  it 
should  be  clear  from  the  preceding  discussion  that  the  physics  that  Poland  has  in  mind 
as  sitting  at  the  foundation  of  the  explanatory  hierarchy  is  badc  physics.  Astronomy  and 
thermodynamics  are  not  basic  physics,  so  practitioners  of  those  sciences  are  free  to  be 
unconcerned  with  the  basic,  fundamental  features  of  space-time  and  its  occupants-19 
Surely,  however,  this  approach  falls  to  the  difficulties  Daly  had  earlier  cited,  and 
that  Hellman  had  accepted  in  his  formulation  of  physicalism:  our  current  most  basic 
physics  is  almost  assuredly  incomplete  and  incorrect,  and  we  cannot  simply  postulate  a 
complete  and  correct  unspecified  future  physics  as  the  most  basic  and  universal  physics, 
for  to  do  so  would  render  the  doctrine  of  physicalism  as  stated  vacuous.  To  what  physics 
are  we  to  appeaP 
Poland  is,  however,  perfectly  aware  of  these  difficulties.  He  himself  raises  them  in 
objection  to  the  idea  that  the  physical  ontology  can  simply  be  read  off  from  the  activity 
and  production  of  physics  -  the  very  position  he  is  described  by  Daly  as  occupying,  "' 
which  position  Poland  describes  as  'quite  unacceptable'.  "  Poland  objects  to  this  position 
from  three  directions:  first,  'leaving  it  to  the  physicists'  to  determine  what  is  to  count  as 
physical  is  "unhelpful  unless  it  is  known  who  the  physicists  are  and,  more  broadly,  what 
physics  is".  1a  Without  an  account  to  answer  this  concern,  the  statement  of  what  is  to 
count  as  physical  is  empty  or  circular.  Secondly,  this  position  leaves  it  open  that  physics, 
and  consequently  what  counts  as  physical,  could  be  determined  by  "arbitrary 
administrative  decisions  or  other  forms  of  socio-historic  accidentN  in  ways  that  would  not 
answer  to  the  metaphysical  concerns  of  physicalists.  Thirdly,  it  is  open  whether  it  is 
current  physics,  future  physics,  or  ideal  physics  that  the  physicists  to  whom  we  are 
leaving  it  to  say  in  what  the  physical  ontology  consists  are  supposed  to  be  practising.  The 
difficulties  with  all  three  will  be  familiar  from  the  preceding  discussion. 
Is  Poland  then  contradicting  himself  in  saying  that  the  ontology  of  physics  is  to 
be  derived  from  a  characterisation  of  physics?  Not  at  all:  the  position  ascribed  to  Poland 
by  Daly  is  not  in  fact  one  that  he  occupies,  but  rather,  like  Hellman,  Poland  explicitly 
45 rejects  the  notion  that  any  constraints  at  all  can  be  set  upon  the  physical  that  are  not 
subject  to  revision.  It  is  inappropriate,  according  to  Poland,  to  circumscribe  the  physical 
ontology  according  to  any  set  physical  science,  current,  future,  or  ideal:  rather, 
physicalism  must  recognise  the  changing  nature  of  physical  science,  its  method  and 
content,  and  must  accommodate  and  incorporate  that  in  its  formulation:  "What  the 
physical  ontology  consists  in  is,  of  course,  the  central  question  to  be  solved  for  proper 
development  of  physicalist  doctrine.  Recognition  of  the  changing  nature  of  physical 
theory  and  the  consequent  rejection  of  specific  apioH  conceptions  of  the  physical  are 
critical  aspects  of  that  problem.  "14 
Poland's  formulation  of  physicalism  begins  with  a  characterisation  of  physics 
(properly  basic  physics)  as  a  science  concerned  to  answer  certain  kinds  of  questions 
about  the  fundamental  nature  of  space-time  and  its  occupants.  Whatever  properties  that 
science  says  are  physical  are  the  properties  that  we  sbould  take  it  are  physical.  But  this  is  an 
ideological  derivation,  and  insofar  as  the  ideology  of  physics  is  subject  to  change  and 
revision,  so  too  should  our  notion  of  what  is  to  count  as  a  physical  property  -  or  at  the 
very  least,  a  basic  physical  property-  be  subject  to  change  and  revision.  Poland  rejects 
the  notion  that  constraints  can  be  set  upon  the  ontology  of  physics  from  outside  physics. 
We  are  to  take  it  that  the  properties  identified  by  basic  physics  are  physical  properties, 
but  for  the  purposes  of  physicalism  what  specific  properties  physics  identifies  -  even, 
indeed,  whether  physics  as  characterised  exists  -  is  irrelevant. 
Thus,  neither  Hellman  or  Poland  provide  an  explanation  ofwhat  is  to  count  as  a 
physical  property,  nor  do  they  intend  to,  attempting  instead  to  convey  content  upon  the 
doctrine  of  physicalism  while  explicitly  rejecting  any  constraints  upon  what  is  to  count  as 
physical.  They  do  not  provide  accounts  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  physical  property,  not 
because  the  formulations  of  physicalism  they  offer  fall  short  of  doing  so  adequately,  but 
because  these  formulations  are  constructed  to  avoid  doing  precisely  that.  Given  the  very 
serious  problems  already  encountered  for  the  elucidation  of  what  is  to  count  as  a  physical 
property,  this  does  not  appear  to  be  a  bad  strategy. 
Having  examined  several  possible  ways  of  describing  what  it  is  to  be  a  physical 
property  and  finding  all  wanting,  Daly  concludes  that  the  notion  of  'the  physical!  is  not 
well  defined,  and  so  all  metaphysical  programs  that  assume  a  distinction  between 
physical  and  nonphysical  properties  should  be  abandoned  in  favour  of  problems  that 
would  emerge  irrespective  of  whether  or  not  such  a  division  were  assumed.  However,  I 
believe  that  this  prescription  is  a  trifle  hasty.  It  may  be  perfectly  possible  to  construct  a 
formulation  of  physicalist  doctrine  that  is  able  to  confer  content  upon  the  notion  of 
physicalism  without  requiring  apriori  criteria  by  which  to  distinguish  physical  properties 
from  nonphysical  properties.  Consequently,  I  agree  with  Daly  that  there  are  serious, 
perhaps  insurmountable,  problems  involved  in  the  attempt  to  specify  what  properties, 
amongst  the  great  inventory  of  properties  that  we  might  identify,  are  to  count  as  physical 
ones.  I  disagree  with  his  conclusion  that  this  makes  the  concept  of  physicalism  itself 
empty.  Rather,  I  think  that  important  lessons  can  be  learned  from  the  difficulties  that 
Daly  has  brought  to  light  which  indicate  a  direction  for  further  development  of  the 
Physicalist  thesis,  a  direction  already  explored  by  Hellman  and  Poland.  If  we  cannot  say 
46 what  properties  are  to  count  as  physical,  then  perhaps  we  can  get  somewhere  by 
formulating  a  minimalist  physicalism  which  does  not  draw  on  such  a  notion,  but  rejects  it 
entirely,  in  favour  of  other  kinds  of  constraints. 
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Reconsidering  Reduction: 
3.  The  Foundations  ofPbysicalism 
From  the  preceding  discussion  a  picture  of  the  character  of 
physicalist  doctrine  has  been  constructed,  along  with  some  of 
the  serious  difficulties  involved  in  the  expression  of  that 
doctrine.  Though  generally  presented  against  dualism  as  a  thesis 
about  the  mind,  to  the  effect  that  the  mental  is  ontologically 
grounded  in  the  physical,  it  should  be  clear  that  physicalism  is  a 
general  doctrine,  wherein  the  physicalist  claims  not  just  that 
mental  things  are  so  grounded,  but  that  everytbing  is  in  some  way  physical.  The  physical  is 
the  prime  ontological  category  to  which  everything  belongs  or  upon  which  everything 
depends.  Further,  physicalism  places  some  constraints  on  the  ways  in  which  nonphysical 
properties  can  be  dependent  upon  physical  properties:  it  is  not  enough  that  they  simply 
exist  alongside  physical  properties,  dependent  upon  the  physical  only  for  pure  existence. 
Physicalists  typically  speak  of  nonphysical  properties  being  instantiatedin  or  realisedby 
physical  properties.  I  propose  to  differentiate  the  two  terms,  and  shall  henceforth  use 
them  as  follows:  I  understand  the  notion  of  instantiation  to  be  an  expression  of  token 
identity,  according  to  which  each  instance  of  a  mental  (or  other)  nonphysical  property  is 
identical  with  some  instance  of  a  physical  property.  Realisation  I  shall  take  to  express  a 
stronger  relation  of  relevance,  which  I  understand  in  both  an  explanatory  and 
metaphysical  sense. 
Barry  LePore  and  Ernest  Loewer  explain  the  notion  of  realisation  as  follows: 
The  usual  conception  is  that  e's  being  P  realises  e's  being  F  iff  e  is  p  and  e  is  F  and  there  is  a 
strong  connection  of  some  sort  between  P  and  F.  We  propose  to  understand  this  connection  as  a 
necessary  connection  which  is  explanatory.  The  existence  of  an  explanatory  connection  between 
two  properties  is  stronger  than  the  claim  thatP-+M  is  physically  necessary  since  not  every 
physicafly  necessary  connection  is  explanatory.  ' 
Jaegwon  Kim  objects  that  though  the  idea  behind  LePore's  and  Loewer's  explanatory 
requirement  is  right,  the  explanatory  relation  simpliciter  should  not  be  understood  as 
48 constitutive  of  realisation.  Rather,  an  objective  metaphysical  relation  should  be  taken  as 
grounding  the  purely  epistemological  relation  of  explanation.  He  says: 
That  P  explains  M  cannot  be  a  brute,  fundamental  fact  about  P  and  M...  In  the  case  of  realisation, 
the  key  concepts,  I  su  est,  are  those  of  causalmechanism  and  microstructure.  When  P  is  said  to 
"realize"  M  in  some  sYmust  specify  a  microstructural  property  of  s  that  provides  a  causal 
mechanism  for  the  implementation  of  M  in  s;  moreover,  in  interesting  cases  -  in  fact,  if  we  are  to 
speak  meaningfýlly  of  'implementation"  ofM-  P  will  be  a  member  of  a  family  of  - 
hysical 
properties  forming  a  network  of  nomologically  connected  n-dcrostructural  states 
lat 
provides  a 
microcausal  mechanism,  in  systems  appropriately  likes,  for  the  nomological  connections  among  a 
broad  system  of  mental  properties  of  which  M  is  an  element.  " 
Kim  suggests  that  we  take  a  realist  stance  towards  explanation:  if  P  explains  M  in  some 
systems,  it  is  because  there  is  a  specifiable  causal  mechanism  ins's  microstructure  that  is 
sufficient  for  M  in  s.  In  emphasising  causal  mechanism  and  microstructure,  Kim  implies 
that  realised  properties  must  be  functional  properties,  to  be  distinguished  from  second- 
order  properties  generally.  That  is,  I  believe,  correct:  all  realised  properties  must  be 
construed  functionally  in  order  to  understand  their  relation  to  the  mechanisms  that 
explain  them.  Thus,  the  property  watersolubk  must  be  understood  as  something  along 
the  lines  of  being  a  structure  that  loses  internal  cohesion  when  in  water  in  order  to  specify  the 
microstructural  mechanisms  that  result  in  the  exhibition  of  this  property  of  certain 
substances.  To  say,  then,  that  the  mental  is  realisedin  physical  states  is  to  make  a  much 
stronger  claim  than  that  mental  properties  are  ontologically  dependent  upon,  covariant 
with,  or  instantiated  by  physical  properties.  It  is  to  claim  that  it  is  a  fact  about  the 
microstructure  of  the  system  in  which  mental  states  occur  that  there  are  causal 
mechanisms  that  bring  it  about  that  there  are  mental  states  in  that  system:  causal 
mechanisms  which,  had  we  the  science  to  find  them  out,  would  ground  a  complete 
explanation  of  the  obtaining  of  mental  states  in  that  system.  3 
This  does  not  mean  that  for  any  type  of  phenomenon  picked  out  on  any  level 
there  exists  a  description  or  explanation  inphysics.  -  there  are  some  kinds  of  properties, 
such  as  being  a  token  ofa  monetary  unit  or  being  a  desire  that  Raoh  Nader  win  theUS2000 
ekction,  for  which  there  can  be  no  interesting  physical  description,  4and  explanations 
involving  such  properties  in  themselves  will  not  be  interesting  or  illuminating  on  the 
physical  level.  But  physical  properties  and  physical  interactions  win  back  each  instance  of 
a  property  or  interaction  on  any  level  of  individuation. 
I  believe  that  Kim  is  right  in  advocating  a  realistic  conception  of  the  realisation 
relation.  The  idea  that  the  properties  of  things  can  be  explained  and  understood  in 
terms  of  the  properties  of  the  things  that  comprise  them  is  fundamental  in  actual 
scientific  practice  and  in  the  ideology  of  physicalism.  Taken  realistically,  the  notion  of 
physical  realisation  involves  metaphysical  and  explanatory  principles  underlying  the 
relation  of  realised  properties  to  the  physical  properties  doing  the  realising.  Causal-nomic 
Connections  among  appropriate  microstructural  relata  are  what  underlie  realised 
properties.  Thus  for  the  physicalist  to  entertain  the  notion  of  realisation,  the  physicalist 
must  have  some  commitment  to  a  realistic  conception  of  an  explanatory  relation 
obtaining  between  properties. 
The  two  principles  which  best  capture  these  primary  concerns  of  physicalist 
49 doctrine  without  necessarily  committing  physicalists  to  potentially  undesirable 
consequences  are  those  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain  and  the 
supervenience  of  all  phenomena  upon  physical  phenomena.  Supervenience,  when 
applied  to  the  physical  domain  the  thesis  that  there  can  be  no  change  at  an  without  some 
physical  change,  expresses  the  physicalist's  commitment  to  the  dependence  of  all  the 
facts  upon  the  physical  facts,  while  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical 
domain  is  expressive  of  the  metaphysical  and  explanatory  constraints  robust  physicalism 
imposes  upon  the  ideas  of  causation  and  composition., 
I  want  to  say  a  bit  about  these  principles,  and  to  establish  them  as  essentially 
underpinning  the  thesis  of  physicalism.  Importantly,  I  will  not  attempt  to  establish  the 
trutb  of  these  principles.  I  do  not  believe  that  either  principle  can  beproven:  there  is 
much  speculation  on  the  nature  of  causation,  on  the  idea  of  which  any  discussion  of 
causal  closure  must  be  based,  and  the  phenomenon  is  empirically  opaque.  Any  definite 
answer  to  the  question  of  whether  the  physical  facts  do  determine  all  the  facts  is  similarly 
in  principle  obscure.  Thus,  I  can  give  no  indefeasible  reason  why  these  principles  should 
be  believed.  I  hope  to  be  able  to  say,  however,  why  it  is  reasonable  for  serious  Physicalists 
to  accept  them,  and  how  the  considerations  motivating  the  acceptance  of  these 
principles  are  the  same  ones  motivating  physicalism  generally.  My  aim  in  this  thesis  is 
not  to  demonstrate  the  truth  of  physicalism  to  the  anti-physicalist,  nor  is  it  to  argue  for 
the  truth  of  the  causal  closure  principle  or  the  thesis  of  supervenience.  Rather,  in 
discussing  the  principles  that  I  take  to  be  at  the  heart  of  physicalism,  I  hope  to  expose 
some  considerations  which  I  believe  physicalists  ought  generally  to  share,  as  well  as  weed 
out  some  problematic  notions  with  which  some  physicalists  have  been  concerned. 
Finally,  I  wish  to  make  a  case  for  a  possible  formulation  of  the  physicalist  thesis  which 
may  have  some  surprising  consequences. 
4,3.1. 
The  Causal  Closure  oftbePbysical  Domain 
We  have  already  encountered  a  version  of  the  causal  closure  principle  as 
presented  by  Papineau  in  his  formulation  of  physicalism.  There  were  some  problems 
with  his  defence  of  that  principle,  some  of  which,  I  noted  at  the  time,  were  resultant 
from  his  formulation  of  the  principle.  Recall  that  Papineau  had  said: 
ryhysical 
I  take  it  that  physics,  unlike  the  other  special  sciences,  is  complete,  in  the  sense  that  aý 
events  are  determined,  or  have  their  chances  determined,  by  prior  pbysical  events  accor  ing  to 
pýysical  laws.  In  other  words,  we  never  need  to  look  beyond  the  realm  of  the  physical  in  order  to 
identify  a  set  of  antecedents  which  fixes  the  chances  of  any  subsequent  physicat  occurrence.  A 
purely  physical  specification,  plus  physical  laws,  will  always  suffice  to  tell  us  what  is  physically 
going  to  happen,  insofar  as  that  can  be  foretold  at  all! 
The  principle  is  formulated  as  an  epistemological  one  applying  to  the  science  of  physics, 
describing  what  Papineau  refers  to  as  the  internal  completeness  ofpbysics.  7To  formulate  the 
principle  in  this  way  makes  it  necessary  for  Papineau  to  argue  for  this  completeness,  for 
there  is  no  reason  for  us  to  assume  that  pýysics  is  complete;  indeed,  Papineau  simply  had 
so stipulated  it  to  be  so,  and  we  saw  how  this  had  serious  negative  consequences  for  his 
argument.  Further,  though  he  states  the  principle  in  terms  of  the  closure  of  the  physical 
sciences,  it  is  not  clear  that  its  dcfinition  is  purely  epistemological:  the  notion  that  all 
physical  events  are  determined  by  prior  physical  events  according  to  physical  laws 
certainly  would  seem  to  constrain  properties,  entities,  and  states,  not  merely  their 
descriptions  in  physics,  and  so  to  present  a  more  metaphysical  usage.  Papincau  perhaps 
could  have  saved  himself  this  trouble  had  he  formulated  the  principle  as  the  explanatory 
closure  ofpbysicr-  all  explanations  of  events  describable  in  physics,  he  might  have  said, 
cite  only  causes  also  describable  in  physics,  or,  we  need  never  go  beyond  the  physical 
vocabulary  to  give  a  complete  sufficient  explanation  of  physical  events.  But  had  he  kept 
the  principle  in  a  purely  epistemological  form,  it  is  uncertain  that  it  would  have  been  able 
to  do  the  work  that  he  requires  it  to  do  in  supporting  the  manifestability  argument  for 
supervenience  and  the  causal  argument  for  token  congruence.  I  am  not  certain  why  he 
chooses  to  formulate  the  principle  as  he  does:  perhaps  because  he  knows  that  he  can 
describephysics,  but  not  thephysicd.  However,  I  do  not  think  that  this  difficulty  should 
stop  us  from  understanding  the  principle  as  applying  to  the  physical  domain.  Had 
Papineau  so  expressed  it,  he  would  not  have  had  to  give  the  arguments,  which  proved 
highly  problematic,  for  the  closure  of  physics,  for  we  have  good  reasons  to  believe  that  the 
physical  domain  is  complete  and  casually  closed,  even  ifphysirs  is  not., 
A  domain  is  said  to  be  causally  closed  if  elements  in  the  domain  interact  only  with 
other  elements  in  the  same  domain.  Thus,  for  the  physical  domain,  in  tracing  the  causal 
history  of  any  event  falling  under  physical  description,  we  need  never  move  outside  the 
physical  domain  to  cite  nonphysical  causes.  Each  physical  event  has  a  complete 
sufficient  physical  cause.  This  implies  that  if  a  mental  cause  is  cited  in  any  causal  chain 
involving  an  antecedent  physical  effect,  9  then  that  mental  cause  must  somehow  or  other 
be  a  physical  cause,  for  nothing  but  physical  causes  can  result  in  physical  effects. 
Crane  and  Mellor  had  implicitly  rejected  this  principle  when  they  said  that  there 
is  plenty  of  mental  causation,  10  taking  it  that  a  pure  mental  event,  qua  mental,  could  be 
cited  in  any  causal  chain  involving  physical  effects.  This  assertion  was  made  in  objection 
to  the  physicalist's  desideraturn  that  explanations  of  events  should  make  explanatory 
sense.  I  had  answered  that  to  argue  along  these  lines  ultimately  robs  an  the  sciences  of 
their  explanatory  power:  if  nonphysical  events  can  straightforwardly  and  in  themselves  be 
causally  efficacious  with  respect  to  the  physical,  we  cannot  expect  that  physical 
explanations,  will  be  sufficient  to  describe  physical  chains  of  events,  and  the  difficulty 
generalises  over  other  sciences  as  well.  But  perhaps  that  is  too  strong.  Indeed,  the 
principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain  makes  a  lot  of  trouble  for  higher 
level  properties  not  taken  as  strictly  physical  but  assumed  to  be  causally  effectivep  as  it 
seems  intuitively  plausible,  even  obvious,  that  so  many  of  them  are.  In  the  face  of  such 
compelling  evidence  that  mental  events  cause  and  are  caused  by  physical  events  (and  in 
the  absence  of  compelling  reasons  to  think  that  mental  causes  are  physical  causes),  does 
it  make  sense  to  insist  upon  the  causal  closure  principle?  Can  we  not  have  perfectly  good 
explanatory  systems  without  it? 
At  the  higher,  more  abstract  levels  of  description,  such  as  the  psychological  or 
5' biological,  it  makes  sense  to  regard  the  domain  without  any  form  of  closure  constraint. 
Indeed,  it  is  necessary  to  do  so,  for  it  is  an  accepted  truism  that  the  generalisations 
employed  at  such  levels  are  never  exceptionless,  but  are  subject  to  occasional 
falsification.  However,  when  a  law  of  the  special  sciences  does  not  apply  in  a  particular 
case,  we  take  it  that  there  is  some  reason  for  the  exception  to  have  occurred,  or  that 
something  happened  to  make  the  exception  occur.  The  laws  of  the  special  sciences  are, 
universally,  hedged  or  ceterisparibus  laws,  and  can  be  interpreted  as  being  of  the  form  "All 
things  being  equal,  C-+E",  or  "C--)E,  unless,  forsome  reason,  not.  "  Entities  and  events 
individuated  in  higher  level  sciences  can  be  described  in  terms  of  entities  and  events  in 
lower  level  sciences,  and  as  such,  elements  from  lower  level  domains  can  interact  with 
elements  in  higher  level  domains  in  ways  for  which  the  sciences  appropriate  to  that 
domain  have  neither  terms  nor  descriptive  apparatus.  This  can  result  in  things 
happening  on  the  higher  level  that  might  be  completely  unexpected  in  terms  of  the 
sciences  appropriate  to  that  level,  or  in  higher  level  phenomena  apparently  having  a 
somewhat  unpredictable  nature  as  far  as  their  descriptive  sciences  are  concerned.  Hume 
puts  it  welh 
The  vulgar,  who  take  things  according  to  their  first  appearance,  attribute  the  uncertainty  of 
events  to  such  an  uncertainty  in  the  causes  as  makes  the  latter  often  fail  of  their  usual  influence; 
though  they  meet  with  no  impediment  in  their  operation.  But  philosophers,  observing  that,  almost 
in  every  part  of  nature,  there  is  contained  a  vast  variety  of  springs  d  rinciples,  which  are  hid,  by 
e  oss  e  the  contrariety  of  effects  r  ason  of  their  minuteness  or  remoteness,  find  that  it  is  at  least  p 
anild, 
may  not  proceed  from  any  contingency  in  the  cause,  but  from  the  secret  operation  of  contrary 
causes,  and  proceeds  from  their  mutual  opposition...  From  the  observation  of  several  parallel 
instances,  philosophers  form  a  maxim  that  the  connexion  between  all  causes  and  effects  is  equally 
necessary,  and  that  its  seeming  uncertainty  in  some  instances  proceeds  from  the  secret  opposition 
of  contrary  causes.  " 
Ob 
The  possibility  of  the  falsification  of  higher  level  generalisations  is  not  a  brute, 
inexTficable  fact  about  higher  level  generalisations.  Uncertainty  is  not  an  intrinsic 
property  of  higher  level  generalisations,  but  is  in  fact  perfectly  explicable  in  terms  of  the 
lawlike  operation  of  opposing'springs  and  principles'  on  lower  levels  conspiring  to  bring 
about  a  effect  other  than  what  the  higher  level  generalisation  predicts. 
At  the  level  of  basic  physics,  however,  it  is  quite  different.  If  a  law  in  basic  physics 
does  not  apply  in  any  given  instance,  there  can  be  no  reason  why  it  should  have  been 
falsified,  for  there  are  no  'opposing  springs  and  principles'  at  a  level  lower  than  basic 
physics  from  which  the  failure  of  the  law  to  hold  in  that  instance  could  be  understood  to 
proceed.  n  Further,  lower  level  laws  cannot  admit  of  falsifications  by  contributions  from 
higher  level  phenomena,  for  each  higher  level  phenomenon  win  be  describable  in  lower 
level  terms;  the  generalisations  involved  at  the  higher  level  will  be  backed  by  lower  level 
generalisations  and  ultimately  by  physical  laws.  But  nothing  backs  the  laws  of  basic 
physics.  Given  that  they  are  basic,  they  must  simply  be  taken  as  given.  There  are  no  lower 
level  dynamics  to  back  falsifications  of  predictions  in  basic  physics,  for  nothing  backs 
basic  physics.  Any  physcally  explicable  interactions  at  the  fundamentally  physical  level, 
therefore,  will  take  place  completely  within  the  domain  of  basic  physics.  -3  Anything 
interacting  with  the  fundamentally  physical  domain  which  is  not  itself  on  that  level  does 
52 so  in  a  way  that  cannot  be  explained. 
The  falsifications  of  higher  level 
generalisations  will  have  reasonable 
explanations  in  lower  level  terms, 
because  elements  describable  in  lower 
level  terms  can  interact  with  the 
elements  described  in  higher  level 
sciences.  The  reverse,  however,  is 
inexplicable.  It  is  inconceivable  how 
anything  can  interact  with  physical  things 
on  the  level  of  basic  physics  except 
insofar  as  they  fall  under  some 
description  in  basic  physics.  Thus,  in 
order  to  meet  the  desideraturn  for 
explanatory  sufficiency,  the  physical 
domain  must  be  regarded  as  causally 
closed.  Some  may  object,  arguing  that  the  "I  think-  you  should  be  =re 
inconceivability  and  inexplicability  of  the  eXpliCit  here  in  step  two-' 
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phenomenon  is  no  reason  to  say  that  it 
Sydney  Harris  on  explanation.  does  not  happen,  asserting  that  things 
outwith  the  physical  domain  could  interact  with  the  physical  domain  in  a  non-explanatory 
way.  To  maintain  this  position,  however,  would  be  tantamount  to  an  assertion  on 
interactionist  dualism,  and  it  should  be  clear  that  such  a  metaphysic  cannot  support  a 
robust  explanatory  system.  In  stating  that  the  rejection  of  the  principle  of  the  causal 
closure  of  the  physical  domain  has  serious  and  unacceptable  consequences  for  the 
concept  of  sensible  explanation,  I  intimated  that  the  principle  is  derived  from  our 
intuitive  rejection  of  the  idea  of  substance  interactionism,  which  problem  was  the 
downfall  of  Cartesian  dualism.  I  believe  that  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the 
physical  domain  is  an  expression  of  that  reservation.  If  we  did  not  have  qualms  about 
substance  interaction,  it  would  not  be  a  mystery  how  a  purely  mental  thing  with  no 
physical  properties  could  affect  a  physical  thing,  and  Descartes's  postulation  of  spirits 
both  subtle  and  fine  whose  vectors  could  be  altered  by  the  influence  of  the  Res  Cogitans 
would  be  perfectly  acceptable.  But  it  is  not  acceptable.  The  same  is  true  for  the  causal 
powers  of  a  thing  composed  of  smaller  physical  things,  for  any  mereological  whole:  if  its 
causal  powers  are  not  derived  from  the  causal  powers  of  is  components,  then  any  effects 
it  has  upon  the  physical,  described  on  the  level  of  the  parts  that  constitute  it,  are  occult. 
One  powerful  idea  behind  the  causal  closure  principle  is  simply  that'Weird 
things  don't  happen  on  the  physical  level',  where  'weird'  is  to  be  taken  in  its  archaic 
sense:  14supernatural  things  don't  happen,  spooky  things  don't  happen,  and  neither  do 
unexplainable  spontaneities  of  a  sort  not  proprietary  to  the  physical  domain  happen,  on 
the  physical  level.  We  do  allow  in  current  physics  for  randomness,  for  spontaneous 
violations  of  the  conservation  laws,  for  genuine  non-locatability  of  particles,  for 
probabilistic  outcomes  of  causal  interactions,  and  for  all  manner  of  things  that  would  have 
53 stricken  a  classical  physicist  as  downright  occult.  But  when  we  do  this,  we  take  it  that 
these  are  natural  features  of  the  physical  at  the  level  of  our  most  basic  physics,  not 
strange  miracles  visited  upon  the  physical  from  another  realm.  In  other  words:  Tecause  a 
random  quantum  event  transported  all  of  its  mitochondria  to  the  far  side  of  the  galaxyis  a 
perfectly  valid  explanation  for  a  particular  cell's  failure  to  metabolise  on  some  occasion. 
The  chances  of  its  being  a  true  one  are  minute,  but  the  point  is  that  this  event  is  not 
miraculous.  -  it  has  a  physical  reason  to  have  happened.,,  s 
The  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain  is  a  far-reaching  and 
ultimately,  it  must  be  admitted,  unprovable  principle,  and  one  may  choose  not  to  accept 
it.  However,  I  believe  that  this  principle  is  what  underlies  the  sense  in  which  the  physical 
domain  enjoys  a  certain  metaphysical  and  explanatory  primacy  with  regard  to  all  other 
domains,  and  so  to  reject  it  is  to  reject  the  notion  that  there  can  be  reasonable  interlevel 
explanations  as  well  as  the  possibility  that  there  can  be,  even  theoretically,  a  complete 
physics.  The  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain  is  problematic  for  the 
notion  of  higher  level  properties  construed  as  causally  effective  in  their  own  right,  but  the 
cost  of  its  rejection,  I  think,  is  far  too  high. 
3.2.  Supervenience 
Supervenience  expresses  a  relation  between  two  or  more  sets  of  properties  such 
that  there  can  be  no  variation  in  one  set  of  properties  without  there  being  some  variation 
in  the  other.  One  set  of  properties  is  said  to  be  supervenient  or  to  supervene  upon  the 
other  set,  whilst  this  is  known  as  the  set  of  subvenient  properties,  or  as  forming  the 
supervenience  base  for  the  first  sev6  .  Supervenience  might  perspicuously  be  likened  to 
the  notion  of  composition:  two  mereological  wholes  with  qualitatively  identical  sets  of 
parts  in  all  the  same  relations  will,  we  expect,  be  qualitatively  identical;  -  if  mereological 
wholes  are  different,  we  would  expect  there  to  be  some  difference  in  their  constitution. 
The  thesis  that  the  properties  of  a  mereological  whole  are  determined  by  the  properties 
and  relations  of  its  parts  is,  indeed,  the  thesis  of  mereological  supervenience. 
Three  types  of  supervenience  are  generally  recognised,  termed  weak,  strong  and 
global  supervenience.  Weak  supervenience  nicely  captures  the  basic  sentiment  of  the 
relation  given  above.  Jaegwon  Kim  has  characterised  weak  supervenience  thus:  if  A  and 
B  are  two  nonempty  sets  of  properties,  closed  under  standard  Boolean  operators,  A 
supervenes  upon  B  just  in  case.  - 
Necessarily,  for  any  x  and  y,  if  x  and  y  share  all  properties  in  B,  then  x  and  y  share  all  properties  in 
A-  that  is,  indiscernibility  in  B  entails  indiscernibility  in  A.  " 
An  equivalent  definition  is  given  as  follows: 
Necessarily  for  any  object  x.  and  and  any  property  F  in  A,  if  x.  has  F,  then  there  exists  a  property  G 
.,  P, 
in  B  such  that  x  has  G,  and  if  any  y  has  G,  it  has  F.  " 
54 Note  that  this  exTression  does  not  strictly  identify  having  F  with  having  a  particular, 
specifiable  property  G.  Weak  supervenience  only  requires  that  if  some  x  has  some 
property  in  F  in  A,  then  it  has  some  property  in  B  such  that  if  anything  else  had  the  same 
property  in  B,  it  would  also  have  the  same  F  in  A.  In  order  to  identify  the  property  F  with 
the  property  G,  G  would  have  to  be  the  unique  supervenience  base  for  F.  In  other  words, 
the  relation  between  F  and  G  would  have  to  be  of  biconditional  form:  for  any  object  x 
and  any  property  F  in  A,  iff  x  has  F,  then  x  has  G,  and  iff  any  y  has  G,  y  has  F.  No  such 
biconditional  is  involved  in  the  basic  expression  of  weak  supervenience  given  above: 
some  z  could  have  F  in  virtue  of  having  some  quite  different  property  G*  in  B.  But  if  any  v 
had  G*,  v  would  also  have  F.  Too,  G  could  be  a  functional  property,  and  so  realisable  in 
any  number  of  mechanisms  (the  function  may  be  supervenient  upon  the  properties  and 
relations  of  the  parts  of  whatever  performs  the  function  -  supervenience  is  transitive 
and  reflexive).  Thus  when  we  read  G,  we  would  understand  'whatever  performs  the 
function  that  is  specified  by  G  as  being  the  physical19  base.  G  could  refer  to  a  disjunctive 
property  as  well  -  suppose  that  some  property,  for  example,  being  a  carburettor,  can  be 
realised  in  a  certain  number  of  physical  constructions  (PI,  P2,  P3  .... 
Pn).  Then  if  any  x  is  a 
carburettor,  then  x  has  G  where  G  is  some  member  of  the  set  (PI,  P2,  P3 
.... 
Pn),  and  if 
any  y  has  any  member  of  that  set,  then  y  too  is  a  carburettor.  The  relation  of 
supervenience  is  thus  much  weaker  than  that  of  identity. 
A  distinction  can  also  be  drawn  between  reading  the  property  G  as  a  B-maximal 
y  or  as  a  B-minimal  property  in  B.  If  G  is  taken  as  a  B-ma3dmal  property,  then  G  is  ever 
property  in  Bpossessedby  some  x.  Thus  when  we  read'if  X  has  F,  then  x  has  some  G  in  B, 
and  if  any  y  has  G,  y  has  F'we  should  understand  the  claim  as  being'if  any  y  is  B-identical 
to  some  x,  then  y  has  F'.  If  B  is  the  domain  of  physical  properties  and  A  the  domain  of 
psychological  properties,  as  is  typically  taken  for  the  psychophysical  case,  then  the  claim 
is  that  if  any  y  is  physically  identical  to  some  x,  then  y  is  psychologically  identical  to  X.  - 
This  would  be  consistent  with  taking  F  as  expressing  every  property  in  A  possessed  by 
some  x.  However,  if  we  wish  to  take  F  as  a  particular  property  in  A,  then  it  is  probably 
perspicuous  to  regard  G  as  being  a  subset  of  the  properties  in  B  possessed  by  some  x,  as 
we  might  like  to  take  it  that  individuals  who  are  not  in  every  way  identical  may  possess 
some  of  the  same  properties. 
To  take  an  example  borrowed  from  Kim-  for  the  case  of  moral  properties 
construed  as  supervenient  upon  nonmoral  properties:  suppose  that  St.  Francis  is  a  good 
man.  We  would  naturally  expect  that  if  anyone  were  exactly  like  St.  Francis,  in  that  they 
possessed  all  of  the  intrinsic  properties  St.  Francis  possesses  and  are  embedded  in  a 
sufficiently  similar  environment,  that  that  person  (let's  call  him  Ed)  would  also  be  a  good 
maw2  However,  it  is  certainly  too  much  to  say  that  one  has  to  be  exactly  like  St.  Francis' 
in  all  of  these  respects  in  order  to  be  good,  or  to  resemble  an  intractably  vast  and  possibly 
infinite  disjunction  of  properties:  (beingjust  like  St.  Francis  v  beingjust  like  Mobammed  v  being 
just  like  Florence  Mkbtingak  v  ..  v  beingjast  like  h).  Rather,  it  seems  that  one  can  be  good  in 
virtue  of  possessing  certain  properties  in  common  with  St.  Francis  that  are  relevant  in 
some  important  way  to  his  being  good  while  failing  to  share  other  properties  he  has 
55 which  (probably)  have  nothing  to  do  with  his  being  good:  being  about  57,21  for  example, 
or  being  disposed  to  talk  to  birds. 
Let  us,  for  the  sake  of  brevity,  construct  a  highly  simplistic  account  of  goodness, 
and  say  that  St.  Francis  is  good  in  virtue  of  being  courageous  (C),  being  benevolent  (V), 
and  being  honest  (H),  such  that  the  property  beinggood  in  the  domain  A  supervenes  upon 
possession  of  the  conjunction  of  properties  in  the  domain  B  beingcourageous  and  being 
benevoknt  and  being  bonest.  Call  this  conjunction  Gm,  for  G-minimal.  Now,  if  Ed  or 
anything  else  possesses  Gm  among  any  other  properties  it  may  have,  it  will  be  good. 
Further,  it  is  not  necessary  to  take  just  this  minimal  set  of  St.  Francis's  properties  as  the 
supervenience  base  for  beinggood  Minimal  properties  can  be  disjunctive  as  well.  For 
example,  suppose  that  it  is  not  possession  of  the  full  conjunction  (CV,  H)  that  forms  the 
supervenience  base  for  beinggood,  but  only  possession  of  any  two  of  them.  Then  there  are 
eight  possible  conjunctions  of  these  three  properties  -  (CVH),  (CV,  -1-%  (C,  -V)11)v 
(-C,  V,  11),  (Q-V,  -11),  (-CV,  -14),  (-C,  -V,  1-1),  and  (-C,  -V,  -H),  and  only  four  of  them  -  the 
first  four  -  are  Gm,  and  form  the  supervenience  base  for  beinggood. 
Weak  supervenience  is  generally  considered  to  be  too  weak  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  robust  physicalism  committed  to  metaphysical  and  epistemic 
explanatory  relations  obtaining  between  levels  of  properties.  The  reason  is  that  under 
weak  supervenience,  nothing  holds  B-properties  necessarily  to  the  A-properties  for 
which  they  serve  as  a  supervenience  base,  such  that  what  A-properties  supervene  upon 
which  B-properties  is  arbitrary  and  world-relative.  For  illustration,  consider  an  example  for 
the  psychophysical  case. 
Consider  aa  possible  world  Wi  in  which  physicalism  is  true,  and  consider  the 
kinds  of  properties  that  many  physicalistically  inclined  philosophers  would  think  likely  to 
be  relevant  to  a  particular  individual's  being  conscious.  It  does  not  particularly  matter 
what  those  are,  just  so  long  as  it  is  understood  that  there  are  some  sorts  of  properties  that 
could  be  so  relevant,  and  other  sorts  of  properties  that  simply  do  not  fit  the  bill.  Let  us 
assume  a  fairly  probable  base  set  of  properties:  say  that  it  is  a  certain  functional 
organisation  of  physical  bits  and  pieces  relative  to  a  certain  system  description  DS  (such 
as  a  neural  structure,  possibly  among  other  things,  might  instantiate  relative  to  a  human 
being),  and  call  this  organisation  0.  Being  conscious  (in  A)  then  will  weakly  supervene  upon 
baving  0  relative  to  Ds  (in  B)  if  any  individual  that  is  conscious  in  this  world  has  0  relative 
to  Ds  (remember  that  being  0  is  a  multiply  instantiable  minimal  base  property),  and  any 
individual  that  has  0  relative  to  Ds  is  conscious. 
Now  consider  another  possible  world  W2  that  is  physically  identical  to  Wi  except 
in  the  minor  detail  that  it  is  not  the  property  0  relative  to  Ds  that  is  the  supervenience 
base  for  consciousness,  but  rather  it  is  the  minimal  set  of  properties  which  in  this  world. 
is  also  responsible  for  photosynthesis.  Here  is  a  world  with  parsons,  periwinkles  and 
pocket  calculators,  in  which  none  of  the  people  are  conscious,  but  much  of  the  plankton 
is.  Wi  and  W2.  are  severally  and  together  perfectly  consistent  with  weak  supervenience: 
Necessarily  in  Wx,  if  any  x  is  conscious,  then  x  has  0,  and  if  any  y  has  0,  then  y  is 
conscious. 
$6 Necessarýj  isýW2,  If  any  ý  is  conscious,  then  x  is  a  photosynthesiser,  and  if  any  y  is  a 
photosynt  lesiser,  then  y  is conscious. 
Under  weak  supervenience,  A-properties  can  be  redistributed  over  B-properties 
anyway  you  Me.  Whatever  strongly  connects  A-properties  to  B-properties  is  not 
captured  by  this  relation.  The  remedy  for  this  is  to  formulate  supervenience  so  that  it 
applies  with  cross-worlds  necessity.  This  is  Strong  Supervenience.  A  family  of  properties  A 
strongly  supervenes  upon  a  family  of  properties  B  just  in  case: 
Necessarily,  for  any  object  x  and  any  property  F  in  A,  if  x  has  F,  then  there  exists  a  property  G  in 
B  such  that  x  has  G,  and  necessarily  if  any  y  has  G,  it  has  F.  24 
The  addition  of  the  second  necessity  condition  guarantees  that  strong  supervenience 
holds  across  words,  and  so  that  if  being  conscious  strongly  supervenes  upon  baving  0  in  any 
world,  it  does  so  in  every  world,  and  if  it  does  not  strongly  supervene  on  being  a 
photosyntbesiser  in  some  world,  it  does  not  in  any  world.  Anything  that  has  0  in  anyworld 
will  be  conscious,  and  if  there  is  a  conscious  photosynthesiser  in  any  world,  its 
consciousness  will  have  nothing  to  do  with  its  photosynthesising  and  everything  to  do 
with  its  having  0. 
This  does  capture  the  sense  of  a  robust  relation  of  relevance  obtaining  between 
properties,  such  as  can  support  the  expression  of  the  relation  of  realisation  as  a  strong 
metaphysical  and  explanatory  relation  discussed  above,  and  as  answers  to  our  intuitive 
notion  that  there  is  something  about  properties  on  a  lower  level  that  makes  it  such  that 
they  conspire  in  certain  relations  to  realize  the  properties  that  they  do:  how  it  is  a  matter 
of  reason,  as  it  were,  and  not  just  a  matter  of  fact,  that  certain  kinds  of  phenomena 
underlie  other  kinds  of  phenomena.  But  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  while  the 
relation  of  strong  supervenience  does  express  that  sense,  it  does  not  entail  it.  Cross-worlds 
necessity  can  be  just  as  brute  and  inexplicable  as  world-relative  necessity:  instead  of  the 
properties  involved  with  our  hypothetical  functional  propertybaving  0  relative  to  Ds  being 
the  supervenience  base  for  consciousness,  it  could  be  baving  botb  a  beart  anda  kidrmy;  it 
could  be  beingafeatherless  biped;  if  you're  deeply  skeptical  about  other  minds,  you  may 
even  entertain  that  it  is  being  Owertyour  name  bere). 
Q 
3.3.  Supervenienee.  -  The  Foundation  oftbe  Relation 
In  his  SWervenience  and  Materialism. 
I 
Mark  Rowlands  argues  that  weak 
supervenience  is  not  just  a  weak  determinative  relation,  but  that  it  is  not  a  relation  of 
determination  at  all.  He  arrives  at  this  conclusion  through  development  of  a  problem 
originally  raised  by  Simon  Blackburn.  25  Under  weak  supervenience,  as  we  have  seen)  B- 
indiscernibility  entails  A-indiscernibility  within  a  given  possible  world,  but  allows  that 
individuals  across  possible  worlds  may  be  B-identical  but  A-discernible.  Let  some 
57 property  F  in  A  supervene  upon  some  property  G  in  B  in  some  worlds,  and  call  these 
worlds  G/F  worlds.  Call  those  possible  worlds  where  F  does  not  supervene  upon  G  G/O 
worlds.  Following  Blackburn,  Rowlands  asks:  why  there  are  no  mixed  worlds?  "That  is, 
why  are  there  no  worlds  of  the  form  G/FvO?  These  worlds  are  ruled  out  by  weak 
supervenience,  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  the  justification  for  this.  After  all,  weak 
supcrvenience  allows  both  G/F  and  G/O  situations  ... 
The  difficulty  is  that  once  we  have 
imagined  a  G/F  world  and  a  G/O  world,  it  is  as  if  we  had  done  enough  to  imagine  a 
G/FvO  world,  and  have  implicitly  denied  ourselves  a  right  to  forbid  its  eidstence.  " 
There  are,  of  course,  worlds  where  some  things  are  G  and  F  and  some  things  are 
G  but  not  F.  In  such  worlds,  F  does  not  supervene  upon  G,  for  if  it  did,  all  G-things 
would  be  F-things.  27  The  difficulty  Rowlands  identifies  comes  from  the  reading  of  weak 
supervenience  as  indicating  that  in  G/F  worlds,  being  G  determines  being  F,  while  in 
other  worlds,  it  does  not.  He  suggests  that  such  a  determinative  relation  is  more  than  a 
matter  of  brute  metaphysical  fact,  but  that  there  is  something  about  G-ncss  that  "makes 
for"  F-ness.  If  being  G  "makes  for"  being  F  in  some  world,  but  not  in  another,  then  it 
would  appear  that  G  alone  is  not  sufficient  for  F.  It  is  necessary  also  to  make  reference  to 
some  aspect  of  G/F  worlds  that  plays  a  role  in  F's  supervenience  upon  G.  This  indicates 
that  F  does  not  supervene  upon  G  simpticiter,  but  that  in  G/F  worlds,  F  supervcnes  upon 
G  and  some  aspect  of  the  world  in  question.  Rowlands  concludes: 
...  the  moral  of  Blackburn7s  mixed  worlds  problem  is  not  weak  supervenience  is  a  weak  relation,  or 
even  an  extremely  weak  relation.  The  correct  inference  ,I  think,  is  that  weak  supervenience  is  not 
a  relation  of  determination  at  all.  If  G  sup  osedly  determines  F  in  a  G/F  world,  but  not  in  a  G/O 
world,  then  it  cannot,  after  all,  be  G  whiS  is  determiniy  F  in  the  G/F  world.  At  the  very,  least, 
s  the  determining  factors  have  to  include  not  only  G  but  so  some  aspect  of  the  world  in  which  G 
is  instantiated.  29 
In  order  to  read  supervenience  as  expressing  a  genuine  determinative  relation, 
Rowlands  suggests  that  it  is  necessary  to  adopt  a  realist  stance  towards  the  supervenience 
relation.  This  involves  accepting  the  proposition  that  there  is  indeed  something  about  G 
properties  which  "makes  for"  F  properties,  such  that  anything  which  has  G  has  F.  He 
defines  realism  about  the  supervenience  relation  as  follows: 
1D  Q 
RS:  An  interpretation  of  supervenience  is  realist  if  and  only  if  it  claims  that: 
W  subvenient  and  supervenient  properties  are  related  as  the  (preferred)  definition  of 
supervenience  claims  they  are  related.  And 
(ii)  for  any  given  object  x  which  instantiates  both  a  subvenient  property  G  and  its 
corresponding  supervenient  property  F,  it  is  the  possession  of  G  by  x  which  makes  for 
its  possession  of  F-30 
Since  weak  supervenience  is  not  strong  enough  to  capture  the  sense  in  which  G- 
properties  "make  for"  F-properties,  Rowlands  suggests  that  the  preferred  definition  of 
supervenience  is  the  cross-worlds  stable  relation  of  strong  supervenience.  Since  strong 
supervenience  does  not  permit  the  coexistence  of  G/F  worlds  and  G/O  worlds,  it  is  not 
vulnerable  to  the  problem  of  mixed  worlds.  However,  the  essence  of  the  difficulty  he 
58 perceives  for  weak  supervenience  is  that  it  does  not  capture  the  sense  in  which  it  is 
something  about  G-ness  that  necessitates  F-ness.  While  strong  supervenience  may 
minimalistically  capture  that  sense,  it  is  not  fully  expressive  of  it,  and  Rowlands's  problem 
can  be  extended  to  strong  supervenience  as  well.  Given  that  it  is  the  case  under  strong 
supervenience  that  G-things  are  F-things  in  worlds  where  supervenience  holds,  we  can 
still  ask  a  filrther  question:  why? 
Rowlands  draws  a  distinction  between  realism  about  the  supervenience  relation 
and  the  reification  of  the  relation,  and  cautions  that  to  interpret  supervenience  as  a  Real 
Relation  obtaining  between  two  sets  of  properties  is  to  invite  anew  the  concern  that  it  is 
not  G-ness  simpliciter  that  makes  for  F-ness,  but  that  something  about  the  world  in 
question  -  the  supervenience  relation  itself  -  is  a  partial  determinant  of  F-ness  in  G 
things.  3'  Under  this  interpretation,  it  would  appear  to  be  possible  for  there  to  coexist  two 
possible  worlds  identical  in  every  respect  save  in  the  presence  of  the  supervenience 
relation:  in  both  possible  worlds,  all  G-things  are  F-things,  but  in  one,  the  relation  is  due 
to  the  existence  of  a  relation  of  supervenience  obtaining  between  G-properties  and  F- 
properties,  while  in  the  other,  it  is  a  matter  of  brute  coincidence  that  all  G-things  are  also 
F-things.  That  is,  the  coexistence  of  G/F  and  G/O  worlds  is  possible. 
Rowlands's  arguments  turn  on  the  reading  of  supervenience  as  a  determinative 
relation,  which  reading  he  suggests  is  the  natural  way  to  interpret  supervenience-l" 
However,  while  the  reading  of  the  supervenience  relation  as  one  of  determination  of  one 
set  of  properties  by  another,  or  the  dependence  of  a  set  of  properties  upon  another,  may 
be  an  intuitive  and  natural  reading,  it  may  be  questioned  whether  it  is  quite  the  correct 
one.  As  Kim  has  pointed  out,  the  relation  of  supervenience  cannot  be  an  explanatory 
relation,  because  it  is  compatible  with  different,  mutually  exclusive  explanatory  theories: 
epiphenomenalism,  some  forms  of  dualism,  and  type-identity  theory,  for  example,  all  may 
assert  that  mental  states  are  necessarily  associated  with  certain  physical  states,  but  the 
nature  of  the  relation  between  mental  properties  and  physical  properties  is  very  different 
between  them.  The  relation  of  supervenience  can  be  said  to  hold  whether  it  is  a  matter 
of  lawlike  connections,  mysterious  harmonies,  or  brute  covariation  between  sets  of 
properties.  Supervenience  by  itself,  then,  cannot  explicate  what  it  is  about  G-properties 
which  "makes  for"  F-ness  in  things  which  possess  G.  Unaccompanied  by  a  separate 
account  grounding  the  relation  of  supervenience  in  some  specified  determinative 
relation,  supervenience  itself  only  expresses  the  covariation  between  families  of 
properties,  leaving  it  open  why  it  is  that  those  families  covary.  The  relation  of 
supervenience  cannot  stand  alone,  but  needs  to  be  grounded  in  some  specified  relation 
of  determination.  Discussing  the  psychophysical  case,  Kim  says: 
We  must  conclude  then  that  mind-body  supervenience  itself  is  not  an  explanatory  tbeor  , 
it  merely  y 
states  a  pattern  of  property  covariation  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  and  points  to  the 
existence  of  a  dependency  relation  between  the  two.  Yet  supcrvcnicncc  is  silent  on  the  nature  of 
the  dependence  relation  that  might  explain  why  the  mental  supervenes  on  the  physical.  Another 
way  of  putting  the  point  would  be  thisi  supervcnience  is  not  a  type  of  dependence  relation  -  it  is 
not  a  relation  that  can  be  placed  alongside  causal  dependence,  reductive  dependence,  mereoloýical  dependence,  dependence  grounded  in  definability  or  entailment,  and  the  like.  Rather,  any  of  these  dependence  relations  can  generate  the  required  covariation  of  properties  and  tbereby  quifijý  as  a 
supervenience  relation.  " 
59 Rowlands  argues  that  weak  supervenience  is  not  a  relation  of  determination  at  all.  He  is 
right:  it  is  not.  But  neither  is  strong  supervenience  a  relation  of  determination  or 
dependence.  Though  it  is  strong  enough  to  capture  the  sense  in  which  higher  level 
properties  are  genuinely  determined  by  lower  level  properties,  so  that  possession  of  the 
lower  level  properties  in  question  alone  suffices  for  possession  of  the  higher  level 
properties,  strong  supervenience  needs  to  be  grounded  in  some  relation  of 
determination  that  is  a  reason  why  it  should  obtain.  Kim's  wording  indicates  that  any 
dependence  relation  that  grounds  the  supervenience  relation  is  a  supervenience  relation. 
It  is  preferable  to  leave  the  interpretation  of  the  modal  operator'necessarily'  open 
in  the  formulation  of  supervenience,  to  accommodate  different  relations  of  determination 
that  may  qualify  as  supervenience  relations.  For  the  psychophysical  case,  as  for  the 
supervenience  of  higher  level  properties  upon  lower  level  properties  generally,  it  is  usual 
to  read  the  first  'necessarily'  in  the  formulation  of  strong  supcrvcnicncc  as  metaphysical 
necessity,  and  the  second  as  nomological  necessity.  That  is,  if  the  property  keing  consc;  ous 
supervenes  in  this  world  upon  baving  somefunctional  organisation  0  relative  to  system 
description  Ds,  it  does  so  as  a  matter  of  natural  law  in  this  world.  Further,  and  fairly 
obviously,  the  cross-worlds  stability  of  strong  nomological  supervenience  only  holds 
across  worlds  with  the  same  laws  of  physics,  as  is  sometimes  explicitly  stated.  -%  There  is 
no  reason  why  the  higher  level  physical  properties  that  supervene  upon  lower  level 
physical  properties  in  this  word  should  do  so  in  an  alternate  possible  world  in  which 
different  physical  natural  laws  apply.  Also,  we  would  expect  that  someone  just  like  St. 
Francis  in  this  world,  in  a  relatively  similar  cultural  climate,  would  be  a  good  man,  but  we 
would  not  expect  the  goodness  of  such  a  person  to  be  preserved  were  he  transplanted  to 
a  culture  wherein  goodness  were  measured  according  to  different  standards.  Since  it  is 
not  desirable  to  take  the  laws  of  physics,  or  the  conceptual  systems  definitive  of  moral  or 
aesthetic  properties,  or  many  other  such  relations  of  dependence,  as  being 
metaphysically  necessary,  we  should  take  it  that  the  first  necessity  condition  in  the 
expression  of  strong  supervenience  holds  only  across  worlds  where  what  grounds  the 
second  necessity  condition  is  identical. 
Does  this  commit  us  to  a  form  ofwhat  Rowlands  had  called  the  reification  of  the 
supervenience  relation?  For  if  it  is  necessary  to  ground  the  supervenience  relation  in 
some  more  explanatory  determinative  relation,  then  it  would  appear  that  again  G 
simpliciter  does  not  suffice  for  F  in  G/F  worlds,  but  rather  it  is  having  G  andsometbing  else, 
whatever  relation  grounds  supervenience  in  this  case  -  natural  laws,  conceptual 
necessity,  or  whatever  -  that  are  jointly  sufficient  for  G.  It  would  seem  again  to  be 
possible  for  GIF  and  G/O  worlds  to  coexist. 
For  cases  of  strong  supervenience  where  the  grounding  relation  is  not 
metaphysically  necessary,  it  would  appear  to  be  obligatory  to  specify  that  the  worlds 
across  which  strong  supervenience  is  to  hold  all  be  identical  as  to  the  grounding  relation 
referred  to  by  the  second  necessity  condition  in  the  formulation.  However,  I  suggest  that 
a  far  tidier  alternative  is  to  read  the  grounding  relation  as  forming  part  of  the 
supervenience  base  for  supervenient  properties.  To  do  so  obviates  the  need  to  specify 
6o that  whatever  grounds  supervenience  must  be  the  same  across  possible  worlds  in  which 
strong  supervenience  holds.  That  is,  natural  laws  would  be  part  of  the  set  of  lower  level 
properties  upon  which  psychological  properties  supervene  for  cases  of  psychophysical 
supervenience.  It  is  standardly  taken  that  physical  laws  and  physical  properties  are 
different  kinds  of  things,  but  I  suggest  that  for  the  purposes  of  formulating  the  abstract 
relation  of  supcrvenicnce,  they  should  be  reckoned  together.  This  reading  preserves  the 
sense  in  which  it  is  supposed  to  be  G-properties  simpliciter  which  suffice  to  determine  F 
in  G/F  worlds,  since  the  determinative  relation  grounding  the  supcrvenicncc  of  F  upon  G 
is  included  in  G.  It  has  the  consequence,  which  might  appear  counterintuitive,  that  two 
individuals  described  as  physically  identical  but  embedded  in  different  possible  worlds 
with  different  natural  laws  were  not  in  fact  physically  identical.  However,  I  believe  this  is 
correct:  if  the  explanations  for  why  two  apparently  physically  identical  individuals  exhibit 
certain  higher  level  properties  are  exclusively  different  explanations  as  a  result  of  the 
individuals'microstructures  being  subsumed  by  different  sets  of  natural  laws,  surely  we 
would  not  wish  to  call  them  identical.  In  any  case,  the  relation  of  supervenience  will  be  a 
different  one,  as  if  the  natural  laws  are  not  taken  as  part  of  the  supervenience  base  for 
supervenient  properties,  it  will  be  necessary  to  specify  that  the  relation  only  holds  relative 
to  a  certain  set  of  natural  laws,  which  ex  bypotbesi  it  is  not.  According  to  the 
understanding  of  the  determinative  relation  grounding  and  constitutive  of  the 
supervenience  relation  as  part  of  the  base  for  supervenient  properties,  this  confusion 
cannot  arise. 
43.4. 
Reduction 
The  picture  of  a  physically  grounded  world  is  one  of  a  layered  hierarchy,  ordered 
such  that  phenomena  at  certain  levels  in  the  hierarchy,  in  appropriate  relations,  are 
constitutive  of  phenomena  at  higher  levels,  where  the  properties  of  those  phenomena 
that  are  the  parts  of  things  at  higher  levels  determine  the  properties  of  the  wholes  they 
constitute.  Different  determinative  relations  may  obtain  between  the  levels,  but  in 
general  the  relation  obtaining  between  individuals  on  different  levels  (allowing,  of  course, 
for  a  certain  indistinctness  of  boundaries)  is  one  of  parts  to  wholes:  every  individual  on 
every  level  in  the  hierarchy  except  for  the  lowest  is  entirely  comprised  by  individuals  and 
relations  on  lower  levels.  Whatever  is  on  the  lowest  level  (if  there  is  one)  must  be  taken 
as  brutely  given,  without  decomposition,  whose  properties  admit  of  no  explanation,  but 
which  is  constitutive  of  everything  on  every  level. 
Many  kinds  of  mereological  entities  at  different  levels  of  individuation  will  be 
straightforwardly  identical  with  the  conjunctions  of  their  parts  in  the  appropriate 
relations:  being  water  just  is  being  composed  oftwo  hydrogen  atoms  and  one  oxygen  atom 
elechically  bound.  Likewise,  many  properties  will  be  straightforwardly  reducible  to  physical 
properties:  being  a  fiquid  is  just  having  one  of  a  number  of  molecular  structures  that  cause  a 
substance  to  behave  in  a  certain  fluid  way.  This  property  will  be  explicable  in  terms  of 
6r the  properties  and  dynamics  of  lower  level  parts  of  molecules,  and  so  eventually  in 
general  basic  physical  terms.  Such  properties,  theoretically  at  least,  will  be  reducible  in 
this  way,  even  if  the  complexity  of  the  microphysical  explanations  involved  would  make 
the  practical  reduction  of  these  properties  a  daunting  of  not  outright  impossible 
proposition.  Some  kinds  of  properties  however,  psychological  properties  paradigm  among 
them,  arc  not  so  reducible,  because  they  are  multiply  instantiablc,  functionally  described 
properties,  in  themselves  indifferent  to  the  physical  structures  that  realize  them.  This 
indifference  goes  far  beyond  the  indifference  to  their  specific  realisers  of  properties  like, 
say,  beinga  liquid  that  liquids  qua  liquids  could  be  said  to  have.  Liquidity,  it  is  true,  is  a 
property  that  can  be  exhibited  by  any  of  a  vast  number  of  possible  physical 
configurations,  but  at  a  very  low  level  of  description,  there  will  be  a  kind  of  microphysical 
dynamic  that  is  common  to  all  things  that  are  liquids.  There  will  be  a  general  physical 
account  of  liquidity  that  explains  why  liquids  as  such  behave  as  they  do.  For  some  more 
complicated  kinds  of  properties,  however,  different  sorts  of  microphysical  dynamics 
might  perform  the  function  characterising  by  the  property  in  question,  let  alone  different 
specific  kinds  of  physical  stuff.  For  example,  one  could  build  a  carburettor  out  of  all 
manner  of  materials,  and  might  design  it  in  any  number  of  ways,  so  long  as  that  structure, 
whatever  it  turned  out  to  be,  was  such  that  it  was  able  to  perform  the  function  that  a 
carburettor  performs.  Many  kinds  of  animals  have  hearts,  or  organs  that  serve  the 
function  of  moving  blood  about  the  body,  but  these  organs  are  wildly  diverse  in  form 
across  the  animal  kingdom.  We  believe  that  creatures  of  extremely  varied  descriptions  - 
me,  my  dog,  an  octopus,  or  a  silicon-based  life  form  from  Mars  -  would  all  feel  pain  if 
stimulated  in  certain  ways,  even  though  we  all  have  very  different  biological  structures. 
We  are  each  able  to  feel  pain  becausepain,  like  beinga  beart  or  beinga  carburettor,  is 
defined  not  in  terms  of  whatever  physical  strueture  realises  it,  but  by  the  function  that  it 
performs  in  the  system  in  which  it  is  instantiated:  a  certain  rather  unpleasant  detection  of 
damage  to  the  body,  resulting  in  behaviour  designed  to  isolate  and  avoid  the  cause  of 
such  damage,  and  so  on.  Many  kinds  of  mechanisms  could  serve  this  function  in 
different  systems  -  perhaps  an  unlimited  number  of  heterogeneous  physical  structures 
could  fulfil  this  causal  role.  Thuspa;  n  is  entirely  indifferent  to  the  specific  physical  base 
that  realises  it,  and  to  the  specific  manner  in  which  any  particular  physical  base  goes 
about  performing  that  function.  -v 
The  multiple  instantiability  of  mental  states  has  led  many,  if  not  most, 
philosophers  of  mind  to  believe  that  the  mental,  and  indeed  any  properties  conceivably 
realised  in  wildly  heterogeneous  physical  bases,  such  as  economical  properties,  cannot  be 
reduced  to  the  physical  in  any  meaningful  or  interesting  way.  Particularly,  it  is  generally 
believed  that  the  multiple  instantiability  of  such  properties  prevents  the  special  sciences 
in  which  they  feature  from  being  reducible  to  the  physical  sciences.  What  this 
irreducibility  indicates  is  a  subject  of  active  debate:  for  some  the  irreducibility  of 
psychological  generalisations  to  physical  laws  indicates  that  there  are,  properly  speaking, 
no  psychological  generalisations;  for  others  it  indicates  the  autonomy  of  psychology  and 
other  special  sciences  vis-a-vis  the  physical  sciences.  Whatever  it  is  taken  as  entailing, 
the  irreducibility  of  the  mental  based  upon  the  heterogeneity  of  its  possible  realising 
62 bases  is  largely  taken  to  be  true,  and  reductionism  has  fallen  by  the  wayside  as  simplistic 
and  untenable. 
There  is  also  a  powerful  appeal  in  the  notion  of  the  independence  of  the  mental 
from  the  physical  domain.  For  many,  the  ideas  of  the  reducibility  of  the  mental  states  to 
physical  states  and  processes  or  the  reduction  of  straightforward  folk  psychological 
explanations  of  human  thought  and  action  to  hard  neurobiology  imply  that  the  mental  is 
notbing  but  physical  states  and  processes,  that  the  mind  is  only  the  brain,  and  that  we  in 
all  of  our  loftiest  aspirations  are  merely  atoms  in  the  void.  If  an  elect  set  of  properties, 
mental  properties  foremost,  can  be  shown  to  be  perfectly  indifferent  to  the  particular 
arrangement  of  atoms  and  void  realising  them,  then  the  idea  of  the  ontological 
dependence  of  the  mental  upon  the  physical  loses  much  of  its  unappealing  bite.  The 
multiple  instantiability  of  the  mental  is  thought  to  open  the  way  for  a  naturalistic  account 
of  mentality  according  to  which  the  mental  is  instantiated  in  and  supervenient  upon 
physical  events  and  processes,  but  also  according  to  which  mental  state  types  cannot 
meaningfiAly  be  given  analyses  in  physical  terms,  and  according  to  which  the 
generalisations  subsuming  mental  dynamics  are  not  reducible  to  physical  laws.  Such  an 
approach  can  be  read  as  preserving  the  natural  dignity  of  the  mental'of  which  traditional 
reductionism  would  rob  it. 
The  wholesale  rejection  of  reductionism  at  this  Point  in  the  debate  is,  to  my 
mind,  a  little  hasty.  Physicalism  is  a  doctrine  with  very  wide  appeal  in  philosophy  as  well 
as  in  other  academic  disciplines,  and  I  think  it  is  safe  to  say  that  most  modem 
philosophers  of  mind  in  the  Western  tradition  would  categorise  themselves  as 
physicalist.  Very  few,  however,  will  admit  to  being  reductionists.  But  if  nonreductive 
physicalism  has  its  appeal,  it  also  has  its  problems,  chiefest  among  these  being  that  of 
the  provision  of  a  coherent  account  of  how  the  mental  qua  mental  can  be  causally 
effective  in  the  physical  world  in  which  it  is  grounded.  It  will  be  the  burden  of  the  next 
chapter  to  show  why  I  think  this  is  a  problem  that  nonreductive  physicalism  is  unlikely  to 
be  able  to  solve.  Now,  it  will  be  interesting  to  turn  to  the  problem  generated  for 
reductionism  by  the  multiple  instantiability  of  the  mental  (among  other  physically 
irreducible  things),  and  to  evaluate  whether  or  not  there  can  be  a  solution. 
If  I  may  be  permitted  to  foreshadow  the  following  chapter  somewhat:  I  think  that 
there  can  be  a  solution.  Moreover,  I  think  that  there  must  be.  It  seems  to  me  to  be 
inescapable  that  ifphysicalism  is  true  and  all  phenomena  are  grounded  in  physical 
phenomena,  and  ifit  is  the  case  that  mental  events  qua  mental  are  genuinely  causally 
effective  aspects  of  the  world,  then  some  form  of  psychophysical  reductionism  must  be 
true,  at  least  on  the  level  of  spatiotemporally  individual  events.  According  to  robust 
physicalism,  every  causal  interaction  on  any  level  of  description  is  grounded  in  physical 
interactions  and  is  backed  by  physical  laws.  If  the  mental  is  physically  realiscd,  but  for 
any  specific  instance  of  a  mental  event  causing  or  being  caused  by  a  physical  event  the 
psychological  generalisations  subsuming  that  causal  interaction  float  entirely  free  of 
Physical  laws,  then  surely  there  can  be  no  genuinely  lawlike  connections  linking  mental 
phenomena  to  anything  at  all,  and  no  nomologically  necessary  connections  binding 
thought  and  action.  That  is,  if  mental  generalisations  float  entirely  free  of  physical  laws, 
63 then  either  physicalism,  at  least  as  I  have  understood  it,  is  false,  or  else  the  mental,  qua 
mental,  is  not  a  genuinely  causally  effective  aspect  of  the  world.  Neither  horn  of  this 
dilemma  is  terribly  appealing,  but  perhaps  the  dilemma  itself  can  be  avoided  by  re- 
evaluating  the  notion  of  reduction  to  the  physical  and  to  physical  laws. 
3.5.  Intertbeoretic  versus  Functional  Reductionism 
The  model  of  intertheoretic  reduction  standard  throughout  the  literature, 
attributed  to  Ernest  Nagel,  36involves  the  derivation  of  the  laws  of  a  science  to  be  reduced 
from  the  laws  of  a  reducing  science  accompanied  by  identity  statements,  or'bridge  laws', 
linking  the  terms  of  the  two  sciences.  A  science  S  is  reducible  to  a  science  R  just  in 
case,  for  any  generalisation  Sx-->Sy,  Sx  and  Sy  can  be  defined  in  R's  terms  such  that 
Sx<->Rx  and  Sy<-->Ry,  and  a  law  exits  or  can  be  written  in  R  such  that  Rx-->Ry.  The 
problem  presented  by  the  multiple  instantiability  thesis  for  such  reduction  is  the 
extreme  unlikelihood  of  the  existence  of  such 
, 
bridge  principles  linking  physical 
predicates,  such  as  could  feature  in  physical  laws,  with  predicates  in  special  sciences 
featuring  multiply  instantiable  properties.  Jerry  Fodor  exprcsscs  it  wcU  for  the  case  of 
economics: 
Suppose  GresharnVlaw"I  really  is  true...  I  am  willing  to  believe  that  physics  is  general  in  the  sense 
that  it  implies  that  any  event  which  consists  of  a  monetary  exchange  (hence  any  event  which  falls 
under  Gresham's  law)  has  a  true  description  in  the  vocabulary  of  physics  and  in  virtue  of  which  it 
falls  under  a  law  of  physics.  But  banal  considerations  suggest  that  a  description  which  covers  all 
such  events  will  be  wildly  disjunctive.  Some  monetary  exchanges  involve  strings  of  wampum.  Some 
involve  dollar  bills.  And  some  involve  signing  one's  name  to  a  check.  What  are  the  chances  that  a 
disjunction  of  physical  predicates  which  covers  all  these  events  (i.  e.,  a  disjunctive  predicate  which 
can  form  the  right  hand  side  of  a  bridge  law  of  the  formx  is  a  monetary  exchange  *4...  )  expresses" 
a  physical  natural  kind?  " 
The  same  is  true  for  the  psychological  as  for  the  economical.  That  there  are  physiological 
kinds  coextensive  with  psychological  kinds  such  that  laws  linking  the  antecedents  with 
consequents  in  psychological  generalisations  have  meaningful  expressions  in  physical  law 
is  a  highly  dubious  proposition.  Physical  descriptions  might  obtain  for  each  instantiation 
of  a  mental  property,  and  physical  laws  may  back  each  instance  of  mental  causation,  but 
the  generalisations  of  psychology  will  not  be  reducible  to  the  laws  of  physics  in  anyway 
that  makes  sense. 
Kim  gives  a  compelling  criticism  of  the  standard  Nagelian  derivational  model  of 
reduction.  Beyond  questions  about  the  availability  of  bridge  laws  linking  the  predicates  of 
the  special  sciences  to  physical  predicates,  Kim  questions  the  appropriateness  of  the 
model  from  considerations  of  explanation  in  reduction  and  the  ontology  admitted  by  the 
reducing  sciences.  First,  he  points  out  that  Nagelian  derivational  reduction  is  in  essence 
the  deductive-nomological  model  of  scientific  explanation  forwarded  by  Hempel  and 
64 Oppenheirn  in  1948:  4-  "Just  as  Hempelian  explanation  consists  in  the  derivation  of  the 
statement  describing  the  phenomenon  to  be  explained  from  laws  taken  together  with 
auxiliary  premises  describing  relevant  initial  conditions,  Nagelian  reduction  is 
accomplished  in  the  derivation  of  the  target  theory  taken  in  conjunction  with  bridge  laws 
as  auxiliary  premises.  It  is  therefore  more  than  a  little  surprising  that  while  the  deductive- 
nomological  model  has  had  few  adherents  for  over  three  decades,  Nagcl's  model  is  still 
serving  as  the  dominant  standard  in  discussions  of  reduction  and  reductionism.  "4The 
problem  faced  by  the  deductive-nomological  account  of  scientific  explanation  is, 
classically,  that  the  model  fails  to  distinguish  between  genuine  laws  of  nature  and 
accidental  generalisations,  a  failing  that  easily  can  be  seen  to  carry  over  to  the  Nagelian 
derivational  model  of  intertheoretic  reduction.  Bridge  laws  linking  physical  predicates 
with  special  science  predicates  realised  in  heterogeneous  bases  do  seem  less  like  laws 
and  more  like  accidental  generalisations. 
Kim's  filrther  questions  address  the  degree  of  satisfaction  we  may  derive  from  the 
Nagelian  model  of  intertheoretic  reduction  in  terms  of  its  fulfilling  the  role  we  would 
expect  a  model  of  reduction  to  fulfil.  Bridge  laws,  we  have  seen,  express  covariations 
between  the  predicates  of  the  special  sciences  and  reducing  sciences.  But  these 
covariations  are  simple  statements  of  identity-.  the  Nagelian  model  does  not  require  that 
anything  back  the  correlation  between  a  predicate  in  the  special  sciences  and  a  physical 
predicate.  No  Particular  relation  between  a  special  science  predicate  and  a  physical 
predicate  is  required  beyond  covariation.  This  fact  makes  it  the  case  that  Nagelian 
reduction  of  psychological  predicates  could  carry  through  even  in  a  dualist, 
epiphenomenalist,  emergentist,  or  dual-aspect  system  -  if  a  correlation  between 
physical  predicates  and  psychological  predicates  can  be  identified,  then  the  reduction 
can  go  through.  44  But  this  does  not  reflect  the  actual  concerns  shared  by  many 
philosophers  over  the  possibility  of  the  reduction  of  conscious  mentality  to  the  physical, 
for  what  is  behind  the  reservations  about  this  reduction  -  the  essence  of  the  'Hard 
Problem'  of  consciousness,  as  David  Chalmers  has  expressed  it43-  is  the  inexplicability 
of  the  phenomenon  of  consciousness  in  physical  terms.  It  certainly  appears  to  be  true 
that  consciousness  constantly  covaries  with  certain  neurobiological  functions,  and  there 
have  been  fascinating  developments  in  neurophysiology  linking  specific  parts  of  the 
brain  and  specific  processes  with  sensory  phenomena  and  reports  of  phenomenology. 
But  nothing  about  the  fact  of  such  correlations  explains  why  they  should  obtain,  and  the 
hard  problem  remains.  The  hard  problem,  the  explanatory  gap,  presents  no  obstacle  to 
Nagelian  reduction.  But  surely  it  should  be  an  obstacle  to  the  notion  of  reduction.  Kim 
phrases  it  quite  strongly-. 
When  the  emergentists  claimed  that  consciousness  was  an  emergent  property  that  could  not  be 
explained  in  terms  of  its  physicat/bioloVcral  "basal  conditions",  it  was  these  explanatory  questions 
that  they  despaired  of  ever  answering.  0  them  reduction  was  primarily,  or  at  least  importantly,  an 
explanatory  procedure:  reductionism  must  make  intelligible  how  certain  phenomena  arise  out  of 
more  basic  phenomena,  and  if  that  is  our  goal,  as  I  believe  it  should  be,  a  Nagclian  derivational 
reduction  of  pychologywith  bridge  laws  taken  as  unexplained  auxiliary  premises,  will  not  advance 
our  understandi  ng  of  mental  i  ty  by  an  i  nch.  For  it  is  the  explanation  of  these  hridge  law,  an  explanation  of 
wby  there  arejust  tbese  mind-body  correlations,  that  is  at  the  beart  of  the  demandfor  an  explanation  of 
mentZty.  44 
65 Conceivably,  one  could  impose  an  explanatory  constraint  upon  the  bridge  laws. 
This  measure  would  not  address  Kim's  ontological  question:  the  question  of  what  a 
science  must  recognise.  Bridge  laws,  it  should  be  clear,  dramatically  increase  the  ontology 
of  a  reducing  science,  for  in  order  to  subsume  the  laws  of  the  science  it  reduces,  it  must 
add  the  bridge  laws  linking  the  predicates  of  the  reduced  science  to  its  own  predicates 
as  basic  laws  of  itself.  But  as  Kim  says,  "We  expect  our  reductions  to  yield  simpler 
systems  -a  simpler  system  of  concepts,  or  simpler  system  of  assumptions,  or  simpler 
system  of  entities.  "45Bridge  laws,  rather  than  simplifying,  are  highly  complei*ng.  Thus 
the  Nagelian  model  does  not  answer  to  the  reductionist  demand  that,  as  Kim  puts  it, 
"reductions  must  reduce.  "OThe  addition  of  the  bridge  laws  as  basic  laws  of  the  reducing 
theory  also  has  this  possibly  unsettling  implication:  it  is  a  direct  barrier  to  the  possibility 
of  a  complete  physics.  For  if  physicalist  reductionism  in  the  sciences  is  to  carry,  all 
sciences  must  ultimately  be  reducible  to  basic  physics.  Thus,  bridge  laws  would  have  to 
be  taken  as  laws  in  basic  physics.  But  we  do  not  and  cannot  know  what  all  the  bridge 
laws  are:  a  complete  inventory  of  the  bridge  laws  linking  every  actual  and  possible 
predicate  of  any  actual  or  possible  science  to  the  predicates  of  physics  is  impossible.  So 
basic  physics,  bridge  laws  intact,  could  never  be  complete.  But  it  does  not  seem  correct 
to  think  that  the  very  notion  of  the  decomposition  of  all  phenomena  to  physical 
phenomena  means  that  physics  cannot  be  a  complete,  self-contained  science.  Indeed, 
this  is  quite  the  reverse  of  the  sentiment  behind  reductionism. 
These  may  not  be  hard  and  fast  reasons  to  reject  the  Nagelian  bridge  law  model 
of  reduction,  but  they  are  strong  motivations  for  such  rejection.  One  might  apply  an 
explanatory  constraint  to  bridge  laws  to  address  the  explanatory  concerns  of  reductionist 
physicalism,  and  one  might  be  happy  to  admit  the  infinite  and  unknowable  bridge  laws 
into  the  ontology  of  physics.  Then,  one  may  not.  The  idea  of  laws  linking  the  predicates 
of  physics  to  the  predicates  of  the  special  sciences  may  be  an  intuitive  and  appealing 
one,  but  as  has  been  shown,  it  is  highly  problematic  for  the  idea  of  reduction.  Certain  of 
these  difficulties  -  specifically,  the  question  of  the  availability  of  bridge  laws  linking 
predicates  referring  to  multiply  instantiable  properties  to  physical  predicates  -  have  led 
to  the  near  extinction  of  reductionists  in  the  philosophical  community.  But  perhaps  it  is 
the  Nagelian  model  that  is  at  fault,  and  not  rcductionismperse. 
3.6.  The  FunctionalModel  ofReductioniSM47 
Kim  has  forwarded  a  model  of  reductionism  that  not  only  accords  better  with  the 
concerns  of  physicalists  as  expressed  above  as  well  as  with  actual  scientific  practice  than 
does  the  standard  model,  but  which  does  not  face  the  difficulties  for  reductionism 
presented  by  the  fact  of  the  multiple  instantiability  of  certain  properties.  Instead  of 
speaking  of  intertheoretic  reduction,  or  reduction  of  one  science  to  another,  Kim  focuses 
on  reducing  properties  as  distinguished  on  higher  levels  of  individuation  to  properties  as 
66 distinguished  on  lower:  a  direct  correlate  of  the  notion  of  special  science  properties  by 
proprietary  properties  of  the  lower  level,  ultimately  physical,  sciences,  given  the  layered 
model  of  the  world  already  indicated  by  the  theses  of  supervenience  and  physical 
realisation.  According  to  this  model,  the  key  factor  determining  whether  or  not  a 
property  described  in  one  science  can  be  reduced  to  a  property  described  in  another  is 
whether  or  not  the  first  property  can  be  construed  as  a  functional  property,  whose 
function  can  be  fulfilled  by  a  property  in  the  reducing  science. 
According  to  Kim's  model  of  reduction,  to  reduce  a  property  one  must  first 
construe  it  as  a  second  order  property  defined  by  its  causal  role:  that  is,  the  property  must 
be  construed  functionally  or  extrinsically,  as  the  property  of  having  whatever  it  is  that 
normally  defines  thatproperry.  The  idea  of  a  second  order  property  is  explained  as  follows: 
F  is  a  secondorderproperty  over  set  B  of  base  (or  first-order)  properties  iff  F  is  the  property  of 
having  some  property  P  in  B  such  that  D(P),  where  D  specifies  a  condition  on  members  of  W' 
Functional  second  order  properties  are  further  described  as  "those  second-order 
properties  over  B  whose  specification  D  involves  the  causal/nomic  relation749(as  against, 
for  example,  the  determinable/determinate  relation,  or  the  relation  of  conceptual 
necessity).  Thus  beinggreen  so  construed  is  having  the  property  of  reflecting  only 
frequencies  of  light  in  a  certain  range.  That  property  is  reduced  when  we  arc  able  to 
specify  a  first-order  property  that  fulfils  the  condition  D:  certain  molecular  structures,  in 
virtue  of  having  certain  structural  properties,  absorb  most  frequencies  of  fight,  allowing 
only  the  frequencies  in  the  green  range  to  be  reflected.  Thus  the  property  beinggreen  can 
be  straightforwardly  identified  with  having  such-and-such  a  molecular  structure  that 
absorbs  most  non-green  frequencies  in  the  visible  spectrum  and  reflects  green  light. 
Reduction,  Kim  argues,  need  involve  nothing  more  than  this:  a  property  is  successffilly 
reduced  if  it  can  be  construed  in  functional  terms,  and  if  a  causal  mechanism  can  be 
specified  that  performs  the  function  involved. 
This  kind  of  property  reduction  is  suggested  in  the  notion  of  the  realisation  of  a 
property  as  explained  above.  A  certain  causal  mechanism  which  performs  a  certain 
function  in  some  complex  whole  realises  a  property  F  ascribed  to  that  whole  when  the 
property  is  construed  functionally,  and  the  mechanism  in  question  is  sufficient  for  the 
instantiation  of  that  function  in  that  whole.  Further,  according  to  the  functional  model  of 
reductionism,  the  mechanism  is  not  only  sugricient  for  F:  it  is  F.  Ontological  simplification, 
Kim  argues,  can  only  be  bought  by  strengthening  the  notion  of  property  covariations  into 
property  identities,  and  the  very  way  to  do  this  is  to  construe  those  properties  we  would 
reduce  not  as  intrinsic  properties  of  the  things  to  which  we  ascribe  them,  but 
extrinsically,  as  functions  performed  by  some  mechanism.  A  property  is  reduced  if  it  is 
possible  both  to  give  a  functional  account  of  it  and  to  find  a  causal  mechanism  in  the 
microstructure  of  the  object  to  which  the  property  is  ascribed  that  performs  the 
specified  fanction  in  that  object.  Some  things  appear  green  because  the  electrons  in  the 
outer  shells  of  certain  kinds  of  molecular  structures  are  excited  when  they  encounter 
light  of  certain  frequencies,  thus  absorbing  those  frequencies,  but  not  green  ones;  green 
67 frequencies  are  reflected,  so  the  only  light  that  enters  our  eyes  having  bounced  off  of 
objects  with  these  molecular  structures  is  green  light.  'When  this  can  be  done 
successffilly,  an  explanation  of  the  property  is  also  given. 
Because  the  functional  model  of  reductionism  takes  the  causal  mechanism 
sufficient  for  the  implementation  of  a  second-order  property  F  in  some  system  to  be 
identical  with  F  in  that  system,  it  has  no  need  for  bridge  laws  expressing  identities 
between  special  science  Predicates  and  physical  predicates.  Each  second-order 
property-,  and  each  composed  entity,  is  identical  with  the  functional  organisation  of  its 
microstructure.  There  need  not,  however,  be  tight  connections  between  kinds  of  entities 
as  picked  out  by  the  special  sciences  and  physical  kinds.  There  is  also  room  for  the 
boundaries  of  realised  entities  to  be  left  fuzzy,  compositionally  as  well  as,  to  a  certain 
extent,  in  time  and  space.  This  would  allow  for  the  reducibility  of  properties  realised  in 
highly  dynamic  microstructures.  50 
Where  no  bridge  laws  are  involved,  the  problem  of  the  availability,  or  the  lack 
thereof,  of  bridge  laws  linking  special  science  kinds  with  physical  kinds  cannot  arise.  On 
the  functional  model  of  reductionism,  the  desideratum  that  reductions  be  explanatory  is 
served,  without  involving  any  expansion  in  the  physical  ontology,  either  in  terms  of 
entities  or  laws.  In  a  sense,  the  functional  model  of  reductionism  can  be  seen  as  the 
reverse  of  traditional  bridge  law  reductionism:  it  is  a  reductionism  about  the  explicability 
of  properties  and  of  causal  transactions,  rather  than  about  identities,  with  identity,  and 
not  nomic  covariation,  at  its  heart.  Happily,  this  reversal  involves  a  dissolution  of  some  of 
the  negative  connotations  associated  with  traditional  reductionism. 
If  a  Nagelian  bridge  law  connects  having  a  mental  state  M  with  having  a  physical 
state  P,  we  might  feel  justifiably  miffed  when  we  are  told  that  there  is  nothing'over  and 
above'our  having  M  than  our  having  P.  We  feel'reduced'in  the  sense  of  'lessened'-  we 
feel  that  a  property  we  had  taken  ourselves  to  have,  M,  is  not  one  that  in  fact  we  possess. 
Instead,  we  are  left  only  with  P.  But  on  Kim's  account,  our  having  M  simply  is  our  having 
P.  To  be  M  is  to  be  P.  It  is  P-ness  that  is  M-ness.  And-  and  this  is  an  important'and'- 
the  microstructure  of  M  that  is  P  is  a  real,  ontologically  unproblematic  aggregate  with  its 
own  real,  ontologically  unproblematic  aggregational  causal  potential.  Nothing  is  P,  really, 
that  is  not  M,  really.  Ifwe  are  told  that  we  are  M  because  we  are  Pwe  do  not  feel  lessened. 
Instead,  we  feel  grounded. 
Another  difficulty  that  we  have  seen  to  face  reductive  physicalism  arises  from  the 
question  of  the  explanatory  autonomy  of  the  special  sciences.  The  arguments  from  the 
multiple  realisability  of  some  special  science  kinds  indicates  that  the  sciences  subsuming 
those  kinds  are  irreducible  to  physical  sciences.  It  certainly  seems  to  be  the  case  that 
meaningful  explanations  can  indeed  be  given  in  the  special  sciences,  and  that  many  of 
the  special  sciences  involve  genuinely  meaningful,  albeit  hedged,  generalisations,  even 
when  the  kinds  involved  in  the  expression  of  such  generalisations  are  realised  in  wildly 
heterogeneous  physical  bases.  But  if  the  special  sciences  do  indeed  'float  free'  of  physics, 
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  they  can  be  genuinely  explanatory.  It  is  not  immediately  evident 
that  traditional  reductionism  can  allow  the  special  sciences  to  be  both  autonomous  and 
genuinely  explanatory. 
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sciences,  such  as  psychology,  economics,  evolutionary  biology,  meteorology,  and  a  host  of 
others,  in  spite  of  their  irreducibility  to  basic  physics,  there  is  a  powerful  aesthetic  appeal 
to  the  idea  that  the  special  sciences  are  autonomous  with  regard  to  the  physical  domain. 
The  notion  that  the  special  sciences,  most  importantly  psychology,  can  be  liberated  from 
the  'nomological  nee$,  of  of  deterministic  physics  is  a  very  attractive  one,  appealing  to  our 
sense  of  the  freedom  and  dignity  of  our  particular  variety  of  being.  We  hope  to  see  the 
normatives  of  human  action  to  be  of  a  different  order  than  the  laws  of  ballistics. 
Traditional  reductionism,  it  appears,  may  not  allow  us  consistently  to  do  this.  Functional 
reductionism,  however,  entails  that  the  special  sciences  are  autonomous  with  regard  to 
basic  physics. 
According  to  functional  reductionism,  some  entity  x  has  a  mental  state,  M, 
because  it  has  a  microphysical  state  P  that  realises  M  in  x.  Some  other  thing,  y,  might  also 
have  M,  because  it  has  some  microphysical  structure,  P2,  which  meets  the  same 
functional  specification  in  y  as  P  does  in  x.  In  the  abstract  sense  of  possessing  a 
microstructure  meeting  the  same  functional  specification,  x  and  y  are  both  M.  But  in 
another  sense,  y  is  not  M,  because  it  is  not  P.  It  is  only  at  the  level  of  abstraction  where 
the  causal  potentials  of  functional  organisations  are  construed  as  intrinsic  properties  of 
complex  wholes  that  kind  terms  in  the  special  sciences  can  be  taken  as  referring  to  the 
same  thing  when  they  refer  to  a  property  ascribed  to  different  individuals  with  diverging 
physical  descriptions,  and  so  only  at  this  level  of  abstraction  that  special  science  laws 
have  any  coherency.  Because  they  involve  structures  with  the  same  overall  functional 
descriptions  and  causal  potentials,  they  can  be  taken  as  being  genuinely  predictive,  and 
meaningful  generalisations  can  be  constructed  in  terms  of  higher  level  properties.  But 
below  this  level  of  abstraction,  special  science  generalisations  are  incoherent.  We  cannot 
expect  laws  linking  causes  and  effects  given  in  terms  of  psychology  directly  to  be  echoed 
in  physical  laws  any  more  than  we  can  expect  ballistics  to  be  reflected  in  the  stochastic 
laws  of  quantum  physics.  But  what  we  can  expect,  and  what  we  do  in  fact  find,  is  that  the 
statistical  laws  of  quantum  physics  back  or  ground  the  laws  of  ballistics.  In  the  same  way, 
we  can  expect  the  laws  of  physics  to  back  or  ground  the  laws  of  psychology,  not  in  the 
sense  that  each  psychological  law  has  an  expression  in  physical  terms,  but  that  each 
instantiation  of  a  psychological  law  is  backed  by  physical  laws. 
Functional  reductionism  is  not  a  reductionism  about  sciences.  According  to  this 
model,  sciences  do  not  necessarily  reduce  to  other  sciences  about  entities  lower  in  the 
explanatory  hierarchy.  It  isproper-6es  -  and  individually  occurrent,  dated  properties  at 
that,  rather  than  kinds  of  properties  -  that  are  reducible  to  physical  properties.  The 
explanatory  autonomy  of  the  special  sciences  is  a  direct  outcome  of  the  functional  model 
Of  reductionism,  and  it  is  not  limited  to  the  'higher'  special  sciences  of  the  wildly  multiply 
realisable,  such  as  psychology  or  economics.  All  of  those  sciences  which  have  to  do  with 
properties  susceptible  to  functional  construal,  including  among  them  some  of  the 
'paradigmatically  physical  sciences'  such  as  mechanics  and  chemistry,  are  in  a  sense 
explanatorily  autonomous  with  regard  to  basic  physics.  Some  of  these  sciences,  especially 
those  we  are  inclined  to  think  of  as  paradigmatically  physical,  will  be  closer  to  basic 
69 physics,  in  virtue  of  the  contingent  fact  that  only  a  few,  or  perhaps  only  one,  basic 
physical  microstructure  is  sufficient  to  be  the  organisation  behind  the  aggregational 
causal  potential  of  their  proprietary  entities  in  this  world:  only  a  proton  and  an  electron  in 
a  certain  relation  is  hydrogen,  and  nothing  else  is.  52 
We  can  then  think  of  the  paradigmatically  physical  sciences  as  those  picking  out 
entities  with  fairly  unique  realisation  bases,  or,  as  in  the  case  of  classical  mechanics,  those 
dealing  with  such  properties,  like  mass,  velocity  &c.,  which  can  be  treated  identically 
across  realisation  bases  for  the  description  of  individual  events.  Thus  the  problem  of  how 
to  identify  which  sciences  are  physical  sciences  as  over  and  against  nonphysical  sciences 
or  not-quite-physical  sciences,  is  dissolved:  strictly  speaking,  one  science  is  physical 
(basic  physics)  or  none  of  them  are  (if  there  can  be  no  basic  physics).  '3  Another  way  of 
reading  this  would  be  to  take  it  that  the  lines  dividing  the  physical  sciences  from  the 
nonphysical  sciences  are  fuzzy,  and  they  are  exactly  as  fuzzy  as  the  greatness  of  the 
potential  (actual  or  possible  within  the  actual  world)  for  heterogeneous  realisation  of  the 
properties  picked  out  by  sciences  other  than  basic  physics.  We  might  translate  this 
notion  to  fit  the  description  of  physical  properties:  a  property  is  completely  physical  if  it 
is  a  basic  physical  property,  and  the  closer  a  property  is  to  basic  physical  properties  in 
terms  of  the  possibility  of  the  multiple  instantiability  of  the  property,  the  more  'physical' 
it  is.  % 
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What  then  of  the  dream  of  the  unity  of  science?  If  the  very  formulation  of 
reduction  does  not  admit  of  the  reduction  of  the  special  sciences  to  physics,  is  this  a 
misplaced  ideal?  Perhaps  not.  As  earlier  noted,  Jeffrey  Poland  has  distinguished  between 
the  notions  of  'unitary'  science  and  'unified'  science.  The  former  is  a  notion  according  to 
which  physics  is  completely  explanatorily  sufficient,  so  that  explanations  made  in  terms 
of  the  special  sciences  can  be  replaced  without  loss  of  content  by  explanations  in  basic 
physical  terms.  "What  is  essential  to  this  view  is  that  science  does  not  consist  of  any 
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principle  could  be  served  by  an  ideally  completed  physics.  "O  According  to  the  notion  of 
unified  science,  by  contrast,  "unification  consists,  not  in  the  eliminability  of  all  branches 
in  favour  of  one,  but  in  there  being  one  branch  to  which  all  others  are  related  in  a 
particular  way.  Such  a  view  does  not  preclude  the  possibility  that  a  given  branch  might  be 
eliminable,  but  what  the  view  affirms  is  that  such  elimination  is  neither  the  general  case 
nor  the  goal  of  scientific  activity.  "56Thc  relation  Poland  sees  as  appropriate,  which  he 
terms  'vertical  explanation',  is  essentially  one  of  property  explanation:  "Phenomena  and 
regularities  at  any  given  level  are  explainable  by  appeal  to  other  phenomena  and 
regularities  at  the  same  or  lower  level  (not  necessarily  physics),  but  aUsucb  appeats  are 
ultimately  grounded  in  phenomena  and  regularities  at  the  physical  level.  I  shall  say  that  a 
phenomenon  or  regularity  is  explanatorily  grounded  in  the  physical  basis  where  there  is  a 
chain  of  'vertical  explanations's7that  eventually  links  it  to  the  phenomena  and  regularities 
in  physics.  "ss  The  notion  of  'unified'  science  is  one  of  grounded  science,  with 
explanations  in  terms  of  more  basic  sciences  grounding  or  backing  explanations  given  in 
terms  of  the  special  sciences.  This  does  not  entail  that  special  science  gencralisations 
must  have  precise  echoes  in  physical  law,  or  that  the  there  be  identifiable  coextcnsions 
in  basic  physical  terms  for  the  kinds  picked  out  in  the  special  sciences,  but  only  that  for 
any  particular  explanation  given  in  terms  of  the  special  sciences,  a  chain  of  explanations 
in  lower  level  terms  eventually  grounds  that  one  explanation  in  basic  physics.  This  is  a 
perfectly  workable  notion  of  scientific  unity.  the  intuitive  sense  in  which  basic  physics 
must  be  a  completely  general  science  is  preserved,  as  is  the  understanding  that  basic 
physical  kinds  and  basic  physical  law  underlies  all  phenomena.  But  it  does  not  involve 
the  reducibility  or  eliminability  of  special  science  kinds. 
The  picture  of  physicalism  that  has  been  presented  so  far  is  of  a  doctrine 
committed  to  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain,  and  to  the 
strong  supervenience  of  all  phenomena  upon  physical  phenomena,  where  supervenience 
is  grounded  in  the  metaphysical  and  explanatory  relation  of  realisation.  These  two 
principles  underlie  the  senses  in  which,  according  to  physicalism,  the  physical  domain 
enjoys  both  ontological  and  explanatory  primacy.  I  had  also  suggested  that,  for  reasons 
exposed  by  Blackburn  and  Rowlands,  the  natural  laws  subsuming  (at  least)  the  basic 
dynamics  of  a  system  should  be  included  in  the  supervenience  base  of  higher  level 
phenomena,  entailing  that  natural  laws  are  in  a  sense  part  of  the  structure  of  individuals. 
This  reading  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  it  is  necessary  to  specify,  in  cases  where  the 
second  modal  operator  in  the  expression  of  strong  supervenience  is  read  as  nomological 
necessity,  that  individuals  possessing  identical  microstructures  will  be  alike  in  an  of  the 
properties  realised  by  these  microstructures  so  long  as  the  physical  laws  are  the  same  for 
both  of  them.  Counting  the  physical  laws  as  part  of  the  microphysical  structure  of  these 
individuals  merely  obviates  the  need  for  this  specification:  if  the  basic  laws  are  not  the 
same  for  two  individuals,  they  are  not  physically  identical.  We  have  seen  how  the 
functional  model  of  reductionism  provides  us  with  a  way  of  construing  the  relative 
Physicality  of  properties,  and  of  the  physical  sciences.  But  as  yet,  no  criteria  are  on  the 
offing  by  which  physical  propertiesperse  can  be  identified  as  physical.  Beyond  the 
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relation  of  realisation  and  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain,  what 
more  is  needed  for  an  adequate  expression  of  the  physicalist  position? 
I  would  like  to  suggest  that  nothing  more  is  needed.  As  Daly  has  argued  and  as 
discussed  in  the  previous  section,  there  are  serious  difficulties  involved  with  the  attempt 
to  set  apHoH  constraints  upon  physical  properties.  For  Daly,  this  indicates  that  all 
metaphysical  programmes  that  assume  that  there  is  a  distinction  between  physical 
properties  and  nonphysical  properties  are  ill-founded,  better  abandoned  in  favour  of 
questions  that  would  arise  independently  of  the  assumption.  I  believe,  rather,  that  the 
difficulty  indicates  that  it  is  unreasonable  to  expect  physicalism  to  provide  aptioH  criteria 
for  what  is  to  count  as  a  physical  property.  The  doctrine  of  physicalism  as  I  have  so  far 
presented  it,  encapsulated  in  the  dual  principles  of  strong  supervenience  grounded  in  a 
metaphysical  explanatory  relation  and  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical 
domain,  is  a  commitment  to  the  ontological  and  explanatory  dependence  of  all  actual  or 
possible  properties  upon  physical  properties  and  the  dynamics  subsuming  them,  and  this 
sets  strong  constraints  upon  what  can  count  as  a  physical  property  in  a  system  that 
contains  any  properties  that  are  physical.  I  suggest  that  according  to  this  notion  of 
physicalism,  what  it  is  to  be  a  physical  property  can  be  explained  purely  by  reference  to 
to  the  scheme  of  metaphysical  and  explanatory  realisations  taken  as  causally  closed:  to  be 
physical  is  just  to  fit  into  a  closed  causal/explanatory  hierarchy  wherein  all  properties, 
relations,  dynamics  and  facts  are  underwritten  by  basic  properties,  relations,  dynamics 
and  facts. 
According  to  this  identification  of  what  it  is  to  be  a  physical  property,  'physicality' 
is  a  world-relative  property  things  have  by  virtue  of  their  embedment  within  the  kind  of 
hierarchy  described.  This  has  the  possibly  counterintuitive  connotation  that'physical' 
worlds  are  possible  which,  because  they  have  very  different  sorts  of  properties  subsumed 
by  very  different  natural  laws  than  those  found  in  the  actual  world,  are  possible.  That  is, 
an  alternative  possible  world  containing  only  ecto-properties,  which  are  not  physical  in 
this  world,  would  be  a  physical  world  if  ecto-properties  in  the  ecto-world  world  are 
subsumed  by  ecto-laws,  and  if  properties  and  laws  in  the  ecto-world  were  organised  into  a 
closed  causal/explanatory  hierarchy  such  that  higher  level  ecto-properties  are  realised  by 
lower  level  ecto-properties  and  all  higher  level  ecto-dynamics  are  describable  in  terms  of 
lower  level  ecto-dynamics.  So  long  as  all  phenomena  in  the  ecto-world  are  functionally 
reducible  in  this  way,  the  ecto-world  is  a  physical  world,  though  it  contains  no  properties 
which  could  be  classified  as  physical  in  the  actual  world.  Further,  properties  which  are 
physical  in  the  actual  world  might59  not  be  physical  in  the  ecto-world,  because  they  might 
not  be  properties  that  fit  into  its  dosed  causal/explanatory  hierarchy. 
This  is,  to  my  mind,  an  acceptable  proposition.  The  notion  of  possible  physical 
ecto-worlds  might  not  be  so  troubling  when  it  is  considered  that  while  the  properties  and 
laws  of  such  worlds  do  not  resemble  any  properties  and  laws  with  which  we  are  familiar, 
such  ecto-worlds  whose  properties  were  organised  in  a  closed  causal/  explanatory 
hierarchy  would  be  just  like  the  actual  world  in  these  significant  ways:  higher  level 
properties  would  strongly  supervene  upon  lower  level  properties.  A  metaphysical 
72 explanatory  relation  would  obtain  between  the  realisers  of  higher  level  ccto-propcrties 
and  the  higher  level  properties  themselves,  grounding  the  stroong  supervenience 
relation,  such  that  explanations  of  higher  level  ecto-properties  would  be  possible  in  terms 
of  lower  level  ecto-properties.  Ecto-sciences  would  be  possible.  If  an  ecto-world  had 
properties  and  laws  that  could  support  the  existence  of  complex  microstructures  that 
could  realize  minds,  and  if  some  of  these  mindful  structures  took  to  the  study  of  the 
general  underlying  features  of  their  world,  they  would  be  doing  what  physicists  do  in  the 
actual  world,  and  I  can  see  no  reason  to  withhold  the  designation  from  these  ecto- 
scientists,  provided  that  their  science  is  restricted  to  their  world. 
An  objection  might  run  as  follows:  suppose  there  is  an  ecto-world  that  is  a  perfect 
shadow  of  our  world.  All  of  its  properties  and  laws  exactly  resemble  the  properties  and 
laws  of  the  actual  world,  and  it  has  molecule-for-ecto-molecule  identical  duplicates  of 
every  existing  thing  in  this  world.  Suppose  that  we  transpose  a  pair  of  duplicates  between 
worlds:  I  go  to  the  ecto-world,  and  my  ecto-twin  appears  in  this  world.  Because  we  have 
the  same  functional  microstructure,  no  difference  should  be  evident,  yet  because  the 
ecto-Nightshade  does  not  fit  within  the  closed  causal/explanatory  hierarchy  of  the  actual 
world,  and  I  do  not  fit  in  that  of  the  ecto-world,  neither  of  us  in  fact  has  any  physical 
effect  upon  the  worlds  in  which  we  find  ourselves.  We  vanish. 
This  objection  is,  however,  incoherent.  If  what  it  is  to  be  a  physical  property  is 
solely  described  in  terms  of  the  property's  fitting  within  a  closed  causal/explanatory 
hierarchy,  then  the  above  described  scenario  is  impossible,  for  the  only  thing  that  makes 
an  ecto-property  a  nonphysical  property  in  the  actual  world  is  that  it  does  not  fit  into  the 
closed  causal/explanatory  hierarchy  that  describes  this  world.  The  ecto-world,  being  a 
property-for-property  and  law-for-law  shadow  of  our  world,  is  not  in  fact  an  alternative 
possible  world  just  like  this  world.  By  Leibniz's  Law,  it  is  this  world. 
The  characterisation  of  the  physical  in  terms  of  a  closed  causal/explanatory 
heirarchy  avoids  the  difficulties  earlier  discussed  for  the  formulation  of  physicalism.  It 
sets  no  apriori  constraints  on  what  can  count  as  a  physical  property,  but  it  does  place 
some  principled  restrictions  on  physicality:  if  any  phenomenon  is  not  in  principle 
explicable  in  terms  of  the  closed  causal/explanatory  hierarchy  the  base  set  of  properties 
for  which  is  physical,  if  it  is  not  functionally  reducible  to  physical  properties  and 
dynamics,  then  that  phenomenon  is  not  physical.  As  we  have  seen,  the  functional  model 
of  reductionism  is  not  confronted  with  the  difficulties  traditional  reductionism  faces  in 
terms  of  the  multiple  instantiability  of  many  special  science  properties.  Thus,  the 
irreducibility  of  special  science  kinds  to  physical  kinds  and  the  irreducibility  of  the 
special  sciences  of  the  multiply  instantiable  to  physical  sciences  is  no  obstacle  to  the 
functional  reduction  of  particular  instances  of  multiply  instantiable  higher  level  properties 
to  physical  properties.  On  this  notion  of  physicalism,  kindf  can  be  nonphysical,  while  no 
instantiations  of  physical  kinds  can  be. 
The  constraint  that  all  nonbasic  physical  properties  be  functionally  reducible  to 
basic  physical  properties  is  indifferent  to  existing  physics,  or  to  any  possible  physics  we 
might  care  to  describe.  It  therefore  allows  for  the  continuing  development  of  physics, 
and  to  the  expansion  of  the  ontology  that  physics  recognises.  On  this  account  of 
73 physicalism,  in  the  absence  of  a  complete,  correct  physics,  we  cannot  know  what  all  of 
the  physical  properties  are,  nor  can  we  in  principle  exclude  actual  properties  from  the 
physical  ontology  when  we  do  not  know  what  future  physics  is  likely  to  be  able  to 
accommodate.  So  much  is  entailed  by  the  requirement  that  physicalism  be  formulated 
such  that  future  developments  in  physics  do  not  render  the  doctrine  false.  Thus, 
physicalism,  according  to  this  characterisation,  will  be  impossible  to  falsify  from  apiiori 
argument:  the  truth  or  falsity  of  physicalism  will  only  be  evident  when  basic  physics  is 
fully  developed  and  a  full  inventory  of  all  of  the  properties  the  world  contains  is  in.  But 
like  the  principles  which  I  have  argued  underlie  robust  physicalism,  the  supervcnience  of 
all  phenomena  upon  physical  phenomena  grounded  in  a  metaphysical  explanatory 
relation  and  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain,  I  do  not  believe 
that  the  truth  of  physicalism  can  beproven.  That  it  be  provable  or  falsifiable  in  principle, 
however,  is  an  unreasonable  requirement  to  set  upon  a  doctrine  about  everything.  That 
we  do  or  do  not  have  good  reasons  to  place  some  faith  in  the  truth  of  the  doctrine,  given 
what  we  actually  know  about  the  world,  is  enough. 
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Downward  Causation 
4.  Nonreductive  Pbysicalism  and  Emergent  Evolution 
IN  THE  WAKE  OF  THE  COMPELLING  ARGUMENTS 
that  have  been  levelled  against  the  traditional  model 
of  reductionism,  which  is  focused  around  the  notion 
of  the  reduction  of  the  special  sciences  to  the 
9  physical  sciences  via  Nagelian'bridge  laws'linking 
special  science  kinds  to  physical  kinds,  nonreductive 
physicalism  has  taken  centre  stage  in  modem 
philosophy  of  mind.  The  version  of  nonreductive 
physicalism  with  which  we  are  here  concerned  has  as  its  motivation  the  multiple 
instantiability  of  the  mental,  among  other  special  science  kinds:  if  mental  states  are 
essentially  functional  states  that  can  be  realised  in  heterogeneous  physical  bases,  then 
qua  mental,  they  cannot  be  reduced  to  physical  kinds  or  correlated  with  physical  kinds 
via  bridge  laws.,  If  this  is  the  case,  then  the  reduction  of  psychology,  and  other  special 
sciences  that  deal  with  multiply  instantiable  properties,  to  physics  cannot  go  through. 
We  have  seen  how  the  functional  model  of  reductionism,  centred  around  the  notion  of 
the  functional  construal  of  higher  level  properties  and  the  identification  of  particular 
instantiations  of  higher  level  properties  with  whatever  microstructure  performs  the 
specified  function,  does  not  encounter  the  difficulties  faced  by  the  traditional  model  of 
reductionism,  and  entails  that  the  special  sciences  are  irreducible  to  physics.  The 
availability  of  such  a  model  itself  might  motivate  a  reconsideration  of  reductionism  about 
the  relation  of  mental  to  physical  properties  as  a  viable  option  for  the  physicalist.  I  want 
further  to  argue  that  if  nonreductive  physicalism  takes  mental  properties  to  be  real, 
causally  effective  properties  qua  mental,  and  if  it  takes  psychological  laws  to  be  real,  albeit 
hedged,  laws  genuinely  descriptive  of  mental  dynamics,  it  is  essentially  incompatible  with 
robust  physicalism.  This  is  because  such  a  construal  of  mental  properties  and 
generalisations  is  directly  at  odds  with  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical 
domain,  which  principle  I  have  argued  underlies  robust  physicalism. 
In  his  (1992)  "Downward  Causation  and  Emergence,  "  jaegwon  Kim  has  argued 
75 that,  in  essence,  nonrcductivc  physicalism  is  a  form  of  the  doctrine  of  emergentism  or 
emergent  evolution.  The  version  of  emergentism  with  which  Kim  is  concerned  belongs  to 
the  influential  body  of  work  Brian  McLaughlin  (1992)  has  termed  British  Emergentism,  " 
which  has  its  origin  in  Milrs  (1843)  System  ofL4c,  reaching  its  mature  expression  in 
Broad's  (1925)  MindandIts  Place  in  Natur4  the  last  major  work  in  the  emergentist 
tradition.  In  his  analysis  Kim  is  not  concerned  with  the  differences  in  the  expression  of 
the  doctrine  of  emergentism  between  the  various  writers  on  emergentism,  but  rather 
with  the  common  core  of  the  doctrine:  the  cmergcntists'  notion  of  the  relation  between 
properties  they  regarded  as'emcrgent'and  th  eproperties  and  relations  from  which 
emergent  properties  were  supposed  to  emerge,  and  in  the  causal  potency  assigned  to 
emergents.  3  He  argues  that  modem  nonreductive  physicalism,  insofar  as  it  is  committed 
to  a  realistic  construal  of  mental  properties,  is  as  committed  to  the  notion  of  downward 
causation,  essentially  the  notion  that  higher  level  properties  can  be  causally  effective  in 
virtue  of  their  natures  qua  higher  level,  as  is  emergcntism. 
Emergentism  was  forwarded  as  a  naturalist  doctrine  in  keeping  with  the  empirical 
investigation  of  the  natural  world.  The  emergentists  rejected  talk  of  mysterious  factors  in 
nature,  particularly  of  immaterial  entities,  such  as  entelechies,  ilan  vital,  Cartesian  souls, 
or  the  like,  cited  as  causally  responsible  for  the  presence  of  characteristic  properties  of 
living  and  mindful  beings.  They  held  that  these  characterising  properties  were  fiffly 
determined  by  the  material  structure  of  the  living  and  mental  entities  that  exhibited 
them.  However,  against  mechanism,  according  to  which  the  characterising  properties  of 
such  structured  wholes  is  not  only  determined  by  the  properties  and  organisation  of  the 
parts  are  in  principle  deducible  apriori  from  a  complete  knowledge  of  the  parts  and  their 
relations,  the  emergentists  held  that  the  whole  is,  quite  literally,  more  than  the  sum  of  its 
parts:  certain  configurations  of  parts,  they  held,  are  sufficient  for  the  emergence  of 
genuinely  novel  properties,  unpredictable  from  the  fifflest  knowledge  of  the  properties 
and  dynamics  of  the  parts  in  akstracta  or  in  other  combinations. 
Kim  isolates  the  central  thesis  of  emergentism  as  encapsulated  by  three 
principles:  that  of  an  Ultimate  Physicalist  Ontology,  that  of  Property  Emergence,  and 
that  of  the  Irreducibility  of  Emergents,  outlined  as  follows: 
i)  The  Ultimate  Pln-sicalist  Ontology:  There  are  basic,  nonemergent  entities 
and  properties,  an  t  ese  are  material  entities  and  their  fundamental  physical 
properties.  4 
2)  Property  Emergence:  When  aggregates  of  basic  entities  attain  a  certain  level  of 
structural  complexity  (relatedness),  genuinely  novel  properties  emerge  to 
characterize  those  structured  aggregates.  Moreover,  these  emergent  properties 
emerge  only  when  the  appropriate  basal  conditions  are  met. 
3)  The  Irreducibility  of  Etnýrgents:  Emergent  roperties  are  novel  in  that  they 
are  not  reductively  explainable  in  terms  of  t 
Zions 
out  of  which  they  emerge. 
We  can  see  immediately  that  there  is  a  close  parallel  between  the  first  two  of  these 
principles  and  principles  generaRy  accepted  by  nonreductive  physicalists.  It  seems 
76 commonly  to  be  held,  if  not  stated  outright,  that  there  is  some  basic  level  of  the  world's 
ontology  at  which  nothing  is  decomposable  into  constituent  parts,  and  this  is  generally 
taken  to  be  the  basic  physical  domain.  The  second  principle  can  be  read  as  an 
expression  of  supervcniencc,  correlating  the  genuinely  novel  properties  of  certain 
aggregates  with  the  structures  of  these  aggregates:  if  anything  has  a  certain  aggregational 
structure  G,  then  it  has  some  characteristic  property  F,  and  if  anything  else  has  G,  then  it 
too  has  F.  Ile  qualification  that  emergent  properties  emerge  only  when  their  basal 
conditions  arc  met  is  an  expression  of  the  dependency  of  emergents  upon  their 
emergence  bases:  emergent  properties  never  float  free,  but  are  found  always  and  only 
where  appropriate  structural  conditions  obtain. 
There  are  some  important  clarifying  remarks  to  be  made  about  (3).  The  idea  of 
reduction  with  which  the  emergentists  were  working  was  not  the  model  of  intertheoretic 
reduction  common  in  modem  literature.  Rather,  their  notion  of  reduction  generally 
corresponds  more  closely  to  property  reduction.  Broad  speaks  of  the  deduction  of 
characteristic  properties  of  aggregates  from  knowledge  of  the  parts  in  isolation  or  in  other 
aggregates,  and  terms  the  theory  that  all  properties  of  composed  objects  are  in  principle 
deducible  from  a  complete  knowledge  of  the  properties  and  relations  of  the  parts  of 
those  objects  mechanism.  Illuminating  the  distinction  between  mechanism  and 
cmcrgentism,  Broad  writes: 
Put  in  abstract  terms  the  emergent  theory  asserts  that  there  are  certain  wholes,  composed  (say)  of 
constituents  A,  B,  and  C  in  a  relation  R  to  each  other;  that  all  wholes  composed  of  constituents  of 
the  same  kind  as  A,  B,  and  C  in  relations  of  the  same  kind  as  R  have  certain  characteristic 
properties;  that  A,  B,  and  C  are  capable  of  occurring  in  other  kinds  of  complex  where  the  relation 
is  not  of  the  same  kind  as  R;  and  that  the  characteristic  properties  of  the  whole  R(A,  B,  Q  cannot, 
even  in  theory,  be  deduced  from  the  most  co!  nplete  knowledge  of  the  properties  of  A,  B,  and  C  in 
isolation  or  in  other  wholes  which  arc  not  of  the  form  R(A,  B,  Q.  The  mechanistic  theory  rejects 
the  last  clause  of  this  assertion.  ' 
Thus  an  emergent  property  is  a  property  of  a  mercological  whole  which,  whilst  its 
obtaining  is  lawlikc  in  that  all  mcreological  wholes  with  the  same  parts  and  having  the 
same  structure  will  have  that  property,  is  not  explicable  in  terms  of  the  properties  of  the 
parts  and  the  laws  governing  the  dynamics  of  the  parts  in  that  structure  or  in  any  other. 
Emergent  properties,  and  the  laws  correlating  them  with  the  structured  aggregates  in 
which  they  are  found,  are  ontologically  unique  and  ultimate. 
The  notion  that  higher  level  properties  of  structured  wholes  can  on  the 
mechanistic  view  be  deduced,  orpredicted,  from  an  ideal  knowledge  of  the  properties  of 
the  parts  and  of  the  laws  subsuming  the  dynamics  of  the  parts  in  abstracta  and  in  other 
combinations  is  the  important  defming  characteristic  of  mechanism  for  the 
emergentists.  However,  I  think  that  the  notion  of  the  deduction  of  higher  level  properties 
from  knowledge  of  lower  level  properties  is  a  stronger  notion  than  is  strictly  required  by 
emergentist  doctrine,  and  the  strength  of  the  notion  of  deduction  may  cloud  the  idea 
they  wish  to  express  for  those  coming  to  their  works  from  a  more  modem  perspective. 
We  are  now  aware  that  there  are  some  systems  whose  behaviour,  whilst  being  completely 
and  wholly  determined  by  the  properties  and  dynamics  of  the  components  of  the 
system,  are  nonetheless  genuinely  unpredictable.  Such  systems,  such  as,  notoriously, 
77 wcathcr  patterns,  among  othcr  phcnomcna,  arc  govcmcd  by  chaos  dynamics,  an  only 
comparatively  recently  developed  branch  of  mathematics.  The  emergentists  did  not  have 
chaos  among  the  scientific  and  mathematical  notions  upon  which  they  could  draw,  but  it 
seems  to  me  that  if  they  were  to  have  had  it,  they  would  agree  that the  practical  or 
thoretical  deducibility  of  the  properties  or  behaviour  of  a  system  in  terms  of  the 
properties  and  behaviour  of  its  parts  is  too  strong.  I  suggest  that  a  notion  that  would  be 
agreeable  to  them  is  that  of  explanation.  The  behaviour  of  chaotic  systems  is  not 
predictable  from  a  complete  knowledge  of  the  parts  and  their  dynamics,  but  it  is  so 
cxplicable.  I  will  speak  sometimes  of  the  explanation  of  higher  level  properties  in  terms 
of  lower  level  properties,  occasionally  making  reference  to  deducibility  when  it  appears  in 
the  emergentist  text,  with  that  caveat  in  mind. 
It  is  not  the  case  for  the  modem  nonreductive  physicalist  that  realised  properties 
are  irreducible  to  physical  properties  in  the  sense  that  they  are  inexplicable  in  terms  of 
the  physical  systems  rcalising  them.  Rather,  it  is  generally  taken  that  particular  instances 
of  realised  properties  may  be  fiffly  explainable  in  terms  of  the  functional  organisation  of 
the  particular  microstructure  realising  the  propertý,  at  that  time.  7  It  is,  rather,  kinds  of 
properties  which  are  not  reducible  to  physical  structures.  In  this  respect,  nonreductive 
physicalism  and  emergentism  areptimafacie  not  equivalent.  But  though  these  two  claims 
of  the  nonreducibility  of  realised  or  emergent  properties  are  different  in  nature,  they 
both  have  the  consequence  that  theories  couched  in  lower  level  terms  will  be  inadequate 
for  the  explanation  of  higher  level  phenomena.  As  Kim  says, 
What  is  common  to  all  these  antireductionisms  is  the  belief  that  phenomena  and  regularities  at 
one  level  are  explanatorily  unrearbable  from  another  level,  that  the  distinctively  and 
characteristically  psychological  phenomena,  properties,  and  regularities  constitute  an  autonomous 
domain,  from  the  point  of  view  of  scientific  theo  relative  to  the  domain  of  physical  and  biological 
phenomena.  And  this  is  in  spite  of  the  fact  that, 
7rom 
an  ontological  point  of  view,  mentality  is 
dependent  on  physical  and  biological  processes! 
So,  while  nonreductive  physicalism  and  emergentism  have  different  reasons  to  assert  the 
nonreducibUity  of  certain  higher  level  properties  and  have  different  notions  of  in  what 
that  nonreducibility  consists,  we  do  see  a  remarkable  convergence  between 
nonreductive  physicalism  and  emergentism:  both  advert  to  a  basic  physical  ontology 
underlying  all  phenomena,  both  adhere  to  a  supervenience  thesis,  and  both  have  the 
consequence,  through  different  notions  of  irreducibility,  that  the  laws  of  basic  physics  or 
of  any  of  the  lower  level  sciences  are  inadequate  for  the  explanation  of  higher  level 
phenomena  that  involve  multiply  instantiable,  for  the  one,  or  emergent,  for  the  other, 
higher  level  properties. 
Realism 
To  construe  mental  properties  realisdcally  is  to  construe  them  as  genuine  causal 
agents  in  themselves  and  in  their  own  right  as  mental  properties.  That  is,  when  a  mental 
event  is  cited  as  relevant  in  any  causal  interaction,  on  the  realistic  construal  of  mentality  it 
78 is  the  properties  which  arc  characteristic  of  the  mental  event  qua  mental  that  arc  relevant 
to  the  explanation.  Suppose,  for  example,  I  tidy  the  kitchen.  I  pick  up  pots  and  pans 
from  the  stove  and  put  them  in  the  sink;  heat  water,  scrub  pots  and  pans;  clean  the 
countertops;  sweep  the  floor,  in  short,  by  wilfi4  moving  my  body  about  in  various  ways,  I 
cause  all  kinds  of  physical  things  (not  just  my  body)  to  be  moved  and  rearranged.  A  very 
reasonable  explanation  for  this  flurry  of  physical  movings-around  is  that  I  desired  that  the 
kitchen  should  be  tidy,  and  that  I  beUeved  that  by  performing  these  various  physical  acts, 
the  kitchen  would  become  tidy.  My  actions,  and  the  resultant  state  of  the  kitchen,  is 
explained  by  reference  to  contcntful  mental  states. 
Kim  argues  that  this  kind  of  explanation,  taken  at  face  value,  commits  the 
nonreductivc  physicalist  to  the  notion  of  downward  causation.  But  downward  causation 
proves  highly  problematic  for  the  physicalist  who  is  committed  to  the  principle  of  the 
causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain,  which  principle  I  have  argued  is  essential  to  the 
physicalist  doctrine.  If  Kim  is  right,  then  the  conclusion  that  nonreductivism  is 
incompatible  with  a  formulation  of  physicalism  that  is  committed  to  the  causal  closure 
principle  is  supported. 
Kim  defines  downward  causation  as  the  idea  that  "bigberhvelmentalevents  and 
processes  cause  lower  levelfibysicallaws  to  be  violated,  that  the  molecules  that  are  part  of  your 
body  behave,  at  least  sometimes,  in  ways  different  from  the  way  they  would  behave  if  they 
weren't  part  of  a  body  animated  by  mental  processes.  "',,  If  any  piece  of  physical  behaviour 
is  explicable  only  in  terms  of  a  mental  cause  -  if,  as  the  quotation  says,  the  physical  parts 
of  my  body  as  I  tidy  the  kitchen  behave  in  ways  that  they  would  not  or  could  not  in  the 
absence  of  a  mind,  in  that  the  mental  state  has  to  be  invoked  to  explain  the  physical 
permutations  my  body  undergoes  -  no  complete  physical  description  could  be  given  for 
that  piece  of  physical  bchaviour.  Me  mental  states  attributed  to  me  are  essential 
elements  in  the  complete  explanation  of  this  physical  activity.  This,  however,  is  to  violate 
the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain,  which  asserts  that  in  tracing 
the  causal  history  of  any  event  falling  under  physical  description,  we  need  never  move 
outside  the  physical  domain  to  cite  nonphysical  causes,  and  that  each  physical  event  has 
a  complete  sufficient  physical  cause.  When  the  emergentist  maintains  that  certain 
structured  aggregates  are  enabled  to  behave  in  ways  that  the  parts  of  the  aggregate  could 
not  in  abstracta  or  in  other  combinations,  and  that  they  are  so  enabled  in  virtue  of  a 
genuinely  novel  property  that  cannot  be  deduced  from  or  explained  in  terms  of  the 
properties  and  relations  of  the  aggregate's  parts,  they  assert  that  causal  interactions 
involving  these  aggregates  involve  the  participation  of  a  factor  for  which  no  complete 
physical  description  exists,  but  which  must  be  invoked  on  its  own  level,  in  its  own  terms. 
The  emergentist  is  thus  committed  to  downward  causation. 
Kim's  contention  is  that  the  nonreductive  physicalist  who  construes  the  mental 
realistically  is  as  committed  to  the  occurrence  of  downward  causation  as  is  the 
emergentist.  His  elegant  argument  is  as  follows: 
At  this  point  we  know  that,  on  emerýgentism,  mental  properties  must  have  causal  powers.  Now, 
these  powers  must  manifest  themselves  ýy  causin$  eitheý  physical  properties  or  other  mental 
properties.  If  the  former,  that  already  is  downward  causation.  Assume  then  that  mental  property  M 
79 causes  another  mental  prorrty  W.  I  shall  show  that  this  is  possible  only  if  M  causes  some 
tr  pyysical  property.  Notice  irst  that  M  is  an  emergent;  this  means  that  M*  is instantiated  on  a 
given  occasion  ondy  because  a  certain  physical  roperty,  P*,  its  emeFgence  base,  is  instantiated  on 
that  occasion.  In  view  of  AM  emergent  dcpengence  on  P*,  then,  wha-t  are  we  to  think  of  its  causal 
dependence  on  At?  I  believe  that  these  two  claims  concerning  why  W  is  present  on  this  occasion 
must  be  reconciled,  and  that  the  oýy  viable  way  of  accomplishing  it  is  to  suppose  that  M  caused 
M*  by  causing  its  emergence  base  P.  In  general,  the  principle  involved  is  this:  the  only  way  to  cause 
an  emergentpropert  y  to  bi  imundated  is  to  cause  its  emergence  bareproperty  to  be  instantiated.  And  this 
means  that  same  level  causation  of  an  emergent  pr?  perty  pýesupposes  the  downward  causation  of  its 
emer&ence  base.  That  briefly  is  why  emergentism  is  committed  to  downward  causation.  I  believe 
that  the  argument  remains  plausible  when  emergence  is  replaced  by  physical  realization  in 
appropriate  places.  " 
I  should  like  to  return  to  this  argument  later.  At  this  point  it  will  be  interesting  to  look 
more  closely  at  the  doctrine  of  emergentism  itself,  so  as  better  to  appreciate  its  subtleties 
as  well  as  its  similarities  and  differences  in  respect  of  nonreductive  physicalism.  In  what 
follows  I  shall  focus  on  C.  D.  Broad's  Alind  and  Its  Place  in  Nature  as  Broad7s  is  a 
particularly  clear  expression  of  developed  emergentist  thinking. 
--,  . 
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The  context  of  Broa&s  work,  and  of  emergentism  generally,  is  the  debate 
between  vitalism,  which  asserts  that  the  characteristically  lifelike  properties  of  living 
entities  could  not  be  explained  purely  in  terms  of  processes  of  the  physical  body,  but 
that  appeal  has  to  be  made  to  a  novel  and  irreducible  componca  present  in  the  living 
body:  an  entelechy  or  itan  vital  to  explain  the  liveliness  of  the  living.  Mechanism,  on  the 
other  hand,  holds  that  all  living  processes,  and  all  other  processes  as  well,  are  fully 
explicable  in  terms  of  the  properties  and  laws  which  describe  the  dynamics  of  basic  non- 
living  systems.  The  emergentists  rejected  appeal  to  a  mysterious,  generally  nonphysical 
component  taken  to  be  present  in  aggregates  exhibiting  the  property  beingalive,  while 
acknowledging  apparently  inexplicable  properties  of  aggregates,  and  were  concerned  to 
account  for  these  properties  in  a  naturalistically  acceptable  way. 
One  of  the  factors  motivating  the  emergentists  was  the  apparently  inexplicable 
nature  of  the  properties  of  chemical  compounds  in  relation  to  the  properties  their 
component  elements  could  be  observed  to  exhibit  in  isolation,  and  the  then  inscrutable 
laws  of  chemical  bonding.  Though  at  the  the  time  that  he  was  writing  the  Tarner 
lectures,  Broad  was  aware  that  atoms  were  not  understood  to  be  fundamental  aspects  of 
nature,  but  that  they  were  possessed  of  a  certain  microstructure  of  protons  and  electrons 
(neutrons,  as  McLaughlin  notes,  were  not  discovered  until  1932n),  the  theory  that  could 
explain  chemical  bonding  -  quantum  mechanics  -  had  not  been  developed.  Though 
Broad  accepts  that  a  future  science  might  show  chemical  as  wen  as  vital  phenomena  to 
be  fully  mechanistically  explicable,  he  had  no  way  to  anticipate  the  sciences  that  would 
do  so.  "3  For  all  he  knew  or  could  expect,  the  facts  having  to  do  with  chemical  bonding 
had  simply  to  be  taken  as  brute.  Thus  for  Broad,  as  for  the  British  Emergentists 
generally,  the  scope  of  the  problem  was  wider  that  the  debate  between  vitalism  and 
mechanism.  For  Broad,  the  question  is:  "Are  the  differences  between  merely  physical, 
8o chemical,  and  vital  behaviour  ultimate  and  irreducible  or  not?  And  arc  the  differences  in 
chemical  behaviour  between  Oxygen  and  Hydrogen,  or  the  differences  in  vital  behaviour 
between  trees  and  oysters  and  cats,  ultimate  and  irreducible  or  not?  "&40r.  are  there 
unique  and  ultimate  differences  between  certain  aggregates  and  their  components,  or 
between  individuals  at  higher  and  at  lower  levels,  or  are  there  not? 
To  illuminate  the  dilemma,  Broad  gives  the  contrasting,  now  classic,  examples  of  a 
clock  and  a  chemical  compound.  Even  if  a  person  had  never  seen  a  clock,  if  he  is 
knowledgeable  about  the  general  rules  describing  mechanical  behaviour,  which  he  could 
learn  through  the  observation  of  other  mechanical  systems,  and  if  he  is  told  how  a  clock 
is  constructed,  he  could  predict  how  it  would  behave.  At  the  time  Broad  was  writing  this 
was  not  even  theoretically  possible  for  the  case  of  chemical  properties.  Broad  writes: 
Oxygen  has  certain  properties  and  Hydrogen  has  certain  other  properties.  They  combine  to  form 
water,  and  the  proportions  in  which  they  do  this  are  fixed.  Nothing  that  we  know  about  Oxygen  by 
itself  or  in  its  combinations  with  anything  but  Hydrogen  would  give  us  the  least  reason  to  suppose 
that  it  would  combine  with  Hydrogen  at  all.  Nothing  that  we  know  about  Hydrogen  by  itself  or  in 
its  combinations  with  anything  but  Oxygen  would  Vve  us  the  least  reason  to  expect  that  it  would 
combine  with  Oxygen  at  all.  And  most  of  the  chemical  and  physical  properties  of  water  have  no 
known  connexion,  either  quantitative  or  qualitative,  with  those  of  Oxygen  and  Hydrogen.  Here  we 
have  a  clear  instance  of  a  case  where,  so  fir  as  we  can  tell,  the  properties  of  a  whole  coýnposed  of 
two  constituents  could  not  have  been  predicted  from  a  knowledge  of  the  properties  of  these 
constituents  taken  separately,  or  from  this  combined  with  a  knowledge  of  the  properties  of  other 
wholes  which  contain  these  constituents.  '$ 
The  doctrine  of  property  emergence  was  forwarded  precisely  to  accommodate  this 
apparent  gap  in  our  understanding  naturalistically,  without  invoking  mysterious  entities  or 
powers. 
Having  dismissed  (rightly,  I  think)  as  logically  possible,  but  empirically  unrealistic 
and  philosophically  unsatisfying  theories  of  property  dependence  according  to  which  the 
characteristic  behaviours  of  mereological  wholes  are  not  in  anyway  dependent  upon  their 
microstructural  organisation,  &6  Broad  distinguishes  two  types  of  the  complementary 
theory,  according  to  which  the  structures  of  aggregates  are  key  factors  in  determining 
which  characteristic  properties  these  structures  will  exhibit:  component  theories,  which 
hold  that  the  characteristic  behaviour  of  a  certain  object  or  class  of  objects  is  in  part 
dependent  on  the  presence  of  a  peculiar  component  which  does  not  occur  in  anything 
that  does  not  behave  in  this  way,  "  and  those  to  which  I  shall  refer  as  structur-c  theories. 
This  kind  of  theory  denies  that  there  need  be  any  peculiar  component  which  is  present 
in  all  things  that  behave  in  a  certain  way  and  is  absent  from  all  things  which  do  not 
behave  in  this  way.  Rather,  such  theories  hold  that  the  components  may  be  exactly  alike 
in  both  cases,  and  they  explain  the  difference  of  behaviour  wholly  in  terms  of  difference 
of  structure.  's 
Component  theories,  Broad  notes,  are  the  kind  standardly  employed  in 
chemistry:  silver  chloride  has  certain  properties,  and  common  salt  has  others,  because  in 
addition  to  chlorine  one  compound  contains  silver,  and  the  other  sodium.  Differences  in 
the  structural  arrangement  of  chemical  compounds  are  also  cited  as  explaining  the 
different  properties  they  may  exhibit.  Thus,  the  reason  that  the  two  chemical 
compounds  acetone  and  propion  aldehyde  have  such  very  different  properties  though 
81 they  arc  composed  of  the  same  chemical  elements  is  ascribed  to  the  fact  that they  have 
the  different  structures  symbolised.  by 
CH3-C-CH3 
II 
0 
(acetone) 
and 
CH3*CH2*C 
(propion  aldehyde)19 
This  blend  of  structure  and  component  theories  will  be  appropriate  if  the  properties  of 
the  chemical  elements  are  brute,  irreducible  properties.  This  has  turned  out  not  to  be 
the  case  for  the  chemical  elements,  but  in  any  case,  it  should  be  noted  that  whatever  the 
state  of  future  scientific  practice,  whatever  the  properties  of  whatever  is  taken  to  be  the 
most  basic  and  fundamental  element  of  nature  will  have  to  be  taken  as  brute,  not  further 
decomposable.  It  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  any  fundamental  theory  will  take  the  form 
of  a  blend  of  structure  and  component  theories. 
The  doctrine  Broad  identifies  as  Substantial  Vitalism,  which  holds  that  a  necessary 
factor  in  explaining  the  characteristic  behaviour  of  living  bodies  is  the  presence  in  them 
of  a  peculiar  component,  often  called  an  "Entelechy",  which  does  not  occur  in  inorganic 
matter  or  in  bodies  which  were  formerly  alive  but  have  now  died,  211  has  the  form  of  a 
component  theory  about  mereological  wholes.  Given  that  we  do  accept  component 
theories  on  the  basic  levels  of  explanation,  why  should  we  reject  them  for  aggregates? 
The  reason  why  we  feel  better  about  accepting  ultimate  and  irreducible  properties 
of  chemical  components  in  explanations  about  why  certain  chemical  compounds  have 
certain  properties,  and  not  so  good  about  accepting  entelechies  or  ilan  vital  in 
explanations  about  why  certain  mereological.  wholes  exhibit  lifelike  properties  has  to  do 
with  the  nature  of  the  proposed  entelechy  itself.  a  purely  hypothetical  entity  of  a  typically 
immaterial  nature.  Some  chemical  elements,  Broad  notes,  have  been  hypothesised  and 
used  in  chemical  explanations  long  before  they  ever  actually  were  isolated.  But  prior  to 
that,  other  chemical  elements  bad  been  isolated,  with  greater  or  lesser  degrees  of 
difficulty.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  hypothetical  chemical  elements  couldnot  be 
isolated,  or  if  the  degree  of  difficulty  involved  in  the  isolation  should  be  too  great,  that 
they  could  not  be  isolable  in  theory.  No  entelechy,  however,  has  ever  been  isolated,  and 
it  is  difficult  to  see,  given  the  supposed  immaterial  nature  of  the  thing,  how  such  a  feat 
could  even  be  accomplished.  An  entelechy  is  a  purely  hypothetical  entity  in  a  way  that 
82 hypothesised  but  as  yet  unisolated  chemical  elements  are  not.  To  the  objection  that  an 
entelechy  is  in  principle  not  something  that  could  empirically  be  detected,  Broad 
perspicuously  answers 
If  it  be  said  that  an  isolated  entelechy  is  from  the  nature  of  the  case  something  which  could  not 
be  perceived,  and  that  this  objection  is  therefore  unreasonable,  I  can  only  answer  (as  I  should  to 
the  similar  assertion  that  the  physical  phenomena  of  mediumship  can  happen  only  in  darkness  and 
in  the  presence  of  sympathetic  spectators)  that  it  may  well  be  true  but  is  certainly  very 
unfortunate.  ' 
Another  objection  might  be  advanced  to  the  effect  that  some  chemical  elements  cannot 
e3dst  in  isolation,  and  that  therefore  the  objection  that  entelechies  cannot  be  isolated  is 
inappropriate.  Broad  responds: 
It  is  true  that  some  groups  which  cannot  exist  in  isolation  play  a  most  important  part  in  chemical 
explanations.  But  they  are  groups  of  known  composition,  not  mysterious  simple  entities;  and  their 
inability  to  exist  by  themselves  is  not  an  isolated  fact  but  is  part  of  the  more  general,  though 
imperfict  understood,  fact  of  valency.  Moreover,  we  can  at  least  ass  these  groups  from  one 
compounYto  another,  and  can  note  how  the  chemical  properties  c 
asge 
as  one  compound  oses 
? 
an  I 
such  a  group  and  another  pins  it.  There  is  no  known  analogy  to  this  with  entelechies.  You  cannot 
pass  an  entelechy  from  a  living  man  into  a  corpse  and  note  -that  the  former  ceases  and  the  latter 
begins  to  behave  vitally.  - 
Further,  since  an  entelechy  is  not  a  material  entity,  and  so  is  not  necessarily  in  space,  it  is 
very  difficult  to  make  sense  of  the  notion  that  a  living  body  is  a  compound  of  physical 
stuff  and  an  entelechy.  Thus  Broad  rejects  substantial  vitalism,  acknowledging  it  to  be 
logically  possible,  but  certainly  less  than  appealing  from  a  naturalistic  standpoint.  Since 
his  arguments  are  general,  at  the  same  time  he  rejects  any  component  theory  about 
mereological  wholes. 
Broad  identifies  two  types  of  structure  theories:  mechanistic  and  emergent. 
Within  this  distinction  two  versions  of  mechanistic  theories  are  distinguished:  pure 
mechanim  a  very  strong  reductive  mechanism  with  an  eliminativist  character,  and  plain 
mechanism,  a  weaker  version.  According  to  the  ideal  of  pure  mechanism,  there  is  only 
one  fundamental  kind  of  particle,  and  only  one  law  of  composition  governing  the 
possibilities  for  its  combinations.  All  mereological  entities  and  all  of  the  sciences  that 
describe  them  would  be  reducible  to  descriptions  in  terms  of  the  fundamental  stuff  and 
its  fundamental  law.  All  the  apparently  different  kinds  of  stuff,  under  this  ideal,  are  just 
differently  arranged  groups  of  different  numbers  of  the  one  kind  of  elementary  particle; 
and  all  the  apparently  peculiar  laws  of  behaviour  are  simply  special  cases  which  could  be 
deduced  in  theory  from  the  structure  of  the  whole  under  consideration,  the  one 
elementary  law  of  behaviour  for  isolated  particles,  and  the  one  universal  law  of 
composition.  On  such  a  view  the  external  world  has  the  greatest  amount  of  unity  which  is 
conceivable.  "There  is  really  only  one  science,  and  the  various  "special  sciences"  are  just 
particular  cases  of  it.  "-3  This  kind  of  mechanism  offers  the  highest  degree  of  tidiness 
possible,  but  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  mechanist  to  take  so  strong  a  stance.  A  mechanist 
could  admit  that  there  were  different  types  of  element  and  a  group  of  laws  describing 
their  combinations  and  dynamics,  as  the  electronic  theory  of  matter  at  the  time  did.,  4 
83 One  could  also  be  a  mechanist  about  particular  levels  of  explanation:  E.  g.,  if  a  biologist 
held  that  all  the  characteristic  behaviour  of  living  beings  could  be  deduced  from  an 
adequate  knowledge  of  the  physical  and  chemical  laws  which  its  components  would  obey 
in  isolation  or  in  non-living  complexes,  he  would  be  called  a  "Biological  Mechanist"  even 
though  he  believed  that  the  different  chemical  elements  are  ultimately  different  kinds  of 
stuff  and  that  the  laws  of  chemical  composition  are  not  of  the  type  demanded  by  Pure 
Mcchanism.  25 
As  we  have  seen  in  Kim's  description  of  the  fundamental  tenets  of  cmcrgentism, 
the  crucial  difference  between  emergence  theories  and  mechanistic  theories  lics  in  the 
manner  in  which  the  properties  of  structured  aggregates  are  held  to  be  related  to  the 
structures  of  the  aggregates  themselves.  Mechanistic  theories  and  emergent  theories 
differ,  says  Broad,  "according  to  the  view  that  we  take  about  the  laws  which  connect  the 
properties  of  the  components  with  the  characteristic  behaviour  of  the  complex  wholes 
which  they  make  up".  -%'  According  to  mechanism,  "the  characteristic  behaviour  of  the 
whole  is  not  only  completely  determined  by  the  nature  and  arrangement  of  its 
components;  in  addition  to  this  it  is  held  that  the  behaviour  of  the  whole  could,  in  theory 
at  least,  be  deduced  from  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  how  the  components  bchave  in 
isolation  or  in  other  wholes  of  a  simpler  kind.  "27  According  to  cmergentism,  on  the  other 
hand,  "the  characteristic  behaviour  of  the  whole  could  not,  even  in  theory,  be  deduced 
from  the  most  complete  knowledge  of  the  behaviour  of  its  components,  taken  separately 
or  in  other  combinations,  and  of  their  proportions  and  arrangements  in  this  whole.  "2' 
Mechanism  asserts  that  the  properties  and  laws  that  subsume  the  dynamics  of  the  parts 
of  a  particular  aggregate  are  sufficient  to  determine  the  characteristic  properties  of  that 
aggregate.  Emergentism  denies  this  part  of  the  mechanist  thesis.  For  the  cmergentist 
there  is  indeed  something  over  and  above  the  sum  of  the  parts  of  certain  structured 
aggregates.  In  holding  that  emergent  properties  are  determined  by  the  structure  of  the 
entity  in  which  they  inhere,  but  which  are  in  principle  inexplicable  and  nondeduciblc  in 
terms  of  the  properties  and  laws  appropriate  to  the  parts,  the  emergentist  introduces  two 
fundamental  elements  to  the  world.  a  unique  and  ultimate  emergent  law,  29  which  has  no 
reflection  in  lower  level  laws,  and  the  emergentproperty  itself,  a  new,  ultimate  and 
irreducible  property. 
There  are  two  ways  of  thinking  about  the  emergent  nature  of  chemical  properties 
and  the  laws  binding  them  to  certain  structured  aggregates.  We  can  consider  it  to  be 
among  the  "properties"  (Broads  scare  quotes)  of  a  particular  element,  that  when  mixed 
with  some  different  element  in  a  certain  proportion  yields  a  compound  with  such  and 
such  characteristic  properties;  another  of  its  "properties"  that  when  mixed  with  some 
other  element  in  some  proportion,  yields  a  compound  with  such  and  such  other 
characteristic  properties;  and  so  on.  The  complementary  properties  can  be  assigned  to 
the  other  elements  involved.  In  this  case,  we  can  never  know  all  of  the  properties  of  any 
clement  until  we  have  observed  it  in  all  possible  compounds  and  all  possible 
combinations  a  potentially  impossible  proposition,  even  if  merely  possible  properties  of 
elements  generated  by  their  combination  with  merely  possible  but  nonactual  elements 
with  merely  possible  elemental  properties  are  overlooked.  r  In  the  other  case,  we  can 
84 take  it  that  the  properties  of  an  element  are  those  which  it  has  intrinsically,  and  which  it 
exhibits  when  it  is  not  behaving  chemically  in  anyway.  In  this  case,  we  can  never  know 
all  of  the  laws  having  to  do  with  a  particular  elements  forming  compounds  with  certain 
characteristic  properties  when  in  combination  with  other  elements  in  different  structural 
organisations.  Broad  takes  the  second  approach,  but  he  notes  that  these  divergent  views 
are  the  same  in  practice,  and  they  both  have  the  same  consequence:  "that  the  behaviour 
of  an  as  yet  unexamined  compound  cannot  be  predicted  from  a  knowledge  of  the 
properties  of  its  elements...  it  matters  little  whether  we  ascribe  this  to  the  existence  of 
innumerable  latent  properties  in  each  element,  or  to  the  lack  of  a  general  principle  of 
composition...  by  which  the  behaviour  of  any  chemical  compound  could  be  deduced 
from  its  structure  and  from  the  behaviour  of  each  of  its  elements  in  isolation  from  the 
rest.  rO 
Emergentist  doctrine  describes  the  world  as  a  hierarchy  of  levels  of  structural 
complexity,  from  the  purely  physical,  to  the  chemical,  to  the  vital,  to  the  psychological. 
Each  level  is  distinguished  by  the  characteristic  properties  unique  to  entities  on  that 
level.  Such  entities  are  mereological  wholes,  structured  aggregates  of  lower  level 
components,  and  the  characteristic  properties  exhibited  by  these  wholes  are  taken  to  be 
fully  determined  by  the  structure  that  exhibits  them.  However,  these  characterising 
properties  are  irreducible,  ultimate  properties  without  echo  or  explanation  on  the  level  of 
the  parts  which  in  that  specific  organisation  determine  them.  Nonetheless  according  to 
emergentist  doctrine  the  relation  between  the  structure  of  a  mereological  whole  and 
emergent  properties  of  that  whole  was  more  than  a  of  matter  brute  covariation,  but  is  a 
nomological  determinative  relation. 
Broad's  emergentism  distinguishes  two  different  kinds  of  laws:  laws  governing  the 
interactions  of  elements  within  any  particular  level  of  the  hierarchy,  and  laws  that  bind 
emergent  properties  to  the  mereological  structures  in  which  they  are  found,  and  which 
characterize  them  as  higher  level  in  respect  of  their  parts.  These  are  termed  Intra-ordinal 
Laws  and  Trans-ordinal  Laws  respectively.  just  as  emergent  properties  are  unique  and 
ultimate  properties  of  aggregates  not  explicable  from  even  the  mot  complete  knowledge 
of  the  properties  of  the  parts,  a  trans-ordinal  law  is  a  unique  and  ultimate  law.  It  is  "a 
statement  of  the  irreducible  fact  that  an  aggregate  composed  of  aggregates  of  the  next 
lower  order  in  such  and  such  proportions  and  arrangements  has  such  and  such 
characteristic  and  non-deducible  properties.  "-"  Intra-ordinal  laws  subsume  dynamics 
within  any  particular  level,  whether  or  not  there  are  emergent  properties  on  that  level, 
and  in  company  with  the  characteristic  properties  on  that  level  are  those  to  which  merely 
resultant  properties  and  laws  on  higher  levels  could  conceivably  be  reduced.  Recall  the 
example  of  the  biological  mechanist:  it  is  consistent  with  emergentism.  that  some  higher 
level  properties  be  reducible,  albeit  not  necessarily  all  the  way  to  the  physical  level,  as  will 
be  the  case  when  entities  with  emergent  properties  are  components  of  wholes  exhibiting 
merely  resultant  properties.  A  schoolýof  fish  or  a  flock  of  birds  might  be  examples:  the 
behaviour  of  the  school  or  of  the  flock  is  reducible  to  the  behaviours  of  the  individual 
members,  but  on  emergentist  doctrine,  the  vital  properties  of  the  individuals  themselves 
are  not  further  reducible.  4 
85 Intra-ordinal  laws  proprietary  to  higher  levels  are  special  science  laws.  As 
expressed,  some  of  these  laws  will  be  reducible  to  laws  of  lower  level  sciences,  when 
those  laws  have  to  do  only  with  resultant  properties  of  the  individuals  on  the  level  in 
question.  When  intra-ordinal  laws  generalise  over  emergent  properties  on  their  own  level, 
reduction  will  not  be  possible.  Thus,  while  Broad  himself  does  not  characterize  them  this 
way,  -9  it  is  fair  to  take  such  intra-ordinal  laws  as  generalise  over  emergent  properties  as  a 
species  of  emergent  law,  and  we  might  call  them  emergent  intra-ordinal  laws.  W'hat  is 
important  to  notice  here  is  that  since  these  emergent  intra-ordinal  laws  have  to  do  with 
the  dynamics  of  unique  and  ultimate,  irreducible  emergent  properties  of  structured 
wholes,  the  behaviour  of  the  wholes  as  subsumed  by  emergent  intra-ordinal  laws  is  unique 
and  ultimate  behaviour,  without  echo  in  physical  laws.  This  is  downward  causation  exactly 
as  Kim  described  it:  higher  level  emergent  processes  are  according  to  their  own  laws, 
causing  lower  level  laws  to  be  violated. 
`4.3.  Doumward  Causation  in  Nonreductive  Pbysicalism 
We  now  have  enough  to  reconsider  Kim's  argument  that  modem  nonreductive 
physicalism  is  in  essence  a  species  of  emcrgentism,  and  is  committed  to  downward 
causation  in  the  same  way  that  emergentism  is.  If  Kim  is  right,  then  his  is  a  formidable 
case  against  nonreductive  physicalism,  for  as  we  have  seen  downward  causation  is  directly 
at  odds  with  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain.  Remember  that 
Kim's  argument  runs  as  follows:  emergent  mental  properties  have  novel  causal  powers 
which  must  manifest  themselves  by  causing  some  other  properties  to  come  about,  cithcr 
physical  properties  or  other  mental  properties.  If  emergent  mental  properties  cause 
physical  properties  to  come  about,  this  already  is  downward  causation:  a  Property  which 
cannot  be  given  a  purely  physical  description  is  invoked  to  explain  a  physical  chain  of 
events.  If  a  mental  property  causes  another  mental  property  to  obtain,  then  that  too  is 
downward  causation,  for  "the  only  way  to  cause  an  emergent  property  is  to  cause  its 
emergence  base  property  to  be  instantiated.  "34  A  particular  mental  property,  M,  obtains 
in  a  system  because  its  physical  emergence  base  property,  P,  obtains  in  that  system.  For 
M  to  cause  another  mental  property,  M*,  M  must  somehow  bring  it  about  that  M*s 
physical  emergence  base  property,  P*,  occurs  in  the  system.  Thus  if  M  causes  any  event, 
M  causes  a  physical  event,  which  is  downward  causation.  Kim's  contention  is  that  this 
argument  can  be  run  just  as  well  with  nonreducible  property  in  the  place  of  emergent 
property. 
I  believe  that  while  this  argument  can  be  run  for  nonreductive  physicalism,  it 
cannot  be  applied  to  British  emergentism,  because  it  is  not  true  according  to  emergentist 
doctrine  that  the  only  way  to  cause  an  emergent  property  to  come  about  is  to  cause  its 
emergence  base  property  to  come  about  in  the  sense  that  the  argument  requires.  This  is 
because  of  the  very  different  ways  that  nonreductive  physicaliS*m  and  emergentism 
construe  the  relation  of  higher  level  properties  to  their  lower  level  base  properties.  As 
86 already  mentioned  above,  according  to  nonreductive  physicalism,  it  is  not  individual 
realised  properties  that  are  irreducible  to  their  physical  bases,  but  kinds  of  realised 
properties  that  are  irreducible  in  virtue  of  their  multiple  instantiability.  This  is  not  the 
case  for  the  emergentist,  for  whom  it  isparticular  instances  of  emergent  properties  are 
inexplicable  in  terms  of  the  base  properties  with  which  they  are  associated  via  unique  and 
ultimate  trans-ordinal  laws. 
Kinds  of  multiply  realisable  properties  for  the  nonreductive  physicalist  are 
irreducible  to  physical  kinds,  but  typically  for  the  nonreductive  physicalist,  any  one 
specific  higher  level  property  will  be  explicable  in  terms  of  its  realization  in  a  particular 
physical  base.  Higher  level  properties  as  nonreductive  physicalism  describes  them  are 
functional  properties  whose  function  can  be  fulfilled  by  one  of  a  number  of  possible 
physical  systems,  adhering  to  the  physical  laws  subsuming  those  physical  systems.  The 
realization  of  such  higher  level  properties  is  therefore  explicable  in  terms  of  the 
properties,  relations,  and  subsuming  gencralisations  of  the  relevant  parts.  At  the  level  of 
the  special  sciences,  where  multiply  instantiable  properties  are  construed  as  intrinsic 
properties,  no  general  physical  story  can  be  told  about  their  obtaining  in  physical  systems 
or  about  the  causal  relations  into  which  they  may  enter.  Hence  the  special  sciences  of 
multiply  instantiable  properties  are  irreducible  to  physics,  while  specific,  individually 
occurrent  realised  properties  are  reducible  to,  and  explicable  in  terms  of,  physical 
properties. 
The  relation  that  obtains  between  emergent  properties  and  their  emergence 
bases  is  quite  different  from  that  which  obtains  between  functional,  rcalised  properties 
and  the  physical  bases  that  realise  them  as  construed  by  modem  nonreductive 
physicalists,  and  so  is  the  notion  of  the  actual  properties  themselves.  The  nonreductive 
physicalist  typically  speaks  of  mental  properties  in  terms  of  specific  mental  states:  of  a 
certain  belief  that  p,  say,  as  a  property  of  a  certain  organism.  It  does  not  appear  that  the 
emergentists  in  general  thought  of  emergent  properties  as  such  individually  occurring 
states,  but  rather  in  terms  of  novel  capacities  to  behave  emerging  from  physical  aggregates 
meeting  certain  structural  specifications.  For  example,  Broad  speaks  of  the  power  of 
reproduction  as  an  example  of  an  ultimate  characteristic  of  [the  vital]  ordcr.  -v  Structured 
aggregates  with  mental  properties  have  "the  power  of  cognizing,  the  power  of  being 
affected  by  past  experiences,  the  power  of  association,  and  so  on.  "o  These  arc  emergent 
powers  within  which  individual  states,  or  particular  properties,  such  as  a  particular 
cognitive  exercise,  or  a  particular  memory  or  association,  occur.  Once  a  structure  is  so 
constituted  as  to  exhibit  emergent  properties  considered  as  powers  or  capacities  to 
behave,  such  aspects  of  its  total  behaviour  as  are  characteristic  of  that  emergent  property 
are  mediated  by  the  property  itself,  on  the  level  that  it  characterises.  In  other  words,  it  is 
not  a  particular  mental  state  M  that  emerges  from  a  particular  physical  structure,  P,  but 
mentality  that  emerges  from  structures  like  P.  This  kind  of  thinking  is  particularly  evident 
in  Morgan's  words.  He  writes: 
IN  the  foregoing  lecture  the  notion  of  a  pyramid  with  ascending  levels  was  ppt  forward.  Near  its 
base  is  a  swarm  of  atoms  with  relational  structure  and  the  quality  we  may  call  atomicity.  Above 
87 this  level,  atoms  combine  to  form  new  units,  the  dis  n  ishin&  quality  of  which  is  molecularity;  tiagm  n=rein 
atoms  and  molecules  are  grouped 
. 
ysta  ýigher  up,  on  one  line  of  advance,  are,  let  us  say,  cr 
in  new  relations  of  which  the  expression  is  crystalline  form;  on  another  line  of  advance  are 
organisms  with  a  different  kind  of  natural  relations  which  give  the  quali  of  vitality;  7et  higher,  a 
new  kind  of  natural  relatedness  supervenes  and  to  its  expression  the  worY"  mentality'  may,  under 
safeguard  from  journalistic  abuse,  be  appliedY 
The  difference  can  be  illuminated  somewhat  by  reflection  on  the  different  roles  played 
by  the  intra-ordinal  and  the  trans-ordinal  laws  in  Broad's  system.  Recall  that  intra-ordinal 
laws  are  those  governing  the  dynamics  of  entities  within  any  level  of  emergence,  whereas 
trans-ordinal  laws  connect  emergent  properties  to  their  bases,  and  are  an  indicator  of 
layer  adjacency.  The  emergentists  were  were  perfectly  aware  that  many  of  the  higher 
level  properties  they  considered  to  be  emergent  were  multiply  instantiable:  many  kinds 
of  structures  of  highly  diverse  descriptions,  for  example,  exhibit  vital  properties.  They 
were  also  sensitive  to  the  fact  that  isolable  substructures  within  a  structure  were  often 
responsible  for  specific  aspects  of  that  systems  overall  emergent  behaviour:  different 
parts  of  the  living  body  handle  different  aspects  of  vital  behaviour,  and,  a  certain 
subsystem  is  correlated  with  the  higher  mental  functions  in  those  structures  that  exhibit 
mental  properties.  In  Broad's  emergentism,  different  trans-ordinal  laws  connect  various 
aspects  of  the  characteristic  behaviour  of  a  structure  to  different  substructures  in  that 
system.  Once  the  subsystems  are  in  place  and  working  as  they  ought  to  form  the  base  for 
the  emergent  aspect,  it  is  intra-ordinal  laws  that  subsume  the  interaction  of  the  emergent 
properties  with  other  properties  on  their  own  or  on  other  levels.  Broad  writes:  "Me  law 
which  asserts  that  all  aggregates  composed  of  such  and  such  chemical  substances  in 
such  and  such  proportions  and  relations  have  the  power  of  reproduction,  would  be  a 
instance  of  a  Trans-ordinal  Law.  The  laws  connecting  the  reproduction  of  living  bodies 
with  other  ultimate  characteristics  of  living  bodies  would  be  instances  of  Intra-ordinal 
Laws.  "31 
So  it  does  not  appear  to  be  the  case  that,  as  Kim's  argument  requires  for  the  case 
of  emergentism,  the  only  way  to  cause  an  emergent  property  to  be  instantiated  is  to  cause 
its  emergence  base  property  to  be  instantiated  in  the  sense  that,  for  some  mental  state 
M  to  cause  some  other  mental  state  M*,  M  must  somehow  cause  some  new  physical 
emergence  base  property  P*  to  occur  to  serve  as  M*s  emergence  base.  Rather,  on 
emergentism,  as  a  consequence  of  an  entity's  being  composed  of  such  and  such 
chemical  substances  in  such  and  such  proportions  and  arrangements,  that  entity  exhibits 
certain  vital  and  mental  behavioural  capacities.  M's  causing  M*  is  characteristic  of  that 
behaviour  and  is  subsumed  by  the  intra-ordinal  laws  on  the  mental  level.  This  does  not 
mean  thatinental  changes  can  occur  without  there  being  concomitant  physical  changes, 
or  that  the  mental  is  somehow  abstracted  from  the  physical  in  its  functioning.  The 
cmergentists  would  have  rejected  such  a  mysterious  notion.  They  considered  the 
functioning  of  the  body  and  brain  to  be  constitutive  of  vital  and  mental  behaviour,  via 
nonreducible,  ultimate  trans-ordinal  laws.  Rather  than  associating  particular  mental  states 
with  particular  physicochemical  states,  which  might  be  cited  as  causally  bring  about  other 
physicochernical  states  bound  to  other  mental  properties  via  special  trans-ordinal  laws, 
the  vital  and  mental  capacities  to  behave  conferred  upon  an  entity  by  virtue  of  its 
88 aggregational  structure  orchestrate  a  unique  and  ultimate,  novel  arena  of  behaviour 
according  to  their  own  emergent  laws.  But  as  earlier  discussed,  this  means  that  the  lower 
level  laws  that  pertain  to  levels  lower  than  the  mental,  and  ultimately  physical  laws,  in 
which  mental  generalisations  have  no  echo,  will  be  violated.  This  is  downward  causation 
exactly  as  Kim  had  described  it. 
I  suspect  that  the  problem  of  downward  causation  is  not  one  that  troubled  the 
British  Emergentists.  39  It  should,  however,  concern  modem  physicalists,  to  whom  the  the 
principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain  is  important,  and  Kim's  assertion 
that  nonreductive  physicalism  is  committed  to  downward  causation  if  it  is  committed  to  a 
realistic  construal  of  realised  mental  properties.  As  earlier  described,  to  construe  a  higher 
level  property  realistically  is  to  construe  it  as  causally  potent,  and  mental  realism  is  the 
claim  that  mental  properties,  in  virtue  of  their  characteristic  features  qua  mental,  are 
causally  effective  properties.  Individual  realised  properties  as  nonreductive  physicalism 
construes  them  are  taken  to  be  filUy  realised  in  physical  states,  and  therefore  to  have 
complete  physical  descriptions,  unlike  as  is  the  case  in  emergentist  doctrine. 
Psychological  properties  as  sucb,  however,  do  not  admit  of  any  particular  physical 
description.  But  if  it  is  the  characteristic  features  of  properties  construed  intrinsically  on 
the  psychological  level  psychological  properties  as  sucb  that  are  described  as  being 
causally  relevant,  and  not  tbepbysicalproperties  that  realise  tbem,  then  the  claim  is  that  a  kind 
of  property  that  does  not  admit  of  physical  description  is  capable  of  entering  into  causal 
transactions  involving  the  physical,  violating  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the 
physical  domain. 
If  it  makes  sense  to  construe  psychological  properties  realistically,  then  surely  it 
makes  sense  to  construe  psychological  laws  realistically  as  well.  If  it  is  taken  to  be  the 
case  that  a  mental  property  say,  for  example,  the  desire  tbatp  is  a  real  property  with  causal 
potential  in  its  own  right,  then  surely  the  law  that  says  that  the  desire  tbatp,  taken  in 
conjunction  with  the  belieftbat  -p  unless  q  results,  all  things  being  equal,  in  the  intention  to 
bring  it  about  that  q,  is  a  real  law,  albeit  a  hedged  one.  But  what  kind  of  a  law  would  it  be?  It 
certainly  cannot  be  a  law  grounded  in  physical  laws,  for  the  properties  it  subsumes  are  all 
multiply  instantiable,  irreducible  functional  properties.  If  it  is  taken  that  psychological 
laws  are  real  laws,  that  they  somehow  supersede  physical  laws  such  that  they  are 
appropriate  to  the  description  of  causal  interaction  on  the  psychological  level,  andnot 
pbysical  laws,  then  psychological  generalisations  begin  to  look  very  much  like  emergent 
intra-ordinal  laws.  If  psychological  laws  are  construed  realistically  and  as  irreducible  to 
physical  laws,  then  it  is  difficult  to  see  in  what  other  way  they  could  be  taken.  But,  as  we 
have  seen,  emergent  intra-ordinal  laws  involve  the  violation  of  lower  level  laws,  and  are 
incompatible  with  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain. 
Consider  Kim's  argument  again:  suppose  some  mental  property  M  brings  about 
some  physical  event.  If  it  does  so  according  to  generalisations  that  are  not  grounded  in 
physical  law  and  in  virtue  of  features  that  have  no  physical  base,  then  it  is  a  clear  instance 
of  downward  causation.  Because  the  nonreductive  physicalist  describes  mental 
properties  as  realised  at  any  point  in  time  in  a  particular  physical  base,  then  for  M  to 
cause  a  mental  event  M*,  M  must  bring  it  about  that  M*s  realization  base,  P*,  is 
89 instantiated.  To  cause  any  event,  M  must  cause  a  physical  event,  which  again  involves 
downward  causation.  It  seems  then  that  if  the  nonreductive  physicalist  is  committed  to  a 
realistic  construal  of  mental  properties  as  causally  potent,  then  they  are  equally 
committed  to  downward  causation. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  nonreductive  physicalist  rejects  downward  causation, 
claiming  instead  that  it  is  the  physical  properties,  the  properties  of  the  physical 
realization  base  of  a  particular  mental  property  that  are  genuinely  causally  responsible  for 
whatever  effect  the  mental  property  is  said  to  have,  it  is  difficult  to  see  in  what  sense  the 
mental  property  could  be  construed  realistically  as  described  above,  as  causally  potent 
qua  mental.  This  difficulty  is  what  Kim  has  elsewhere  termed  the  problem  of  causal 
exclusion  in  the  context  of  the  compatibility  of  physical  and  mental  explanations  for  the 
same  piece  of  behaviour:  suppose  some  mental  event  M  is  cited  as  a  cause  of  some 
physical  effect  event  E.  M  is  a  higher  level  property  realised  in  a  particular  physical  base, 
P.  Now,  to  deny  that  E  has  a  complete  physical  cause  would  be  to  violate  the  principle  of 
the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain.  Thus,  it  seem  that  the  physicalist  committed 
to  that  principle  should  acknowledge  that  P,  the  physical  realization  base  of  M,  is  in  fact 
a  complete  cause  of  E.  But  if  it  is  so,  then  what  is  left  for  M,  qua  M,  to  contribute?  It 
would  seem  that  to  consider  M  as  causally  effective,  one  must  not  construe  it  as  an 
intrinsic  property  in  its  own  right,  but  in  terms  of  its  physical  realization  base,  and  this 
would  imply  that,  in  order  not  to  violate  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical 
domain,  one  cannot  construe  mental  properties  realistically.  Further,  if  it  is  impossible  to 
construe  mental  events  realistically  qua  mental  as  causes  of  physical  (or  other  mental) 
events,  then  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  science  of  the  mental,  or  the  sciences  of  any 
multiply  instantiable  higher  level  properties,  can  count  as  genuinely  explanatory  sciences. 
The  nonreductive  physicalist  would  seem  to  be  at  an  impasse.  It  appears  that  the 
notion  that  mental  states  qua  mental  are  causally  potent,  connectedly  that  the 
psychological  sciences  are  genuinely  explanatory,  the  notion  of  the  multiple 
instantiability  of  the  mental,  and  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical 
domain  are  not  mutually  compatible.  Yet  none  of  these  principles  is  easily  rejected.  That 
psychological  generalisations  are  not  genuinely  explanatory  and  meaningfully  predictive  is 
not  only  an  unappealing  proposition,  but  if  the  idea  behind  the  rejection  that  they  are  so 
is  generalised  to  encompass  all  of  the  special  sciences  that  involve  multiply  instantiable 
properties,  it  begins  to  look  wildly  improbable:  whatever  one  may  think  about  their 
ultimate  explanatory  status,  it  is  difficult  to  deny  that  many  of  the  special  sciences  very 
simply  work,  and  that  the  phenomena  they  describe  economies,  migratory  behaviour, 
evolutionary  chains,  human  interactions  are  rea1pbenomena.  The  proposition  that  mental 
states  can  be  realised  in  systems  withvcry  different  physical  descriptions  seems  very 
likely  to  be  true  each  individual  human  brain  is  different  from  every  other,  with  different 
connections  and  neural  pathways  formed  over  time  by  different  experiences.  Yet  we 
communicate;  we  share  thoughts  about  our  experiences  and  use  words  (often)  to  refer  to 
the  same  objects.  And  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain,  I  have 
argued,  is  what  underlies  the  idea  of  interlevel  explanation.  To  reject  it  would  be 
tantamount  to  rejecting  physicalism  in  any  recognisable  form. 
go We  have  seen  how  the  functional  model  of  reductionism.  solves  the  problem  of 
causal  exclusion  for  realised  mental  properties.  According  to  this  model,  mental 
properties,  when  construed  extrinsically  as  second  order  properties  specified 
functionally,  are  reducible  to  and  identical  with  whatever  performs  the  specified 
function.  Where  the  higher  and  lower  level  properties  involved  are  identified,  there  can 
be  no  question  of  which  one  of  them  is  the  real  causal  factor.  But  the  question  of  the 
status  of  the  special  sciences,  and  of  the  generalisations  that  they  employ,  remains  open. 
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5.  Downward  Causation  in  the  LePtotboracine  Ants 
It  is  uncontestable  that  mereological  wholes  exhibit 
properties  and  causal  powers,  derived  from  the  properties 
and  organisations  of  their  parts,  that  the  parts  do  not  and 
cannot  have  in  abstracta.  It  is  likewise  beyond  reasonable 
4F  -,  %I  suspicion  on  the  level  of  common  sense  that  the  special 
sciences,  and  most  notably  psychology,  employ  a  descriptive  and  predictive  apparatus 
that  is  genuinely  workable.  It  is  reasonable  to  think  that  this  is  because  psychology, 
among  others  of  the  special  sciences,  describes  realproperties  that  can  be  ascribed  to 
certain  kinds  of  wholes,  that  these  properties  characterise  the  entities  that  exhibit  them 
in  ways  that  can  be  described  in  general  terms,  and  that  the  generalisations  that  describe 
the  dynamics  of  entities  exhibiting  these  properties  describe  real  laws.  In  other  words,  it 
seems  reasonable  to  think  that  what  is  behind  the  descriptive  and  predictive  success  of 
the  special  sciences  is  the  reality  and  causal  efficacy  of  the  properties  and  generalisations 
to  which  their  terms  refer.  However,  we  have  seen  that  there  is  a  conflict  involved  in  the 
realistic  construal  of  such  generalisations  as  the  special  sciences  employ  and  a 
commitment  to  robust  physicalism,  for  according  to  robust  physicalism,  all  causal 
interactions  must  take  place  according  to  basic  physical  laws,  and  basic  physical  laws 
must  back  all  higher  level  causal  transactions.  But  laws  involving  properties  that  may  be 
instantiated  in  wildly  heterogeneous  physical  bases  cannot  be  expressed  in  physical 
terms.  Thus,  the  realistic  construal  of  such  laws  appears  to  be  in  direct  conflict  with  the 
principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain. 
According  to  the  traditional  model  of  reductionism,  special  sciences  whose  terms 
are  applied  to  multiply  instantiable  properties  cannot  be  reduced  to  physical  sciences, 
and  we  have  seen  how  this  irreducibility  leaves  the  nonreductive  physicalist  to  choose 
between  rejection  of  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain  (if  they 
retain  their  commitment  to  a  realist  construal  of  psychological  generalisations)  or 
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physicalism  that  has  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain  as  a  tenet). 
The  functional  model  of  reductionism  described  above  avoids  many  of  the  problems  and 
shortcomings  of  the  traditional  bridge-law  model  of  intertheoretic  reduction,  and  entails 
that  the  special  sciences  do  not  reduce  to  physics,  but  in  itself  the  functional  model  of 
reductionism  leaves  open  the  problem  of  the  status  of  special  science  gencralisations  as 
descriptive  of  real  dynamics  and  along  with  that  the  causal  efficaciousness  of  mental 
states  qua  mental.  If  we  wish  both  to  commit  to  robust  physicalism  and  to  maintain  a 
realistic  attitude  towards  mental  properties,  among  other  properties  described  by  the 
special  sciences,  we  must  find  a  way  to  describe  the  relation  of  the  dynamics  described 
by  the  special  sciences  to  those  described  by  physics  in  a  way  that  respects  both  the 
integrity  of  special  science  properties  as  causally  potent  described  intrinsically  and  the 
principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain.  We  must  find  a  way  to  characterise 
multiply  instantiable  properties  and  the  generalisations  that  subsume  them  in  a  way  that 
is  unproblematic  from  a  physicalist  perspective. 
A  1  Emergence  Revisited 
It  might  be  tempting  to  describe  higher  level  properties  as  a  kind  of  'emergent 
simplicity',  or  as  a  kind  of  identifiable  pattern  characterising  the  causal  potential  of 
complexwholes  thatrides  upon'the  complex  properties  and  interrelations  of  the  whole's 
components.  One  modem  writer  who  has  discussed  the  notion  of  emergence  in 
scientific  explanation'in  such  terms  is  David  Deutsch.  He  defines  'emergence'as  follows: 
"An  emergent  phenomenon  is  one...  about  which  there  are  comprehensible  facts  or 
explanations  that  are  not  simply  deducible  from  lower-level  theories,  but  which  may  be 
explicable  or  predictable  by  higher-level  theories  referring  directly  to  that 
phenomenon.  ""  However,  unlike  as  is  the  case  in  British  Emergentist  doctrine,  he 
describes  higher-level  explanations  as  not  incompatible  with  lower-level  explanations.  " 
For  him,  the  core  idea  of  emergence  has  to  do  with  the  explanation  of  higher-level 
phenomena  in  terms  appropriate  to  basic  physics  as  opposed  to  the  special  sciences  to 
which  those  phenomena  are  appropriate.  Basic  physics  can  provide  descriptions  of  any 
phenomenon  in  so  far  as  it  can  provide  descriptions  of  the  properties  and  configurations 
of  the  basic  physical  constituents  of  that  phenomenon,  and  in  so  far  as  basic  physics  can 
describe  the  basic  physical  state  of  a  system  at  any  time,  it  may  be  possible  (in  principle) 
to  predict  the  basic  physical  configuration  of  the  system  at  some  later  point  in  time.  3  But, 
he  argues,  this  is  not  to  provide  an  explanation  of  the  phenomenon  in  question. 
For  example,  Deutsch  asks  us  to  consider  the  position  of  one  particular  copper 
atom  in  the  tip  of  the  nose  of  the  statue  of  Winston  Churchill  that  is  in  Parliament 
Square  in  London.  Why  is  that  copper  atom  in  that  particular  place?  It  may  be  the  case 
that  a  very  sophisticated  physics  "...  would  in  principle  make  a  low-levelprediction  of  the 
probability  that  such  a  statue  will  exist,  given  the  condition  of  (say)  the  solar  system  at 
some  earlier  date.  It  would  also  in  principle  describe  how  the  the  statue  presumably  got 
93 there.  But  such  descriptions  and  predictions  (wildly  infeasible,  of  course)  would  explain 
nothing.  "4This  is  because  the  description  of  the  trajectory  of  our  particular  copper  atom 
through  space  and  time,  and  the  concomitant  description  of  the  trajectories  of  vast 
numbers  of  other  atoms,  will  leave  out  the  higher  level  reason  for  that  particular  copper 
atom's  being  there:  "It  is  because  Churchill  served  as  prime  minister  in  the  House  of 
Commons  nearby,  and  because  his  ideas  and  leadership  contributed  to  the  Allied  victory 
in  the  Second  World  War-,  and  because  it  is  customary  to  honour  such  people  by  putting 
up  statues  of  them;  and  because  bronze,  a  traditional  material  for  such  statues,  contains 
copper,  and  so  on.  "s 
The  understanding  of  such  higher-level  explanations  involves  the  resolution  of 
very  complex  descriptions  of  low-level  phenomena  into  overlying  patterns.  Recognition 
of  such  patterns  enables  us  to  understand  the  trajectories  of  vast  accumulations  of  basic 
physical  entities,  incredibly  complicated  in  itself,  in  simpler  terms.  These  overlying 
patterns  are  what  Deutsch  terms  emergent  phenomena.  He  says 
The  reason  why  higher  level  renomena  can  be  studied  at  all  is  that  under  special  circumstances 
x  the  stupendously  complex  be  aviour  of  vast  numbers  of  particles  resolves  itself  into  a  measure  Of 
simplicity  and  comprehensibility.  High-level  phenomena  about  which  there  are  comprehensible 
facts  that  are  simply  not  deducible  from  lower-level  theories  are  called  emergentpbenomena.  ' 
The  notion  of  emergence  presented  by  Deutsch  is  one  of  higher  level  patterns  of 
simplicity  overlying  lower-level  complexity,  such  that  the  ordering  of  physical  systems  can 
be  understood  in  terms  of  the  interactions  of  physical  organisations  over  which  such 
patterns  exist.  Further,  explanations  that  do  not  advert  to  such  higher-level  systems,  he 
thinks,  are  not  explanations,  but  are  merely  descriptions  andpredictions. 
It  should  be  clear,  however,  that  this  characterisation  of  emergent  phenomena  is 
not  sufficient  to  set  higher-level  phenomena  described  as  emergent  apart  from  their 
component  parts  such  that  generalisations  involving  higher  level  phenomena  can  be 
construed  realistically,  for  the  problem  of  explanatory  exclusion  has  not  been  addrcsscd. 
If,  as  Deutsch  admits  is  the  case,  there  exist  complete  descriptions  in  terms  of  basic 
physics  for  all  higher  level  phenomena,  then  for  those  phenomena  that  are  emergent  in 
Deutsch's  sense  and  are  multiply  instantiable,  a  conflict  can  be  seen  to  exist  between 
explanations  in  terms  of  the  generalisations  subsuming  the  phenomena  as  described  in 
higher-level  terms  and  the  explanations  in  lower-level  terms  subsuming  the  interactions 
of  the  parts.  For  while  Deutsch  asserts  that  descriptions  of  higher  level  phenomena  in 
lower  level  terms  are  not  explanatory  in  that  they  fail  to  capture  the  inherent  qualities  of 
the  higher-level  phenomena  that  they  describe,  this  is  primarily  because  higher  level 
terms  do  not  exist  in  the  lower  level  sciences.  Basic  physics  cannot  capture  the  higher 
level  phenomena  involved  in  the  position  of  our  particular  copper  atom  because  basic 
physics  does  not  employ  concepts  such  as  Trime  Minister',  'War,  or'Honour.  That 
certain  structures  of  elements  or  certain  microphysical  dynamics  can  be  resolved  into 
such  things  as  Prime  Ministers,  wars,  honourings,  and  so  forth,  involves  a'creative 
process  of  discovery,  through  which  the  intrinsic  nature  of  such  systems  as  they  are 
described  on  the  higher  level  is  creatively  uncovered: 
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being  there,  you  would  still  not  be  able  to  say,  'Ah  yes,  now  I  understand  why  it  is  there.  '  You 
would  merely  know  that  its  arrival  there  in  that  way  was  inevitable  (or  likely,  or  whatever)  given 
all  the  atoms'  initial  configurations  and  the  laws  of  physics.  If  you  wanted  to  understand  why,  you 
would  still  have  no  option  but  to  take  a  further  step.  You  would  have  to  inquire  into  what  it  was 
about  that  configuration  of  atoms,  and  those  trajectories,  that  gave  them  the  propensity  to  deposit 
a  copper  atom  at  this  location.  Pursuing  this  inquiry  would  be  a  creative  task,  as  discovering  new 
explanations  always  is.  You  would  have  to  discover  that  certain  atomic  configurations  support 
emergent  phenomena  such  as  leadership  and  war,  which  are  related  to  one  another  by  high-level 
explanatory  theories.  Only  when  you  knew  those  theories  could  you  fully  understand  why  that 
copper  atom  is  where  it  W 
But  exactly  how  is  the  understanding  of  the  position  of  the  copper  atom  in  terms 
of  social  policy  a  privileged  explanation?  If  the  understanding  of  a  certain  copper  atom's 
being  in  a  certain  geospatial  location  is  said  to  require  the  understanding  of  its  placement 
there  in  terms  of  such  phenomena  as  prime  ministers,  wars,  honour,  and  such,  we  might 
rightly  ask  what  justifies  this  explanation  over  other,  compatible  varieties  of  higher-level 
explanatory  theories.  Proponents  of  the  selfish  gene  theory,  for  example,  might  argue 
that  the  positioning  of  that  particular  copper  atom  had  far  more  to  do  with  the 
propagation  of  Winston  Churchilrs  genetic  code  than  with  the  social  notion  of 
honouring  prime  ministers  with  statues.  Too,  it  could  be  pointed  out  that  while  different 
explanatory  theories  may  offer  different  explanations  for  the  same  phenomena,  relative  to 
each  other,  they  will  all'leave  something  out',  relative  to  each  other:  the  selfish  gene 
theorist  may  complain  that  the'social  explanation  makes  no  reference  to  the  fitness  of 
Winston  Churchill's  genes.  The  basic  physicist  may  argue  that  while  the  social 
explanation  may  give  a  reason  why  a  copper  atom  is  in  that  particular  geospatial  location, 
it  does  nothing  to  tell  us  why  that  one  is  there:  surely  any  old  copper  atom  would  suffice  to 
help  conspire  in  a  bronze  representation  of  Winston  Churchill's  nose?  If  there  is  no 
particular  privilege  that  one  explanatory  theory  can  assert  over  another,  then  how  many 
explanatory  theories  must  we  discover  before  we  can  be  said  to  understand  why  that 
copper  atom  is  there? 
Certainly,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  there  is  a'something  else'that  we  may  ascribe 
to  aggregates  insofar  as  we  individuate  them  on  the  macroscopic  level,  for  whatever 
reason  we  may  do  so.  Things  are  particular  dynamic  configurations  of  subatomic  particles, 
fields,  and  forces,  or  whatever  our  most  basic  physics  describes  things  as  being.  They  are 
also  cubic  centilitres  of  heavy  water,  gold  doorknobs,  coffeepots,  zebra  finches,  dual 
carriageways,  and  the  like.  We  recognise  such  higher  level  individuals  as  higher  level 
individuals  because  we  pick  them  out  as  defined  aggregates,  and  we  group  them  into 
kinds  insofar  as  examples  of  them  have  the  same  kinds  of  properties,  properties  which 
they  have  as  a  result  of  possessing  certain  microstructures  with  certain  causal  potentials. 
But  the  reading  of  these  higher  level  properties  as  patterns  of  simplicity  overlying  the 
complexity  of  basic  physical  components  and  dynamics  is  not  enough  to  make  real  sense 
of  the  generalisations  subsuming  higher  level  properties.  Though  it  is  beyond  question 
that  large  collections  of  atoms  organised  into  human  beings  in  societies  with  Prime 
95 Ministers,  wars,  commemorative  statues  and  the  like  are  capable  of  producing  behaviour 
which  those  atoms  could  not  if  not  so  organised,  the  description  of  such  capabilities  in 
terms  of  a  pattern  of  simplicity  riding  upon  the  complex  behaviours  of  the  atoms  is  not 
cnough  to  save  society  from  a  basically  Hobbesian  analysis.  Similarly  any  such 
interpretation  of  higher  level  properties  as  properties  that  can  be  'read  into'  the 
complexity  of  the  microstructure  of  the  whole  instantiating  the  properties  is  not  enough 
to  privilege  the  laws  subsuming  the  dynamics  of  higher  level  properties  with  the  status  of 
real  laws  and  explanations  on  their  terms  as  genuinely  explanatory.  If  we  wish  to  think 
realistically  of  higher  level  generalisations  and  also  respect  the  principle  of  the  causal 
closure  of  the  physical  domain,  it  must  be  possible  to  characterise  at  least  some  higher 
level  properties  as  robust  properties,  in  the  sense  that  these  properties  arc  best 
understood  as  intrinsic  properties  of  a  complex  system,  from  whatever  vantage  point  from 
which  we  wish  to  view  a  complex  whole  and  its  components,  and  we  must  find  a  way  to 
describe  such  properties  without  compromising  their  dependency  upon  their  lowcr-level 
microstructures. 
Though  in  much  philosophical  literature  the  term  'cmergence'generally  refers  to 
the  sort  of  phenomenon  described  by  Broad  and  the  other  British  emergentists,  vide  a 
higher  level  property  of  a  system  that  cannot  be  explained  by  reference  to  the 
microstructure  of  that  system,  it  has  another  use  more  common  in  scientific  discourse, 
and  which  is  gaining  philosophical  currency  particularly  in  the  fields  of  the  philosophy  of 
artificial  intelligence  and  artificial  life.  In  this  sense,  'emergent'  is  applied  to  a  property  of 
a  mereological  system  which  arises  out  of  the  dynamic  behaviours,  of  its  elements,  but 
which  is  neither'coded  for'by  any  of  those  elements  nor'directed'by  some  central 
organising  component  or  arrangement.  Such  properties  are  perhaps  best  illustrated  by 
example. 
In  an  article  published  in  New  Scientist,  '  Brian  Goodwin  describes  a  rhythmic 
pattern  of  oscillation  between  activity  and  inactivity  that  is  observable  in  colonies  of  some 
species  of  ants  in  the  genus  Leptothorar  observed  by  entomologist  Nigel  Franks  and 
further  studied  and  described  by  Blaine  Cole.  In  general,  the  Leptothoracine  ants  are 
active  for  a  certain  amount  of  time,  then  they  lapse  into  quiescence  for  a  while.  Across 
entire  Leptothorax  colonies,  the  activity  patterns  of  the  ants  are  oscillatory.  -  ants  tend  to 
oscillate  between  activity  and  inactivity  such  that  most  ants  are  active  or  inactive  at  the 
same  times,  taking  about  30  minutes  to  complete  one  cycle.  Individual  ants,  however,  do 
not  display  this  behaviour.  Observing  isolated  ants  and  ants  in  very  small  groups,  Cole 
found  that  the  ants  exhibit  no  intrinsic  rhythmic  or  co-ordinated  activity,  but  rather  that 
their  activity/inactivity  behaviour  is  chaotic.  But  when  the  density  of  the  ant  population 
reaches  a  certain  level  at  which  Leptothorax  colonies  do  in  fact  tend  to  be  found  naturally, 
the  oscillatory  patterns  in  the  activity  of  the  ants  appeared. 
Together  with  Richard  Sole  and  Octavio  Miramontes,  Goodwin  developed  a 
computer  simulation  to  show  how  such  a  collective  dynamic  could  appear  at  a  special 
population  density  given  individuals  whose  behaviour  in  isolation  does  not  resemble  that 
of  individuals  in  the  dynamic  colony  or  of  the  colony  as  a  whole,  when  the  behaviour  of 
the  individuals  is  constrained  by  certain  simple  rules.  Sole,  Miramontes  and  Goodwin 
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situated  were  directed  by  neural  networks  producing  behaviours  described  by 
deterministic  chaos,  as  was  their  activity/inactivity  behaviour  patterns,  so  that  their 
individual  behaviours  were  like  those  of  real  Leptothorax  individuals.  Their  simulated  ants 
could  interact  with  each  other  in  some  ways  similar  to  those  in  which  real  Leptothorax 
interact-.  whenever  an  active  sim-ant  encountered  an  inactive  sim-ant  on  the  grid,  the 
inactive  sim-ant  would  be  stimulated  into  activity.  They  found  that,  when  the  sensitivity 
of  inactive  sim-ants  to  be  stimulated  into  activity  by  active  ants  was  within  a  certain 
(comparatively  wide)  range,  and  when  the  population  density  was  at  the  right  level  (about 
eighty  individuals),  the  'colony'  exhibited  a  well-defined  oscillating  pattern  of 
activity/inactivity.  Goodwin  describes  this  orderly  behaviour  as  an  emergent  property  of 
the  modeled  colony:  "...  model  ants,  behaving  chaotically  and  interacting  "socially"  by 
stimulation,  can  generate  a  collective  rhythm  throughout  a  colony.  This  is  a  clear  case  of 
emergent  behaviour:  it  was  impossible  to  predict  the  collective,  rhythmic  pattern  just 
from  a  knowledge  of  the  chaotic  behaviour  of  the  individuals.  ",,, 
What  is  important  to  notice  about  this  rhythmic  oscillation  of  activity  across 
Leptothorax  colonies  is  that  it  is  not  just  a  pattern  that  can  be  recognised  as  overlying  the 
collective  activity  of  many  individuals,  not  merely  a  simple  pattern  into  which  complexity 
on  the  level  of  individual  ants  can  be  resolved  when  looking  at  the  colony  from  a  higher 
perspective.  It  is  a  robust  property  of  the  colony  as  a  whole,  and  one  which  may  beu  of 
benefit  to  the  colony  as  a  whole.  But  the  behaviour  has,  it  must  be  stressed,  no 
expression  in  the  behaviour  of  the  individual  ants,  much  though  it  is  determined  by  the 
properties  of  multiple  individuals  in  certain  concentrations.  Such  well-defined,  robust 
organisation  arising  in  this  way  from  the  collective  actions  and  interactions  of  individuals 
with  no  several  intrinsic  directing  towards  such  organisation  has  been  termed  'order  for 
free',  12  or  self-organization. 
Perhaps  some  of  the  most  obvious  and  compelling  examples  of  emergent 
organised  behaviours  occur  in  the  social  insects,  such  as  the  building  of  complex  nests,  a 
behaviour  that  is  of  obvious  advantage  to  the  insects  concerned.  Andy  Clark  describes 
the  mechanism  by  which  termites  build  arched  passageways:  individual  termites  are 
disposed  to  make  mud  balls,  which  at  first  they  will  drop  in  random  locations,  adding  as 
they  do  so  a  chemical  trace  to  the  mudballs.  Termites  prefer  to  drop  mudballs  in  places 
that  carry  the  chemical  signal,  so  that  a  termite  carrying  a  mudball  after  a  few  mudballs 
have  been  placed  will  prefer  to  place  her  mudball  on  top  of  another  mudball,  which 
carries  the  trace.  Now  there  are  two  mudballs  in  one  location,  increasing  the  attracting 
power  of  the  chemical  trace  in  that  location.  Other  mudball-carrying  ten-nites  will  be 
drawn  to  place  theirs  in  these  locations  bearing  stronger  chemical  signals.  The  more 
mudballs,  the  stronger  the  signals,  until  eventually  columns  of  attractive  mudballs  arc 
formed.  If  two  columns  are  within  a  certain  range  of  each  other,  termites  will  tend  to  try 
to  place  their  mudballs  where  the  chemical  signal  is  strongest,  on  the  side  of  a  column 
facing  a  neighbouring  column.  This  increases  the  attractiveness  of  the  site,  and 
eventually  an  archway  is  formed.  Thus,  blind  insects  with  tiny,  simple  brains  are  able  to 
accomplish  a  veritable  architectural  feat,  literally  without  having  any  idea  what  they  are 
97 doing.  All  they'know"  is  that  mudballs  are  to  be  placed  where  the  chemical  signal  is 
strongest.  By  following  this  and  a  few  other  simple  rules,  inevitably,  a  complex  structure 
emerges,  with  ordered  tunnels,  chambers  and  cells,  and  one  which  is  suited  to  the 
natural  features  of  the  environment  in  which  the  nest  is  built:  an  apparently  designed 
artefact  appears,  in  the  complete  absence  of  designers.  This  kind  of  behaviour  involves 
the  added  dimension  of  stigmergy,  the  process  by  which  the  results  of  one  termite's 
actions,  the  placing  down  of  a  mudball  bearing  a  chemical  trace,  stimulates  another 
termite  to  perform  another  action,  the  placing  of  a  mudball  on  top  of  that  one,  which 
Clark  uses  the  arch-building  behaviour  to  illustrate.  ') 
A  termite  mound  in  Matopoi  National  Park,  Zimbabuv.  No  design  or  blueprint  exists 
for  tbij.  anywbere.  4 
While  properties  like  these  are  fully  determined  properties  explicable  in  terms  of 
the  properties  and  relations  of  the  individuals  in  the  colony  (simulated  and  natural),  as 
Goodwin,  SoI6  and  Miramontes  show  in  their  simulation  and  as  Clark  describes,  they  are 
robust  and  interesting  properties  of  the  collectives  as  a  wholes.  Because  these  kinds  of 
properties  arise  from  the  collective  activities  and  interactions  of  dynamic  components  of 
complex  systems,  and  to  distinguish  the  sense  in  which  robust  properties  of  whole 
systems  arising  from  the  collective  dynamics  of  the  components  of  the  system  are 
ternergent  propertiesof  the  system  considered  as  a  whole  from  the  traditional  sense  of 
6emergence'as  employed  by  the  British  emergentists,  an  inexplicable  property  of  an 
aggregate  necessarily  linked  to  aggregates  of  appropriate  description,  I  propose  to  term 
such  properties  'dynamically  emergent'. 
Dynamically  emergent  properties  are  by  no  means  confined  to  the  eusocial 
hymenoptera.  Clark  cites  I  lutchins  (1995),  who  provides  another  example,  interesting  in 
that  it  features  not  the  behaviour  of  social  insects,  but  the  very  human  example  of  the 
successful  navigation  of  a  ship.  Hutchins  writes: 
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.  ijIyiiiti  \1ii,  \1iii: in  fact,  it  is  possible  for  the  [navigation)  team  to  organize  its  behaviour  in  an  appropriate  sequence 
without  there  being  a  global  script  or  plan  anywhere  in  the  system.  "  Each  crew  member  only 
needs  to  know  what  to  do  when  certain  conditions  are  produced  in  the  environment.  An 
examination  of  the  duties  of  members  of  the  navigation  team  shows  that  many  of  the  specified 
duties  are  given  in  the  form  "Do  X  when  Y"  Here  are  some  examples  from  the  procedures- 
A.  Take  soundings  and  send  them  to  the  bridge  on  request. 
B.  Record  the  time  and  sounding  every  time  a  sounding  is  sent  to  the  bridge. 
C.  Take  and  report  bearings  to  the  objects  ordered  by  the  recorder  and  when  ordered  by  the 
recorder.  " 
'W'hile  it  is  possible  for  the  human  agents  responsible  for  the  various  tasks  they  perform 
aboard  the  ship  to  conceive  of  the  ship,  of  the  navigation  of  the  ship,  and  of  the  role  that 
their  activity  plays  in  that  navigation,  it  is  not  strictly  necessary  that  they  do  so.  No  one 
member  of  the  crew  needs  to  understand  bow  the  ship  gets  navigated,  and  though  it  is 
surely  the  case  that  this  property  of  the  ship  and  its  crew-  that  it  be  successfully 
navigated  from  one  point  to  another,  adapting  its  behaviour  to  deal  with  whatever  hazards 
it  may  encounter-  is  a  designed  one,  represented  in  somebody's  mind,  its  actual 
execution  can  be  unrepresented  and  undirected.  It  might  be  carried  out  by  computers 
and  robots  programmed  only  for  very  specific  tasks,  just  as,  for  example,  Rodney  Brooks's 
six-legged  walking  robot  'Attila'  (now  retired)  is  able  to  navigate  over  sloped  and  cluttered 
terrains  without  a'control  centre'  of  any  description,  but  through  the  collective  activity  of 
several  finite-state  motors  and  processors  which  together  yield  skilful  walking  behaviour.,? 
Clark  distinguishes  two  ways  in  which  robust  properties  of  collectives  of 
individuals  can  arise  without  the  need  for  the  property  to  be'coded  for'  or  directed  by  any 
property  exhibited  by  the  individuals  themselves,  which  he  terms  direct  emergence  and 
indirect  emergence.  The  key  notion  distinguishing  the  two  forms  is  the  role  of  the 
environment  in  producing  the  emergent,  ortarget',  property.  Direct  emergence  "relies 
largely  on  the  properties  of  (and  relations  between)  the  individual  elements,  with 
environmental  conditions  playing  only  a  background  role.  "  The  oscillation  of  activity  in 
Leptothorax  colonies,  arising  out  of  nothing  but  certain  properties  of  the  individuals  and 
their  relations  to  each  other  (e.  g.,  population  density)  would  be  an  example  of  direct 
emergence.  Indirect  emergence  "relies  on  the  interactions  of  individual  elements  but 
requires  that  these  interactions  be  mediated  by  active  and  often  quite  complex 
environmental  structures".  "  The  arch-building  behaviour  of  termites,  with  its 
dependence  upon  stigmergy,  would  be  an  example  of  indirect  emergence.  The  use  of 
the  environment  as  cues  for  the  actions  of  individual  members  of  the  collective  allows  for 
extremely  complex  robust  properties  of  the  collective  to  arise  whilst  keeping  the 
properties  of  the  individuals  in  the  collective  simple  and  economical.  It  would  be  a  very 
complicated  termite  indeed  that  had  an  on-board  representation  of  a  complete  termite 
rnound  in  its  head,  which  had  the  sensory  and  cognitive  capacity  to  evaluate  the 
proposed  nest  site,  plan  a  mound  for  that  site,  evaluate  termite  mounds  in  various  stages 
99 of  completion,  and  which  knew  how  to  organize  its  own  actions  or  the  actions  of  other, 
less  complex'follower  termites'  towards  the  completion  of  a  fimctioning  termite  mound. 
But  in  order  for  strong,  appropriately  formed,  fimctional  termite  mounds  to  emerge  from 
the  collective  activity  of  termites,  no  such  complexity  of  the  individuals  is  necessary,  and 
no  'foreman-termite'directing  the  behaviours  of  its  underlings  need  e.  3dst.  Termites  need 
only  be  able  to  recognise  and  react  to  specific  stimuli  in  certain  simple  ways,  Again, 
Clark: 
At  no  point  in  this  extended  process  [constructing  a  moundl  is  a  plan  of  the  nest  represented  or 
followed.  No  termite  "knows"  anything  beyond  how  to  respond  when  confronted  with  a  specific 
patterning  of  its  local  environment.  The  termites  do  not  talk  to  one  another  in  any  way,  except 
through  environmental  products  of  their  own  activity.  Such  environmcnt-based  coordination 
requires  no  linguistic  encoding  or  decoding  and  places  no  load  on  memory,  and  the  "signals"  persist 
even  if  the  originating  individual  goes  on  to  do  something  else.  '9 
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,  omplex.  properties  of  collective  systems  can  thus  be  'coded  for'in  simple  rules 
governing  the  actions  and  interactions  of  members  of  the  collective  with  one  another  and 
with  their  environment,  with  no  particular  component  or  subset  of  components  acting  as 
a  director  or  control  centre  organising  the  system  towards  the'target  property'  (Clark's 
term).  Robust  order  can  be  bought  very  cheaply  in  collective  systems  through 
exploitation  of  simple  rules  describing  how  individual  members  of  the  collective  interact 
with  each  other  and,  in  the  most  interesting  cases  of  emergence,  with  the  environment 
in  which  the  collective  is  situated.  Such  order  can  be  (and  generally  is,  when  it  is  found  in 
natural  systems)  of  positive  value  for  the  collective  as  a  whole:  nest-building,  food-storing, 
brood-raising,  and  such  properties  are  of  clear  benefit  to  the  social  insects,  and  examples 
such  as  the  robot  walkers  show  how  clever  humans  can  design  systems  to  exhibit  certain 
desirable  target  properties  without  specifically  coding  for  them,  and  thus  avoiding  the 
cost  in  complexity  that  such  coding  would  necessitate.  Further,  this  kind  of  order  is  not 
simply  a  resolution  of  the  complex  behaviours,  of  the  individuals  into  patterns  of 
simplicity  enabling  us  to  understand  the  dynamic  of  the  system  in  new  ways.  Quite  the 
opposite,  it  is  complexity  arising  from  the  simple  behaviours  of  individual  components  of 
the  collective.  No  single  element  of  the  system  has  an  on-board  representation  of  the 
target  property  it  and  its  cohorts  conspire  to  realise.  None  of  them  is  individually  capable 
of  the  complex  relations  between  the  collective  and  the  environment  into  which  the 
whole  is  able  to  enter:  no  single  processor/motor  subsystem  of  Attila  'knows'  how  to  step 
over  an  obstacle,  and  no  termite  'knows'  how  to  build  an  arch.  Out  of  whole  systems 
exploiting  simple  parameters  of  their  components  arise  complex  behaviours  which,  if 
they  were  to  be  accomplished  by  a  single  devoted  system  representing  and  designing  the 
target  behaviours,  would  require  immense  powers  of  representation,  computation  and 
manipulation.  Such  robust  properties  of  collective  systems  can,  in  a  sense,  be  interpreted 
as  characterising  those  systems:  Attila  is  a  collection  of  motors  and  finite  state 
processors,  but  in  virtue  of  the  way  those  processors  interact,  it  is  also  a  walking  robot;  a 
ship  with  its  crew  is  a  seafaHng  vessel  An  ant  colony  is  a  bunch  of  ants  of  different 
descriptions  searching  out  food,  moving  soil  about,  laying  eggs,  and  so  forth,  but  to 
I00 consider  the  behaviour  of  individual  ants  is  really  to  miss  the  point  of  the  colony,  which  is 
a  thriving  thing  and  a  vehicle  for  the  survival  of  the  species,  which  individual  workers, 
being  by  and  large  sterile,  cannot  be.  As  myrmecologists  E.  0.  Wilson  and  Bert 
HoUd6bler  put  it,  "One  ant  alone  is  a  disappointment;  it  is  really  no  ant  at  all".  ", 
Another  interesting  and  important  feature  of  dynamically  emergent  properties 
which  is  particularly  compelling  of  their  construal  in  realistic  terms  is  that  once  a  system 
exhibits  a  dynamically  emergent  property,  the  property  becomes  self-propagating,  in  that 
the  behaviours  of  the  individual  components  of  the  system  instantiating  the  property  are 
constrained  by  the  presence  of  the  property.  For  example,  an  individual  representative  of 
Leptothorax,  abstracted  from  its  colony,  is  about  as  likely  to  be  active  as  inactive  at  any 
given  time.  Within  the  colony,  however,  the  individual  is  determined  to  exhibit  a  routine, 
ordered  activity/inactivity  cycle  co-ordinated  with  that  of  its  ncstmates,  which  are  similarly 
constrained  by  the  order  that  arises  from  their  behaviour  at  appropriate  densities. 
Collective  activity  thus  constrains  the  behaviours  of  individuals  within  the  collective.  This 
is  a  feature  of  all  self-organising  systems.  As  Clark  says,  "["self-organising"  systems)  are 
such  that  it  is  simultaneously  true  to  say  that  the  actions  of  the  parts  cause  the  overall 
behaviour  and  that  the  overall  behaviour  guides  the  action  of  the  parts.  "",  This  feature,  he 
tells  us,  is  sometimes  termed'circular  causation'.  23 
This  feature  is  especially  interesting  upon  consideration  of  Kim's  dcrinition  of 
'downward  causation'.  Recall  that  Kim  had  characterised  the  notion  of  downward 
causation  as  the  idea  that  "bigher  kvelmental  events  andprocesses  cause  lower  hvelphysical 
laws  to  be  violated,  that  the  molecules  that  are  part  of  your  body  behave,  at  least 
sometimes,  in  ways  different  from  the  way  they  would  behave  if  they  weren't  part  of  a 
body  animated  by  mental  processes".  13Within  a  self-organised  collective  instantiating  a 
dynamically  emergent  property,  the  individuals  do  indeed  behave  in  ways  in  which  they 
would  not  if  they  were  not  within  a  collective'animated'by  the  property.  However,  they 
do  so  in  a  way  that  violates  no  lower-level  laws.  As  Goodwin,  Sole  and  Miramontcs  have 
shown  through  their  computer  model  of  the  oscillation  of  activity  patterns  in  simulated 
ants  and  as  Clark  has  amply  illustrated  in  various  examples,  ordered  collective  behaviour 
arises  naturally  out  of  the  individually  directed  behaviour  of  components  interacting  in 
specific  ways.  Thus,  even  better  than  'order  for  free',  dynamic  emergence  can  be 
understood  as  giving  us  a  kind  of  'downward  causation  for  free':  the  constraint  of  the 
behaviour  of  individual  components  within  a  dynamic  collective  by  the  overall  behaviour 
of  the  collective  is  a  natural,  nonmysterious  phenomenon,  in  that  it  is  fully  explicable  in 
terms  of  the  properties  and  relations  of  the  interacting  parts  of  the  system. 
This  feature  is  also  illustrative  of  the  way  in  which  understanding  the  collective 
dynamic  of  a  system  exhibiting  a  dynamically  emergent  property  in  terms  of  that  property 
is  motivated  over  consideration  of  systems  in  terms  of  patterns  of  simplicity  overlying 
collective  complexity.  As  I  expressed  earlier,  the  privilege  of  a  certain  explanatory 
framework  forwarded  to  understand  certain  kinds  of  phenomena  is  questionable  when 
different  compatible  explanatory  frameworks  are  possible,  such  as  the  explanation  of  the 
position  of  a  particular  atom  in  basic  physical  terms,  or  in  terms  of  the  social  construct 
that  built  the  statue  in  whose  nose  the  atom  is,  or  in  any  one  of  many  possible 
roz explanations  in  terms  of  alternative  theories.  The  properties  referred  to  in  these  several 
systems  will  not  directly  be  represented  in  other,  compatible  explanatory  theories  or  in 
theories  that  pick  out  properties  on  different  levels  of  description:  there  is  no  correlate 
for'prime  minister'  in  basic  physics,  and  social  theory  does  not  include  the  predicates  of 
basic  physics  among  its  explanatory  apparatus.  But  because  dynamically  emergent 
properties  are  self-propagating,  they  can  be  seen  as  pervasive  through  the  system  as  far 
down  as  the  lowest  complete  dynamic  components:  24  in  constraining  the  behaviour  of 
individual  components,  dynamically  emergent  properties  arc  robustly  present  at  the  level 
of  the  component.  Thus,  there  is  a  higher  degree  of  objectivity  in  the  assignation  of  such 
properties  to  wholes,  and  concomitantly  a  higher  degree  of  motivation  for  the 
understanding  of  such  wholes  in  terms  of  dynamically  emergent  properties  that  they 
instantiate. 
Realism 
Dynamically  emergent  properties  are  special  kinds  of  properties  of  mercological 
wholes,  and  are  especially  interesting  in  a  number  of  respects.  They  are  completely 
determined  by  and  explicable  in  terms  of  the  properties  and  relations  of  their  active  and 
interactive  components,  and  in  the  most  interesting  cases,  features  of  the  environment 
upon  which  the  components  of  the  system  act  in  various  ways  and  from  which  they 
receive  various  behavioural  cues.  As  such,  they  are  unproblcmatically  realiscd  properties 
from  the  point  ofview  of  robust  physicalism.  Though  they  arc  perfectly  physically 
realised  properties  susceptible  to  physical  explanation,  however,  there  arc  provocative 
reasons  for  the  consideration  of  dynamically  emergent  properties  in  their  own  terms,  as 
genuinely  furthering  understanding  of  the  systems  instantiating  them.  The  phenomenon 
of  'circular  causation'  is  particularly  compelling.  dynamically  emergent  properties  are, 
once  realised,  also  dynamically  self-perpetuating,  constraining  the  behaviours  of 
component  elements  in  ways  for  which  the  components  have  no  intrinsic  leanings  for 
such  constraint.  Such  a  phenomenon  certainly  invites  the  understanding  of  particular 
behaviours  of  individual  components  within  a  system  in  terms  of  the  higher  level 
dynamically  emergent  property  that  component  has  a  part  in  rcalising.  Systems  exhibiting 
dynamically  emergent  properties  are  also  able  to  act  in  and  interact  with  the  environment 
and  with  other  similar  systems  in  highly  complex  and  even  apparently  intelligent  ways, 
without  requiring  that  the  components  themselves  or  any  subset  thereof  be  complex  or 
intelligent,  or  that  they  receive  direction  from  something  that  is.  By  exploiting  simple 
parameters  limiting  the  behaviour  of  its  components  the  whole  system  generates  for  itself 
what  Goodwin  called'order  for  free'.  Dynamically  emergent  properties  are  particularly 
robust  properties,  and  the  causal  potential  of  mereological  wholes  exhibiting  dynamically 
emergent  properties  can  be  seen  as  on  another  order  from  'merely  resultant'  properties  of 
complex  wholes,  though  without  compromising  the  explanatory  concerns  of  robust 
physicalism. 
Inasmuch  as  dynamicaUy  emergent  properties  are  fuUy  rcalised  by  their 
Z02 components  and  the  relations  of  those  components  to  each  other  and  in  some  cases  to 
aspects  of  their  environment,  phenomena  involving  dynamically  emergent  properties  can 
be  explained  in  terms  of  the  properties  of  the  components  realising  them.  But  Clark 
argues  that  explanation  of  emergent  phenomena  in  terms  of  the  components  (Clark 
terms  this  kind  of  explanation  'componential  explanation',  ')  may  not  be  completely 
informative  in  terms  of  a  full  understanding  of  such  phenomena.  Clark  gives  two  primary 
reasons  for  this,  the  first  motivated  by  the  fact  that  dynamically  emergent  phenomena 
often  involve  aspects  of  the  environment  in  which  the  components  of  the  system  are 
situated,  as  well  as  the  properties  of  the  components  themselves.  Explanations  that  track 
the  behaviours  of  the  individual  components  rather  than  that  of  the  whole  will  in  general 
fail  to  do  justice  to  dynamically  emergent  phenomena  so  rooted.  Rather,  Clark  says,  an 
ideal  explanatory  framework  for  the  understanding  of  such  phenomena  will  have  two 
main  features:  it  will  be  "...  well  suited  to  modeling  both  organismic  and  environmental 
parameters"  and  it  will  model  both  kinds  of  features  "...  in  a  uniform  vocabulary  and 
framework,  thus  facilitating  an  understanding  of  the  complex  interactions  between  the 
two"  .  a6 
The  second  reason  Clark  gives  has  to  do  with  the  possible  nature  of  the 
components  realising  dynamically  emergent  properties  themselves.  The  analysis  of  a 
system  in  terms  of  the  components  of  the  system  is  perfectly  appropriate  and  informative 
when  those  components  contribute  to  the  behaviour  of  the  whole  system  in  well  defined 
ways  characteristic  of  the  kinds  of  components  that  they  arc  and  the  particular  function 
they  perform  for  the  system.  For  example,  bow  a  car  works  could  interestingly  be 
explained  by  reference  to  what  all  of  the  various  car  parts  do  in  a  functioning  car.  But  for 
systems  where  there  may  be  very  little  or  no  difference  between  components  which  all 
perform  much  the  same  function,  or  for  systems  the  bchaviours  of  whose  components 
are  highly  interdependent  such  that  the  states  of  some  are  determinants  of  the  statcs  of 
others,  such  explanation  may  not  be  appropriate.  Clark  says: 
When  each  of  the  components  makes  a  distinctive  contribution  to  the  ability  of  a  system  to 
display  some  target  property,  componential  analysis  is  a  powerful  tool.  But  some  systems  are  highly 
homogenous  at  the  component  level,  with  most  of  the  interesting  properties  dependent  solely 
upon  the  aggrepte  effects  of  simple  interactions  amon&  the  parts...  A  more  complex  case  occurs 
when  a  system  is  highly  nonhomogenous,  yet  the  contributions  of  the  parts  are  highly  Inter- 
defined-:  -  that  is,  the  role  of  a  component  C  at  time  ti  is  determined  by  (and  helps  determine)  the 
roles  of  other  components  at  tj,  and  may  even  contribute  quite  differently  at  a  time  t2,  courtcs)r  of 
complex  (and  often  nonlinear-  see  note  8")  feedback  and  feedforward  links  to  other  subsystems.  "' 
Analysis  of  systems  like  this  in  terms  of  what  individual  parts  contribute  is  likely  to  be 
uninformative  as  to  how  the  whole  behaves,  and  in  the  absence  of  understanding  of  the 
collective  dynamic  and  how  it  affects  the  individual  components  of  a  systcm,  the 
behaviour  of  the  individual  components  maybe  difficult  to  interpret.  It  seems  that 
though  explanation  of  the  properties  and  behaviour  of  complex  systems  exhibiting 
dynamically  emergent  properties  and  of  phenomena  involving  them  in  terms  of  the 
microphysical.  structure  of  such  systems  might  be  possible,  explanations  that  attend  to 
the  collective  dynamic  are  interesting  and  informative  not  just  for  understanding  of  the 
103 systems  considered  as  wholes,  but  for  understanding  of  the  bchaviours  of  the 
components  of  the  systems  as  well.  Further,  since  dynamically  emergent  properties  are 
so  very  robust,  enabling  the  wholes  exhibiting  them  to  behave  in  extremely  different  and 
sometimes  vastly  more  complex  ways  than  anything  of  which  the  dynamic  components 
are  capable,  and  since  dynamically  emergent  properties  pervade  the  system  on  the 
component  level,  explanations  that  do  not  track  the  collective  dynamic  will  miss  a  very 
real  aspect  of  the  system  instantiating  it. 
Clark  suggests  that  phenomena  involving  what  I  have  termed  dynamically 
emergent  properties  are  best  understood  in  terms  of  dynamical  systems  theory,  a  branch 
of  mathematics  describing  systems  in  essentially  geometrical  terms,  tracking  the 
changing  states  of  dynamic  systems  as  the  progression  of  the  system  through  various 
states  in  a  space  defined  as  all  possible  states  in  which  the  system  might  be,  including 
attractive  features  of  the  topology  of  the  state  space  which  tend  to  draw  the  system 
towards  certain  states,  all  of  this  defined  by  a  set  of  governing  equations.  Considering  the 
theory  as  a  model  for  explaining  the  behaviour  of  complex  systems,  these  equations  can 
be  taken  as  expressing  laws  about  the  behaviour  of  the  system:  it  illuminates 
counterfactual  conditionals  about  the  behaviour  of  the  system  in  possible  situations. 
Dynamical  systems  theory  is  a  well-cstablished  and  successful  explanatory  and  predictive 
scientific  tool,  which  treats  the  changing  states  of  whole  systems  irrespective  of  the 
microphysical  properties  of  the  systems  concerned.  It  is  thus  able  to  deal  meaningfully 
with  systems  with  homogenous  or  highly  interdependent  components.  It  is  also  able  to 
accommodate  phenomena  involving  systems  whose  behaviour  involves  reacting  to  or 
manipulating  features  of  the  environment  by  treating  the  system  and  the  environment  as 
a  coupled  system,  described  by  a  set  of  interlocking  equations.  "  Clark  is,  however,  at 
pains  to  emphasise  that  the  dynamical  systems  approach  to  modelling  the  behaviour  of 
real  systems  should  be  regarded  as  complementary  to  explanatory  systems  treating  the 
properties  and  functions  of  the  parts  of  the  system.  In  the  absence  of  information  about 
the  parts  and  how  they  contribute  to  the  dynamic  of  the  whole  system,  we  lack 
understanding  of  how  dynamic  systems  are  grounded.  According  to  Clark,  both  kinds  of 
understanding  are  required  for  a  fiffl,  complete  explanation  of  dynamic  systems: 
understanding  of  the  collective  behaviour  of  the  system,  which  constrains  the  behaviour 
of  the  component  and  may  not  in  the  slightest  resemble  the  bchaviours  of  the 
components,  and  information  about  the  properties  of  the  components  that  determines 
how  their  collective  activity  rcaliscs  the  behaviour  of  the  whole  system. 
Dynamically  emergent  properties  are  very  real,  robust  properties  of  complex 
systems,  enabling  the  systems  instantiating  them  to  act  in  and  interact  with  their 
environment  in  highly  complex  ways,  even  as  the  actions  of  the  components  of  complex 
systems  may  be  governed  by  simple,  highly  specific  rules.  Thus  the  properties  of  the 
whole  system  can  be  radically  different  from  the  properties  of  the  components  which 
ffilly  realise  the  system.  Dynamically  emergent  properties  of  whole  systems  also  affect 
individual  components  of  the  system,  such  that  the  activity  of  the  components  is 
constrained  by  the  whole  in  ways  for  which  the  components  themselves  have  no  intrinsic 
leanings.  For  the  reasons  detailed  above,  the  understanding  of  phenomena  involving 
104 dynamically  emergent  properties  partially  in  terms  of  the  dynamically  emergent 
properties  themselves,  not  just  in  terms  of  the  microphysical  structure  of  the  systems 
exhibiting  dynamically  emergent  properties,  is  motivated.  If  the  understanding  of 
complex  phenomena  involving  dynamically  emergent  properties  essentially  involves 
explanation  in  higher  level  terms,  as  Clark  has  argued,  then  realism  about  higher  level 
gencralisations  subsuming  the  dynamics  of  the  whole  system,  such  as  might  be 
described  in  dynamical  systems  theory,  is  motivated.  These  laws  deal  with  the  unfolding 
of  the  states  of  whole  systems  through  time,  not  with  the  components  of  the  system. 
Dynamical  systems  theory  is  blind  to  the  physical  realiscrs  of  real  phenomena  it  may 
describe,  and  the  laws  expressed  in  its  terms  are  abstracted  from  physical  law.  However, 
when  a  dynamical  systems  account  is  accompanied  by  an  account  of  components  of  the 
system  detailing  how  the  complex  dynamic  is  determined  by  the  properties  and  relations 
of  the  components,  the  laws  expressed  in  the  dynamical  systems  account  can  be  seen  to 
be  grounded  in  the  physical  laws  governing  the  bchaviours  of  the  components..  "  Of 
course,  since  dynamically  emergent  properties  are  fully  realised  in  physical  properties  and 
the  generalisations  subsuming  them  are  fully  grounded  in  physical  law,  explanations  in 
purely  physical  terms  will  exist  for  causal  interactions  involving  complex  systems 
exhibiting  them.  However,  these  explanations  arc  best  interpreted  as  grounding  real 
generalisations  subsuming  robust,  albcit  irreducible  in  themselves,  properties  of  whole 
systems,  just  as  descriptions  in  microphysical  terms  can  be  seen  as  grounding  any 
multiply  instantiable  property.  The  notion  of  dynamic  emergence  and  the  model  for  the 
understanding  of  dynamically  emergent  properties  in  terms  of  both  the  collective 
dynamic  of  the  whole  system  and  the  physical  realisers  of  the  system  provides  us  with  a 
framework  in  which  we  can  make  sense  of  higher  level  gcneralisations  as  grounded  in 
physical  laws,  and  a  way  of  construing  higher  level  gcneralisations  realistically  without 
compromising  the  requirements  of  robust  physicalism. 
The  notion  of  dynamicism  is  enjoying  attention  in  ncurophysiological  research,  as 
well,  and  some  ncuroscientists  arc  beginning  to  think  that  the  brain,  with  its  population 
of  some  thirty  billion  neurons,  may  work  on  similar  principles.  FollowingJohn 
McCrone's-11  exposition  of  some  recent  thinking  and  work  in  ncurophysiology,  I  would 
like  to  consider  how  one  of  the  brain's  abilities  -  the  ability  to  rccognisc  objects  -  can  be 
thought  about  as  a  dynamically  emergent  property  arising  out  of  the  actions  and 
interactions  of  a  great  many  specialised  neurons  in  different  areas  of  the  visual  cortex. 
The  account  I  present  will  be,  of  course,  highly  simplificd,  but  it  is  not  so  important  that 
the  picture  presented  be  exactly  right,  as  that  it  provide  some  insight  into  the  way  that 
brains  might  see. 
In  1972,  C.  Gross,  C.  Rocha-Miranda  and  D.  Bender  were  performing  singlc-ccU 
recordings  from  the  inferotemporal  cortex,  an  area  of  the  brain  now  understood  to  be 
involved  in  the  recognition  of  objects,  qualities  of  objects  and  in  reaching  and  grasping 
actions,  of  an  anaesthetised-O  Macaque  monkey.  Using  a  projector,  they  presented 
different  kinds  of  visual  stimuli  to  the  monkey  in  an  effort  to  determine  what  kinds  of 
stimuli  would  induce  the  cells  in  the  inferotcmporal  cortex  to  fire.  None  of  the  stimuli 
they  had  prepared  was  having  any  interesting  effect,  until  quite  by  accident,  one  of  the 
Z05 researchers  caught  his  hand  in  the  projector  beam.  A  cell  immediately  responded,  most 
enthusiastically,  and  would  do  so  whenever  a  hand  shape  was  present  in  the  visual  field. 
It  appears  that  there  are  cells  in  the  cortex  of  the  Macaque  that  are  specialiscd  to  signal 
the  presence  of  hands.  -v 
That  different  areas  of  the  brain  are  specialised  to  handle  different  tasks  has  been 
common  knowledge  for  some  time,  but  it  was  not  until  the  development  of  the 
technique  for  recording  the  responses  of  single  cells  in  the  brain  to  different  kinds  of 
stimuli  that  researchers  came  into  a  hill  appreciation  of  how  specialiscd  individual  cells 
can  be,  from  cells  that  code  for  such  specific  stimuli  as  a  dark  line  against  a  light 
background  angled  at  ii:  oo  and  moving  from  left  to  right  presented  to  a  certain  tiny 
comer  of  the  visual  field,  to  cells  that  code  for  entire  objects,  such  as  a  hand.  With  much 
painstaking  labour,  neurophysiologists  are  beginning  to  be  able  to  piece  together  the 
complex  hierarchy  of  processing  that  is  involved  in  the  chain  of  events  proceeding  from 
light  entering  the  eyeballs,  to  nervc  signals  entering  the  primary  visual  cortex  at  the  back 
of  the  brain  through  the  lateral  geniculate  nucleus,  through  many  layers  of  processing 
culminating  in  the  firing  of  cells  coded  to  signal  the  presence  of  whole  objects  or 
significant  parts  of  objects.  Over  thirty  richly  interconnected  areas  have  been  identified 
in  the  primate  visual  cortex,  but  it  is  standardly  divided  into  five  major  areas:  the  primary 
or  striate  cortex,  or  Vx;  V2p  V3,  V4  -  the'colour  ccntrc'of  the  brain,  and  VS,  or  MT,  the 
middle  temporal  cortexm 
Information  about  stimuli  presented  to  the  eyes  enters  the  visual  cortex  via  Vi,  a 
sizeable  area,  with  six  distinct  layers,  in  the  occipital  lobc.  As  David  Hubcl  and  Torstcn 
Wiesel  discovered  in  1958,  cells  in  the  Vi  area  are  very  picky  about  what  will  induce  them 
to  fire.  Groups  of  cells  responsive  to  certain  frequencies  of  light  presented  to  specific 
parts  of  the  visual  field  occur  at  regular  intervals  throughout,  but  most  of  the  cells  in  V1 
arc  coded  to  respond  to  the  presence  of  lines  or  edges  in  specific  areas,  only  a  few 
degrees  across,  in  the  visual  field.  Moreover,  they  respond  only  to  lines  appropriately 
angled.  Some  prefer  dark  lines  against  light  backgrounds,  whereas  some  prefer  light  lines 
against  dark;  some  respond  to  an  appropriately  angled  boundary  between  light  and  dark. 
Some  neurons  in  Vi  are  also  sensitive  to  motion:  they  will  respond  to  the  presence  of  an 
appropriately  angled  line  in  their  few  degrees  of  visual  field,  or  to  an  appropriately  angled 
line  that  is  moving;  most  respond  only  to  motion  in  a  particular  direction.  flubcl  and 
Wiesel  classified  cells  in  Vi  as  'simple'  orcomplex'  depending  on  the  type  of  stimulus  to 
which  they  respond.  'Simplc'ceRs  will  respond  to  just  the  right  kind  of  line  appearing  in 
just  the  right  spot,  and  have  sub-regions  in  which  the  right  kind  of  stimulus  will  have  an 
excitatory  effect,  inducing  the  cell  to  fire  enthusiastically,  and  sub-regions  in  which  the 
presence  of  stimuli  will  tend  to  inhibit  the  ceirs  response.  Simple  cells  are  not  sensitive 
to  motion,  whereas  complex  cells  are,  though  complex  cells  are  less  choosy  about  where 
in  their  particular  few  degrees  of  visual  field  a  stimulus  is  presented:  so  long  as  it  is  at  the 
right  angle  and  moving  in  the  right  direction  (though  some  will  fire  if  the  stimulus  is 
Stationary),  the  cell  will  fire. 
Thus  there  is  in  Vi  "the  machinery  for  a  rich  representation  of  linc":  N  "With 
thousands  of  neurons  to  code  for  the  same  point  in  visual  space,  there  would  always  be 
zo6 the  right  kind  of  cell,  or  combination  of  cells,  to  specify  exactly  what  the  eyes  were 
seeing.  "A  Cells  in  Vi  are  also  very  neatly  arranged:  throughout  the  six  layers  of  Vi,  cells 
preferring  lines  of  the  same  kind  and  at  the  same  angle  are  clustered  togetherg  whereas 
across  the  surface  of  the  cortex,  a  cell,  preferring  lines  at  a  certain  angle  will  sit  neatly 
between  cells  preferring  lines  at  an  angle  a  few  degrees  less  to  one  side,  a  few  degrees 
more  to  the  other,  so  that  the  arrangement  of  the  whole  cortex  is  a  very  ordered  map. 
This  order  appears  to  pervade  the  sensory  and  motor  cortices.  " 
Vi  maps  fine-grained  information,  with  cells  reporting  the  presence  by  their  firing 
or  the  absence  by  their  silence  of  very  particular  kinds  of  stimuli  in  precise  locations  on 
the  visual  field.  The  other  components  of  the  visual  cortex  appear  to  take  the  data 
reported  by  Vi  and  refine  it  in  various  ways.  V2  receives  information  from  both  line- 
sensitive  and  colour-sensitive  cells  in  Vi.  CeUs  in  V2,  according  to  McCrone,  have  "a 
more  powerful  reaction  to  boundaries  and  wavelength  changes,  as  if  they  were 
emphasising  the  principle  shapes  and  blocks  of  colour  present  in  the  visual  scene".  -O  V2. 
in  turn  passes  information  on  to  V3,  most  of  whose  cells  are  sensitive  to  orientation, 
motion  and  depth,  and  to  V4,  which,  as  previously  noted,  has  been  described  as  the 
d  colour  centre'of  the  brain.  This  is  because  it  is  in  V4  that  the  rich  array  of  colours  we  are 
able  to  perceive  is  added  to  our  experience.  The  eye  itself  can  only  detect  thrcc  discrete 
colours,  but  by  refining  the  information  feeding  in  from  Vi  and  V2  about  the  distribution 
of  those  colours  and  general  illumination,  V4  maps  the  rich  spectrum  of  our  experience 
onto  what  our  eyes  detect.  McCronc  explains  the  process  as  follows: 
The  process  starts  with  the  mapping  of  wavelength  information  In  Vi  and  V2  using  cells  tuned  to 
represent  a  red/green  contrast  or  a  lue/yellow  contrast.  So,  for  example,  a  green-coding  cell  will  be 
switched  on  by  predominantly  green  wavelength  light  hitting  an  area,  and  turned  off  if  the  mix  of 
the  three  wavelengths  is  mainly  red.  But  the  response  of  each  cell  is  too  unrefined  to  say  that  it 
really  sees  a  colour  as  such.  It  is  only  in  V4  that  the  firing  of  cells  beFins  to  match  the  subjective 
experience  of  witnessing  individual  hues.  Each  v4  cell  appears  to  Combine  the  the  response  of 
many'red'  "green'  'yeUoV,  and  'blue'  neurons,  and  to  mix  it  up  with  some  general  Information  about 
illuminatio'n  level's  -  the  amount  of  'black'  or  'white'  in  the  picture  -  to  produce  the  complex 
reaction  of  seeing  an  actual  shade  such  as  turquoise,  brown  or  pink.  So  what  started  out  as  a  crude 
physical  measurement  -  the  wavelength  response  of  a  retinal  pigment  -  could  be  turned  by  a 
chain  of  rernapping  and  condensing  into  a  highly  specific  psychological  response.  " 
The  same  kind  of  process  of  finer  and  finer  refinement  appears  to  be  the  case  for  the 
recognition  of  objects  as  well..  On  Vi,  there  arc  representations  of  basic  lines,  basic 
motions,  and  colours,  but  very  little  analysis  of  the  scene  presented  to  the  eyes.  As  the 
data  is  processed  through  the  hierarchy  of  the  visual  cortex,  the  data  becomes  further 
and  further  analysed  and  refined,  parts  emphasised  and  parts  filtered  away  into  the 
background,  until  at  the  higher  levels  of  processing  in  such  regions  as  IT,  cells  light  up 
to  signal  the  presence  of  complex  objects  or  rccognisablc  properties  of  objects.  Cells 
coding  for  more  complex  patterns,  such  as  the  hand-coding  cell  in  the  IT  cortex  of  the 
Macaque  monkey,  bchave  differently  from  cells  on  lower  levels  of  processing.  They  tend 
not  to  be  concerned  with  where  in  the  visual  field  their  kind  of  stimulus  is  presented:  the 
macaque's  hand-coding  cell  would  fire  whenever  a  hand  was  visible  to  the  monkey. 
Moreover,  whereas  when  a  stimulus  stops  being  presented  to  a  cell  on  the  lower  levels  of 
processing  such  as  Vi  orV2,  the  cell  will  immediately  stop  firing,  cells  in  higher  areas  of 
Z07 processing  will  continue  to  fire,  sometimes  long  after  the  stimulus  has  been  removed. 
The  picture  of  the  processing  of  information  in  the  visual  cortex  presented  so  far 
is  fairly  straightforward:  very  specific  maps  of  visual  information  made  out  of  the  firing  of 
cells  in  the  primary  visual  cortex  are  'fed  upwards'  through  higher  and  higher  maps, 
becoming  more  and  more  refined,  as  if  Vi  were  a  kind  of  screen,  where  pixels  of 
information  are  lit  up,  with  patterns  in  the  pixels  stimulating  cells  in  higher  maps  to  light 
up  as  they  resolve  patterns  in  the  lower-level  maps.  This  is,  as  above  noted,  an  extremely 
oversimplified  account:  there  are  multiple  subdivisions  in  the  different  visual  cortices, 
each  connected  in  different  ways  with  themselves  and  with  other  layers  in  other  cortices. 
Too,  information  does  not  flow  just  one  way,  from  the  primary  visual  cortexupwards':  the 
higher  levels  of  processing  communicate  with  the  lower  levels  as  well,  and  there  are 
complex  feedback  and  feedforward  loops  on  all  levels.  Nonetheless,  for  current 
purposes,  this  highly  simplified  account  of  the  processing  of  information  from  the  eyes  in 
the  brain  will  suffice  to  illustrate  the  general  point,  and  the  general  problems  with  this 
account. 
A  particularly  troublesome  problem  for  an  account  of  the  workings  of  the  visual 
cortex  presented  above  has  been  termed  the  'Grandmother  ccu'problem.  Consider 
again  the  hand-coding  cell  in  the  IT  cortex  of  the  Macaque.  In  the  experimental 
conditions,  the  cell  would  fire  when,  and  only  when,  a  hand  was  present  in  the  visual 
field.  It  would  not  fire  in  response  to  any  other  kind  of  stimulus.  As  McCronc  says,  "It 
had  become  semantically  specific.  By  extension,  this  suggested  there  might  be  a  high- 
level  cell  to  stand  for  every  level  of  experience,  and  the  firing  of  that  cell  would  somehow 
fill  our  consciousness  with  its  presence.  So  every  time  we  saw  or  thought  about  our 
grandmothers,  somewhere  in  our  brain  a  grandmothcr-coding  cell  would  have  to  burst 
into  action.  "4,,  But  this  cannot  be  the  case.  One  reason  is  that,  notwithstanding  the  vast 
number  of  cells  in  the  higher  processing  regions  of  the  cerebral  cortex,  our  abilities  to 
experience  complex  phenomena  far  outreach  the  number  of  cells  we  would  require  on 
this  model.  Consider:  we  are  able  to  rccognise  our  grandmothers  by  numerous  critcria. 
We  may  recognise  her  by  sight,  by  the  sound  of  her  voice,  or  by  other  means.  We 
recognise  her  from  the  back  and  in  profile  as  well  as  when  she  is  facing  us.  Too,  we 
recognise  her  when  she  appears  to  us  in  guises  in  which  we  have  never  seen  her:  if  she 
has  always  had  long  hair,  for  example,  and  one  day  has  it  cut  very  short,  or  if  we  rccognisc 
her  in  a  picture  taken  when  she  was  in  her  twenties.  In  each  of  these  cases,  the 
presentation  of  our  grandmother  to  our  senses  produces  a  very  different  lowcr-lcvcl  map. 
To  recognise  our  grandmothers  in  as  many  guises  as  we  actually  can,  we  would  have  to 
have  a  vast  number  of  Grand  mother-cod  i  ng  cells,  one  to  respond  to  each  of  the  many 
significantly  different  grandmotherly  experiences  we  may  have,  and  this  would  have  to  be 
true  for  all  of  the  highcr-level  phenomena  we  encounter,  not  just  our  grandmothers.  We 
would  thus  require  an  impossible  proliferation  of  cells  in  higher-lcvcl  cortical  arcas  to 
stand  for  all  the  phenomena  we  arc  able  to  experience.  Even  though  we  do  have  quite  a 
lot,  we  simply  do  not,  and  cannot,  have  that  many  brain  cells. 
Further,  it  is  the  case  that  even  if  our  ability  to  map  the  world  is  spccifically 
compromised,  we  continue  to  be  able  to  identify  complex  objects.  People  who  have 
Z08 suffered  lesions  in  the  V4  area,  for  example,  have  a  condition  called  achromatopsia,  in 
which  they  are  neither  able  to  perceive  colours,  nor  to  remember  colours  they  had  once 
perceived,  if  the  lesion  was  suffered  after  infancy.  *  Achromatopsic  individuals 
experience  the  world  in  shades  of  grey,  because  the  area  of  the  brain  that  deals  with 
colour  information  is  not  functioning.  Thus,  the  maps  presented  to  the  higher  level 
processing  areas  in  their  cortices  arc  incomplete.  Yet  they  still  rccognisc  their 
grandmothers,  just  as  would  a  person  with  a  healthy  V4  if  presented  with  a  black  and 
white  photograph  of  Grandmother.  Another  consideration  is  that  brain  cells  die  at  a 
regular  rate,  or  are  killed  by  injuries.  On  a'one  cell,  one  function'account,  we  would 
expect  very  specific  losses  in  the  ability  to  experience  to  occur  concomitantly  with  the 
death  of  cells  in  the  higher  processing  regions  of  the  cerebral  cortex:  we  might  expect 
the  death  of  a  certain  cell  or  group  of  cells  in  IT,  for  example,  to  result  in  the  failure 
properly  to  recognise  very  specific  objects,  such  as  Grandma  or  hands.  But  while  we  do 
find  that  damage  to  specific  cortical  regions  can  result  in  very  specific  cognitive 
deficiencies,  we  never  find  such  gaps  as,  say,  the  failure  to  be  able  to  experience  Morbier 
cheese,  and  nothing  else. 
Another  problem  with  the  kind  of  interpretation  given  above  is  that  the  maps 
presented  by  lower-level  processing  areas  to  higher-levcl  ones  cannot  be  as  crisp  and 
sharply  defined  as  they  would  have  to  be,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  response  of  cells 
to  stimuli  is  not  sharply  defined.  A  cell  in  Vi  coding  for  a  dark  line  falling  across  a  light 
background  at  a  45  degree  angle  from  lower-lcft  to  upper-right  in  a  small  area  of  the  visual 
field,  for  example,  will  fire  enthusiastically  when  just  that  is  present.  It  will  also  fire,  albeit 
less  enthusiastically,  if  the  degree  of  the  line  is  just  slightly  off  in  either  direction,  or  if 
the  line  does  not  go  all  the  way  across  the  part  of  the  visual  field  it  is  attending,  or  if  the 
line  isn't  as  dark  as  all  that  really  or  the  background  isn't  as  light.  A  cell  in  V4  that  fircs 
most  happily  in  response  to  fight  at  64o  nanomctcrs,  a  colour  McCronc  describes  as  "a 
cheerful  tomato  red",  44  will  also  fire  more  weakly  to  620  -a  kind  of  orangy  colour  -  and  to 
66o,  a  more  crimson  shade,  and  indeed  its  response  to  orange  and  to  crimson  will  be 
identical.  The  response  of  cells  to  the  stimuli  that  fall  within  their  receptive  ficids  is 
better  represented  by  a  narrow  bell  curve  than  a  sharp,  well-defined  peak.  But  how  could 
higher-level  processing  areas  of  the  brain  build  precise  maps  out  of  such  ambiguous  data? 
What  is  ambiguous  when  reported  by  one  cell,  however,  can  be  resolved  into  crisp 
precision  when  information  across  an  entire  group  of  cells  is  considered.  To  elucidate 
this  notion,  McCrone  asks  us  again  to  consider  the  identification  of  that  cheerful  tomato 
red.  Even  if  no  cell  responds  to  light  with  a  frequency  of  64o  nanorricters,  tomato  red 
can  still  be  1coded'in  the  responses  of  cells  responsive  to  different  shades  across  a 
population  of  cells: 
For  example,  say  a  red  spot  of  light  fell  across  the  receptive  fields  of  three  V4  cells,  each  with  A 
sfightly  different  frequency  response.  One  neuron  might  be  provoked  to  fire  at  8o  per  cent  of  Its 
capacity,  while  another  fired  at  40  per  cent,  and  the  third  at  io  per  cent.  None  of  the  cells  would 
be  claiming  to  be  7oo  per  cent  sure  about  anything.  None  would  be  A  tomato  red  cell,  as  such,  but 
would  merely  be  reporting  how  close  the  spot  happened  to  come  to  hitting  their  own  personal 
peak  frequency.  However,  the  particular  combination  of  firing  rates  could  only  stand  for  A  single 
zog wavelength.  Only  a  hue  of  640  nanometers  could  provoke  a  response  of  an  80,4o,  and  io  per  cent 
response  within  this  small  group  of  cells.  From  a  population  reaction,  a  pattern  of  voting  by  a  spread 
of  cells,  would  emerge  an  exceptionally  precise  trajectory  of  firing.  41  (94) 
On  such  an  account,  there  need  be  no  cell  or  group  of  cells  dedicated  to  alerting  the 
brain  of  the  presence  of  cheerful  tomato  red  in  the  visual  field.  The  group  activity  of 
populations  of  cells  can'code  forchccrful  tomato  red,  even  though  the  individual  cells 
involved  are  dedicated  to  reporting  something  quite  different.  This  kind  ofgroup 
coding'  scheme  works  for  the  recognition  of  objects  or  specific  motions  as  well.  Cells  in 
Vi  through  V5  produce  maps  of  the  raw  data  that  is  presented  to  the  eyes,  within  a 
certain  degree  of  precision.  Across  an  entire  population  of  cells  and  their  activity  and 
intcractivity  throughout  the  visual  cortex,  an  unmistakable  pattern  can  emerge  that  may 
be  picked  up  by  a  cell  in  IT,  which  fires  to  signal  the  presence  of  a  hand.  'Population 
coding'also  solves  the  'Grandmother  Ccfl'problcm.  While  it  seems  reasonable  that  we 
might  have  cells  or  groups  of  cells  that  fire  in  response  to  such  commonly  perceived 
outlines  as  hands  in  general,  or  faces  in  general,  the  notion  that  we  have  individual  cells 
that  code  for  each  specific  kind  of  higher  level  experience  -  Grandma's  face,  as  against 
Ralph  Nader's  face  -  is  not  reasonable.  But  coding  for  Grandmother  can  exist  in  the 
complex  action  and  interactions  of  a  population  of  cells  none  of  which  is  devoted  to 
representing  Grandmotherly  experiencesperse. 
The  idea  of  group  coding  allows  us  to  interpret  the  inhcrcnt'sloppincss'of  the 
responses  of  cells,  their  tendency  to  fire  within  various  degrees  of  the  presentation  of  the 
right  sort  of  stimulus,  into  a  positive  virtue.  Nor  is  it  an  unlikely  theory-.  as  McCronc  says, 
there  is  support  for  the  notion  that  the  brain  actually  does  make  use  of  the  individually 
ambiguous  firings  of  cells  across  whole  populations.  By  recording  from  many  different 
cells  in  the  motor  cortex  of  a  monkey  as  it  carried  out  some  spccific  motor  task  for  which 
it  had  been  trained,  such  as  keeping  its  eyes  focused  upon  a  particular  spot  on  a  screen 
or  reaching  out  to  touch  a  spot,  researchers  found  that  individually,  the  firing  of  cells  was 
approximate,  but  the  overall  firing  across  the  populations  measured  matched  the  actions 
the  monkey  was  performing.  44Population  coding  also  can  explain  how  it  can  be  possible 
that  our  actual  perceptual  abilities  arc  more  precise  than  can  be  accounted  for  by  the 
properties  of  individual  cells.  McCronc  says: 
...  astonishingly,  the  brain  does  much  better  at  detecting  sensations  that  the  receptive  field 
properties  of  its  neurons  would  seem  to  allow.  In  standard  psychophysical  tests,  the  human  eye  can 
pick  out  very  tiny  details.  We  are  sensitive  to  the  faintest  bend  in  a  straight  line,  or  the  slightest 
gap  between  two  almost  touching  balls.  It  would  seem  that  to  be  able  to  code  for  such  a  gap,  we 
would  need  to  use  at  least  three  retinal  cells:  one  to  represent  the  gap,  and  one  to  represent  the 
space  in  the  middle.  Yet  experiments  show  we  can  see  a  gap  rive  times  thinner  than  the  shadow  it 
casts  across  a  single  receptor  on  the  back  of  our  eyeballs.  Our  vision  far  out-performs  the  physics, 
dimensions  of  our  light  detecting  equipment. 
On  the  group  coding  account,  it  is  not  necessary  that  individual  cells  be  as  precise  and  as 
accurate  as  they  would  have  to  be  to  account  for  human  perceptual  abilities  as  described 
above,  for  this  level  of  accuracy  emerges'for  free'  in  the  interactions  of  entire  populations 
I70 of  cells. 
Population  coding  thus  enables  the  whole  brain  to  achieve  feats  of  precision  well 
beyond  the  abilities  of  its  component  neurons.  It  also  generates  robustness  in  the 
representational  capacities  of  the  brain:  because  patterns  in  whole  populations  of  cells 
are  involved  in  the  representation  of  a  complex  object,  the  whole  brain  can  still  be  able  to 
represent  the  object  even  if  parts  of  the  brain  that  would  normally  be  involved  arc 
damaged  or  missing.  People  who  are  achromatopsic  because  of  a  lesion  in  V4,  though 
none  of  the  cells  in  V4  contributes  to  their  representation  of  Grandmother,  will  still 
recognise  her,  albeit  without  the  rich  colour  detail  that  cells  in  V4  contribute,  because 
the  remaining  population  is  sufficient  to  realise  the  pattern  that  is  associated  with 
Grandmother.  It  also  allows  for  degrees  of  certainty:  the  greater  or  lesser  degree  to  which 
a  population  coding  for  a  complex  object  did  so,  as  against  the  degree  to  which  another 
pattern  or  no  pattern  in  particular  obtained,  could  account  for  the  uncertainty  we  can 
experience  in  identifying  objects  we  encounter  in  situations  where  they  are  hard  to  pick 
out:  Grandmother  encountered  in  a  dark  room  with  her  face  turned  away,  or 
Grandmother  in  a  taxi  going  by  at  a  fair  clip. 
Population  coding  is  a  property  that  inheres  in  the  dynamic  actions  and 
interactions  of  cells  in  the  brain  each  individually  following  their  own  very  specialiscd 
instructions.  It  enables  the  brain  to  represent  possible  infinitude  of  different  complex 
objects  or  states  of  affairs;  to  detect  subtleties  far  beyond  the  capacities  of  individual 
neurons;  to  plan  and  command  complex  motor  actions  far  outreaching  the  ability  of 
individual  fuzzy  ncrve  firings.  Such  functions  as  the  representation  of  an  object  or  the 
planning  of  a  movement  are  dynamically  emergent  properties,  arising  out  of  the  complex 
actions  and  interactions  of  individual  simple  components.  Thus  the  observations  earlier 
made  for  emergent  properties  generally  can  be  carried  over  to  the  brain's  capacity  to 
represent  and  to  act:  representational  properties  are  very  real,  robust  properties  that 
enable  the  whole  brain  and  body  to  represent  and  rccognise  aspects  of  the  world,  and  to 
act  upon  and  interact  with  the  environment  in  ways  that  the  individual  components 
realising  it  never  could.  The  abilities  of  the  brain,  and  its  structure  and  dynamics,  are 
vastly  beyond  the  properties  and  organisation  of  ant  and  termite  societies,  but  the  same 
observations  that  can  be  made  for  these  much  simpler,  easier  understood  examples  carry 
over  to  the  case  of  the  brain:  if  the  brain  is  a  complex  dynamic  system  instantiating 
dynamically  emergent  properties,  then  these  robust  and  real  properties  merit  treatment 
in  their  own  terms  and  under  the  gencralisations  subsuming  them  at  the  higher  level  at 
which  they  exist.  Further,  the  presence  of  a  dynamically  emergent  property  demonstrably 
constrains  the  behaviour  of  the  individual  components  realising  it.  If  a  representation  in 
the  brain  is  understood  as  a  dynamically  emergent  property,  we  can  begin  to  see  how  the 
representation,  qua  higher  level  property,  can  be  a  genuinely  causally  effective  aspect  of 
the  whole  system  in  which  it  is  instantiated,  in  a  way  that  is  unproblcmatic  from  a 
physicalist  perspective.  Mental  causation  and  the  autonomy  of  psychology  might  be 
possible  under  a  robust  physicalism  after  all. 
III Conclusion 
IF  WE  WISH  SERIOUSLY  TO  ENTERTAIN  A  PHYSICALIST 
view  about  the  relation  of  mental  properties,  among  other 
kinds  of  properties,  to  basic  physical  properties,  we  must 
seriously  accept  the  consequences  of  this  view.  In  assessing 
the  central  tenets  of  the  physicalist  thesis,  I  hope  to  have 
exposed  what  those  consequences  are,  and  also  to  have 
identified  some  associated  notions  from  which  serious 
physicalists  need  not  suffer.  Physicalists  do  not  have  to 
provide  an  appiori  account  of  what  properties  are  physical,  or 
hard  and  fast  criteria  for  the  identification  of  physical  properties.  'Physicality'  can  be 
understood  as  a  contingent  feature  something  can  possess  in  virtue  of  its  fitting  within  a 
closed  causal/explanatory  hierarchy.  Such  an  account  allows  that  the  development  of  the 
physical  sciences  in  ways  that  we  are  unable  to  anticipate  will  not  falsify  physicalism  by 
identifying  some  properties  we  currently  cannot  explain  in  physical  terms  as  physically 
explicable  after  all.  Neither  does  the  physicalist  have  to  he  constrained  by  any  particular 
elucidation  of  whatpbysics  is:  we  do  think,  after  all,  that  physicalism  could  be  true  even  if 
there  were  no  physicists.  This  is,  I  believe,  a  perfectly  workable  account  of  what  it  is  to 
be  physical,  which  does  not  involve  physicalists  in  some  of  the  difficulties  that  havc  been 
identified  for  the  formulation  of  the  doctrine. 
The  requirements  that  all  properties  be  related  to  physical  properties  in  a 
metaphysically  explanatory  way,  and  the  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical 
domain,  do  entail  that  physical  laws  underlie  all  causal  transactions  on  any  level  of 
description.  For  any  actions  we  take,  any  decisions  we  make,  and  any  thoughts  we  have 
about  anything,  there  exists  a  complete  sufficient  description  in  physical  terms.  But 
serious  physicalists  do  not  have  to  accept  that  physical  properties  are  the  only  kinds  of 
properties  that  there  are,  or  that  physical  laws  are  the  only  kinds  of  laws.  Physicalism  can 
recognise  and  tolerate  properties  that  are  not  straight  forwardly  reducible  to  physical 
kinds,  and  physicalists  need  not  require  that  laws  in  the  special  sciences  be  reducible  to 
physical  laws.  On  the  functional  model  of  reductionism,  what  is  central  to  the 
reducibility  of  any  particular  nonbasic  property  is  that  it  can  be  construed  extrinsically  as 
a  functional  property,  and  that  some  physical  system  can  be  identified  in  the microstructure  of  whatever  instantiates  the  property  that  is  sufricient  to  perform  that 
function.  More  basic  laws  will  describe  the  behaviour  of  the  microstructure  involved,  and 
eventually,  basic  physical  laws  will  describe  the  dynamics  of  the  basic  physical  structure, 
or  as  close  to  that  as  can  be  identified.  At  the  level  of  abstraction  at  which  higher  level 
properties  are  considered  as  intrinsic  properties  of  entities,  meaningful  gcneralisations 
can  be  constructed  describing  the  behaviour  of  higher  level  multiply  instantiable 
properties,  but  below  that  level,  these  generalisations  are  incoherent.  Nonetheless, 
physical  laws  can  be  seen  to  ground  special  science  laws,  by  being  descriptive  of  the  low 
level  dynamics  that  occur  in  any  given  higher  level  causal  interaction.  All  that  physicalism 
taking  the  functional  model  of  rcductionism  as  providing  the  criteria  according  to  which 
any  given  higher  level  property  is  physically  reducible  requires  is  that  particular 
instantiations  of  higher  level  properties  and  special  science  generalisations  should  be 
grounded  in  physical  properties  and  physical  laws.  The  reducibility  of  special  science 
kinds  and  laws  to  physical  kinds  and  laws  is  neither  required  nor  desirable;  indeed  quite 
the  opposite  is  the  case. 
In  itself,  this  does  not  solve  the  problem  of  causal  exclusion.  However,  the  notion 
of  dynamically  emergence  provides  us  with  a  way  of  thinking  about  some  kinds  of  higher 
level  properties  instantiated  in  dynamic  systems  as  robust,  very  real  properties,  and  of  the 
generalisations  describing  the  behaviour  of  whole  dynamic  systems  as  genuinely 
descriptive  of  lawful  interactions:  because  the  actions  and  interactions  of  the  simple 
components  of  the  whole  system  enable  the  whole  to  act  in  and  on  its  environment  in 
complex  ways  for  which  no  coding  directly  exists,  basic  physical  explanations  of  causal 
transactions  involving  such  systems,  though  they  may  sufficiently  describe  the 
transactions,  can  be  seen  to  miss  a  very  important  and  very  real  feature  of  dynamic 
systems.  Since  dynamically  emergent  properties  pervade  the  system  down  to  the  lowest 
complete  components,  constraining  the  activity  of  the  components  in  ways  for  which 
the  components  alone  have  no  intrinsic  leanings,  and  because  dynamically  emergent 
properties  can  enable  whole  systems  to  interact  with  their  environments  in  apparently 
intelligent  ways,  we  can  think  of  the  robust  higher-levcl  dynamically  emergent  property 
as  having  a  real  causal  influence  upon  the  world  qua  highcr-lcvcl  property,  without 
invoking  downward  causation.  It  also  shows  us  how  the  very  complex  abilities  of  a  system 
to  act  in  and  interact  with  its  environment  can  be  bought  very  cheaply  in  the  collective 
actions  and  interactions  of  very  simple  components.  Robust,  functional  abilities  of  whole 
systems  can  emerge  unproblcmatically  in  the  collective  dynamics  of  simple  components, 
any  single  one  of  which  could  not  manifest  the  capability  the  whole  system  exhibits,  and 
without  requiring  that  complex  coding  for  higher  level  complex  abilities  be'coded  foe 
anywhere.  Dynamic  emergence  is  thus  very  interesting  from  a  philosophical  perspective, 
providing  us  with  a  framework  in  which  we  can  think  of  some  kinds  of  higher  level 
properties  as  real  features  in  the  physical  world,  and  really  causally  effective,  considered 
in  their  own  right.  If,  as  many  researchers  believe,  the  brain  utiliscs  the  collective 
dynamics  of  entire  populations  of  cells  to  code  for  complex  abilities  such  as  the 
representation  of  particular  objects  or  the  planning  of  very  precise  movements,  or  indeed 
any  of  the  great  many  things  that  brains  do,  we  can  begin  to  appreciate  how  higher-1cvcl properties  realised  in  the  brain  can  drive  the  actions  of  the  whole  system  in  which  those 
properties  inhere.  We  can  begin  to  see  how  the  complex  capabilities  of  the  dynamic 
brain  -  mental  states  -  can  enable  the  brain  and  body  to  carve  trajectories  through  the 
world  in  ways  unanticipated  by  the  capacities  of  its  simple  components.  We  can  begin  to 
see  how  happy  intellection,  or  indeed  graceful  error,  may  enable  the  whole  brain 
mindfully  to  correct  its  cave. 
Functional  reductionism  and  the  notion  of  dynamic  emergence  may  help  us  to 
see  how  mental  states,  qua  mental,  can  be  construed  realistically  as  causally  effective  in 
themselves,  and  how  psychological  generalisations,  though  irreducible  to  physical  laws, 
are  meaningfully  expressive  of  real  dynamics.  But  what  to  my  mind  is  the  greatest 
challenge  to  physicalism  remains  unaddressed.  The  human  organ  of  thought  is  a 
wonderfully  complex  and  amazing  thing,  so  much  so  that  we  are  only  beginning  properly 
to  understand  just  how  wonderful  and  amazing  it  is,  how  subtle  and  powerful  its 
functioning  is.  But  nothing  that  has  been  said  can  provide  any  insight  into  why  any  of  the 
subtle  functionings  of  the  brain  should  be  associated  with  conscious,  qualitative 
experience.  It  is  impossible  to  see  how  a  quale  could  be  construed  extrinsically  as  a 
functional  property,  and  so  functional  reductionism  is  silent  on  whether  or  not  qualia  are 
reducible  to  the  physical  or  not;  no  mechanism  can  be  identified  that  is  sufficient  for  the 
realisation  of  a  quale.  The  phenomenon  of  consciousness  thus  remains  just  as  much  a 
challenge  to  physicalism  as  ever  it  was.  Though  the  notion  of  dynamic  emergence 
provides  us  with  a  fascinating  insight  into  the  ways  mental  states,  insofar  as  they  can  be 
considered  representational  higher  level  states  in  the  brain,  can  be  genuinely  causally 
effective  aspects  of  the  world,  it  cannot  illuminate  why  so  many  of  them  feel  quite  the 
way  they  do.  While  the  cave  may  be  corrected,  it  remains  in  darkness.  Much  work  is  yet 
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2pinion.  Hence  the  weaker  claim. 
Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  op.  cit.  p.  187 
Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  op.  cit.  p.  186 
Here  is  a  further  problem::  conceivably,  it  could  turn  out  to  be  the  case  that  what  we  currently  think  of  as  our  most  basic 
physics  is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  more  advanced  physics,  a  special  science.  It  is  further  conceivable  that  what  we 
currently  think  of  as  our  most  basic  physics  is  irreducible  to  this  putative  more  advanced  physics.  Would  that  indicate 
that  those  properties  and  entities  we  now  consider  to  be  quintessentially  physical  and.  those  thi  t  hich  terms  in  our 
most  basic  physical  sciences  refer  are  nonphysical  and,  under  eliminativist  interpretation,  not  rM 
Z 
In  that  case,  haw 
could  we  know  of  anything  at  all  whether  or  not  it  is  really  reaP  To  my  mind,  this  thinking  shows  that  eliminativism,  as  an 
epistemological  doctrine,  is  essentiall  tical,  though  this  may  not  bother  some  eliminativists. 
.  -which  is  not  to  say  that  all  p  ic  ssible  sciences  are  physical:  there  maybe  rfectly  reasonable  and  infbrmative 
e,  sciences  that  aren't,  which  fact  d  not  necessarily.  imply  that  physicalism  is  s,  ut  only  that  on  a  certain  level  of 
description,  observable  phenomena  and  any  su  s  ng  generalisations,  are  not  reducibk  to  physical  phenomena  and  laws, 
while  th%  may  still  beAackedby  them.  More  on  thi  later. 
ical  because  there  is  nothing  physicall  interesting  about 
ked  by  predictively  interesting  physicalfg. 
gravity  and  quantum?  hysics  could  be  unified  within 
eof  his  death  in  19981.  uperstring  theory  is,  as  far  as  I  am 
stantial  following. 
r  ni  hysicslisnottuniie  physicists  will  still  accept  gravity,  uanturn  and  electromagnetic  phenomcnaas 
t  p  to  eidentifiedandd  ribed  in  their  own  terms  by  indcpcnTent  physical  sciences.  "  Crane  ind  Mellor  19go,  op. 
riciliation  of  quantum  mechanics  with  gravity  as  described 
turn,  gravitational  and  electromagnetic  phenomena 
s.  But  it  is  not  obvious  that  this  cannot  be  done  (see 
were  a  more  comprehensive  physics  to  be  dcvelop4  the 
e  useful.  But  in  that  case  I  should  think  that  the  sciences 
cists,  the  results  they  obtained  through  the  practice  of 
these  sciences  explainable  and  able  in  t  of  e  re  comprehensive  physicsý  and  in  that  sense,  unified  enougb. 
*  Crane  and  Mellor  (1996)  op.  cit.  p.  x89 
*  Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  op.  cit.  p.  189 
In  fact  it  seems  to  me  that  here  Crane  and  Mellor  are  conflating  two  slightly  different  species  of  reductionism, 
microreductionism  and  methodological  reductionism.  Mcthodolo$ical  reductionism  is  indeed  the  doctrine  that,  in  the 
sciences,  the  smaller  the  entities  postulated  in  meaningfW  explanations  of  phenomena  on  any  level,  the  better.  Unlike 
microreductionism,  the  methodological  reductionist  may  stop  short  of  i  that  everything  must  be  reducible  to 
compounds  of  one  sort  of  extremely  small  type  of  object  -  she  may  oýNlrl  to  claim  that,  within  a  particular  domain  - 
the  sociobiological,  say  -  everything  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  a  certain  small  component  factor  -  the  gene,  say.  She 
may  not  wish  to  carry  the  reduction  farther  down,  for  the  very  good  reason  that  to  do  so  would  be  unenlightcning  vis  i  vis 
s0ciObiology.  The  nucroreductionist,  on  the  other  hand,  is  concerned  to  show  that  all  macroph  icalobjcctspropcrties, 
and  states  are  reducible  to  microphysical,  ultimately  basic,  objects,  properties  and  states.  As  suTthe  microreductionist 
may  well  have  to  give  up'small  is  beautifiir  is  empirical  science  or  other  considerations  indicate  that  phenomena  with 
moynerous  boundaries  are  component  determinants  of  arently  tiny  phenomena. 
T.  organ,  Blackuvll-A  Com 
, 
panibn  to  Meta 
4  14ace! 
sprin  to  mind. 
pbysics,  1995 
ýMirri 
andE.  Sosa,  eds.,  s.  v.  "Reduction,  reductionism,  438- 
Crane  and 
Vellor 
(iggo)  op.  cit.  p.  x9o.  Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  op.  cit.  p.  z9o. 
John  Gribbin  is  an  astrophysicist  and  ýrolific  popular  writer  on  cutting  edge  physics.  The  work  to  which  I  referred  is  his 
encyclopaedic  P--i-  -  Phv%ics  from  A  to  Z  (London:  Phoenix  (a  division  of  Orion  Books),  1998), 
entries  on  Superposition,  PP  477-478,  and  Mach's  Principle,  pp  265-268.  "  Ile  relation  is  as  far  as  I  understand  taken  to  be  causal:  just  as  the  first  quanta  is  genuinely  ncither  up  nor  down  until  it  is 
measured,  but  is  in  a  superposition  of  up-ness  and  down-ness,  so  neither  is  its  partner.  Ile  measurement  of  one  particle 
causes  the  coUVse  of  both  into  their  respective  states. 
"  The  standard  interpretation  of  such  ensembles  is,  according  to  Crane  and  Mellor,  that  they  are  complete,  and 
completeness  generally  does  imply  closure.  This  interpretation  might  be  suspect  anyway  in  te  f  nturn  mechanics,  for  quanta  are  supposed  to  be  Ne  to  wink  in  and  out  of  existence;  they  hue  a  certain  probDdsi;  orspontaneous  and  instantaneous  transport  to  the  other  side  of  the  galaxy,  &c.  With  such  properties  as  these  I  do  not  see 
9 
ossible  once  and  f6r  all  to  declare  an 
ow  it  would  be 
_y 
quantum  ensemble  closed  within  a  universe  which  featured  other  such  ensembles  for 
potentialities  for  such).  Thus,  if  the  standard  interpretation  is  indeed  that  such  ensembles  or  closed,  I  cannot  help  but 
think  that  it  must  be  with  some  caveats. 
"  Gribbin  I 
, 
TV,  Op  Cit.  Pp  24-268 
"  Crane  an  ellor  0996)  op.  cit.  p.  ig, 
"  C-  G.  Hempel,  Phflosor)hv  of  Natural  Science  N 
- 
J:  Prentice-Hall,  1966 -E  Nagel,  x96z.  Ile  Structure  of  Science. 
INewYork.  -  Harcourt,  1961 
::  Jaegwon  Kim  has  developed  such  a  model  (Kim  x998),  which  will  be  discussed  in  detail  later  on. 
See  Chapter  3,  especially  subsections  viand  vii. 
14F.  Brentano,  Psychologg  from  an  Em2irical  Standl2oint  x874 
Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  op.  cit.  p.  193 
Crane  and  Mellor  (1996)  op.  cit.  p.  194 
Hilary  Putnam,  (1975),  "Tbe  Meaning  of  'Meaning7,  in  Keith  Gunderson  (ed.  ),  Language,  MindandKnowkdge, 
Minnesota  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of  Science,  VII,  Minneapolis,  University  of  Minnesota  Press,  1975 
Pjaegwon  Kim,  21ind  in  a  PhysicadWorld  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts.  Ile  MIT  Press,  1998)  37- 
Putnam  (1975) 
Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  op.  cit.  p.  194-  1  cannot  help  but  think  that  there  is  a  little  bit  of  circularity  here:  aren!  t  mdels 
and  images  contentful  in  themselves? 
41  Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  op.  cit.  pp.  igi-i92. 
4,  Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  op.  cit.  p.  192 
41  Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  op.  cit.  p.  x95. 
44Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  o  cit.  p.  195. 
41  Not  all  animals  have  both. 
N. 
Jonathan  Sheps  infbrms  me  that  there  is  a  nematode  worm  that  has  a  kidney,  "At  least  if 
by  kidney  [is  meantl  the  various  organs  which  at  one  time  or  another  are  employed  by  the  various  animal  phyla  to  cleanse 
the  blood  of  nitrogenous  wastes  and  to  direct  these  same  effluvia  outwith  the  body  with  minimal  loss  of  water"(Dr.  Sheps, 
via  e-mail,  8th  February  2ooi),  but  which  has  no  organ  performing  the  function  that  a  heart  performs  in  other  animals. 
Presumably,  this  beastie  is  so  constituted  that  it  does  not  need  a  heart,  where  that  is  meant  to  indicate  any  organ 
responsible  for  moving  blood  about  the  body. 
4'Perhaps  the  arggurnent  could  be  more  clearly  put  as  follows.  -  I  agree  that  if  these  two  statements  are  laws: 
(H->  Heart) 
(K->  Kidney) 
and  that  if  it  is  true  and  just  simply  a  fact,  not  a  law,  that  all  mammals  have  both  hearts  and  kidneys,  neither  of  these 
(H->  Kidney) 
(K-Aleart) 
are  implied.  However,  if  it  is  not  a  law  that  all  mammals  have  both  hearts  and  kidneys,  then  there  is  no  law  to  create  a 
nonextensional  context,  as  Cranes!  and  Melloes  arugumcnt  requires  that  there  be.  However,  if  it  is  a  law  that  all  mammals 
have  both  hearts  and  kidneys,  so  that  all  these  are  true. 
(H-<->Heart) 
(K<-Kidney) 
(H<-AQ 
then  no  nonextensional  context  is  created:  if  something  has  11,  it  has  K,  so  if  something  has  11,  it  has  a  kidney.  Ilus  the 
substitution'Mammal  with  a  heare  can  truthfully  be  substituted  forMammal  with  a  kidney'  in  extensional  contexts.  I  use 
the  biconditional  in  all  three  statements  to  discount  the  possibility  that  something  other  than  11  could  be  responsible  for 
hearts  and  something  other  than  K  for  kidneys;  if  some  11'could  produce  hearts  in  mammals,  then  obviously  the  example 
woul(Wt  work  unless  (H'<->I<)  were  a  law  too. 
41  Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  op.  cit.  p.  195 
'0  Crane  and  Mellor  (1996)  op.  cit.  p.  196 
41  Crane  and  Mellor  19go:  op.  cit.  p  197.  Ile  embedded  quotation  is  from  C.  McGinn,  "Mental  States,  Natural  Kinds,  and 
ýýhophysical  Laws  ",  Proceeding  oftbeAristOteNan  SOcietY  SuAPkmfflZa?  Y  VOlum,  1978,  p.  197-(by  interesting  coincidence). 
raneandMelIor(i99o)op.  cit.  p.  203 
Hilary  Putnam,  (1975),  'Me  Meaning  of  'Meaning!  ",  in  Keith  Gunderson  (ed.  ),  IfMwge,  MindandKnowledgr, 
Minnesota  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of  Science,  VII,  Minneapolis,  University  of  Minnesota  Press,  ig7s 
Crane  and  Mellor  (iggo)  Op.  Cit.  P.  205 
I  recall  an  exercise  in  quantum  mechanics  given  to  students  by  Dr.  jim  Mahoney  of  Marlboro  College  Marlboro,  Vt, 
described  to  me  by  Brooks  Walsh:  students  were  asked  to  calculate  the  likelihood  of  a  co-ordination  ol  random  quantum 
events  transporting  them  entire  from  the  Science  Building  to  the  Dining  Hall.  Ile  answer  indicated  that  this  might 
probably  happen  once  T  man  m=,  tunes  the  estimated  age  of  the  universe,  some  iS  or  16  bill  ion  years  or  so:  the  chances 
of  it  occurring  were  vanishingry  s Notes  to  Cbapter  2 
C.  Daly,  "What  Are  Physical  Properties? 
#"PlaifilýP6ilOSOPbica/!  ZYarter/Y  79  4998) 
Daly  (1998)  cit.  p.  z96-igg. 
Daly  4998)2stracted  from  pg.  x98. 
41've  replaced  Dalys  tennindividuar  with'objects,  properties,  and  states'so  as  to  be  able  to  accommodate  functional 
'duals  such  as  orbitsflockingkebaziour  and  such. 
nt. 
s  at  Oxfbrd  University,  Trinity  term  1995,  crediting  the  idea 
ckwell,  igg 
man,  ete  nat  n  it  100  82 
A85): 
6o7-6i8. 
-J.  Poland,  PLUical  ism:  'Me  Philosonhical  Foun  tio  s  xfor  -  Ord  University  Press,  x994) 
-  Daly  (1998)  op.  Cit.  P.  200. 
"Daly  (1998)  op.  Cit.  P.  20o,  referring  to  T.  Kuhes  71he  Fssential  Tension  1977PPP&309-313. 
Daly  (x998)  op.  cit.  p.  2oo 
Uvine  "Materialism  and  Qualia:  The  Explanatory  Gap  "  Pacific  Philosophical  Quarterly  64  (198ý,  and  "On  Ieavin  Lt 
ýý  It's  Like,  in  M.  Davies  and  G.  Humphreys,  eds.:  Consciousness  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Blackwell,  iqý 
T.  Nagel,  "What  Is  It  Like  to  Bea  Bat?,  "The  Philosophical  Review  83  (1974). 
Snowdon,  'On  Formulating  Materialism  and  Dua-lisie,  in  Cause.  Mind.  and  Reatim  Essays  in  Honour  ofC.  B.  Martin 
Heil,  ed.,  Kluwer  Academic  Press,  Dordrecht  1989,  Bg.  i5L 
al  Snowdon,  153-  1  have  quoted  slightly  farther  than  aly-  aly  on-tits  the  sentence  "Me  discovery  (if  such  is  possible)  of  the 
ssence  of  this  kind.  is  a  posteriori%  ! 
'Daly  (1998)  op.  Cit.  P.  204,  raises  specific  difficulties  for  the  notion  of  a  proper  sbein  physical  if  it  exists  in  physical 
Ts  ýace.  Physical  space,  he  notes,  must  be  disti  ished  from  other  kinds  of  spac%the  qu  ity  space  of  the  colour  circle  and 
e'spaceformed  by  the  one-dimensional  curing  of  the  determinatcs  of  a  determinable  quantity  such  as  tcmperaý  are 
his  examples,  though  I  think  that  there  could  be  some  argument  about  whether  such'space!?  are  r*yspaq),  in  which  case 
a  principled  definition  of  what  space  is  needs  to  be  given.  If  Snowdon  takes  a  relational  notion  of  space,  then  part  of  what 
it  is  to  be  a  physical  object  is  to  exist  in  a  physical  space  which  is  itself  defined  in  terms  of  relations  between  physical 
pbjects.  If  on  the  contrary  an  absolute  notion  of  space  is  taken,  then  part  of  what  it  will  be  to  be  a  physical  object  will 
involve  being  located  in  another  physical  object.  Moreover,  if  physical  space  is  a  physical  object,  then  there  is  at  least  one 
Oysical  object  which  is  not  in  pýrical  space. 
"'ne  attempt  to  set  ap  ir  r  tho  a  propriate  imitations  is  faced  with  the  same  difficulties  encountered  above,  fb  wi  ut 
preconceived  notion  of  which  basic  and  shared  essential  features  can  count  as  physical,  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  say 
which  of  the  properties  ghosts  and  apparitions  might  exhibit  count  as  the  sorts  of  properties  shared  with  all  other  things, 
and  which  separate  ghosts  and  apparitions  from  physical  things 
'Snowdon  1989,  op.  cit.  p.  152 
See  especially  his  section  zo:  Vafieties  ofMatcridhm,  re  uctive  r 
. 
tP&  154-x56,  in  which  he  speaks  of  non  d  hysicalism 
es  affirming  that  "mental  states  of  affairs  are  physic  e  sense  that  they  are  such  as  can  obtain  in  a  purely  Physical 
domain 
... 
* 
Daly,  WbatArePbysicdPrppertiesý  Op.  Cit.  p.  205. 
Snowdon  (1989)  op.  cit.  p.  138 
'4Snowdon  4989)  op.  cit.  P-  140 
$  Snowdon  4989)  op.  cit.  p.  152. 
"Snowdon  6989)  op.  cit.  p.  152. 
Snowdon  4989)  op.  cit.  p.  151. 
Daly  (1998)  op.  cit.  p.  2o5 
He  does:  Snowdon  (1989)  op.  cit.  p.  14L  Snowdon  does  discuss  the  constitution  relation  at  some  length,  but  in  my  opinion  he  does  little  to  meet  this  objection: 
Pý140-143- 
avid  Papineau,  Philoso2hical  fbrd.  Blackwell,  1993) 
ýapineau  (1993)  op.  cit.  io.  fie  says:  "Supervenience  on  the  physical  means  that  two  systems  cannot  differ  chemically, 
or  biologically,  or  gchofcýcally,  or  whatever,  without  differin  Ph  sical1r,  or,  to  put  it  the  other  way  round,  if  two 
,V  el  v 
If  I 
systemsarephysic  7  identical,  then  they  must  also  be  chemic  yi  entical,  biologically  identical,  psychologically  identical,  and  so  on. 
See  especially  page  Papineau  (1993)  P.  24.  Papineau,  (199j)  OP-  cit-  P-  13  See  especially  his  section  on  Realisation  for  discussion  of  causal  overdetermination:  Papineau  (1993)  PP-  23-27.  papineau  4993)  OP.  cit.  p.  16  Papineau,  op.  cit.,  PP9.17-18.  Note  that  this  principle  is  vulnerable  to  arguments  such  as  those  David  Chalmers  has 
forwarded  about  the  possibility  of  absent,  inverted,  or  dancing  qualia.  If  such  arguments  are  consistent,  then  there  is  at  least  one  type  of  mental  occurrence-  qualitative  occurrences-  whose  differences  would  not  manifest  themselves  in  arrf 
physical  context. 
"J.  Kim,  "The  Nonreductivist's  Troubles  with  Mental  Causation7  inj.  Kirn:  Supgrvenience  and  Minde  Selected- 
PhilosoRbical  EssW  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1993)  348.  S.  Alexander,  S2Le.  Time.  andPaitL  volume  2,  p  8,  quoted  in  Kim  1993.  OP  Cit.  348  Except,  perhaps,  for  whatever  dynamics  there  may  be  internal  to  the  electron,  but  on  the  level  of  electrons,  no  causal  transactions  take  place. 
Papineau  considers  the  plausibility  of  token  congruence  without  supervenicrice:  Papineau  (igg  p.  28-29.  nis  is  not  uncontroversial:  see  Kim  4989):  Mechý=_iwx,  PwPose  and&  _vrludon,  rcpnnt?  cli  n  Kim,  ýIanato?  yF  Suoervenience  and  Mind:  Selected  Philos-1--l  rN__1_  I 
41  Papineau  (1993)  op.  Cit.  P.  24.  Papineau  uses- 
Essays&  "_U"UJridge-.  Cambridge  University  Press,  1993. 
25.  the  term  state  to  be  a'stylistic  variation!  on'properties!:  footnote  #22,  pg. -  Papineau  (199  3)  Op.  Cit.  Pp.  29-30 
ra  ineau 
41P  *(? 
)3)  OP.  Cit-  P-  30 
ly 
(z958),  who  differentiated  between  of  the  tc  41  Dý  noteslt9lit  such  an  approach  has  been  taken  before  by  Fie  two  uses  rm 
'physical'.  physicali,  having  something  to  do  with  space,  time  an  causality,  and  physical2,  which  is  applied  tothe  type  of 
concepts  and  laws  which  suffice  in  principle  for  inorganic  processe!?. 
Such  a  move  would  also  trivialise  the  physicalism/dualism  debate  for  the  actual  world,  as  I  shall  explain  below. 
Ile  relations  of  determinate  to  determinable  is  transitive,  and  so  the  implication  of  a  new  physical  determinable  would 
imply  that  the  determinable'physical'would  then  have  to  include  this  new  determinable,  from  which  the  newly  discovered 
determinates  emanate. 
Someone  has  termed  such  possible  physical  properties'aliere,  but  unfortunately  I  cannot  remember  who  it  was. 
PaSineau  (1993)  op.  Cit.  ý.  29-30 
Dy  (1998)  Op.  Cii  P.  20 
Daly  (1998)  op.  Cit.  P.  2o8 
-0  Papineau  (t99j)  OP-  Cit-  P-  30 
14  See  especially  Papineau  op.  Cit.  PPg  29-32. 
of  P 
Y  , 
7,  in  199  1  OP.  c1t-  P.  30 
,  (1  90  cit.  P.  205 
9  (1  98)  0-  Cit-  P.  204 
32y're  ed  opment  of  subatomic  physics,  many  chemical  properties  were  taken  to  be  brutely  emergent  and 
)li  le  in  terms  of  physics.  ýIeMlman 
and  Thompson,  "Physicalism  Ontology,  Determination,  and  Reduction,  "JoumalofAilos0pby  72  (1975) 
Hellman,  "Determination  and  Logical  Truth,  'Journal  of  Philosophy  82  0985) 
Hellman  6989)  op.  cit.  p.  61o 
Hellman  0989)  op.  cit.  p.  6og 
Daly  4998)  pp.  cit.  p.  2io 
,  PolandPh  icalism:  Ile  Philosophical  Foundations  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1994)  13- 
oland(iggrop.  cit.  p.  it 
Poland  (1994)  op.  cit.  p.  18 
Poland  (1994)  OP-  Cit-  P-  19 
Poland  (1994)  op.  cit.  P.  20 
Poland  (1994)  OP-  Cit-  P-  20 
See  Poland  (1994)  P  21,  pp  22-23 
It  ni  ecessarily  Ot  be  assumed  that  these  relations  must  always  be  to  lower  level  branches  of  science,  but  this  is  not  n  the 
case.  Vertical  explanation  can  proceed  via  sciences  on  the  same  level  or  even  via  sciences  at  higher  levels:  it  might  be  the 
case,  for  example,  that  there  are  explanations  in  folk_psychologr  fbr  the  behaviour  of  some  individual  human  being. 
ty 
byway  of  sociology.  Though  the  point  is 
.  14 
Relating  folk  psycholopy  to  physics,  however,  might  have  to  proceed  pr 
contestable,  it  seems  that  the  science  of  individuals  is  lower  in  the  scienti  ic  hierarchy  than  the  science  of  social  groups. 
Poland  (1994)  op.  cit.  p.  124 
Poland  (1994)  OP-  Cit-  P-  124 
With  deference  to'the  intentional  stance  as  described  by  D.  Dennet,  which  can  be  applied  to  almost  anything;  an 
electroes  being  attracted  to  a  proton  might  be  describes  as  the  electroes  wanting  to  be  where  the  proton  is.  However, 
such  a  stance  cannot  be  taken  by  an  agent  which  is  not  itself  intentional,  so  again,  we  never  find  phenomena  apt  for 
MTI  chological  descriptions  in  the  absence  of  human  beings  (or  other  intentional  creatures). 
olland  denies  that  this  is  uniquely  a  feature  of  physics,  and  so  physics  cannot  simply  be  charaLterised  as'the  most 
universal  or  general  science:  see  ppg.  x2o-ni. 
I  Ile  objection  could  be  raised  that,  as  explored  earlier  in  this  paper,  microscopic  systems  are  often  not  closed  within  the 
same  spatiotýmporal  boundarics,  as  the  macroscopic  objccts  thcy  arc  takm  as  constituting,  Howcvcr  thcrc  is  nothing  in 
the  notion  of  vertical  explanation  that  suggests  that  they  must  be  so  closed,  and  I  do  not  see  that  this  objection  carries  for 
the  idea  of  vertical  explanation  in  Poland's  sense. 
"  Poland  (1994)  op.  cit.  p.  u5 
"  Poland  (1994)  OP.  cit-  P.  125 
"  Whether  or  not  astronomy  and  thermodynamics  do  count  as  physical  sciences,  why  they  do,  and  why  other  sciences  do 
not,  is  a  further  question.  If  all  sciences  are  vertically  related  to  physics,  then  how  do  some  sciences,  such  as  chemistry  or 
ballistics,  qualify  as  physical  sciences  whereas  other  sciences,  such  as  psychology  or  virology,  do  not?  I  think  there  is 
certainly  room  for  a  principled  answer,  and  that  such  an  answer  is  most  likely  to  come  from  the  notion  of  vertical 
explanation  itself.  A  world-specific  method  of  identifying  some  sciences  as  physical  and  excluding  others  from  the 
qualification  could  be  given  as  follows:  a  science  is  a  physical  science  just  in  case  its  proprietary  objects  and  principles  are 
such  that  they  are  directly  related  to  basic  h  gnccs  in  ways  that  are  interesting  from  the  perspective  of  basic  physics.  For 
physiclsh  example,  chemistry  will  count  as  ae  ce  according  to  this  view,  because  its  proprietary  entities  and  principles 
molecules,  atoms,  electrical  forces  and  their  d  cular  arrange  ynamics,  &c  -  are  uniquely  realised  by  pard  ments  of  subatornic 
and  quantum  phenomena,  and  by  no  other  things.  Chemical  properties  are  not  multiply  realisable.  Nothing  is  a  water 
molecule  that  is  not  also  a  collection  of  hydrogen  and  oxyVen  in  a  particular  relation,  and  also  a  collection  of  protons, 
neutrons  and  electrons  in  a  particular  relation,  and  so  on  down  to  the  most  basic  elements  physics  can  describe.  If  a 
science  has  proprietary  elements  or  principles  that  have  some  features  or  aspects  that  are  not  interesting,  from  a  physical 
Perspective-  as,  presumably,  virology  has,  for  some  of  the  properties  of  viruses  could  be  instantiated  by  one  or  another 
phyiical  structure  -  then  that  science  is  not  a  physical  science,  though  it  is  vertically  related  to  physics.  Such  a  method  for 
identifyin  hi  sciences  does,  incidentally,  draw  upon  an  important  distinction  between  kinds  of  properties  that 
could 
Yesiclildate 
the  difference  between  physical  and  no&e  ical  properties  without  committing  the  s)ltcm  to  any 
a  dri  constraints  ppon  the  notion  of  a  physical  prope,  7and  e  allowing  that  notion  to  be  subject  to  revision  as 
I  ysics  progresses.  These  themes  will  been  II  ored  in  the  nal  section  of  this  paper  in  more  detail. 
I  refer  again  to  the  above  cited  passage:  effrey  Poland  attempt  to  say  which  properties  are  physical  by  (i)  what 
physics  is,  and  then  (2)  sayingwhat  properties  are  physical  properties  in  terms  of  sayingwhat  properties  are  d=ed  by 
ph  1  . 11  SICS  Yolaný 
(1994)  op.  cit.  p.  118  Poland  4994)  op.  cit.  p.  118  Poland  (1994)  OP.  cit.  p-  118  Poland  0994)  OP.  cit.  P.  41 Notes  to  Cbapter3 
-  Ernest  LePore  and  Barry  Loewer,  "More  on  Making  Mind  Matter,  "Philosophical  Topics  17  (1989):  I77ý178,  quoted  in  Kim, 
below. 
,  Jacgwon  Kim,  'Me  Nonreductivises  Troubles  with  Mental  Causation",  reprinted  in  Kim  (1993):  Sul&rvenicnce  and 
Mind-  Selected  Philosophical  Essays,  Cambridge-  Cambridge  University  Press,  -  343. 
"Ibis  does  not  mean  that  the  physicalist  must  accept  the  rcalisation  relation  for  mental  states,  or  indeed  arrf  nonphysical 
propertics.  'Ibey  may  be  happywith  the  realisation  relation  obtaining  between  higher  level,  but  still  fairly 
uncontentionably  physical  properties,  such  a-,  the  realisation  of  chemical  properties  by  atomic.  Yet  they  may  still  deny  that 
a  relation  of  this  type  obtains  between  the  mental  and  the  physical.  Those  who  adhere  to  nonreductive  physicalism  would 
forward  theses  in  this  direction,  as  the  realisation  relation  as  above  expressed  implies  reduction.  Ile  degree  to  which  such 
theses  coherently  can  be  maintained  will  be  a  topic  of  discussion  later  in  this  work. 
4This  is  because  the  ph  ical  instantiators  of  properties  of  this  kind  can  be,  and  probably  characteristically  are,  wildly 
heterogeneous.  This  wiNe  discussed  in  more  detail  later. 
II  include  composition  here  because  I  believe  that  the  notion  that  composed  entities  that  are  somehow'more  than  the 
sum  of  their  parts',  when  the  relation  between  the  parts  is  included  in  that  sum,  is  inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  the 
causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain;  this  will  be  argued  in  a  later  section. 
Papineau  6993)  op.  cit.  p.  16 
Papineau  (1993)  OP-  Cit-  P-  13.  His  italics. 
Pkysics,  of  course,  caift  be  causally  anyWng-,  physics  is  an  explanatory  system,  or  a  theory,  and  beyond  the  entailment  of 
some  statements  in  a  theory  by  others,  I  can  think  of  no  causation  that  gDes  on  within  theories. 
I  The  principle  of  the  causal  closure  of  the  physical  domain  specifies  only  that  the  causes  of  physical  events  must  be 
physical.  It  does  not  imply  the  converse,  that  ox  events  can  only  have  physical  effect.  It  is  consustent  with  the  closure 
pmciple  as  I  interpret  it  that  there  be  epiphenomcna  caused  by,  or  at  least  consistenly  associated  with 
hh 
ic 
cl 
g  al 
phenomena,  so  long  as  phenomena  proprietary  to  substantial  realms  outside  the  bounds  of  the  physic  havenoeffect 
upon  the  physical  domain. 
Crane  andMellor  (iggo)  op.  cit.  p.  192 
David  Hume,  Enquiries,  Reprinted  from  the  1777  edition  with  introduction  and  analytical  index  by  L.  A.  Selby,  3rd  ed. 
(Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1994)  86-87- 
It  maybe  objected  that  quantum  randomness  falsifie  diCtiOns  in  basic  physics.  That,  however,  would  be  incorrect. 
The  stochastic  nature  of  quantum  dynami*cs  is  a  perfeý&  well-behaved  feature  of  the  quantum  domain,  which  feature  is 
's  " 
reflected  in  the  laws  of  quantum  physics.  If  a  quantum  prediction  goýsx  will  y  with  99.998%  probability,  and  then  if  x 
fails  to  y,  there  is  a  perfectly  gc)odreason  for  this:  this  particular  occasion  was  one  of  the.  002%  Ofall  X-Y  Cases  where  x  does 
not  Y. 
"It  is  conceivable  that  there  maybe  no  ultimate  basic  level  of  physics,  or,  that  all  entities  are  infinitely  decom  )sableThis  K 
does  not  affect  the  central  point  being  made,  however.  If  it  is  the  case  that  there  is  no  basic  ontological  level,  t  enit;  iUbc 
possible  that  there  are  no  levels  on  which  laws  are  exceptionless,  but  it  will  still  be  the  case  that  in  order  to  nuke  sense  of 
explanations  on  any  level,  falsifications  of  generalisations  by  inputs  from  higher  levels  must  be  ruled  out. 
44ýe  author  believes  that  the  English  language  lost  a  wonder"  expressive  term,  which  does  not  have  a  suitable  modem 
equi,  %Falent,  whenweir(r  lost  this  sense.  11anks  to  Sydney  Harris  fi)r  the  kind  permission  for  the  use  of  his  cartoon,  which  so  aptly  illustrates  this  very  point. 
In  general,  supervenience  is  taken  as  expressing  a  relation  of  determination  of  the  supervenient  properties  by  the 
subve-nient  properties  and  of  dependence  of  the  supervenient  properties  upon  the  subvenicnt  pr  )pertics,  though  as  we.  have  sccn,.  thc  supcrvcnicncc  rclationshnPliciteris  not  cxprcssivc  of  such  aVmmctjY.  onct  css,  itisuscful.  incxprcssing 
ay7etnc  p!  o 
-.  -. 
gerty  relations,  and  so  I  sliall  here  fbllow  the  convention  of  taking  it  as  being  used  to  do  precisely  that. 
J-  -  in  (1987)  Strong  andglobal'supervenience  revisited"inj.  Kim  (1993):  -nience  and  Min&  Selected 
hilmnnhirgl  Essays,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  P  79. 
"  Kim  (1987)  OP.  cit.  P.  80 
"  It  should  be  point6d  out  that,  though  functionalism  and  supervenience  arc  typically  advocated  by  physicalists,  and  that 
though  discussions  of  functionalism  and  supervenience  lically  occur  in  the  context  of  discussions  about  physicalism, 
neither  functionalism  nor  supervenience  are  physicalist  t7eses  in  essence.  I  refer  here  to  a  relation  between  physical  properties  and  psychological  rather  than  mental  properties,  because  it  is 
standardly  taken  that  in  descriptions  of  supervenience  like  this  one,  a)  the  properties  F  and  G  are  taken  to  be  intrinsic 
properties  and  b)  mmulstates,  such  as  are  picked  out  by  content,  do  not  supervene  on  intrinsic  properties  alone,  but 
involve  relational  properties,  tide  the  relation  of  an  individual  to  factors  in  that  individual's  environment.  Psycbologicd 
Properties,  in  the  sense  I  wish  to  use  the  term,  are  those  properties  of  an  individuars  mentality  that  do  not  depend  on 
content:  they  might  be  normatives,  such  asifyou  believe  p,  do  not  at  the  same  time  believe  that  -p',  or  other  non-content  dependent  properties  of  mind,  as  the  syntactical  elements  of  the  language  of  thought  would  have  to  be,  or  the  concepts  of 
space-tinic  and  causc.  would  havc  to  bc.  for  Kant.  As  mentioncd  in  prcvious  discussion,  it  is  possibic  to  formulatc 
supervenience  to  accommodate  relational  properties,  and  there  is  no  immediate  reason  beyond  convention  to  assume  that  G  is  always  an  intrinsic  propeFtyý  but  I  abide  by  this  convention  for  clarýty.  "J.  Kim  4984)  "Concepts  of  Supervenience  inj.  Kim  (1993):  S  nd  Mind:  Selected  Philosol2hical  Essavs 
Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  pp.  58-6o.  "I  disallow  the  possibility  that  this  person  could  be  female,  because  they  are  supposed  to  possess  all  of  St.  Franciss 
intrinsic  properties,  including  beingmale. 
"  Ile  author  actually  has  no  idea  how  taU  St.  Francis  was.  %Kim  (T87),  op  cit.  p  So.  The  italics  are  his. 
"S.  Blai  bum,  "Supervenience  Revisitedý  in  1.  Hacking  (ed),  Fxercises  in  AnL]lr  brid  University 
Press,  198S)  .  5is,  (CambridW.  Cam  ge 
"  Mark  Rowlands,  S=rvenience  ism  (Hants,  England  and  Brookfield,  VT.  Ashgate  Publishing  Company, 
1995)  P.  10.  -and 
Materialis 
"  There  are  worlds-  of  the  form  G/Fv0  where  G  is  a  R-minimal  pr  realisirig  F  within  a  bystern  relative  to  that  system.  In  such  cases,  the  expression  of  the  supervenience  of  F  upon  G 
=iveto 
specify  the  system  description  in  which  it  does 
SO. Rowlands  69  ý  op.  cit.  p.  ti.  His  emphasis 
Rowlands  (1995)  P.  TT 
Rowlan,  1995)  op.  cit.  pm 
Jx  See  especially  Rowlands  69%)  up.  cit.  pp.  18-20. 
I@  Rowlarýds  4995)ýý.  cit.  p.  n 
It  T  Vim 
,..  1-___  -_  - 
h)ý5ic  Worlef  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  A  Bradford  Book,  The  MIT  Press)  1998  P-  14.  Emphasis 
on  the  last  clause  mine. 
34See  for  example  Kim  (1998),  almers  (1993),  Papineau  (x993) 
mental  to  Ile  multiple  realisability  o  rties,  among  other  kinds  of  properties,  now  a  generally  accepted  truism  in  the 
KrSOphy  of  mind,  was  originally  bp  to  the  attention  of  the  community  at  large  by  Putnam,  (iqý5)`I  eNatureof 
'ph 
talStateeinhi-k4i 
Et, 
ev  and  Realitv  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press)  and  Fodor  (Special  Sciences) 
19  "S  ial  (or  the  disunity  of  science  as  a  working  bypothesis)",  Synth&,  28,  pp.  97-115  ý4  Pec  SO 
mest  Nagel,  Ile  Structure  of  Science  (New  York:  Harcourt,  Brace,  x961) 
Gresham's  law-  the  principle  that  "bad  money  drives  out  gDod,  Le.,  when  depreciated,  mutilated,  or  debased  coinage  (or 
currency)  is  in  concurrent  circulation  with  money  of  high  value  in  terms  of  precious  metals,  the  good  money  is  withdrawn 
from  circulation  by  hoarders.  "  -from  the  entry  on  Gresham,  Sir  11ornas,  at  http:  //www.  encyclooedia.  com.  Another 
internet  source  gives  it  this  way:  Tasicall  the  law  is  that  bad  money  drives  out  good.  When  more  than  one  kind  of 
money  is  in  circulation  (for  example,  golTand  silver  coins),  the  money  which  is  overvalued  at  the  official  price  will  tend  to 
remain  in  circulation  because  it  is  worth  more  as  a  medium  of  exchange  than  as  bullion  in  the  market.  The  money  which  is 
undervalued  will  disa  ear  from  circulation  to  be  hoarded  or  to  be  melted  down  because  it  has  higher  value  as  metal  than 
as  legal  tender.  "  at  xxcpFcr,  http:  //www-=fer.  com/ent.  ry/344o5o.  Ilie  law  is  not  Gresham's  oýpinally,  but  has  had  various 
statements  throughout  history.  For  a  detailed  tion,  see  Robert  Mundell's  "Uses  and  Abuses  of  Gresham's  Law  in  the 
History  of  Money'  at  http:  /Avww.  colurnlbia.  edT-Xrami5/ýrash.  htrnl.  All  sites  functioning  as  of  i5/2/oi. 
osit 
Fodor,  "Special  Sciences,  *  Synthbe  28  (1974):  103. 
Fodor,  "Special  Sciences,  *  Synthise  28  (1974):  103.  A  physical  natural  kind,  according  to  Fodor,  is  one  that  features  in 
laws  of  physical  science.  -  with  caveats,  "P  is  a  natural  kind  predicate  relative  to  S  iff  S  contains  proper  laws  of  the  form  PX 
-+arorax-ýNw_Fodor27',  ogc1t,  102* 
4'  CG.  Hempel,  P.  Og-  eim.  StuXies  in  the  Logic  of  Explanation",  1948.  In:  Readings  in  the  Pbilosopby  ofSdence. 
Herbert  FieA  iia.,  I  gJ,  New  York  1953. 
Kim  (1998)  op.  cit.  p.  26 
Kim  4998),  oe..  cit.  esrcWly  pp.  91  and  97. 
DA-lialmers,  Facing  p  to  the  Problem  of  Consciousness,  "JowndofConscioumess  Studies  VoL2  Issue  1  (1995):  pp.  200- 
219 
44Kim  (1998)  op.  Cit-  PP.  95-96 
41  Kim  (1998)  op.  cit.  p.  96 
Kim  0998)  op.  cit.  p.  96.  Italics  mine. 
Ile  functiorW  model  of  reductionism  is  Kim!  s.  I  do,  however,  take  what  I  perceive  to  be  entailments  of  this  model 
finther  than  he  describes,  and  acknowledge  that  he  may  not  agree  with  everything  I  am  about  to  say. 
4$KiM  (1998)  Op.  Cit.  P.  20 
4'  Kim  4998)  op.  cit.  P.  20 
"  Nagelian  redxictionism  does  not  disallow  this,  but  it  would  add  another  level  of  complexity  to  the  required  bridge  laws, 
even  further  lessenilthe  ap 
or 
I 
_peal 
of  the  model  according  to  Kirn!  s  criteria. 
"'ne  phrase  is  Davi  ,  ifs,  from  the  opening  sentence  of  his  MentalEventr,  in:  D.  Davidson,  EssW  on  Actions  and 
Events-  (  rd-  Clarendon  Press,  ig8o) 
*  As  far  as  I  know,  this  is  true. 
*  One  might  propose  that  those  sciences  are  physical  that  pick  out  entities  with  only  one  possible  realisation  base  in  this 
world.  Ihis  might  be  a  viable  proposition,  but  it  must  be  taken  on  board  that  it  will  be  subject  to  revision,  if  future 
microphysics  reveals  that  there  are  entities  lower  than  we  currently  suspect,  and  two  or  more  arrangements  of  those  entities 
turn  out  to  be  sufficient  for  the  realisation  of  pro  ies  that  we  currently  take  to  have  a  unique  realisation  base. 
SUSPect  that  according  to  thLe.  notion  of  the  re 
ratZ 
physsicality  of  properties,  qome  kinds  of  properties,  for  example, 
economical  properties,  will  appear  to  be  less  physical  than  psychological  properties,  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  it  is  probable 
that  such  properties  are  more  multiply  instantiable  than  psycholotcý  properties  as  a  matter  of  nomological  necessity.  It 
seems  tome  highly  unlikely  that,  in  the  actual  world,  a  fiinctionagl  rain  could  be  constructed  of  beer  cans  and  bubble  gum 
.  even  in  principle.  Functionalism  says  that  multiply  instantiablc  higher  level  properties  arc  to  be  defined  not  in  terms  of 
whatever  bits  and  bobs  constitute  the  system  instantiating  them,  but  in  terms  ofwhatever  function  those  bits  and  bobs 
perform  in  that  system.  But  this  does  not  mean  that  just  arTy  old  bits  and  bobs  are  of  the  right  sort  to  perform  that 
runction.  'Iliere  may  be,  and  there  probably  are,  only  a  limited  number  of  appropriate  bits  and  structures  realisable  by 
those  bits  that  are  adequate  to  the  task  of  performing  certain  functions  in  the  actual  world.  11e  living  body  is  a 
wonderfully  complex  and  dynamic  thing,  the  brain  in  particular  being  dazzling  in  its  complexity,  so  much  so  that  we  are 
only  't  beginning  properly  to  appreciate  it  for  the  natural  wonder  it  is,  or  to  understand  most,  let  alone  all,  of  the  factors 
invom  in  the  function  it  performs.  Given  that  the  laws  of  physics  are  as  they  are  in  the  actual  world,  I  think  it  highly 
unlikel  that  a  system  constructed  of  beer  cans  and  bubble  gum  would  be  able  to  do  what  a  brain  can  do.  This  is  not  to  imply  t  there  can  be  no  other  system  in  the  actual  world  that  can  do  what  a  brain  can  do  -  thatugly  bags  of  mostly 
water',  as  a  crystalline  native  of  the  planet  designated  by  the  Federation  as  Velera  III  termed  hunýanity  in  a  discussion  with  Captain  Kirk  over  the  destruction  of  a  hurnari  terraforming  operation  on  its  home  planet  (Start  Trek,  'Home  Soil),  are  the  only  possible  mindful  systems  in  the  actual  world.  Ilere  might  be  other  possible  systems.  If  there  are,  that  too  is  a  contingent  fact  about  this  world  and  its  population  of  properties  and  laws. 
By  contrast,  anything  can  be  money-.  Following  the  total  undermining  of  the  US  economy  and  the  abolishment  of  all  currently  reco  ised  f  rms  f  erican  currency,  some  elected  official  could  stick  two  beer  cans  together  with  a  to  t 
S 
piece  of  Tirý  call  irV$5,  and  if 
OeveTolne 
agrees,  it  is  Does  this  mean  that  being  US  $5  is  less  physical  than  being  the  befief 
tha"  ,  NJ  1ý4  ader$&UldhatV  U'On  the  S2ooo  election? 
ýrobably 
not.  Tbough  brain  states  maybe  more  limited  in  their  instantiators,  than  economical  states  by  virtue  of  there  being  more  stringent  limitations  on  what  can  be  a  brain  than  on  what  can  be  money,  intentionalstates  Will  almost  certainly  remain  more  multiply  instantiable  than  economical  states,  for  there  are  myriad  -  probably  unlimited  -  ways  for  dynamics  in  the  brain  to  become  associated  with  particular  Propositions.  So  rest  assured,  true-believers"  if  economical  states  are  pretty  nonphysical,  your  beliefs  are  even  more  so. f0j.  Poland  1994,  Pbvsicalism-  the  Philosonhical  Foundations.  (New  York;  Oxfbrd:  Clarendon  Press;  oxford  University 
Press,  1994)  p.  it 
Poland  ý1?  94)  OP.  Cit.  P-11 
"Polarure.  ootnote:  "aSrertical  explanation!  of  some  phenomenon  is,  roughly,  an  explanation  of  why  it  occurs  in  term%  of 
lower  level  phenomena.  ' 
Poland  (1994)  op.  cit.  pp.  12-13 
I  anticipate  that  there  inight  be  some  overlap  between  the  physical  or  nonphysical  status  of  properties  crowwoflds.  some 
. 
planat  ry  rarchy  f  or  indeed  all  of  the  properties  that  arephysical  in  this  world  might  fit  into  the  closed  causal/ex  o  hie  o 
another  possible  world,  while  that  wor  d  might  contain  properties  which  are  not  physical  in  this  world. NotestoCkepter4 
I  Another  prominent  form  is  Donald  Davidson's  Anomalous  Monism,  a  full  discussion  of  which  is  outwith  the  scope  of 
this  thesis. 
0  McLaughlin,  wrhe  Rise  and  Fall  of  British  Emergentism"  in  Beckermann,  Flohf,  and  Kim  (eds.  )  Fniergcnce  or 
Reduction?  Berlin  and  New  York:  De  Gruyter  1992  PP.  49-93 
1  Kim,  "Downward  Causation  and  Emergence  in  Beckermann,  Flohr,  and  Kim  (eds.  )  Eme=nce  or  Rediictioniý 
I 
Berlin 
and  New  York:  De  GWer,  T992,  P.  T22 
4  It  is.  not  immediately  inconsistent  with  emergentism.  that  there  be  no  ultimate  ontology  of  any  sort:  it  might  be,  as  it  were, 
emergents  all  the  way  down.  Neither  is  it  the  case  that  the  ultimate  ontology  has  to  be  pliysical:  Alexander,  Kim  notes,  held 
that  matter  is  emergent  from  space  and  time.  However,  the  British  EmergentiSts  generally  did  hold  that  there  were  some 
basic,  nonernergent  entities  and  properties,  and  generally  these  were  held  to  be  physical  entities  and  properties. 
,  Broad  (1925),  ch.  2  par.  35.  Unfortunatcly,  at  the  tinic  of  writing  (May  2001)  1  did  not  havc  availablc  a  papcr  copy  of 
Broa(rs  MindandftiPlace  in  Nat=.  Fortunately,  however,  the  bulk  of  the  relevant  parts  of  the  text  hadbeen  made 
available  online  at  http:  /Avww.  ditext.  com/broadlmpn.  htm],  which  version  I  used.  Ibis  version,  of  course,  does  not  have 
ubjp 
pges,  so  I  cannot  give  page  references.  For  citations  of  this  work,  I  adopt  the  convention  of  givmi  aragraphrcferences. 
For  those  wishing;  to  ffillow  my  references,  the  mention  of  some  tricks  are  in  order.  i)  Chapter  sub  mdings  count  as 
paragraphs.  2)  Broad  occasionally  makes  use  of  chemical  diagrams.  In  the  online  version,  these  are  accomplished  with 
formatted  text,  and  therefore  count  as  several  paraffaphs.  I  have  replaced  the  fbrmatted  text  with  single  Uhics,  thus  each 
chemical  diagram  counts  as  a  sinoc  paragraph.  3)  The  beginning  of  the  text  of  each  chapter,  if  downloai  directly, 
contains  a  number  of  chapter  and  subchapter  headings  for  browser  navigational  purposes.  I  have  omitted  these  from  the 
paragraph  count,  but  included  his  quotation  from  Dickens.  4)  For  those  importmg  the  text  into  a  word  processor  for 
automatic  paragraph  count,  a  false  paragraph  (a  paragraph  consisting  of  a  singje  space)  tends  to  appear  ffillowing 
subheaders.  I  have  deleted  these. 
"Ilis  nonpredictability  is,  it  should  be  noted,  not  a  merely  practical  impossibility,  unless  you  include  within  the  domain 
of  practical  considerations  the  amount  of  information  it  is  possible  to  contain  in  the  universe.  Dr.  Michael  Charleston  of 
Oifbrd  tells  me  that,  in  chaotic  systems,  a-you  have  a  completely  deterministic  system  (like  fractals,  the  weather, 
population  models  etc)  but  because  of  its  Sensitivity  to  Initial  Conditions  it  becomes  impossible  to  contain  the 
complete  state  of  the  system  in  a  finite  universe.  The  precision  required  is  infinite.  This  means  that  you  can't  predict  the 
future  state,  though  it  is  completely  deterministic,  more  than  a  short  time  into  the  future.  "  (Dr.  Charleston,  via  ICQ,  24th 
A  ril  2001  [ICQ,  by  ICQ  Inc.,  is  an  application  for  communicating  with  other  people  over  a  network  or  the  Internet])  galitative 
properties  are  a  notable  exception.  Kim  (1992)  OP  Cit-  P  131-  Italics  Kirn's. 
'Kim  (1992)  OP  Cit-  P  131 
Kim  (1992)  op  cit.  p  i2o.  Italics  Kim!  s. 
"  Kim  (1992)  Op  Cit.  p.  136 
-  McLaughlin  (1992),  OP  Cit.  P  57  Phenomenological  mental  properties,  Broad  held,  were  emergent  apriý?  i. 
Broad  (T925)  ch.  2  par.  22 
Broad  (1925)  ch.  2  Par-  38 
Broad  (1925)  ch.  2  par.  24 
Broad  (1925)  ch.  2  par.  25 
Broad  (1925)  ch.  2  par.  31 
Broad  (1925)  CIL  2  ppar.  25-28 
Broad  (1925)  ch.  2.  par  29 
Broad  (1925)  ch.  2  par  30 
Broad  (1925)  ch.  2  par.  30 
Broad  (1925)  ch.  2  par-  58 
*4  See  Broad  (1925)  CIL  2  par.  io 
Broad  (1925)  CIL  2  par.  32 
Broad  (1925) 
ch.  2  par.  32 
Broad  (1925) 
ch. 
2  par.  32 
Broad  (1925)  ch.  2  par. 
32 
"Broad(192  ch.  2  par,  40.  Broad  says  "No  doubt  the  properties  of  silver-chloride  are  completely  dekmdwdby  those  of 
Saver  and  oýchloririe;  in  the  sense  that  whenever  you  have  a  whole  composed  of  these  two  elements  in  certain  proportiorrs 
and  relations  you  have  something  with  the  characteristic  groperties  of  silver-chloride,  and  that  nothing  has  these 
.w  properties  except  a  whole  composed  in  this  way.  But  the  -w  connecting  the  properties  silver-chloride  with  those  of  saver 
and  of  chlorine  with  the  structure  of  the  compound  is,  so  far  as  we  know,  aw.  "This  is  not,  I  believe,  an  issue  with  which  Broad  was  directly  concerned. 
nque  and  ufthxate  law.  "  Italics  Broads. 
Broad  (1925)  ch.  2  par.  42 
Broad  4925)  ch.  2  par.  59 
Accordin&  to  Brian  McLaughlin,  Broad  never  speaks  of  intra-ordinal  laws  a-,  emergent:  McLaughlin  6992),  op.  cit.  P  81 
14  Kim  (1992)  OEýIt-  p  136  Broad  (1925) 
2  par.  60 
Broad  (1925)  P-  436,  quoted  in  McLaughlin  (1992)  p.  Si  C  Lloyd  Mor  F-wrgentEtWution.  London:  Williams  and  Norgatc  (1923),  P-  35  Broad  (1925) 
K 
par.  60 
"'I'lie 
, 
der  might  be  interested  to  peruse  C.  Iloyd  Morgans  "Lecture  X:  Causation  and  Causality"  in  his  (1923)  Erne 
'-t  ution  or  Broad's  Ch.  3,  'I'heTraditional  Problem  of  Body  and  Mind",  in  his  (1925)  M  ind  and  Its  Place  in- 
. Nature. Notes  to  CbapterS 
I  David  DeutschThe  Fabric  of  RealitX  Penguin  Books,  1998)  P  30- 
a  Deutsch  (1998)  op..  cit.  p.  2a 
9  The  caveat  that  chaotic  or  probabilistic  laws  may  be  involved  is  appreciated. 
4  Deutsch  (1998)  op.  cit.  p.  22 
Deutsch  (x998)  op.  cit.  p.  22 
Deutsch  (x998)  op.  Cit.  P.  20 
Deutsch  (1998)  op.  Cit. pp.  22-23 
Brian  Goodwin,  *All  for  one,  one  for  all",  New  Sdentirt  no.  2138,13thjune  1998 
It  is  by  no  means  restricted  to  this  genus  of  ants.  According  to  Octavio  Miramontes,  the  oscillating  activity  of 
Ieptothorax  colonies  "appears  to  be  universal  to  the  genus  and  possibly  to  to  other  social  genuses  as  well".  Wiramontes: 
'Order-Disordcr  Transitions  in  the  Behaviour  of  Ant  Societies"  Gwi0xitY  1995  vol.  1  no.  3) 
Goodwin  (1998),  P  34.  Actually  this  characterisation  of  eme  nce  is  s  ghtly  misleading;  there  is  no  principled  reason 
why  this  behaviour  could  not  theoretically  at  least  be  predictWas  will  be  clalified  below. 
11  1n  all  probability,  it  is  of  benefit  to  the  colony,  but  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  precisely  how  it  is  so  is  currently  imperfectly 
understood.  Goodwin  speculates  that  it  may  contribute  to  the  successful  raising  of  the  brood.  Ants  will  seek  out 
unattended  larvae  and  pupae  to  feed  and  groom,  and  if  the  activity  of  the  worker  ants  is  co-ordinated,  the  probability  is 
eater  at  care  will  be  distri  ut  y  over  t  ro  ,  ensu  ta  greater  nu  ero  young  adulthood. 
iramontes  further  speculates  that  the  intainin  ofthe  ion  density  at  the  bound  at  ich  order  emerges 
ma 
Qe 
the  Colo  a  whole  to  adapt  more  readily  to  changes  in  its  from  the  chaotic  behaviour  of  individuals 
rýi 
ibi 
environment  (Miramontes:  "Order-Disorder  ransitions  in  the  Behaviour  of  Ant  Societies"  Cwhpkxity  x995  Vol.  1  no.  3); 
the  self-maintenance  of  ant  colonies  at  this  level  is  widely  observed. 
"  Goodwin  (1998)  OP.  Cit.  P.  34 
)Andyaark,  Being  ere-  Putting  Brain.  Bodv  and  World  Top-ether  Again  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts  and  London, 
E=The  MIT  Press,  1999)  75- 
94  1  tojohn  Mullen  for  his  kind  permission  fbr  the  use  of  his  photography. 
Is  Clark's  note-.  'On  many  vessels  there  is  in  fact  a  formal  plan.  But  crew  members  do  not  explicitly  use  it  to  structure  their 
actions;  indeed,  Hutchins  (1995,  p.  178)  suggests,  the  plan  would  not  work  even  if  they  did.  "  -Clark  (iggg),  note  8,  P-234 
'  Clark  0999)  op.  cit-  P-  76 
"  See  Clark  (199t))  ch.  i,  Autonomous  Agents,  for  a  description  of  Attila  and  other  similarly  designed  robots. 
Clark  6999)  OP-  Cit-  PP-  73-74 
Clark  (1  99)  op.  cit.  75-76 
B.  Holl2ler  and  Eff*Wflson,  Toumey  to  the  Ants,  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press  1994)  P.  107- 
Clark  (1999)op.  cit-  P-  107 
Clark  (1999)op.  cit-  P-  107 
Kim  (ic)92)  op.  cit.  p  x2o.  Italics  Kim's. 
I  specify  that  dynamically  emergent  properties  are  present  down  to  the  level  of  the  lowest  compkte  components  of  the 
tem  because  dynamically  emergent  properties  can  be  layeredl  and  while 
_present 
in  a  sense,  it  is  not  obvious  that 
plain  states  at  lower  emergent  levels  (or 
0 
='cally 
emegen  roperties  at  the  highest  level  are  appropriately  invoked  to  ex 
nonemergentleves).  or  example,  it  seems  likely  that  insects  employ  a  similar  mechinism  for  walking  as  robots  like  Att&- 
rather  than  having  a  dedicated  central  processor  for  identifying  obstacles  and  moving  the  various  parts  of  the  body  to 
navigatF  over  and  around  obstacles,  insects  have  multiple  specific  processors  that  respond  to  certain  stimuli  in  certain 
ways,  yielding  skilled  walking.  The  behaviours  of  whole  insects,  ofwhich  walking  is  a  dynamically  emergent  behaviour, 
when  in  colonies,  yield  other  dynamically  emergent  features  of  the  colony,  such  as  the  oscillations  in  activity  patterns  in 
Leptothoracine  ants.  Insofar  as  the  activity  of  a  particular  ant  within  a  colony  can  be  understood  as  a  result  of  the 
dynamically  emergent  oscillation  of  the  activity  of  individuals,  the  fact  that  one  of  its  legs  is  not  moving,  or  that  it  is 
metabolising  at  a  certain  rate,  or  that  the  atoms  in  its  body  are  mu-6%  &c,  can  also  be  so  understood,  but  it  is  probably 
not  appropriate  to  think  of  the  oscillatory  activity  patterns  across  the  colony  as  expldningwhy  a  particular  leg  of  a  certain 
ant  is  not  moving  at  a  given  time.  It  is,  however,  responsible  for  the  cycling  of  activity  patterns  in  whole  individual  ants, 
rgo  . 
atnately 
invoked  to  explain  why  a  particular  whole  ant  in  the  colony  is  or  is  not  active  at  a  certain  time. 
(1999)  OP.  Cit.  P-  104 
"  (lark  (1999)  op.  cit.  p.  113 
0  a0  0f 
"  Clark's  (x999)  note  8  tofa  s  104-115  explains-  "A  nonlinear  system  is  one  in  which  the  two  quantities  or  values  do  not 
alter  in  a  smooth  mutw  C  st  . 
Instead,  the  value  of  one  quantity  may  (e.  g  ,) 
increase  for  some  time  without  affecting 
the  other  at  all,  and  then  suddeZ,  when  some  hidden  threshold  is  reached,  cause  the  other  to  make  amdden  leap  or 
chýmge.  "  Clark  goes  into  considerably  more  detail  on  the  nature  of  nonlinear  relations.  Ile  note  appears  on  page  236. 
-aark  (1999)  op.  cit.  p.  113 
See  Clark  (igo)  PP-  Cit-  P-  114 
ne  resolution  of  complex  dynamically  emergent  properties  to  physical  properties  may  have  to  proceed  through  more 
than  one  layer  of  dynamic  emergence,  but  this  is  unproblematic. 
"John.  McCrone  Going  Inside-  A  Tour  round  a  Moment  of  Consciousness  (London:  Faber  and  Faber  Ltd.,  1999) 
"  Whether  or  not  a  subject  is  conscious  is  not  relevant  to  whether  or  not  cells 
. in  the  visual  cortex  will  fire  in  response  to 
stimulation. 
0  C-  Gross,  C.  Rocha-Miranda,  and  D.  Bender,  'Visual  properties  of  Neurons  on  the  Inferotemporal  Cortex  of  the 
Maca  e,  "Jouma10fNew*?  P1Yd010V35  (1972):  Pages. 
IT,  tTe  inferior  temporal  cortex,  is  not  property  a  part  of  the  visual  cortex  It  does  receive  information  from  (and  present 
information  to)  the  visual  cortex,  among  other  areas. 
*  McCrone  (iggg),  op.  cit.  p.  84 
*  McCrone  (1999),  op.  cit.  p.  84 
*  See  McCrone  (igg§)  op.  cit.  84-86 
*  AICCrone  (iggg),  op.  cit.  pp.  88-89 
McCrone  4999)  op.  cit.  p.  89 
McCrone  (1999),  op.  cit.  P.  92 4'S.  Zeki,  'Me  Visual  Image  in  Mind  and  Brain",  in  Editors  of  Scientific  American,  The  Scientific  American  Book  of- 
the  Brain  with  introduction  by  A.  Damasio  (New  York:  Ile  Lyons  Press,  1999) 
4'  McCxone  (iggg)  OP.  Cit.  P.  77 
McCrone  499o)  op.  Cit-  P  94 
McCrone  cites:  A.  P  Geo  Wos,  A.  B.  Schwartz,  and  R.  E.  Kettner,  "Neuronal  population  coding  of  movement 
direction",  Sdence  233 
6986); 
c,  W.  H.  Rohrer  and  D.  L.  Sparks,  "Population  coding  of  saccadic  eye  movements  by 
neurons  in  the  superior  cOlliculus",  Nat=  332  (1988);  and  A.  GeorgDpoulos  ct.  al.,  "Mental  rotation  of  the  neuronal 
population  vector',  SCienCe  26S  (x994). 
Ile  atom,  ant,  and  ammonite  graphics  used  herein  were  commissioned  especially  for  this  work  and  executed  by  David  at 
Draw4u.  cOm.  All  other  graphics  are  public  domain,  original,  or  have  been  used  with  the  permission  and  acknovAedgement 
of  their  creators. 